
H ffill HI 

Wmm mm 

















</> <v 



v. ^ : , .. 



r° 




« 



LOGIC 
FOB THE MILLION. 



LONDON 
CLAY, PRINTER, BREAT' STREET HILL. 







///,7/'/ 



- . 



- 



LOGIC FOE THE MILLION; 

Ji familiar fepita 

OP 

THE ART OF REASONING, 

WITH AN APPENDIX ON 

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 



J. W. GILBABT, F.R.S. 



gdl\ <£bxitoit. 



LONDON: 

LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, LONGMANS & ROBERTS. 
1857. 



g 






PREFACE. 



I have called this book, Logic foe the Million. By 
this title, I mean that here the Art of Seasoning is ex- 
plained in such a way as to be readily understood even 
by those men and women who have not had the advantage 
of a literary education. 

The imperfection of the existing works on Logic, as 
means of popular instruction, is thus stated by Mr. 
Blakey : — 

" There seem to be two principal causes which render 
modern systems of logic both tiresome and comparatively 
useless; and these are, first, the employment of a vast 
number of the old scholastic terms and phrases, derived 
from logicians of former times, which throw over the art 
such an air of difficulty and perplexity, that the reader, 
before he has well entered upon the study of his subjeet, 
is worn out by the mere pressure of uncouth words, and is 
glad to make his retreat from such an irksome task with 
all possible expedition. The second cause, and one which 
is by far the most important, is, that our common books 
of logic may be said rather to treat of metaphysical systems 
than to unfold those rules, precepts, and suggestions, which 
are instrumental in directing the judgment to right con- 
clusions on the various important subjects with which it 
is necessary that man should be well acquainted. The 
generality of the books here alluded to, have been founded 
a 2 






VI PKEFACE. 

upon the principle, that before we could exercise our 
reasoning powers with energy and effect, — before we could 
form right notions, and give method and consistency to 
our conceptions, — it was absolutely necessary that we 
should be expert metaphysicians, should be acquainted 
with all the mental speculations of the day, and intimately 
and familiarly conversant with the anatomy and physiology 
of our own minds. But this, I apprehend, is a radical 
error in our common treatises on logic." 

The first cause refers to scholastic logic, the second to 
metaphysical logic. 

The advocates of the scholastic system of logic still 
contend for the use of a technical language. It has been 
a great hindrance to popular education, that as soon as 
any branch of knowledge is exalted into a science, it is 
surrounded by a number of uncouth words, the under- 
standing of which is more difficult than the understanding 
of the science. The practice of using hard words to 
denote common things was ridiculed in "Butler's Hudi- 
bras," with reference to the rhetoricians, and the ridicule 
will apply with equal justice to the scholastic logicians 

" For rhetoric, he could not ope' 
His mouth but out there flew a trope ; 
And when he happen'd to break off 
F the middle of his speech, or cough, 
He 'd hard words ready to show why, 
And tell what rules he did it by ; 
Else, when with greatest art he spoke, 
You 'd think he talk'd like other folk ; 
For all the rhetorician's rules 
Teach nothing but to name his tools." 

Metaphysical logic consists in the knowledge of the 
nature of those powers of the mind which are exercised in 



PREFACE. Vli 

the act of reasoning. This subject is not discussed in the 
following pages. It does not appear to me that this meta- 
physical knowledge is at all necessary to the art of reason- 
ing. The analogy between the body and the mind seems 
to hold good in this case. Dancing is an act of the body. 
Reasoning is an act of the mind. As it is not necessary 
to understand the anatomy of the body in order to dance 
well, so it is not necessary to understand the anatomy of 
the mind in order to reason well. The study of meta- 
physical science seems rather to teach the art of doubting 
than the art of reasoning. By this kind of study Berkeley 
was led to doubt the existence of matter, and Hume that 
of mind. " No man," observes Mr. Blakey, " appears more 
unfit for argumentative discussion, on the common and 
every-day topics which engage the attention of men of the 
world, than the profound thinker or the man of mental 
abstraction. His power of mental analysis is too refined 
for objects of a formidable and gigantic nature ; and when 
he comes out into common life to measure his strength 
with the rustic minds around him, he too often finds, to 
his great mortification, that he is worsted and driven from 
the field by the athletic vigour of those who know nothing 
but what Nature has taught them about the abstract 
nature of mind or the recondite rules of mental philo- 
sophy." 

It would be tedious to enumerate all the particulars in 
which the system of logic described in this work differs 
from the other systems now before the public. In one 
respect the difference will be obvious — that is, in the 
character and number of the illustrations. I have not 
copied from other logical works trivial and fictitious ex- 
amples, capable of no practical application. My illustra- 
tions have been gathered from authors of established 
reputation, and are generally upon subjects of great public 



VU1 PREFACE. 

or private interest. I have taken most of my quotations 
from the Bible, from books, on political economy, and from 
newspapers-; others from books referring to the ordinary 
affairs of life — chiefly to health, education, and conduct. 
I have not stopped to examine whether I do or do not 
concur in all the sentiments, they express. I adduce them 
as illustrations of reasoning ; though I believe they will 
generally be found. also to be otherwise useful. Some have 
been selected because they are entertaining; others, be- 
cause they teach lessons, of still higher importance than 
even the art of reasoning. 

Few alterations have been made, in this edition except 
in regard to the illustrations. Some of these have been 
shortened, some transposed, some ■ omitted, and others in- 
troduced. Their bearing .as examples of reasoning has 
occasionally been more clearly exhibited by a change of 
type, the freer use of italics, and the excision of superfluous 
sentences, so that the student may not allow the informa- 
tion, the instruction, or the humour of the quotation to 
render him unmindful of its logical character. For the 
sake of those who might wish to study the science of logic 
as well as the art, I have placed in the notes a few 
references to the philosophical work recently published by 
Mr. Samuel Bailey on " The Theory of Seasoning." The 
object of these changes has been to render the work more 
efficient as a teacher of the Art of Beasoning in either the 
closet, the parlour, or the schoolroom, without making it less 
interesting to the railway traveller or the general reader. 

Let no one commence the perusal of this book under 
the impression that he is about to engage in an exercise 
that is dry, toilsome, or difficult. He will not find it so. 
Here are no intricate theories in which the reader may 
become bewildered — no knotty questions by which he may 
be embarrassed — and no hard word) which he cannot 



PREFACE. IX 

understand. These belong to metaphysical and to scholastic 
logic. The system which this work professes to teach is 
the logic of common sense. That this system is adapted 
to the spirit of the age, and that the mode of illustration 
I have adopted is not unsuitable to the subject, seems 
abundantly shown by the rapid sale of the first edition, 
and the strong commendations of many of our organs of 
criticism. It is very gratifying to observe that the first 
attempt to place before the -million in a simple form the 
principles of an art hitherto confined to the educated 
classes should at once have received the approbation of 
the public, and of so large a number of literary men. 



The Author. 



London, Oct. 1, 1851. 



The first and second editions of this work were 
published—" by a Fellow of the Royal Society." The 
Author has now prefixed his name. 

J. W. G. 

London, May 1," 1852. 



This Edition differs from the last only in having an 
Appendix on the Philosophy of Language. 

J. W. G. 

London, Jan. 1, 1854. 



No alteration has been made in this Edition, and it 
is not the Author's intention to make any in the future 
Editions. 

J. W. G. 

London, July 1, 1857. 



CONTENTS. 



PART I. 

The Introduction to Reasoning. 

;ect. page 

I. — The name and nature of the Art of Eeasoning 2 

II. — The subjects of the Art of Reasoning . 5 

III — The utility of the Art of Reasoning .... 10 

IV. — The dispositions necessary to the Art of Reasoning , . 17 

V. — The knowledge necessary to the Art of Reasoning . . 24 

PART II. 



The Principles of Reasoning. 

I. — The relation of a Subject and its Attributes . . 
II. — The relation of a Whole and its Parts .... 

III. — The relation of Genus and Species 

IY. — The relation of Cause and Effect — Physical Causes 
Y. — The relation of Cause and Effect— Moral Causes . 
VI. — The relation of Cause and Effect — Conditional Causes 
VII. — The relation of Cause and Effect— Final Causes . . 



31 

45 
53 

71 

80 

95 

109 



PART III. 

The Principles op Reasoning— (continued.) 

I. — Reasoning from Examples 127 

tl. — Reasoning from Analogy, Comparison, and Contrast . 143 



Xll CONTENTS. 



III. — Seasoning from Parables, Fables, and Proverbs . . . 166 

IV. — Seasoning from Written Documents 184 

V. — Errors in Seasoning 201 



PAET IY. 

The Forms of Seasoning. 

I. — Descriptive Seasoning 224 

II. — Interrogative Seasoning 237 

III. — Conversational Seasoning . . . » 249 

IV. — Seasoning by Single Syllogism 261 

V. — Seasoning by Compound Syllogism 275 

VI. — Series of Seasonings 288 



PART V. 

The Applications op Seasoning. 

I. — The application of the Art of Seasoning to the ordinary 

affairs of life 303 

II. — The application of the Art of Seasoning to History . . 313 

III. — The application of the Art of Seasoning to Political 

Economy 325 

IV. — The application of the Art of Seasoning to Statistics . 334 
V. — The application of the Art of Seasoning to Moral 

Philosophy 349 

VI. — The application of the Art of Seasoning to the forma- 
tion of habits of reasoning 357 



Appendix ......* 368 

Index 881 

List op Works. 



LOGIC FOB THE MILLION. 



You are informed, gentle Reader, that this book is written 
upon the Art of Reasoning, and is divided into Five Parts. 
The First Part treats of the Introduction to Reasoning ; 
the Second and Third Parts treat of the Principles of 
Reasoning; the Fourth Part treats of the Forms of 
Reasoning ; and the Fifth Part treats of the Applications 
of Reasoning. 



PART I. 

THE INTRODUCTION TO REASONING. 

It seems proper that before we attempt to reason, we 
should understand something of the Name and Nature of 
the Art of Reasoning — of the Subjects on which we Reason 
— of the Utility of Reasoning — of the Disposition of Mind 
we should possess while engaged in Reasoning — and of the 
Information that we should previously acquire. These 
several topics will therefore form the subjects of the five 
following Sections, which, taken together, are called "An 
Introduction to the Art of Reasoning." 

B 



2 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

SECTION I. 

THE NAME AND NATURE OF THE ART OF REASONING. 

The art of reasoning is called Logic. But you know 
Shakspeare has said — 

"What we call a Rose, 
By any other name would smell as sweet." 

In the present case we have no occasion for any name. 
We might simply say the " Art of Reasoning." In the 
same way we say the art of nursing, the art of teaching, 
the art of dancing, or the art of fencing. Had either of 
these arts a Greek name, a writer would begin his treatise 
with stating the meaning of this name ; and probably 
learned men would differ as to the propriety and extent 
of its application. 

There is, however, a convenience in giving distinct 
names to distinct branches of knowledge. But have a 
care of supposing that because an art or a science has 
got a hard name, there must be something very difficult 
in the art or science itself. Many of our arts and sciences 
were taught by the Greeks, and when our learned men 
first wrote upon them in English, they very naturally 
called them by their Greek names. Thus, the word logic 
is derived from a Greek word (logos) that signifies dis- 
course. But these words have no natural connexion with 
the arts and sciences to which they are applied. You will 
have made no unimportant step in a knowledge of the 
art of reasoning, when you at all times recollect that the 
names of things are quite distinct from the things them- 
selves. All the processes of reasoning can be as clearly 
described in " Household Words " as in those Greek words 
in which they are usually expounded. To reason clearly 
and forcibly, it is not necessary that you should under- 
stand any other language than your own. 

" Argumentation or reasoning," says Dr. Watts, " is that 
operation of the mind, whereby we infer one thing, that is, 



WHAT IS LOGIC 1 3 

one proposition, from two or more propositions premised* 
Or it is the drawing a conclusion, which before was either 
unknown, or dark, or doubtful, from some propositions 
which are more known and evident. So when we have 
judged that matter cannot think, and that the mind of 
man doth think, we then infer and conclude, that therefore 
the mind of man is not matter. 

" So we judge that a just governor will make a difference 
between the evil and the good ; we judge also that God is 
a just governor ; and from thence we conclude, that God 
will make a difference between the evil and the good. 

" This argumentation may be carried on further, thus : 
God will one time or another make a difference between the 
good and the evil ; but there is little or no difference made 
in this world ; therefore there must be another world 
wherein this difference shall be made. 

" These inferences or conclusions are the effects of rea- 
soning, and the three propositions taken all together are 
called a syllogism or argument." 

" Archbishop Whately," observes Mr. Mill, " has denned 
logic to be the science as well as the art of reasoning, 
meaning by the former term the analysis of the mental 
process which takes place whenever we reason ; and by the 
latter the rules grounded upon that analysis for conducting 
the process correctly. 

" Logic then comprises the science of reasoning, as well 
as an art founded on that science. But the word reason- 
ing, like most other scientific terms in popular use, abounds 
in ambiguities. In one of its acceptations it means syllo- 
gising; in another of its senses, to reason is simply to 
infer any assertion from assertions already admitted. The 
latter and more extensive signification is that in which 
I mean to use it.* 

" Our object will be to attempt a correct analysis of the 
intellectual process called reasoning or inference, and of 
such other mental operations as are intended to facilitate 
this, as well as on the foundation of this analysis, and 
pari passu with it, to bring together or frame a set of 

* " I am myself disposed to think that any fact which can he shown to he 
implied or contained in another fact may conveniently and properly he said to 
be inferred from it, and that the process may be with equal convenience and 
propriety termed reasoning." — Bailey's Theory of Reasoning, p. 41. 

b2 



4 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

rules or canons for testing the sufficiency of any giver* 
evidence to prove any given proposition." 

The reader will perceive that Mr. Mill's book is written 
on the science of reasoning. Our book is written on the art 
of reasoning. We use the word reasoning in the wider 
sense used by Mr. Mill, and as including what is denoted 
by arguing, proving, inferring, confirming, refuting, and 
all similar words, in the sense in which they are popularly 
understood. A knowledge of the art of reasoning is essen- 
tial to the study of the science ; but an acquaintance with 
the science is not necessary to the practice of the art. 
Indeed it is only by the use of the art that the science 
can be studied. We meddle not with the science. We 
profess not to analyse any of the powers of the mind, nor 
to lay down any new rules for conducting the process of 
reasoning. We shall attempt only to describe those rules 
that are already known, and to apply them correctly. And 
we shall consider their application chiefly with reference to 
those things with which people are most familiar. 

If a man who understands grammar hear a person say. 
" I speaks," he will know, from general practice, that the 
language is improper ; but he will, moreover, quote the 
rule, that " a verb should agree with its nominative case in 
number and person." Now, a collection of such rules form 
grammar, or the art of speaking correctly. So, if a man 
hear a person say — " All men are liars, for a party has just 
told me a lie," he will know from his own common sense 
that this is not sound reasoning ; but if he has studied 
logic, he will also cite the rule, " Universals cannot be in- 
ferred from particulars." Now, a collection- of all these 
rules form logic, or the art of reasoning correctly ; and the 
man who has a knowledge of these rules, and is correct and 
ready in applying them in practice, is called a logician. A 
man may reason accurately without rules. But if he can 
give the rules, he will have more confidence in the truth 
of his reasonings. He will also be better able to perceive 
the incorrect reasonings of others, and to show the sound- 
ness or unsoundness of any opinions propounded for his 
consideration. 

These practical rules of reasoning collected together 
form the art of reasoning, in the same way as a collection 






SUBJECTS OF REASONING. 5 

of rules for speaking and writing with propriety form the 
art of speaking and writing with propriety. The one art 
is called logic — the other art is called grammar. These two 
arts are useful to each other. Thoughts are expressed in 
words. If we think clearly we shall speak clearly, and when 
we are learning to arrange our words with accuracy and 
order, we are learning to think with accuracy and order. 

A person who has acquired a knowledge of grammar 
will afterwards speak and write grammatically, without 
ever thinking of the rules of grammar. So a person who 
has acquired a knowledge of logic, will afterwards reason 
logically, without ever thinking of the rules of logic. The 
rules will have become so deeply fixed in his mind that 
he will habitually reason accurately ; and by practice he 
will come to reason promptly and forcibly. It is the chief 
business both of grammar and logic to teach us how to 
avoid errors. Grammar teaches us how to avoid the use of 
words and sentences that are contrary to its rules. But a 
beautiful or powerful style of writing must arise from the 
constitution of our own minds, or the peculiar direction of 
our studies, and is not to be acquired merely by an observ- 
ance of grammatical construction. So logic teaches how 
to know and to discard bad arguments. To be able to 
reason promptly and forcibly, depends upon our attain- 
ments in knowledge — the constitution of our mental powers 
— the extent of our practice — and the degree with which 
we are familiar with the writings of those learned men 
who are celebrated as the masters of the art of reasoning. 
Dr. Campbell, in his Philosophy of Rhetoric, compares logic 
to the soul, and grammar to the body ; the union of both 
being essential to an excellent discourse. 



SECTION II. 

THE SUBJECTS OP THE ART OF REASONING. 

The human mind can think, can reason, can remember. 
How it performs these operations we do not know. It 
does perform them, that 's certain. 'Tis equally certain 
that these operations are distinct from each other. The 



LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

mind may think of things without reasoning about them ; 
and it may remember things without reasoning about them. 
We shall in this section take a view of those truths with 
which we become acquainted by other means than reason- 
ing. They may be classed into truths of the senses — 
truths of consciousness — truths of the intellect — and truths 
of testimony. On these topics we shall quote Dr. Watts. 

1. Truths of the senses : — 

" The evidence of sense is, when we frame a proposition ac- 
cording to the dictates of any of our senses ; so we judge that 
grass is green ; that a trumpet gives a pleasant sound ; that fire 
burns wood ; water is soft ; and iron is hard ; for we have seen, 
heard, or felt all these. It is upon this evidence of sense that 
we know and believe the daily occurrences in human life ; and 
almost all the histories of mankind, that are written by eye or 
ear-witnesses, are built upon this principle. 

"Under the evidence of sense we do not only include that 
knowledge which is derived to us by our outward senses of 
hearing, seeing, feeling, tasting, and smelling ; but that also which 
is derived from the inward sensations and appetites of hunger, 
thirst, ease, pleasure, pain, -weariness, rest, &c.,and all those things 
which belong to the body ; as, ' hunger is a painful appetite ; light 
is pleasant ; rest is sweet to the weary limbs. 5 " 

2. Truths of consciousness : — 

" As we learn what belongs to the body by the evidence of 
sense, so we learn what belongs to the soul by an inward conscious- 
ness, which may be called a sort of internal feeling, or spiritual 
sensation of what passes in the mind; as, 'I think before I speak ; 
I desire large knowledge ; I suspect my own practice ; I studied 
hard to-day ; my conscience bears witness of my sincerity ; my 
soul hates vain thoughts ; fear is an uneasy passion ; long medi- 
tation on one thing is tiresome. 5 

" Thus it appears that we obtain the knowledge of a multitude 
of propositions, as well as of single ideas, by those two principles 
which Mr. Locke calls sensation and reflection ; *one of them is a 
sort of consciousness of what affects the body, and the other is 
a consciousness of what passes in the mind." 

3. Truths of the intellect : — 

" Intellect relates chiefly to those abstracted propositions which 
carry their own evidence with them, and admit no doubt about 
them. Our perception of this self -evidence in any proposition is 
called intelligence. It is our knowledge of those first principles 



SUBJECTS OF REASONING. 7 

of truth which are, as it were, wrought into the very nature 
and make of our minds : they are so evident in themselves to 
every man who attends to them, that they need no proof. It is 
the prerogative and peculiar excellence of these propositions, 
that they can scarce ever be proved or denied : they cannot easily 
be proved, because there is nothing supposed to be more clear or 
certain, from which an argument may be drawn to prove them. 
They cannot well be denied, because their own evidence is so 
bright and convincing, that, as soon as the terms are understood, 
the mind necessarily assents ; such are these, — ' whatsoever acted 
hath a being ; nothing has no properties ; a part is less than the 
whole ; nothing can be the cause of itself. 5 

" These propositions are called axioms or maxims, or first prin- 
ciples ; these are the very foundations of all improved knowledge 
and reasonings, and on that account these have been thought to 
be innate propositions, or truths born with us." 

4. Truths of testimony : — 

" When we derive the evidence of any proposition from the 
testimony of others, it is called the evidence of faith; and this is 
a large part of our knowledge. Ten thousand things there are 
which we believe merely upon the authority or credit of those 
who have spoken or written of them. It is by this evidence that 
we know there is such a country as China, and there was such a 
man as Cicero, who dwelt in Rome. It is by this that most of the 
transactions in human life are managed : we know our parents 
and our kindred by this means, we know the persons and laws of 
our present governors, as well as things that are at a vast distance 
from us in foreign nations, or in ancient ages. 

'•According as the persons that inform ns of anything are 
many or few, or more or less wise, and faithful, and credible, so 
our faith is more or less firm or wavering, and the proposition 
believed is either certain or doubtful ; but in matters of faith, an 
exceeding great probability is called a moral certainty" * 

The truths of reasoning are distinct from all these. 
They are derived from these truths, or such as these, by 
natural and just methods of argumentation. 

As logic is the art of reasoning it has nothing to do with 
those truths that are self-evident, or which are known to 
be true without reasoning. The positive testimony of the 

* Mr. Bailey observes (p. 29), " In philosophical strictness, we can he said to know 
only those things which we perceive, or have perceived, through our organs of 
sense, and those states of mind or mental events of which we are or have been con- 
scious. Other things we believe on evidence more or less cogent ; that is to say, 
they are matters of inference." If so, the " truths of testimony" -will have to be 
classed under "truths of inference." But the word know is often used in a 
more extended sense. 



8 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

senses supersedes the necessity for reasoning. If you have 
the tooth-ache or the gout, you want no logic to prove to 
you that you suffer pain. And as we know what passes 
without us, by the organs of hearing and seeing — and 
what passes in our bodies, by means of our sensations — so 
we know what passes in our minds, by means of conscious- 
ness. We know that we think — that we judge — that we 
remember. We know that we hope and we fear — we love 
and we hate. All these, and a variety of other operations 
and feelings, pass within our minds ; and we want no logic 
to convince us of their existence. There are also many 
other truths that are self-evident. We know that two and 
two make four — that a part of anything is less than the 
whole — that a cause must precede the effect — and that a 
proposition cannot be both true and not true at the same 
time, and in the same respect. These are called first 
truths, or truths of intuition. They are wrought into our 
very nature, and we cannot disbelieve them, if we would. 
If we meet a man who denies them, we do not reason with 
him. We conclude either that he does not understand the 
meaning of the words, or that he has lost his reasoning 
faculties. — Here logic has nothing to do. 

As logic is merely the art of reasoning, it follows that 
logic has nothing to do with those mental operations in 
which we do not reason. The mere giving or receiving of 
information is not reasoning. If you say to a friend, " It is 
a cold day," there is no logic in that. But if you say, " I 
think we shall have rain in the course of the day," that is 
a logical conclusion ; and if asked to do so, you should be 
prepared to give reasons for your opinion. So the acquisi- 
tion of knowledge by reading or hearing is not reasoning. 
You may possibly read history or biography, learn several 
languages, and become acquainted with botany, natural 
history, and several sciences, without reasoning. All this 
requires nothing more than a good memory. And hence it 
is possible to become a very learned man and yet not be a 
logician. But if you begin to reason about anything you 
learn, you immediately become a logician. Take, for illus- 
tration, a case in history. You have read the life of Napo- 
leon Bonaparte, and you remember all the events recorded, 
and also the opinions of the historian. You are no logician 



SUBJECTS OF REASONING. 9 

here'. But if you stop to ask if any particular event 
be true — if you inquire whether in certain actions he 
evinced sagacity or courage — and consider what were the 
effects of his course on the state of Europe — as soon as you 
commence to discuss these or any similar questions, you 
become a logician. 

As logic has nothing to do with receiving or retaining 
information, so also it has nothing to do with imparting 
information, or with the giving of advice or commands. 
There is no logical process in the following words — " Be 
not wise in your own conceit — Recompense to no man evil 
for evil — Provide things honest in the sight of all men — ■ 
If it be possible, as much as in you lieth, live peaceably 
with all men — Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil 
with good." — But sometimes the terms, though simply the 
language of advice or command, will imply a logical pro- 
cess: thus — "Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her 
ways and be wise," w T hich implies that there is some con- 
nexion between going to the ant and becoming wise ; and 
thus it denotes a logical process in the mind of the speaker. 
So also, if a motive is added, this brings the command or 
advice within the province of logic : thus — " Honour thy 
father and thy mother, that thy days may be long in the 
land " — " Honour the Lord with thy substance, and with 
the first-fruits of all thine increase ; so shall thy barns be 
filled with plenty, and thy presses shall burst out with 
new wine." 

Logic has no province of its own. If you reason at all, 
you must reason about something, and that something 
may belong to any one of the arts or sciences. There is 
no object in nature, nor any fact in history, but what may 
become a subject of argument. Thus, while logic as an 
art has no domain of its own, it has a province in every 
other domain — or rather, it is called in whenever necessary 
to settle disputes and exercise supremacy in all the other 
departments of human knowledge. A judge on Circuit 
has no property in the county in which he administers 
justice, nor any authority over its population. But should 
any estates in the county become the subject of litigation, 
or any person become a party in a civil or criminal pro- 
ceeding, then are they immediately brought under his 
b3 



10 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

jurisdiction. So whenever any difference in opinion arises 
either in the arts and sciences or in ordinary life, it is the 
province of logic to adjust the dispute. Thus every object 
in nature, every feeling of the mind, and every event in 
history, may become connected with a logical process. We 
will illustrate this by a few examples. 

Take a flower : — 

" Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow ; they toil not, 
neither do they spin : and yet I say unto you, that even Solomon 
in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. Wherefore, if 
God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is, and to- 
morrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, 
ye of little faith ? "—Matt. vi. 28—30. 

Take social relations : — 

"If ye then, heing evil, know how to give good gifts unto 
your children, how much more shall your Father which is in hea- 
ven give good things to them that ask him ? " — Matt. vii. 11. 

" He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can 
he love God whom he hath not seen ? " — 1 John iv. 20. 

Take historical events : — 

" Now these things were our examples, to the intent we should 
not lust after evil things, as they also lusted. Neither be ye 
idolaters, as were some of them ; as- it is written, The people sat 
down to eat and drink, and rose up to play. Neither let us com- 
mit fornication, as some of them committed, and fell in one day 
three and twenty thousand. Neither let us tempt Christ, as some 
of them also tempted, and were destroyed of serpents. Neither ' 
murmur ye, as some of them also murmured, and were destroyed 
of the destroyer. Now all these things happened unto them for 
ensamples : and they are written for our admonition, upon whom 
the ends of the world are come. Wherefore let him that thinketh 
he standeth take heed lest he fall. 5 ' — 1 Cor. x. 6 — 12 



SECTION III. 

THE UTILITY OP THE ART OP REASONING. 

All men and women reason from their infancy. 'Tis as 
natural for them to do so as it is for dogs to bark or birds 
to sing. And when they reason about things they under- 



UTILITY OF REASONING. 11 

stand, they generally reason well. But sometimes they 
reason ill ; and 'tis the business of the art of reasoning to 
show them when they reason ill, and to teach them how to 
reason well. Such an art cannot be otherwise than useful. 
It mnst be useful to know how to do well anything we 
have to do every day and several times a-day. And when 
we recollect that much of our health, our success in busi- 
ness, our moral and religious character, our present and 
future happiness, our reputation in the world, and our 
usefulness to others, will depend upon the soundness of 
our reasonings, the art will appear to us to be of very high 
importance. We shall point out a few respects in which it 
is useful : — ■ 

I. The Art of Reasoning is useful by enabling us to form 
our own judgments. 

You talk, of course, about a great many things. You 
talk about yourself ; about your friends, and relations, and 
acquaintances ; about your trade and profession ; about 
the accidents and offences you read of in the newspaper ; 
about public measures and public men ; about France, 
and Russia, and America, and other nations with whom we 
may be or expect to be at war ; about right and wrong ; 
justice and injustice ; wealth and poverty ; slavery and 
liberty ; and on Sundays, if not on other days, you will 
talk about religion, or at least about the pope and the 
Church, and the parson, and about people who are sup- 
posed to be religious. Now, upon all these subjects, and 
a variety of others, you will probably give opinions, and 
most likely very correct opinions, provided you talk only 
of what you understand. But to guard against giving 
incorrect or unguarded opinions, you may as well take a 
lesson or two upon the right way of reasoning. 

You will say that you can do all this without the aid 
of logic. So you can. But logic will teach you how to 
do it better. Logic will teach you that you must form 
your opinions by reason alone, without any bias from your 
passions or feelings. Logic will teach you that you must 
be able to give a reason for all the opinions you entertain. 
Logic will teach you that you must look at both sides of 
the question, and examine the arguments that can be 
advanced against wy opinion as well as those that may be 



LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

advanced in its favour ; and that you must weigh these 
arguments, and see which side preponderates. Logic will 
teach you that after having done this, you must be ready 
to admit any new facts or arguments that may appear on 
either side of the question. In these various ways a know- 
ledge of the art of reasoning will be useful to yourself. 

By thus examining the reasons for your opinions you 
will soon learn to distinguish between good reasons and 
bad ones. You will get into the practice of using good 
reasons and discarding bad ones. You will thus acquire 
the habit of reasoning well, and when assailed with bad 
reasons you will know how to refute them. 

II. The Art of Reasoning is useful in teaching us how 
to give instruction and advice to others. 

You will have occasion to give instruction or advice to 
others. You will often have occasion to do this in your 
family. But, besides, you may be a director in a public 
company, or on the committee of a charitable institution, 
or may be consulted by your friends in cases of emergency. 
In all these positions it is desirable you should be able to 
give good advice, and to enforce it by reasonable conside- 
rations. You know that the counsel of Ahithophel was so 
highly esteemed that it was as if a man had inquired at 
the oracle of God, (2 Sam. xvi. 23,) and doubtless you 
have known men who, though not gifted with eloquence 
or talent, have yet been so remarkable for soundness of 
judgment that they have been treated with universal re- 
spect. If you accustom yourself to reason well when 
forming your own opinions, you will insensibly acquire the 
habit of reasoning well when stating those opinions to 
other people. 

III. The Art of Reasoning is useful by enabling us to 
defend our own principles against the attacks of opponents, 
and to give them currency in the world. 

You may have to defend your opinions against the 
attacks of those who hold contrary opinions. You must 
not hesitate to do this when the cause of truth or of justice 
requires it. When your own character or that of your 
friends, or your political or religious principles are assailed, 
you are bound to make resistance, and it will be useful to 
be able to do it well. The political and religious differ- 



UTILITY OF REASONING. 13 

ences that exist among mankind are by no means to be 
deplored as unmingled evils. They serve to awaken the 
nobler feelings of the soul, and to maintain attention to 
principles that might otherwise be forgotten. They stimu- 
late the intellectual powers, and impart an energy to all 
the faculties and to all the operations of the mind. To 
engage in controversy does not imply that you are to vitu- 
perate the person, misrepresent the opinions, or calumniate 
the character of your opponents. You will be less liable 
to fall into these practices if you understand the art of 
reasoning. You will then have no occasion for these 
ignoble weapons. — You will be conscious that the force 
of truth and the power of logic will have much greater 
effect in defeating your antagonists. 

" A dispute," says Mr. Robinson, " is an oral controversy, and 
a controversy is a written dispute. To controvert or dispute 
a point, either by word or writing, is only to agitate a question 
in order to obtain clear ideas of it. Can it be admitted that 
religion does not admit of this ? The whole of the Jewish 
religion was a controversy against heathenism. The writings of 
prophets are eminently argumentative. The book of Job is a 
controversy. St. Paul's Epistles are most of them controversial. 
The Apostles arrived at truth by means of much disputing among 
themselves (Acts xv. 7.) And they convinced the Jews and the 
Gentiles by disputing with both. (Acts xvii. 17; xix. 8.) Every 
article of religion is denied by some, and cannot be believed 
without examination and discussion by any. Religion authorizes 
us to investigate, debate, dispute, and controvert each article, in 
order to ascertain its evidence." * 

IV. The Art of Reasoning is useful by strengthening the 
memory and systematizing our knowledge : — 

" Memory may be wonderfully strengthened," says Sidney 
Smith, " by referring single facts and observations to one simple 
principle, and by these means we can either remember the prin- 
ciple by remembering the fact, or the fact by remembering the 
principle. Thus, if we were to prove that democracy leads to 
despotism, we may refer to Julius Caesar, Cromwell, and Bona- 
parte. France has fallen under the dominion of a single man, so 
did Rome, so have innumerable free countries : the cause in many 
instances has been precisely the same — that anarchy which has 
been produced by the licentiousness of the people, and which has 

* Notes to Claude's Essay on the Composition of a Sermon. 



14 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

rendered them an easy prey to the first ambitious man who could 
ingratiate himself with the army. Such examples are very trite, 
and what may occur to any one. I only mention them to illus- 
trate the importance of philosophical arrangement to memory, 
and to show how much more likely facts are to reappear when 
we want them, if we have clustered numbers of them together 
as illustrative of a simple principle, than if they are promis- 
cuously scattered through the understanding without any such 
connecting tie." * 

V. The Art of Reasoning is useful by tending to prevent 
those evils that arise from the passions or the imagination 
obtaining an ascendancy over the judgment. 

" The registers of the Bicetre, for a series of years, show that 
even when madness affects those who belong to the educated 
classes, it is chiefly seen in those whose education has been im- 
perfect or irregular, and very rarely indeed in those whose minds 
have been fully, equally, and systematically exercised. Priests, 
artists, painters, sculptors, poets, and musicians, whose professions 
so often appear marked in that register, are often persons of very 
limited or exclusive education; their faculties have been unequally 
exercised ; they have commonly given themselves up too much to 
imagination, and have neglected comparison, and have not habi- 
tually exercised the judgment. Even of this class it is to be 
remembered that it is commonly those of the lowest order of the 
class, in point of talent, who become thus affected : whilst of 
naturalists, physicians, chemists, and geometricians, it is said not 
one instance occurs in these registers. If one go from individual 
to individual in any lunatic establishment, and investigate the 
character and origin of the madness of each, we shall find for 
every one who has become insane from the exercise of his mind, 
at least a hundred have become insane from the undue indulgence 
of their feelings. Those men who really most exercise the 
faculties of their minds, meaning thereby all their faculties, their 
attention, reflection, or comparison, as well as their imagination 
and memory, are least liable to insanity. An irregular and in- 
judicious cultivation of poetry and painting has often concurred 
to produce madness, but nothing is rarer than to find a mad 
mathematician : for, as no study demands more attention than 
mathematics, so it secures the student, during a great part of his 
time, from the recurrence of feelings which are always the most 
imperious in those who are the least occupied." f 

VI. The Art of Reasoning is useful, as it will not only 
give method and system to our own habits, but it will by 

* Elementary sketches of Moral Philosophy. 

t On Man's Power over himself to prevent or control Insanity. (Pickering.) 



UTILITY OF SEASONING. 15 

the force of example, enforce corresponding modes of 
thinking and acting on those around us. And thus their 
reasonings will often be useful in return to ourselves : — 

It is useful to a husband to have a logical wife. 

" But the angel of the Lord did no more appear to Manoah 
and to his wife. Then Manoah knew that he was an angel of 
the Lord. And Manoah said unto his wife, We shall surely die, 
because we have seen God. But his wife said unto him, If the 
Lord were pleased to kill us, he would not have received a burnt- 
offering and a meat-offering at our hands, neither would he have 
showed us all these things, nor would as at this time have told 
us sucli things as these." — Judges xiii. 21 — 23. 

It is useful to a wife to have a logical husband. 

" Then said his wife unto him, Dost thou still retain thine 
integrity ? curse God, and die. But he said unto her, Thou 
speakest as one of the foolish women speaketh. What ? shall 
we receive good at the hand of God, and shall we not receive 
evil?"— Job 'A. 9,10. 

It is useful to a master to have logical servants. 

" Now Naaman, captain of the host of the king of Syria, was 
a great man with his master, and honourable, because by him the 
Lord had given deliverance unto Syria: he was also a mighty 

man in valour, but he was a leper So Naaman came with 

his horses and with his chariot, and stood at the door of the house 
of Elisha. And Elisha sent a messenger unto him, saying, Go 
and wash in Jordan seven times, and thy flesh shall come again 
to thee, and thou shalt be clean. But Naaman was wroth, and 
went away, and said, Behold, I thought, He will surely come out 
to me, and stand, and call on the name of the Lord his God, and 
strike his hand over the place, and recover the leper. Are not 
Abana and Pharpar, rivers of Damascus, better than all the 
waters of Israel ? may I not wash in them, and be clean ? So 
he turned and went away in a rage. And his servants came near, 
and spake unto him, and said, My father, if the prophet had bid 
thee do some great thing, wouldst thou not have done it ? how 
much rather then, when he saith to thee, Wash, and be clean ? 
Then went he down, and dipped himself seven times in Jordan, 
according to the saying of the man of God : and his flesh came 
again like unto the flesh of a little child, and he was clean." — 
2 Kings v. 1, 9—14. 

It is useful to servants to have a logical master. 
" Ye call me Master and Lord : and ye say well ; for so I am. 
If I then, your Lord and Master, have washed your feet ; ye 



16 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

also ought to wash one another's feet. For I have given you an 
example, that ye should do as I have done to you." — John xiii. 
13—15. 

It is useful to public bodies to have logical advisers. 

" Then stood there up one in the council, a Pharisee, named 
Gamaliel, a doctor of the law, had in reputation among all the 
people, and commanded to put the apostles forth a little space ; 
and said unto them, Ye men of Israel, take heed to yourselves what 
ye intend to do as touching these men. For before these days 
rose up Theudas, boasting himself to be somebody ; to whom a 
number of men, about four hundred, joined themselves : who was 
slain; and all, as many as obeyed him, were scattered, and brought 
to nought. After this man rose up Judas of Galilee in the days 
of the taxing, and drew away much people after him: he also 
perished ; and all, even as many as obeyed him, were dispersed. 
And now I say unto you, Refrain from these men, and let them 
alone . for if this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to 
nought : but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it ; lest haply 
ye be found even to fight against God." — Acts v. 34 — 39. 

" And when the town-clerk had appeased the people, he said, 
Ye men of Ephesus, what man is there that knoweth not how 
that the city of the Ephesians is a worshipper of the great goddess 
Diana, and of the image which fell down from Jupiter ? Seeing 
then that these things cannot be spoken against, ye ought to be 
quiet, and to do nothing rashly. For ye have brought hither 
these men, which are neither robbers of churches, nor yet blas- 
phemers of your goddess. Wherefore if Demetrius, and the 
craftsmen which are with him, have a matter against any man, 
the law is open, and there are deputies : let them implead one 
another. But if ye enquire any thing concerning other matters, 
it shall be determined in a lawful assembly. For we are in 
danger to be called in question for this day's uproar, there being 
no cause whereby we may give an account of this concourse. 
And when he had thus spoken, he dismissed the assembly." — 
Acts xix. 35 — 41. 

It is useful to religion to have logical advocates. 

" For in him we live, and move, and have our being ; as certain 
also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring. 
Forasmuch then as we are the offspring of God, we ought not to 
think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, 
graven by art and man's device." — Acts xvii. 28, 29. 

" Then they reviled him, and said, Thou art his disciple ; but 
we are Moses' disciples. We know that God spake unto Moses : 
as for this fellow, we know not from whence he is. The man 
answered and said unto them, Why herein is a marvellous thing, 



LOGICAL DISPOSITIONS. 17 

that ye know not from whence he is, and yet he hath opened 
mine eyes. Now we know that God heareth not sinners : but if 
any man be a worshipper of God, and doeth his will, him he 
heareth. Since the world began was it not heard that any man 
opened the eyes of one that was born blind. If this man were 
not of God, he could do nothing," — John ix. 28 — 33. 

" We know that thou art a teacher come from God : for no 
man can do" these miracles that thou doest, except God be with 
him." — John iii. 2. 

We shall conclude this section by a quotation from 
Archbishop Whately. 

" Among the enemies of the Gospel now, are to be found men 
not only of learning and ingenuity, but of cultivated argumentative 
powers, and not unversed in the principles of Logic. If the ad- 
vocates of our religion think proper to disregard this help, they 
will find, on careful inquiry, that their opponents do not. And let 
them not trust too carelessly to the strength of their cause : 
truth will, indeed, prevail, where all other points are nearly equal ; 
but it may suffer a temporary discomfiture, if hasty assumptions, 
unsound arguments, and vague and empty declamation, occupy 
the place of a train of close, accurate, and luminous reasoning. 

"It is not, however, solely or chiefly for polemical purposes 
that the cultivation of the reasoning faculty is desirable. In per- 
suading, and investigating, in learning, or teaching, — in all the 
multitude of cases in which it is our object to arrive at just con- 
clusions, or to lead others to them, it is most important. A 
knowledge of logical rules will not indeed supply the want of 
other knowledge ; nor was it ever proposed, by any one who 
really understood this science, to substitute it for any other ; but 
it is no less true that no other can be substituted for this : that 
it is valuable in every branch of study ; and that it enables us to 
use the knowledge we possess to the greatest advantage." — Pre- 
face to Logic. 



SECTION IV. 

THE DISPOSITIONS NECESSARY TO THE ART OP REASONING. 

To reason well we must avoid prejudices or pre-judgments 
— judgments formed before we begin to reason. Dr. Watts 
has a chapter on the doctrine of prejudices or springs of 
false judgments. He divides them into four classes — pre- 



18 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

judices arising from things, from words, from ourselves, 
and from others. We shall copy from that chapter, and 
from some other parts of his work, his observations on 
two dispositions, which those who wish to reason well 
ought to cultivate. We mean the love of truth, and a 
spirit of mental independence. 

I. The love of truth :— 

" Search for evidence of truth with diligence and honesty, and 
be heartily ready to receive evidence, whether for agreement or 
disagreement of ideas. 

" Search with diligence ; spare no labour in searching for the 
truth in due proportion to the importance of the proposition. 
Head the best authors who have writ on that subject ; consult 
your wise and learned friends in conversation ; and be not un- 
willing to borrow hints toward your improvement from the 
meanest person, nor to receive any glimpse of light from the 
most unlearned. Diligence and humility is the way to thrive in 
the riches of the understanding, as well as in gold or silver. 
Search carefully for the evidence of truth, and dig for wisdom as 
for hid treasure. 

" Search with a steady honesty of soul, and a sincere impartiality 
to find the truth. Watch against every temptation that might 
bribe your judgment or warp it aside from truth. Do not in- 
dulge yourself to wish any unexamined proposition were true or 
false. A wish often perverts the judgment, and tempts the 
mind strangely to believe upon slight evidence whatsoever we 
wish to be true or false. . . . 

" Keep your mind always open to receive truth, and never set 
limits to your own improvement. Be ready always to hear what 
may be objected even against your favourite opinions, and those 
which have had longer possession of your assent. And if there 
should be any new and uncontrollable evidence brought against 
these old or beloved sentiments, do not wink your eyes fast 
against the light, but part with anything for the sake of truth : 
remember when you overcome an error you gam truth ; the vic- 
tory is on your side, and the advantage is all your own. ... 

" In your whole course of reasoning keep your mind sincerely 
intent on the pursuit of truth ; and follow solid argument where- 
soever it leads you. Let not a party spirit, nor any passion or 
prejudice whatsoever, stop or avert the current of your reasoning 
in quest of true knowledge. 

"When you are inquiring therefore into any subject, maintain 
a due regard to the arguments and objections on both sides of a 
question. Consider, compare, and balance them well, before you 



INDEPENDENCE OF MIND. 19 

determine for one side. It is a frequent, but a very faulty practice, 
to hunt after arguments only to make good one side of a question, 
and entirely to neglect and refuse those which favour the other 
side. If we have not given a due weight to arguments on both 
sides, we do but wilfully misguide our judgment, and abuse our 
reason, by forbidding its search after truth. When we espouse 
opinions by a secret bias on the mind, through the influences of 
fear, hope, honour, credit, interest, or any other prejudice, and 
then seek arguments only to support those opinions, we have 
neither done our duty to God nor to ourselves ; and it is a matter 
of mere chance if we stumble upon truth in our way to ease and 
preferment. The power of reasoning was given us by our Maker 
for this very end, to pursue truth ; and we abuse one of his 
richest gifts, if we basely yield it up to be led astray by any of 
the meaner powers of nature, or the perishing interests of this 
life. Reason itself, if honestly obeyed, will lead us to receive the 
divine revelation of the gospel, where it is duly proposed, and 
this will show us the path of life everlasting." 

II. The spirit of mental independence : — 
1. Independence of mind implies exemption from the 
influence of authority : — 

" To believe in all things as our predecessors did, is the ready 
way to keep mankind in an everlasting state of infancy, and to 
lay an eternal bar against all the improvements of our reason and 
our happiness. Had the present age of philosophers satisfied 
themselves with the substantial forms and occult qualities of 
Aristotle, with the solid spheres, eccentrics, and epicycles of 
Ptolemy, and the ancient astronomers ; then the great Lord 
Bacon, Copernicus, and Descartes, with the greater Sir Isaac 
Newton, Mr. Locke, and Mr. Boyle, had risen in our world in 
vain. We must have blundered on still in successive genera- 
tions among absurdities and thick darkness, and a hundred use- 
ful inventions for the happiness of human life had never been 
known 

"Besides, let us consider, that the great God, our common 
maker, has never given one man's understanding a legal and 
rightful sovereignty to determine truths for others, at least after 
they are past the state of . childhood or minority. No single 
person, how learned and wise and great soever, or whatsoever 
natural, or civil, or ecclesiastical relation he may have to us, can 
claim this dominion over our faith. St. Paul the Apostle, in his 
private capacity would not do it ; nor hath an inspired man any 
such authority, until he makes his divine commission appear. 
Our Saviour himself tells the Jews, that c if he had not done such 
wondrous works among them, they had not sinned in disbelieving 



20 LOGIC FOB THE MILLION. 

his doctrines, and refusing him for the Messiah.' No bishop or 
presbyter, no synod or council, no church or assembly of men, 
since the days of inspiration, hath power derived to them from 
God, to make creeds or articles of faith for us, and impose them 
upon our understandings. We must all act according to the best 
of our own light, and the judgment of our own consciences, using 
the best advantages which Providence hath given us, with honest 
and impartial diligence to inquire and search out the truth ; for 
' every one of us must give an account of himself to God.' " 

2. Independence of mind implies exemption from the 
influence of the passions : — 

" The various passions or affections of the mind are numerous 
and endless springs of prejudice. They disguise every object 
they converse with, and put their own colours upon it, and thus 
lead the judgment astray from truth. It is love that makes the 
mother think her own child the fairest, and will sometimes per- 
suade us that a blemish is beauty. Hope and desire make an hour 
of delay seem as long as two or three hours ; hope inclines us 
to think there is nothing too difficult to be attempted; despair 
tells us that a brave attempt is mere rashness, and that every 
difficulty is insurmountable. Fear makes us imagine that a bush 
shaken with the wind has some savage beast in it, and multiplies 

the dangers that attend our path Sorrow and melancholy tempt 

us to think- our circumstances much more dismal than they are, 
that we may have some excuse for mourning ; and envy represents 
the condition of our neighbour better than it is, that there may 
be some pretence for her own vexation and uneasiness. Anger, 
and icrath, and revenge, and all those hateful passions, excite in 
us far worse ideas of men than they deserve, and persuade us to 
believe all that is ill of them. A detail of the evil influence of 
the affections of the mind upon our judgment, would make a large 
volume." ^ 

3. Independence of mind implies exemption from the 
influence of constitutional infirmities : — 

" The credulous man is ready to receive everything for truth, 
that has but a shadow of evidence ; every new book that he reads, 
and every ingenious man with whom he converses, has power 
enough to draw him into the sentiments of the speaker or writer. 
He has so much complaisance in him, or weakness of soul, that 
he is ready to resign his own opinion to the first objection which 
he hears, and to receive any sentiments of another that are as- 
serted with a positive air and much assurance. 

" The man of contradiction is of a contrary humour, for he 
stands ready to oppose everything that is said: he gives a slight 



INDEPENDENCE OF MIND. 21 

attention to the reasons of other men, from an inward scornful 
presumption that they have no strength in them. When he reads 
or hears a discourse different from his own sentiments, he does 
not give himself leave to consider whether that discourse may 
be true ; but employs all his powers immediately to confute it. 
Your great disputers and your men of controversy, are in con- 
tinual danger of this sort of prejudice : they contend often for 
victory, and will maintain whatsoever they have asserted, while 
truth is lost in the noise and tumult of reciprocal contradictions ; 
and it frequently happens, that a debate about opinions is turned 
into a mutual reproach of persons 

"Another sort of temper that is very injurious to a right 
judgment of things, is an inconstant, fickle, changeable spirit, and 
a very uneven temper of mind. When such persons are in one 
humour, they pass a judgment of things agreeable to it; when 
their humour changes, they reverse their first judgment, and em- 
brace a new opinion. They have no steadiness of soul; they 
want firmness of mind sufficient to establish themselves in any 
truth, and are' ready to change it for the next alluring falsehood 
that is agreeable to their change of humour. This fickleness is 
sometimes so mingled with their very constitution by nature, or 
by distemper of body, that a cloudy day and lowering sky shall 
strongly incline them to form an opinion both of themselves, and 
of persons and things round about them, quite different from 
what they believe when the sun shines, and the heavens are 
serene. 

" This sort of people ought to judge of things and persons in 
their most sedate, peaceful, and composed hours of life, and 
reserve these judgments for their conduct at more unhappy 
seasons." 

4. Independence of mind implies exemption from the 
influence of manner : — 

" There is another tribe of prejudices which is near akin to 
those of authority, and that is, when we receive a doctrine be- 
cause of the manner in which it is proposed to us by others. I 
have already-mentioned the powerful influence that oratory and 
fine words have to insinuate a false opinion, and sometimes truth 
is refused, and suffers contempt in the lips of a wise man, for want 
of the charms of language : but there are several other manners 
of proposals, whereby mistaken sentiments are powerfully con- 
veyed into the mind. 

" Some persons are easily persuaded to believe what another 
dictates with a 'positive air, and a great degree of assurance : they 
feel the overbearing force of a confident dictator, especially if he 
be of a superior rank or character to themselves. 



22 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

" Some are quickly convinced of the truth of any doctrine, 
when he that proposes it puts on aP the airs of piety, and makes 
solemn appeals to heaven, and protestations of the truth of it : 
the pious mind of a weaker Christian is ready to receive any- 
thing that is pronounced with such an awful solemnity. 

" It is a prejudice near akin to this, when a humble soul is 
frighted into any particular sentiments of religion, because a man 
of great name or character pronounces heresy upon the contrary 
sentiments, casts the disbeliever out of the church, and forbids 
him the gates of heaven. 

" Others are allured into particular opinions by gentler prac- 
tices on the understanding ; not only the soft tempers of mankind, 
but even hardy and rugged souls, are sometimes led away captives 
to error by the soft air of address, and the sweet and engaging 
methods of persuasion and kindness 

" There is another manner of proposing our own opinion, or 
rather opposing the opinions of others, which demands a mention 
here, and that is when persons make a jest serve instead of an 
argument; when they refute what they call error by a turn of wit, 
and answer every objection against their own sentiments, by 
casting a sneer upon the objector. These scoffers practise with 
success upon weak and cowardly spirits : such as have not been 
well established in religion or morality, have been laughed out of 
the best principles by a confident buffoon ; they have yielded up 
their opinions to a witty banter, and sold their faith and religion 
for a jest. 

" There is no way to cure these evils in such a degenerate 
world as we live in, but by learning to distinguish well between 
the substance of any doctrine, and the manner of address, either in 
proposing, attacking, or defending it ; and then by setting a just 
and severe guard of reason and conscience over all the exercises 
of our judgment, resolving to yield to nothing but the convincing 
evidence of truth, religiously obeying the light of reason in mat- 
ters of pure reason, and the dictates of revelation in things that 
relate to our faith." 

5. Independence of mind implies exemption from the 
influence of association: — 

" A court lady, born and bred up amongst pomp and equipage, 
and the vain notions of birth and quality, constantly joins and 
mixes all these with the idea of herself, and she imagines these 
to be essential to her nature, and as it were necessary to her 
being : thence she is tempted to look upon menial servants, and 
the lowest rank of mankind, as another species of beings, quite 
distinct from herself. A plough-boy, that has never travelled be- 
yond his own village, and has seen nothing but thatched houses, 



INDEPENDENCE OF MIND. 23 

and his parish church, is naturally led to imagine that thatch 
belongs to the very nature of a house, and that that must be 
a church which is built of stone, and especially if it has a spire 
upon it. A child whose uncle has been excessive fond, and his 
schoolmaster very severe, easily believes that fondness always 
belongs to uncles, and that severity is essential to masters or in- 
structors. He has seen also soldiers with red coats, or ministers 
with long black gowns, and therefore he persuades himself that 
these garbs are essential to the characters, and that he is not a 
minister who has not a long black gown, nor can he be a soldier 
who is not dressed in red. It would be well if all such mistakes 
ended with childhood 

" When we have just reason to admire a man for his virtues, 
we are sometimes inclined not only to neglect his weaknesses, but 
even to put a good colour upon them, and to think them amiable. 
When we read a book that has many excellent truths in it, and 
divine sentiments, we are tempted to approve not only that whole 
book, but even all the writings of that author. When a poet, an 
orator, or a painter, has performed admirably in several illustrious 
pieces, we sometimes also admire his very errors, we mistake his 
blunders for beauties, and are so ignorantly fond as to copy after 
them 

" This sort of prejudice is relieved by learning to distinguish 
things well, and not to judge in the lump. There is scarce any- 
thing in the world of nature or art, in the world of morality or 
religion, that is perfectly uniform. There is a mixture of wisdom 
and folly, vice and virtue, good and evil, both in men and things. 
We should remember that some persons have great wit and little 
judgment ; others are judicious, but not witty. Some are good 
humoured without compliment ; others have all the formalities of 
complaisance, but no good humour. We ought to know that one 
man may be vicious and learned, while another has virtue without 
learning. That many a man thinks admirably well, who has a 
poor utterance ; while others have a charming manner of speech, 
but their thoughts are trifling and impertinent. Some are good 
neighbours, and courteous, and charitable toward men, who have 
no piety towards God ; others are truly religious, but of morose 
natural tempers. Some excellent sayings are found in very silly 
books, and some silly thoughts appear in books of value. We 
should neither praise or dispraise by wholesale, but separate the 
good from the evil, and judge of them apart ; the accuracy of a 
good judgment consists much in making such distinctions." 



24 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

SECTION Y. 

THE KNOWLEDGE NECESSARY TO THE ART OF REASONING. 

I need hardly observe that to reason well, you must have 
common sense. This can be obtained only from Nature. 
While learning will increase your information, extend 
your range of inquiry, and unlock new sources of the 
most refined pleasure, it will not give you common 
sense. Nor does it appear that this common sense is ever 
much improved by learning. As is the child in this 
respect, so is the man. It is possible to have a strong 
memory and a weak understanding. Fools have become 
learned, and still have remained fools. Men of vast 
erudition have shown themselves weak in judgment, even 
in regard to those branches of knowledge in which they 
have obtained distinction — and miserably deficient in the 
ordinary affairs of life. It is only by common sense that 
we can reason, and can judge of the soundness of our 
reasonings. This power or faculty of the mind is not 
sparingly bestowed. It is given to almost every man, and 
to an extent that is found adequate for all the functions 
he is called upon to discharge. Common sense has been 
good sense in every age of the world. 

Presuming, then, gentle reader, that you are endowed 
with common sense, I will proceed to show you what 
further is required to enable you to reason well. Our 
instructions will be taken chiefly from the Logic of Dr. 
Watts. 

1. To reason well, you must understand the subjects 
that you reason about. 

Go to the market-place, and listen to the conversation 
between the buyers and the sellers. How readily the 
sellers advance arguments to show that their goods are 
very cheap, and how promptly the buyers answer these 
arguments, and strongly argue on the other side. Now 
how is it that these uneducated people are enabled to 
argue so forcibly and so fluently? It is that they un- 



LOGICAL DEFINITIONS. ' 25 

derstand what they are talking about. Arid this must be 
the first step in all our reasonings. 

We begin, therefore, by stating clearly what is the sub- 
ject of discussion : and this is called giving a definition 
of it: 

" In order to form a definition of anything, we must put forth 
these three acts of the mind. 

" First, Compare the thing to be defined with other things that 
are most like itself, and see wherein its essence or nature agrees 
with them : and this is called the general nature or genus in a 
definition : so if you would define what wine is, first compare it 
with other things like itself, as cider, perry, &c, and you will find 
it agrees essentially with them in this, that it is a sort of juice. 

" Secondly, Consider the most remarkable and primary attri- 
bute, property, or idea wherein this thing differs from those other 
things that are most like it ; and that is its essential or specific 
difference: so wine differs from cider and perry, and all other 
juices, in that it is pressed from a grape. This may he called its 
special nature, which distinguishes it from other juices. 

"Thirdly, Join the general and special nature together, or 
(which is all one) the genus and the difference, and these make up 
a definition. So the juice of a grape, or juice pressed from 
grapes, is the definition of wine. 

" So if I would define what winter is, I consider first wherein 
it agrees with other things which are most like it, namely, 
summer, spring, autumn, and I find they are all seasons of the 
year ; therefore a season of the year is the genus. Then I ob- 
serve wherein it differs from these, and that is in the shortness 
of the days j for it is this which does primarily distinguish it 
from other seasons; therefore this may be called its special 
nature, or its difference. Then by joining these together, I make 
a definition. Winter is that season of the year wherein the days 
are shortest." 

But everything cannot be defined in this formal manner, 
and we may adopt any mode of expression we please, pro- 
vided it will convey to others a correct description of what 
we mean. Thus we may say — 

" Motion is a change of place. Swiftness is the passing over a 
long space in a short time. A natural day is the time of one 
alternate revolution of light and darkness, or it is the duration 
of twenty-four hours. An eclipse of the sun is a defect in the 
sun's transmission of light to us by the moon interposing. Snow 
is congealed vapour. Hail is congealed rain. An island is a 
piece of land rising above the surrounding water. A hill is an 
elevated part of the earth, and a grove is a piece of ground thick 
set with trees. A house is a building made to dwell in. A 

c 



26 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

cottage is a mean house in the country. A supper is that meal ' 
which we make in the evening. A triangle is a figure composed 
of three sides. A gallon is a measure containing eight pints. 
A porter is a man who carries burthens for hire. A king is the 
chief ruler in a kingdom. Veracity is the conformity of our 
words to our thoughts. Covetousness is an excessive love of 
money, or other possessions. Killing is the taking away the life 
of an animal. Murder is the unlawful killing of a man. Rhetoric 
is the art of speaking in a manner fit to persuade. Natural 
philosophy is the knowledge of the properties of bodies, and the 
various effects of them, or it is the knowledge of the various 
appearances in nature, and their causes ; and logic is the art of 
using our reason well, &c." 

2. To reason well, you must clearly understand what is 
asserted about the subject. 

"A proposition is a sentence wherein two or more ideas or terms 
are joined or disjoined by one affirmation or negation ; as, 'Plato 
was a philosopher : every angle is formed by two lines meeting : 
no man living on earth can be completely happy.' When there 
are ever so many ideas or terms in the sentence, yet if they are 
joined or disjoined merely by one single affirmation or negation, 
they are properly called but one proposition, though they may be 
resolved into several propositions which are implied therein, as 
will appear hereafter. 

" There are three things which go to the nature and constitu- 
tion of a proposition ; namely, the subject, the predicate, and the 
copula. 

"The subject of a proposition is that concerning which anything 
is affirmed or denied : So ' Plato, angle, man living on earth,' are 
the subjects of the foregoing propositions. 

" The predicate is that which is affirmed or denied of the sub- 
ject : so 'philosopher' is the predicate of the first proposition; 
e formed by two lines meeting,' is the predicate of the second ; 
e capable of being completely happy,' the proper predicate of the 
third. 

" The subject and predicate of a proposition taken together, 
are called the matter of it ; for these are the materials of which 
it is made. 

" The copula is the form of a proposition ; it represents the act 
of the mind affirming or denying, and it is expressed by the words, 
am, art, is, are, &c. ; or am not, art not, is not, are not, &c. 

"The subject and predicate of a proposition, are not always 
to be known and distinguished by the placing of the words in the 
sentence, but by reflecting duly on the sense of the words, and 
on the mind or design of the speaker or writer : as if I say, In 
Africa there are many lions, I mean many lions are existent in 



LOGICAL LANGUAGE. 27 

Africa : ' many lions ' is the subject, and ' existent in Africa ' is the 
predicate. It is proper for a philosopher to understand geometry: 
here the word ' proper ' is the predicate, and all the rest is the 
subject, except • is,' the copula. 

" But there are some propositions, wherein the terms of the 
subject and predicate seem to be the same ; yet the ideas are not 
the same ; nor can these be called pure identical or trifling pro- 
positions ; such as, Home is home ; that is, home is a convenient 
or delightful place ; Socrates is Socrates still ; that is, the man 
Socrates is still a philosopher ; The hero was not a hero ; that is, 
the hero did not show his courage ; What I have written, I have 
written ; that is, what I wrote I still approve, and will not alter 
it : What is done, is done ; that is, it cannot be undone. It may 
be easily observed in these propositions the term is equivocal, 
for in the predicate it has a different idea from what it has in 
the subject." 

3. To reason well, you must know how to express your- 
self in clear and intelligible language. 

" As we are led into the knowledge of things by words, so we 
are oftentimes led into error, or mistake, by the use or abuse of 
words also. And in order to guard against such mistakes, as 
well as to promote our improvements in knowledge, it is necessary 
to acquaint ourselves a little with words and terms. 

" Words (whether they are spoken or written) have no natural 
connexion with the ideas they are designed to signify, nor with the 
things which are represented in those ideas. There is no manner 
of affinity between the sounds white in English, or blanc in French, 
and that colour which we call by that name ; nor have the letters, 
of which these words are composed, any natural aptness to signify 
that colour rather than red or green. Words and names there- 
fore are mere arbitrary signs invented by men to communicate 
their thoughts or ideas to one another." 

" Words and terms are either univocal or equivocal. Univocal 
words are such as signify but one idea, or at least but one sort of 
thing ; equivocal words are such as signify two or more different 
ideas, or different sorts of objects. The words book, bible, fish, 
house, elephant, may be called univocal words ; for I know not 
that they signify anything else but those ideas to which they are 
generally affixed ; but head is an equivocal word, for it signifies 
the head of a nail, or of a pin, as well as of an animal : nail is an 
equivocal word, it is used for the nail of the hand, or foot, and 
for an iron nail to fasten anything. Post is equivocal, it is a 
piece of timber, or a swift messenger. A church is a religious 
assembly, or the large fair building where they meet ; and some- 
times the same word means a synod of bishops, or of presbyters ; 
and in some places it is the pope and a general council. 
C2 



28 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 



g-iiity 






" Here let it be noted, that when two or more words signify 
the same thing, as wave and billow, mead and meadow, they are 
usually called synonymous words ; but it seems very strange, that 
words, which are directly contrary to each other, should some- 
times represent almost the same ideas; yet thus it is in some few 
instances : a valuable or an invaluable blessing ; a shameful, or a 
shameless villain ; a thick skull, or a thin-skulled fellow — a mere 
paper skull; a man of a large conscience, little conscience, or no 
conscience; a famous rascal, or an infamous one. So uncertain a 
thing is human language, whose foundation and support is custom. 

"As words signifying the same thing are called synonymous, so 
equivocal words, or those which signify several things, are called 
homonymous, or ambiguous; and when persons use such ambigu- 
ous words with a design to deceive, if is called equivocation." 

"In your own studies, as well as in the communication of your 
thoughts to others merely for their information, avoid ambiguous 
and equivocal terms as much as possible. Do not use such words 
as have two or three definitions of the name belonging to them ; 
that is, such words as have two or three senses, where there is 
any danger of mistake. Where your chief business is to inform 
the judgment, and to explain a matter, rather than to persuade 
or affect, be not fond of expressing yourselves in figurative 
language, when there are any proper words that signify the same 
idea in their literal sense." 

"When we communicate our notions to others, merely with a 
design to inform and improve their knowledge, let us, in the be- 
ginning of our discourse, take care to adjust the definition of 
names, wheresoever there is need of it ; that is, to determine 
plainly what we mean by the chief words which are the subject of 
our discourse ; and be sure always to keep the same ideas when- 
soever we use the same words, unless we give due notice of the 
change. This will have a very large and happy influence, in 
securing not only others, but ourselves too, from confusion and 
mistake ; for even writers and speakers themselves, for want of 
due watchfulness, are ready to affix different ideas to their own 
words, in different parts of their discourses, and hereby bring per- 
plexity into their own reasonings, and confound their hearers." 

" in communicating your notions, use every word as near as 
possible in the same 'sense in which mankind commonly use it ; or 
which writers that have gone before you have usually affixed to 
it, upon condition that it is free from ambiguity. Though names 
are in their original merely arbitrary, yet we should always keep 
to the established meaning of them, unless great necessity requires 
the alteration ; for when any word has been used to signify an 
idea, that old idea will recur in the mind when the word is heard 
or read, rather than any new idea which we may fasten to it. 
And this is one reason why the received definition of names 
should be changed as little as possible." 



LOGICAL EXAMPLES. 29 

4. To reason well, you must accustom yourself to ob- 
serve the reasonings of others, whether in books or conver- 
sation, and try to improve your own by meditation and 
practice. 

"Accustom yourselves to clear and distinct ideas, to evident 
propositions, to strong and convincing arguments. Converse 
much with those friends, and those • books, and those parts of 
learning, where you meet with the greatest clearness of thought 
and force of reasoning. The mathematical sciences, and particu- 
larly arithmetic, geometry, and mechanics, abound with these 
advantages : and if there were nothing valuable hi them for the 
uses of human life, yet the very speculative parts of this sort of 
learning are well worth our study ; for by perpetual examples 
they teach us to conceive with clearness, to connect our ideas and 
propositions in a train of dependence, to reason with strength and 
demonstration, and to distinguish between truth and falsehood. 
Something of these sciences should be studied by every man who 
pretends to learning, and that, as Mr. Locke expresses it, not 
so much to make us mathematicians, as to make us reasonable 
creatures. 

" We should gain such a familiarity with evidence of perception 
and force of reasoning, and get such a habit of discerning clear 
truths, that the mind may be soon offended with obscurity and 
confusion : then we shall, as it were, naturally and with ease 
restrain our minds from rash judgment, before we attain just 
evidence of the proposition which is offered to us : and we shall 
with the same ease, and, as it were, naturally seize and embrace 
every truth that is proposed with just evidence. 

" This habit of conceiving clearly, of judging justly, and of 
reasoning well, is not to be attained merely by the happiness of 
constitution, the brightness of genius, the best natural parts, or 
the best collection of logical precepts. It is custom and practice 
that must form and establish this habit. We must apply ourselves 
to it till we perform all this readily, and without reflecting on 
rules. A coherent thinker, and a strict reasoner, is not to be 
made at once by a set of rules, any more than a good painter or 
musician may be formed extempore, by an excellent lecture on 
music or painting. It is of infinite importance, therefore, in our 
younger years, to be taught both the value and the practice of 
conceiving clearly and reasoning right ; for when we are grown 
up to the middle of life, or past it, it is no wonder that we should 
not learn good reasoning any more than that an ignorant clown 
should not be able to learn fine language, dancing, or a courtly 
behaviour, when Ms rustic airs have grown up with him till the 
age of forty." 



PART II. 

THE PRINCIPLES OP REASONING. 

We have now made some progress. We have gone 
through the first part of our book. We have considered 
the nature of reasoning — the subjects to which it is 
applied — its usefulness, and the dispositions and knowledge 
necessary to enable us to reason well. 

We have ascertained that reasoning is that operation of 
the mind, whereby we infer one proposition from another 
proposition. It is obvious that there must be some con- 
nexion or relation between these two propositions. There 
must be a relation between the proposition containing the 
proof and the proposition which is to be proved. These 
relations are the foundation of all our reasonings. They 
are the principles on which we reason. There must be 
a relation between any doctrine, and the reasons we assign 
for believing that doctrine. There must be a relation 
between any act, and the reason we assign for performing 
that act. If we say, 

Fire will burn, 
Water will drown ; 

here are two independent propositions. They have no con- 
nexion with each other. We can infer nothing from them. 
If we say, Fire will burn, and therefore water will drown, 
we see at once that the reasoning is absurd. Both the 
facts are true,/ but there is no foundation for the word 
" therefore." One fact is not the cause of the other. But 
if we say, Fire will burn, and therefore do not approach it 
too nearly ; water will drown, and therefore do not bathe 
in deep water, unless you can swim ; here the reasoning is 
obvious. Here is a relation or connexion between the 
proposition and the inference. 

The power or faculty by which the mind perceives these 
relations is .called common-sense. We cannot explain 



SUBJECT AND ATTRIBUTE. 31 

how it is, but so it is.* These relations are so numerous 
that we cannot attempt to describe them all. But we 
will specify a few* and discuss them in the following 
order : — 

1. The relation of Subject and Attribute. 

2. The relation of a Whole and its Parts. 

3. The relation of Genus and Species. 

4. The relation of Cause and Effect — Physical causes. 

5. The relation of Cause and Effect — Moral causes. 

6. The relation of Cause and Effect — Conditional causes. 

7. The relation of Cause and Effect — Final causes. 



SECTION I. 

THE. RELATION OF A SUBJECT AND ITS ATTRIBUTES; 

By attribute we mean generally a quality or circumstance 
which is ascribed to some, person or thing ; and the subject 
is that to which the attribute is ascribed. To explain : — 
You understand Grammar. You know that a substan- 
tive is the name of any person, place or thing; and that 
an adjective is a word added to a substantive, to denote its 
quality. Well ; for substantive and adjective, say subject 
and attribute, and you will understand pretty clearly the 
topics of the present section. But the word attribute has 
a more extensive meaning than the word adjective. Every 
adjective denotes an attribute ; but sometimes an attribute 
is expressed by a verb, a particle, or by several words put 
together. Often, too, an adjective united to a substantive 
will become a subject. When you say simply, "A righteous 
man," the word " man" denotes the subject, and " righteous- 
ness" is the attribute. But when you say, "A -righteous man 
regardeth the life of his beast," the words " righteous" and 
"man" united denote the subject, and "regardeth the life 

* " The cogency of no direct and simple process of reasoning can be the subject 
of proof. The oniy question is, Does the reasoning when clearly expressed pro- 
duce conviction ? Or in other words, Do the facts when presented clearly to the 
mind determine it to believe that which is expressed in what is called the con- 
clusion ? If they do, we have reached an ultimate fact, or law, or principle of 
our mental constitution, beyond which it is impossible to go."— Bailey, p. 17. 
See also p. 37. 



32 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

of his beast" is the attribute of the righteous man. What- 
ever you talk about is a subject, and what you say about 
it is an attribute. In many propositions, the subject of 
the attribute is often the subject of the proposition, and 
the attribute is the predicate. But this will depend on 
the grammatical construction of the sentence. For ex- 
ample, in the following sentence, "Blessed is the man 
that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly, nor 
standeth in the way of sinners, nor sitteth in the seat of 
the scornful, but his delight is in the law of the Lord, 
and in his law doth he meditate day and night," the word 
"blessed" denotes the attribute, and all the rest of the 
sentence is the subject. 

Some attributes are called specific. They belong to the 
subject, and to no other subject. These are attributes 
chiefly that distinguish one class or species from others. 
Thus man is called a rational animal. Rationality is 
the specific attribute that distinguishes him from other 
animals. The specific attribute is called by logicians, a 
specific difference. 

Other attributes are called common. They are essential 
to the subject, but they belong also to other subjects. 
Thus, it is an attribute of gold to be yellow. If -a metal is 
not yellow, it is not gold. But other things are yellow 
besides gold. The colour yellow is an attribute common 
to many subjects. These common attributes are called 
properties. 

Other attributes are accidental. Whatever attribute 
can be removed from the subject without destroying the 
subject, is considered to be accidental. A hat may be 
white, or black, or made of beaver, silk, or straw ; these 
are accidental attributes, for they all might be changed, 
and yet the subject remain a hat. These attributes are 
called accidents. 

This relation of subject and attribute is a very extensive 
one. Almost everything we see, or hear, or know, is a 
subject, and has some kind of attributes. The usual way 
in which we define or describe anything, is by an enume- 
ration of its attributes. We shall here adduce a few pro- 
positions expressing this relation, and then we shall show 
how this relation is employed in reasoning. 



1 






SUBJECT AND ATTRIBUTE. 33 

Attributes of inanimate objects — a tree : 

" I saw, and behold a tree in the midst of the earth, and the 
height thereof was great. The tree grew and was strong, and 
the height thereof reached unto heaven, and the sight thereof to 
the end of all the earth : the leaves thereof were fair, and the 
fruit thereof much, and in it was meat for all : the beasts of the 
field had shadow under it, and the fowls of the heaven dwelt in 
the boughs thereof, and all flesh was fed of it." — Dan. iv. 10 — 12. 

Attributes of animals — the eagle : 

" Doth the eagle mount up at thy command, and make her 
nest on high ? She dwelleth and abideth on the rock, upon the 
crag of the rock, and the strong place. From thence she seeketh 
the prey, and her eyes behold afar off. Her young ones also suck 
up blood; and where the slain are, there is she." — Job xxxix. 
27—30. 

Attributes of a country — the land of Canaan : 

" For the Lord thy God bringeth thee into a good land, a land 
of brooks of water, of fountains and depths that spring out of 
valleys and hills ; a land of wheat, and barley, and vines, and fig- 
trees, and pomegranates ; a land of oil olive, and honey ; a land 
wherein thou shalt eat bread without scarceness, thou shalt not 
lack anything in it ; a land whose stones are iron, and out of 
whose hills thou mayest dig brass." — Beut. viii. 7 — 9. 

Personal attributes — St. Paul : 

"lam verily a man which am a Jew, born in Tarsus, a city in 
Cilicia, yet brought up in this city at the feet of Gamaliel, and 
taught according to the perfect manner of the law of the fathers, 
and was zealous toward God, as ye all are this day." — Acts 
xxii. 3. 

Attributes of moral virtues — divine wisdom : 

" But the wisdom that is from above is first pure, then peace- 
able, gentle, and easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good 
fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy." — James iii. 17. 

Attributes of a book — Logic for the Million : 

" This is certainly the most useful and most amusing book on 
the art of logic we ever met with. All the examples are drawn 
from familiar writings. 'Punch' is quoted more than once for 
logical examples, as well as ' Gilbart's Treatise on Banking/ and 
works on political economy and general literature much in vogue. 
The examples of reasoning by fables, by allegories, by description, 
and by various other modes, as well as the examples of fallacies 
c3 



34 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

and false reasoning, are all well chosen, and generally illustrate 
some truth or some important fact, or are very amusing, while 
they explain the art of logic. Generally, too, the author is as 
correct as he is entertaining. We hope that 'Logic for the 
Million ' will be read by the million : it will advance their know- 
ledge and improve their taste, their style of writing, and their 
skill in reasoning." — The Economist. 

You will now observe how the relation of subject and 
attribute is applied in reasoning. 

1. From the presence of the subject, we infer the 
presence of the attribute. 

" A fool uttereth all his mind : but a wise man keepeth it in 
till afterwards." — Prov. xxix. 11. 

Hence, we should infer that if this man be a fool, he 
will utter all his mind. And if he be a wise man, he will 
be cautious in his conversation. From the presence of the 
subject, we should infer the presence of the attribute. 

Arguments of this kind are often expressed in a con- 
ditional form. Thus, we may say — If this be a magnet, 
it will attract iron. If this be an oyster, it is good for food. 
If *he be a wise son, he will obey his father's instruction. 
If he be an honest man, he will pay his debts when he has 
the power, even though his creditors may have given him 
a legal release. If he be a good father, he will attend to 
the education of his children. " Could not this man, 
which opened the eyes of the blind, have caused that even 
this man should not have died 1" — John xi. 37. 

So, if a man has wealth, we may infer that he has the 
luxuries, enjoyments, and influence attendant on wealth. 
If he has wisdom, we may infer that he will profit by in- 
struction. " Give instruction to a wise man, and he will 
be yet wiser." If a man is a rogue, we may infer that it 
is not advisable to lend him any money, for " the wicked 
borroweth, and payeth not again." 

2. From the presence of the specific attribute, or of 
all the common attributes, we infer the presence of the 
subject. 

" Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather grapes 
of thorns, or figs of thistles ? Even so every good tree bringeth 
forth good fruit ; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit. A 



SUBJECT AND ATTRIBUTE. 35 

good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree 
bring forth good fruit. "—Matt. vii. 16—18. 

" Ye are my friends, if ye do whatsoever I command you." — 
John xv. 14. 

You will observe that this rule is the reverse of the 
former. By the former rule, from the presence of the 
subject we inferred the presence of the attribute. By this 
rule, from the presence of the attribute, we infer the 
presence of the subject. In the former case we said — This 
is a good tree, therefore it will bear good fruit. In the 
present case we say — This tree bears good fruit, therefore 
it is a good tree. 

Thus, if we saw a tree bearing apples, we should know 
that it was an apple-tree ; and from the quality of the 
fruit we should judge of the character of the tree. In the 
same manner, from the language or conduct of an indivi- 
dual, we should form an opinion of his character. — " These 
are not the words of him that hath a devil. Can a devil 
open the eyes of the blind?" — John x. 21. 

So, if we should find a metal having all the common 
attributes of gold, we should know that it is gold. This 
principle is of great use in chemical experiments. Thus, 
we know that certain bodies have certain affinities for 
other bodies. To ascertain, therefore, whether this body 
be present in any compound substance, we add some body, 
for which the body, whose presence we wish to detect, has 
an affinity, or upon which it produces a known effect. 
There are certain chemical tests which are in constant use 
in such cases. Thus, the presence of the specific attribute 
shows the presence of the subject. 

So, if an auctioneer had to sell a house, he would enume- 
rate all its attributes, in order to show that it is a most 
agreeable residence. The projector of a new company enu- 
merates all its attributes, in order to show that its shares 
would turn out a most profitable investment. A candidate 
for a seat in the House of Commons states all his attributes, 
in order to prove that he should be a most valuable member. 

To enable you to infer from a single attribute the 
presence of the subject, that attribute must be a specific 
attribute ; that is, it must belong to no other subject. (See 
p. 32.) Thus, if it be an attribute of an express train on 



36 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

any railway, that it does not stop at the intermediate 
stations, you may say — " This train does not stop at 
the intermediate stations ;" therefore, " this train is an 
express train." Here, from the presence of the attribute 
we infer the presence of the subject. But mind, if there 
are other trains besides the express trains that do not stop 
at the intermediate stations, this conclusion may not be 
correct. For then the attribute is no longer a specific 
attribute, but a common attribute. And from the presence 
of an attribute that is common to several subjects you can- 
not infer the presence of any particular subject. All you 
can do is, to infer the presence of either one or other of the 
subjects. Thus, " The express trains and the mail trains 
are the only trains that do not stop at this station. The 
train which has just passed has not stopped at this station ; 
therefore, the train which has just passed is either an 
express train or a mail train." 

But in conformity with the first rule, you may always 
from the presence of the subject infer the presence of the 
attributes, even though the same attributes may belong to 
other subjects. Thus, you may say — None of the express 
trains stop at the intermediate stations. The train that 
leaves at nine o'clock is an express train ; therefore the 
train that leaves at nine o'clock will not stop at the in- 
termediate stations. 

3. From the absence of the subject, we infer the absence 
of its specific attribute. 

" If ye were Abraham's children, ye would do the works of 
Abraham." — John viii. 39. 

" He that is of God heareth God's words : ye therefore hear 
them not, because ye are not of God." — John viii. 47. 

Thus, we may say — This animal is not a human being ; 
therefore he is not endowed with reason. Religion is the 
only source of happiness : this man has no religion ; there- 
fore he is not happy. This man is not an educated man ; 
therefore he is not qualified to be a teacher. This man has 
had no experience in war ; therefore he cannot be qualified 
to be a general. He has an impediment in his speech ; 
therefore, he is not fit for an orator. Those who had no 
season tickets did not attend the opening of the Indus- 



SUBJECT AND ATTRIBUTE. 37 

trial Exhibition of 1851 ; some of the Exhibitors had no 
season tickets ; therefore some of the Exhibitors did not 
attend the opening of the Exhibition. 

Although the absence of a subject shows the absence 
of its sioecific attribute, it does not prove the absence of any 
of its common attributes or properties. For these attri- 
butes belong also to other subjects. Thus, honesty is an 
attribute of religion ; but we cannot say that if a man is 
not a religious man, he is not an honest man, for a man 
may be honest, without being religious. But we may 
reverse the case, and from the absence of the common 
attribute, infer the absence of the subject. We may say — 
If a man is not an honest man, he is not a religious man. 

4. From the absence of an essential attribute, we infer 
the absence of the subject. 

" And from thenceforth Pilate sought to release him : but the 
Jews cried out, saying, If thou let this man go, thou art not 
Caesar's friend : whosoever maketh himself a king speaketh against 
Cassar." — Jo/m xix. 12. 

This rule is the reverse of the last. By the last rule we 
should say — This is not a good tree ; therefore it will not 
bear good fruit. By the present rule we should say — This 
tree does not bear good fruit; therefore it is not a good tree. 

In the illustration we have given it is presumed that the 
friend of Caesar must have as an attribute a desire of sup- 
pressing all claims incompatible with his authority. The 
absence of this attribute would prove the absence of the 
friendship. The Pharisee employed the same reasoning. 
i Now when the Pharisee which had bidden him saw it, he 
spake within himself, saying, This man, if he were a prophet, 
would have known who and what manner of woman this is 
that toucheth him : for she is a sinner." {Luke vii. 39.) Here, 
a knowledge of the moral character of those around him 
is presumed to be an attribute of a prophet. And as the 
Pharisee presumed from the circumstances that our Lord 
did not possess this attribute, he inferred that he was no 
prophet. King Nebuchadnezzar argued in the same way. 
As the magicians could not tell him his dream, he inferred 
that they did not possess those supernatural powers to 
which they laid claim, but "had prepared lying and corrupt 



38 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 






words to speak before him;" Dan. ii. 9. See other examples 
in James i. 26, and 1 John ii. 19. 

So it is an attribute of mind to think. Matter cannot 
think, and hence we infer that matter is not mind. Again, 
it is an attribute of matter to be divisible ; but mind is 
not divisible ; hence we infer that mind is not matter. 

The bread and wine used in the sacrament do not after 
consecration possess the attributes of flesh and blood, and 
hence we infer that they are not flesh and blood ; the ab- 
sence of the attributes proves the absence of the subjects. 

The following is an" illustration from a sermon of Dr. 
Sumner, the present Archbishop of Canterbury, upon 
" Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy." 

" My brethren, if any of you are conscious that you have not 
forgiven a neighbour when he trespassed against you ; if any of 
you are conscious that you have taken a malicious pleasure in 
making a brother's offences known, and injuring his credit ; if 
any have pushed your rights to an extreme, and insisted on a 
severity of justice, when you might rather have shown mercy and 
pity ; if any have no feeling for their fellow-creatures' wants, and 
are contented to enjoy themselves, without bestowing a thought 
on those who have in this life evil things ; you plainly perceive 
that the blessing bestowed on the merciful is not addressed to 
you: you must expect judgment without mercy, if you have 
shown no mercy." 

In the same way reasons St. John. " Whoso hath this 
world's goods, and seeth his brother have need, and 
shutteth up his bowels of compassion from him, how 
dwelleth the love of God in him V* (1 John hi. 17.) Here 
the argument is, Benevolence is an attribute of piety ; the 
absence of benevolence, therefore, shows the absence of 
piety. 

The following anecdote of the Rev. Rowland Hill ilhiS' 
trates the same principle of reasoning : — 

" He always strongly urged upon the poor the necessity of 
every possible adornment of the Christian character, particularly 
cleanhness ; and used to consider a slovenly person and a dirty 
house as an evidence that religion had effected no salutary change in 
the character. The neatness of the inmates of his almshouses at 
Wotton struck every one who visited them. The least symptom 
of untidiness was noticed by him in an instant, with 'Here, 
mistress, is a trifle for you to buy some soap and a scrubbing- 



SUBJECT AND ATTRIBUTE. 39 

brush — there is plenty of water to be had for nothing. Good 
Mr. Whitefield used to say, " Cleanliness is next to godliness." ' " 
— Sherman. 

5. If any two attributes may be ascribed to the same 
subject, then we may infer that these two attributes are 
not inconsistent with each other. 

Sir Isaac Newton was a great philosopher, and also a 
man of strong religious principle ; hence we infer that 
philosophy is not incompatible with religion. The late 
Sir Robert Peel had a taste for the fine arts, he was also a 
good man of business ; hence we infer that a taste for the 
fine arts is not incompatible with habits of business. Sir 
Thomas Fowell Buxton was a very benevolent man, and 
yet a great sportsman ; and hence we infer that benevolent 
feelings are not incompatible with a fondness for field- 
sports. The law of Moses required the Israelites to treat 
all strangers with justice and kindness, and yet the law of 
Moses allowed the Israelites to receive interest for money 
lent to strangers ; we may therefore infer that it is not un- 
just or unkind to receive interest for the loan of money. 

Writers on scholastic logic repeat the subject in this 
kind of argument so as to form two propositions, which 
they usually place under one another, and the conclusion 
under them ; and these three propositions taken together 
they call a syllogism ; thus — 

Sir Robert Peel had a taste for the fine arts. 
Sir Robert Peel was a good man of business. 
Therefore, a taste for the fine arts is not incompatible 
with habits of business. 

The following examples of the same kind are copied 
from Mr. Munro's Manual of Logic : — 

"All who assist in the progress of true science deserve the 
respect of mankind. 
All who assist in the progress of true science have to contend 

with difficulties. 
Some who have to contend with difficulties deserve the respect 
of mankind. 

Some distinguished poets have not escaped poverty. 
All distinguished poets do honour to their country. 
Some who do honour to their country have not escaped poverty 



40 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

No bombastic writers are worthy of imitation. 

Some bombastic writers are amusing. 

Some things amusing are not worthy of imitation." * 

This mode of reasoning may also be expressed in the 
form of example, thus : — " A taste for the fine arts is not 
incompatible with habits of business. In proof of this we 
may cite the example of Sir Robert Peel." " Some who do 
honour to their country have not escaped poverty, which is 
proved by the history of some of our distinguished poets." 
" A very interesting book may consist chiefly of quotations. 
Witness D 'Israeli's 'Curiosities of Literature.'" The fol- 
lowing are instances of the same kind of argument expressed 
in a different form : — " The example of Virgil shows that a 
great poet may be seduced into some faults by the practice 
of imitation." "A man remarkable for his knowledge and 
policy, the wisdom of his maxims, the justness of his 
reasoning, and the variety, distinctness, and strength of his 
characters, may want exactness in his diction, and be care- 
less in the art of writing, for we find all these qualities 
united in Lord Clarendon." 

You will observe that this argument must not be pushed 
too far. It does not prove that either of the two attributes 
is the cause of the other ; or that they always, or even 
often, accompany one another • but merely that they are 
not incompatible. Thus, if we say, The historian Gibbon 
was a man of great learning, and a man of infidel opinions ; 
this would not prove that great learning is the cause ot 
infidel opinions, or that they often accompany each other ; 
it shows only that they are not incompatible — that they 
may co-exist in the same subject. 

6. If the same attribute cannot be ascribed to two 
specified subjects, then we may infer that those subjects 
are different from each other. 

Thus, if the soul of man can reason, and the soul of a 
brute cannot reason, we infer that the soul of a man is 
different from the soul of a brute. If all fever produces 
thirst, and the patient does not suffer thirst, we infer that 
the patient has no fever. "A spirit hath not flesh and 

* These examples illustrate the third figure of syllogistic reasoning: the 
maxim is, " When the whole of a class possess a certain attribute, and the whole 
or part of the class possess another attribute, then some things that possess one 
of these attributes, possess the other also." — See Bailey, p. 72. 



SUBJECT AND ATTRIBUTE. 41 

bones ; you see that I have flesh and bones ; you see then 
that I am not a spirit." The following examples are taken 
from the Port Royal Logic : — 

" No liar is to be believed ; 
Every good man is to be believed ; 
Therefore no good man is a liar. 
No virtne is contrary to the love of truth ; 
There is a love of peace which is opposed to a love of truth ; 
Therefore there is a love of peace which is not a virtue. 

Every virtue is accompanied with discretion ; 

There is a zeal without discretion ; 

Therefore there is a zeal which is not a virtue." * 

You will observe that all these conclusions are negative. 
We deny that one thing is another, because the attribute 
can be ascribed to one of these things and not to the other. 

7. If a subject have certain attributes, we infer that it is 
adapted for the use to which those attributes are applicable. 

Thus, from the attributes of Australia, Cape of Good 
Hope, or Canada, we infer that those countries are adapted 
for certain classes of emigrants. From the attributes of 
the Isle of Wight, Torquay, and Penzance, we infer that 
those places are suitable residences for people in danger of 
consumption. From the attributes of wool, we infer that 
a woollen garment worn next the skin is sometimes good 
for rheumatism. From the attributes of certain medicines, 
we endeavour to learn what are the respective complaints 
for which they are adapted. From the attributes of bones, 
lime, sea- weed, and fish we infer that they may be usefully 
applied as manure to certain kinds of land. So if a man 
have the attributes of honesty, industry, prudence, and 
perseverance, we infer that he will thrive in his pursuits. 
Il a man apply for the office of Member of Parliament, 
excise officer, banker's clerk, or policeman, he must show 
that he has those attributes which will qualify him for the 
discharge of his official duties. The attributes of a joint- 
stock bank are, that it has more than six partners, that it 

**These examples are adduced as illustrations of the second figure of syllo 
gistic reasoning. The maxims of this figure are, " When the whole of a class 
possess a certain attribute, whatever does not possess the attribute, does not 
belong to the class;" and, " When the whole of a class is excluded from the posses- 
sion of an attribute, whatever possesses the attribute does not belong to the 
class." — Bailey, p. 71. 



42 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

has an amount of paid-up capital, and that on the death 
or retirement of any of its partners their portion of the 
capital is not withdrawn, but is transferred to other parties; 
and hence we infer that it is a safer system of banking for 
the public than if the partners were no more than six, and 
the death or retirement of any partner would cause the 
withdrawal of his portion of the capital. So from the 
attributes of the precious metals, it was inferred that they 
were adapted for the purposes of coin. 

" That medium of exchange must be best which unites in itself 
the largest amount of the following qualities: — sameness of value 
both as to time and place, divisibility, durability, and facility of 
transportation. The metals — especially gold and silver — possess 
all these qualities in a great degree. We may have them in tons 
or in grains : wear is slow ; fire will not destroy them ; when 
divided, they can be fused again and re-blended; and, except 
where large values are concerned, they are easily conveyed from 
place to place. Because metals possess these qualities, they were 
early and (in civilized countries) universally adopted as a medium 
of exchange " — Rev. S. Martin's Lecture o?i Money. 

8. The presence of similar attributes in two or more 
subjects shows the probability of their corresponding in 
other attributes. This is called " reasoning by analogy," 
which we shall discuss more at length hereafter. We will 
here give only one example. 

" It is natural to mankind to judge of things less known by 
some similitude, real or imaginary, between them and things more 
familiar or better known. And where the things compared have 
really a great similitude in their nature, when there is reason to 
think that they are subject to the same laws, there may be a 
considerable degree of probability in conclusions drawn from 
analogy. Thus we may observe a very great similitude between 
this earth which we inhabit, and the other planets, Saturn, Jupiter, 
Mars, Yenus, and Mercury. They all revolve round the sun, as 
the earth does, although at different distances and in different 
periods. They borrow all their light from the sun, as the earth 
does. Several of them are known to revolve round their axis, 
like the earth ; and by that means must have a like succession of 
day and night. Some of them have moons that serve to give 
them light in the absence of the sun, as our moon does to us. 
They are all in their motions subject to the same law of gravi- 
tation as the earth is. From all this similitude, it is not un- 
reasonable to think that those planets may, like our earth, be the 
habitation of various orders of living creatures?' 



SUBJECT AND ATTRIBUTE. 43 

9. The presence of any attribute shows the absence of 
a contrary attribute. This, of course, refers only to acci- 
dental attributes, for an essential attribute cannot be 
absent from its subject. Thus, if the weather be hot, it 
is not cold ; if a man be humble, he is not proud ; if 
avaricious, he is not liberal ; if he have the gout, he is not 
in good health. 

The presence of an accidental attribute in one instance, 
proves the possibility of such a subject becoming united 
to such an attribute in any similar case. Wisdom is the 
accidental attribute of a man, and therefore we are justified 
in inferring that a man may become wise. In the same 
way, wealth, learning, virtue, happiness, are attribt^es of 
man, and though not essential attributes, but only acci- 
dental, yet they may all be acquired. Sometimes, as we 
have observed at page 31, an accidental attribute may be 
united to a subject, and form a new subject, which may 
have other attributes. Thus we may say — A wise man will 
receive instruction. Here the word " wise " is not viewed 
as an attribute, but as with "man" forming a subject, and 
a readiness to receive instruction is an essential attribute 
of a wise man. 

In reasoniDg upon the relation subsisting between subject 
and attribute, it is always necessary to distinguish between 
those attributes which are essential, and those which are acci- 
dental. For, if we take accidental attributes, and argue upon 
them as though they were essential, our reasonings will be 
erroneous. Thus, the poet Ovid had a large nose. This 
was a mere accidental circumstance, and was by no means 
essential to him as a poet. If, therefore, we were to meet a 
man in the street with a large nose, we should not be justi- 
fied in inferring that he was a poet. Some men of great 
minds have had feeble bodies, but it does not follow that a 
feeble body tends to invigorate the mind. Some men of 
great intellectual powers have been addicted to great vices, 
but it does not follow that great vices are a mark of 
intellect. 

Erroneous reasonings under this head sometimes arise 
from our omission to take into account some one or more of 
the essential attributes. A tradesman may have all the at- 
tributes of a good man of business, except that he is fond 



44 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

of speculation. A young woman may have all the attri- 
butes of a good wife, except sweetness of temper. A house 
may have all the attributes of an agreeable residence, except 
that the chimney smokes. A man may have all the attri- 
butes of an excellent friend, except that he cannot keep a 
secret. Now, in these cases, if you had, from a review of 
the other attributes, come to the conclusion, " That trades- 
man is worthy of high credit ;" u That young woman would 
make an excellent wife;" " That house is a most agreeable 
residence;" "That man is a most judicious friend," you 
would have formed erroneous conclusions. We read of 
several of the kings of Judah, who "walked in the ways of 
David their father," " but the high places were not taken 
away," " but the people still sacrificed in high places," and 
hence, as an old divine observes, we often find that some 
unlucky "but" or other comes in and spoils all. 

It may also happen, that when we have noticed all the 
attributes, our judgment may be kept in suspense from the 
conflicting character of these attributes. If we have to hire 
servants, those who are most skilled may be deficient in 
sobriety, or, if not deficient in sobriety, they may be defi- 
cient in industry, or in cleanliness. If we want a house, 
we cannot find one that has all the attributes we require. 
Tf we wish to emigrate, we can discover no colony exactly 
suited to our circumstances. In these cases we must 
balance the attributes one against the other. Here, a full 
knowledge of the subject, and plenty of common sense, are 
the best guides. The rules of logic, however, will teach us 
to decide coolly and systematically. The best way is that 
of Dr. Franklin. Write down on, paper first, all the reasons 
for the affirmative, and then all the reasons for the nega- 
tive. Having all the reasons thus before your eyes, weigh 
them deliberately, and see which preponderate. 

Let thine eyes look right on, 

And let thine eyelids look straight before thee, 

Ponder the path of thy feet, 

And let all thy ways be established. — Prov. iv. 25, 26. 



A WHOLE AND ITS PARTS. 45 

SECTION II. 

THE RELATION OP A WHOLE AND ITS PARTS. 

You must observe that some ideas have no parts. Such 
are many attributes. The colours green, red, blue, have no 
parts ; nor have the tastes sweet, sour, bitter, &c. ; nor the 
sounds, loud, sharp, shrill, &c. ; nor the various smells. 
The things that have parts are subjects having attributes. 
Such are all animals, all vegetables, all material objects, 
and all particles of matter, and all mechanical instruments, 
of every kind. An animal may be divided into head, 
trunk, and limbs. A tree may be divided into root, trunk, 
branches, leaves, and fruit. A steam-engine may be divided 
into the several parts of which it is composed. A day may 
be divided into hours. A book may be divided into parts, 
or chapters, and those parts or chapters may be subdivided 
into sections or verses. An art or science may be divided 
into parts. Political economy may be divided into pro- 
duction, distribution, interchange, and consumption. The 
business of a manufactory may be divided into its various 
operations. A cotton manufacture may be divided into 
the departments of spinning, weaving, dyeing, and printing. 
A pound sterling may be divided into shillings, and each 
shilling into pence. A bushel may be divided into gallons, 
and each gallon into quarts and pints. A mile may be 
divided into furlongs, and each furlong into yards. A ton 
weight may be divided into hundreds, and these into pounds 
and ounces. A palace may be divided into apartments. 
A house may be divided into rooms. A farm may be 
divided into acres. 

Upon this subject we shall quote Dr. Watts : — 

" Each part singly taken must contain less than the whole, but 
all the parts taken collectively (or together) must contain neither 
more nor less than the whole. Therefore, if in discoursing of a 
tree you divide it into the trunk and leaves, it is an imperfect 
division, because the root and the branches are needful to make 
up the whole." 

" In all divisions we should first consider the larsrer and mose 



46 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

immediate parts of the subject, and not divide it at once into the 
more minute and remote parts. It would by no means be proper 
to divide a kingdom first into streets, and lanes, and fields ; but 
it must be first divided into provinces or counties, then those 
counties may be divided into towns, villages, fields, &c. ; and 
towns into streets and lanes. 

" The several parts of a division ought to be opposite, that is, 
one part ought not to contain another. It would be a ridiculous 
division of an animal into head, limbs, body, and brains, for the 
brains are contained in the head." 

" Let not subdivisions be too numerous without necessity : for 
it is better many times to distinguish more parts at once, if the 
subject will bear it, than to mince the discourse by excessive 
dividing and subdividing. It is preferable therefore in a treatise 
of geography, to say, that in a city we will consider its walls, its 
gates, its buildings, its streets, and lanes, than to divide it for- 
mally first into the encompassing and the encompassed parts ; the 
encompassing parts are the walls and gates ; the encompassed 
parts include the ways and the buildings ; the ways are the streets 
and the lanes; buildings consist of the foundations, and the 
superstructure, &c. 

"Divide every subject according to the special design you have 
in view. One and the same idea or subject may be divided in 
very different manners, according to the different purposes we 
have in discoursing of it. So if a printer were to consider the 
several parts of a book, he must divide it into sheets, the sheets 
into pages, the pages into lines, and the lines into letters. But a 
grammarian divides a book into periods, sentences, and words, or 
parts of speech, as noun, pronoun, verb, &c. A logician considers 
a book as divided into chapters, sections, arguments, propositions, 
ideas ■ and, with the help of ontology, he divides the propositions 
into subject, object, property, relation, action, passion, cause, 
effect, &c. But it would be very ridiculous for a logician to 
divide a book into sheets, pages, and lines ; or for a printer to 
divide it into nouns and pronouns, or into propositions, ideas, 
properties, or causes. 

"In all your divisions observe with greatest exactness the 
nature of things." 

We shall consider the relation between a whole and its 
parts, with reference to arithmetical numbers, physical 
objects, and moral ideas. 

1. With regard to arithmetical numbers. 

Any arithmetical number may be divided into as many 
parts as it contains units ; and again, a unit may be divided 
into any number of fractional parts. It is obvious, that 



A WHOLE AND ITS PARTS. 47 

all the parts into which any number is divided must, when 
added together, be equal to the whole number. A sove- 
reign is equal to twenty shillings ; if, then, you receive in 
exchange for a sovereign only nineteen shillings, you will 
infer that you have not the whole. A pound weight is 
equal to sixteen ounces ; if, then, in buying a pound of tea, 
or of sugar, you get only fifteen ounces, you will infer that 
you have not the whole. 

Again, if two numbers that are equal to one another be 
multiplied respectively by any number, the products will 
be equal. If one Indian rupee be equal to one shilling and 
tenpence, you will infer that twenty rupees will be equal to 
twenty times one shilling and tenpence. So also — 

If equal numbers be added to equal numbers, the totals 
will be equal. 

If equal numbers be subtracted from equal numbers, 
the remainders will be equal. 

If equal numbers be divided by equal numbers, the 
quotients will be equal. 

These maxims are too obvious to require any illustration. 
They form the foundation of much of our reasoning with 
regard to figures and quantities. 

Addition, subtraction, multiplication and division are the 
four operations with regard to numbers, and these opera- 
tions are often called into exercise, not only with regard to 
our physical, but also with regard to our moral reasonings. 

All the portions of the sacred cross exhibited in Catholic 
countries would, if put together, make a much larger cross 
than could have been carried by Simon the Cyrenian. 
Hence we infer, that some at least of these relics cannot 
be genuine, for all the parts of anything taken together 
cannot make more than the whole. 

We use multiplication when we wish to present any 
matter of quantity or numbers in a strong light. Thus, 
in teaching economy, we may prove the evil of a daily 
extravagance, by showing how much it would cost in the 
course of a year : — 

" Compute the pence of but one day's expense. 
So many pounds, and angels, groats, and pence, 
Are spent in one whole year's circumference." 

To prove the danger of obstructed perspiration, Dr. 



48 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

Erasmus Wilson, in his "Practical Treatise on Healthy 
Skin," states that the pores of the skin are apertures of 
little tubes about a quarter of an inch long ; that upon 
an average there are about 2,800 of these tubes in every 
square inch, and that "the number of square inches of 
surface in a man of ordinary height and bulk is 2,500. 
The number of pores, therefore, is 7,000,000, and the 
number of inches of perspiratory tube 1,750,000, that is, 
145,833 feet, or 48,600 yards, or nearly 28 miles." 

In the Report of the Board of Health upon the Supply 
of Water, it is stated that the Thames, Lea, and New River 
waters contain sixteen grains of lime in every gallon. " The 
importance of this mineral ingredient, however, is only to 
be correctly estimated when viewed in the aggregate ; " for 
the daily supply of water is forty-six millions of gallons, 
and this quantity will contain twenty-six tons of lime. 

If you are a clerk in a public office, and are behind your 
time a quarter of an hour every morning, in three hundred 
days that will amount to seventy-five hours ; more than 
equal at six hours a-day to a holiday of twelve days in the 
course of the year. A large number of small parts will 
make a great whole. 

The following anecdote proves, by multiplication, the im- 
portance of punctuality : — 

"A member of the Committee being a quarter of an hour 
behind the time, made an apology, saying, the time passed away 
without his being aware of it. A Quaker present said — ' Friend, 
I am not sure that we should admit thy apology. It were matter 
of deep regret that thou shouldest have wasted thine own quarter 
of an hour ; but there are seven besides thyself, whose time thou 
hast also consumed, amounting in the whole to two hours — and 
one-eighth of it only was thine own property.' " 

Parties who keep omnibuses or other public conveyances 
waiting for them, should recollect that they are sporting 
with the time of all the other passengers. 

While we multiply in order to prove the importance of 
an object,, we use division when we wish to produce a con- 
trary impression. Mr. Norman, the Bank Director, pub- 
lished a pamphlet a short time ago to show the lightness of 
our taxation. He divided the total amount of the taxes by 
the total number of the population ; and he inferred that 



A WHOLE AND ITS PARTS. 49 

the taxation was light from the small average amount paid 
by each individual. 

2. We shall next consider this principle of the whole and 
its parts with reference to physical objects. 

By physical objects we mean objects known to the 
senses, — such as relate to what is called natural philosophy. 
By chemistry we ascertain what are the parts of which these 
objects are composed. And hence we infer the purposes 
to which they may be applied. Thus, we learn that cer- 
tain substances may be employed as medicines ; and we 
discover the effects of particular kinds of food : — 

"Of what is water composed? Of two gases — oxygen and 
hydrogen. In nine pounds of water, eight are oxygen, and one is 
hydrogen. Of what is atmospheric air composed? Principally 
of two gases, oxygen and nitrogen, mixed together in the propor- 
tion oi one gallon of oxygen to four of nitrogen." — Dr. Brewer's 
Guide to Science. 

"Fruits consist principally of gum, sugar, starch, and vegetable 
jelly, combined with different acids. They contain but little 
nutritious matter, though, on account of then flavour and cool- 
ness, they are very agreeable to the palate, and, therefore, much 
prized as an article of diet. Their use is particularly beneficial 
to the health." — Dr. Trueman, on Food. 

Here from a knowledge of the constituent parts of these 
substances we infer what would be the effect of the whole. 

The relation between a part and a whole has sometimes 
furnished important evidence in cases of judicial proceed- 
ings. In a case of house-breaking, the thief had gained 
admission into the house by means of a penknife, which 
was broken in the attempt, and part left in the window- 
frame. The broken knife was found in the pocket of the 
prisoner, and perfectly corresponded with the fragment 
left. In the case of a man who had been shot by a ball, 
the wadding of the pistol, which stuck in the wound, was 
found to be part of a ballad which corresponded with 
another part found in the pocket of the prisoner. 

The prophet Isaiah argues against the worship of images, 
on the ground that the wood of the image was only part 
of a tree, and could therefore have no more power or 
sanctity than the other parts which were used as fueL 

D 



50 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

" The carpenter stretcheth out his rule ; he marketh it out with 
a line ; he ntteth it with planes, and he marketh it out with the 
compass, and maketh it after the figure of a man, according to the 
beauty of a man ; that it may remain in the house. He heweth 
him down cedars, and taketh the cypress and the oak, which he 
strengtheneth for himself among the trees of the forest : he 
planteth an ash, and the rain doth nourish it. Then shall it be 
for a man to burn: for he will take thereof, and warm himself; 
yea, he kindleth it, and baketh bread ; yea, he maketh a god, and 
worshippeth it ; he maketh it a graven image, and. falleth down 
thereto. He burneth part thereof in the fire ; with part thereof he 
eateth flesh ; he roasteth roast, and is satisfied ; yea, he warmeth 
himself, and saith, Aha, I am warm, I have seen the fire. And 
the residue thereof he maketh a god, even his graven image : he 
falleth down unto it, and worshippeth it, and prayeth unto it, and 
saith, Deliver me ; for thou art my god. And none considereth 
in his heart, neither is there knowledge nor understanding to say, 
I have burned part of it in the fire ; yea, also I have baked bread 
upon the coals thereof ; I have roasted flesh, and eaten it : and 
shall I make the residue thereof an abomination? shall I fall 
down to the stock of a tree ? " — Isa. xliv. 13 — 17, 19. 

The relation of a whole and its parts has sometimes a 
reference to questions in political economy. 

" Let us now observe how the value of a commodity resolves 
itself into three component parts. Take for instance a load of 
hay ; its price pays first the wages of the labourer who cut down 
the grass and made it into hay — then the profits of the farmer 
who sells it, — and lastly, the rent of the field in which it grew. 
This, therefore, constitutes the whole cost of production of the 
load of hay, and may be called its natural value." — Mrs. Marcet. 

3. We shall now consider the application of this prin- 
ciple to moral ideas. 

The word moral is not used here in its ethical sense, as 
opposed to immoral, but as opposed to physical. We 
cannot divide these ideas into parts so readily as we can 
divide arithmetical numbers, or as we may carve a fowl. 
Hence we often use the words imply or include, in order 
to denote the simple ideas of which they are composed. 
Thus at page 19, I have considered independence of mind 
as implying or including several things. Possibly it 
includes several other things besides those I have men- 
tioned. But we are able to argue from these. For if it 
be a duty to cherish independence of mind, then it is a 



WHOLE AND ITS PARTS. 51 

duty to cherish every one of the parts or principles of 
which it is composed. So gratitude includes a consciousness 
of favours received — a disposition to acknowledge them on 
proper occasions — and a resolution to return them when 
an opportunity occurs. Honour includes a regard to truth 
in words — humanity and generosity in actions — candour 
and forgiveness in thought, and resentment of insult or 
affront. 

Under this relation we may class the points of belief, or 
practice adopted by any public body. The following are 
the points of the charter contended for by ifae Chartist : 
1. Equal Electoral Districts. 2. Universal Suffrage. 3. 
Vote by Ballot. 4. Triennial Parliaments. 5. No Pro- 
perty Qualification for Members. 6. Payment of Repre- 
sentatives. 

Lord John Russell, in his letter to the Bishop of 
Durham, thus enumerates the several parts or doctrines 
that form what is called Puseyism. 

" Clergymen of our own Church, who have subscribed the 
Thirty-nine Articles, and acknowledged in explicit terms the 
Queen's supremacy, have been the most forward in leading their 
flocks, ' step by step to the very verge of the precipice. 5 The 
honour paid to saints, the claim of infallibility for the Church, 
the superstitious use of the sign of the cross, the muttering of 
the Liturgy so as to disguise the language in which it is written, 
the recommendation of auricular confession, and the administra- 
tion of penance and absolution — all these things are pointed out 
by clergymen of the Church of England as worthy of adoption, 
and are now openly reprehended by the Bishop of London in his 
Charge to the clergy of his diocese." 

From the character of the individual doctrines, or prac- 
tices, we infer the character of the whole system. 

The settlement of a public question will sometimes turn 
upon this relation of a whole and its parts. Baron Roths- 
child took all the oath required from Members of Parlia- 
ment, except the words, " Upon the true faith of a 
Christian." His friends contended that these words were 
not part of the oath, and that the Baron, having now 
taken the oath, should be allowed to take his seat. The 
House of Commons decided that these words formed a 
part of the oath. The Baron, therefore, could not take 
his seat. 

d2 



52 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

4. The following are erroneous reasonings in relation to 
this principle. 

Saul, the king of Israel, was commanded to destroy the 
Amalekites, and their cattle. He destroyed the Amale- 
kites but not their cattle. He afterwards contended that 
he had obeyed the command. He considered that a part 
was equal to the whole. 

When a public body, or society governed jointly by a 
number of managers, is prosperous, each manager will 
take to himself a high degree of credit for having caused 
that prosperity. On the other hand, when the society 
becomes involved in difficulties, each manager is anxious 
to show that no part of the blame belongs to him ; thus 
the totals of the praise or blame which each manager 
is willing to take to himself is more or less than the total 
that belongs to the whole body. It should be recollected 
in such cases that, whether of applause or censure, the 
total of all the parts cannot be either more or less than 
the whole. 

Mr. Caudle having lent a friend five pounds, Mrs. Caudle 
enumerates four or five ways in which this amount might 
have been employed, and then concludes that the lending 
of this one sum of five pounds has subjected her to all 
those privations. 

"You ought to be very rich, Mr. Caudle. I wonder who'd lerd 
you five pounds ? But so it is : a wife may work and may slave ! 
Ha, dear ! the many things that might have been done with five 
pounds. As if people picked up money in the street ! But you 
always were a fool, Mr. Caudle ! I 've wanted a black satin gown 
these three years, and that five pounds would have pretty well 
bought it. All the girls want bonnets, and where they 're to come 
from I can't tell. Half five pounds would have bought 'em — but 
now they must go without. Next Tuesday the fire-insurance is 
due. I should like to know how it's to be paid. Why, it can't 
be paid at all. That five pounds would have just done it — and 
now, insurance is out of the question. I did think we might go 
to Margate this summer. There 's poor little Caroline, I'm sure 
she wants the sea. But no, dear creature ! she must stop at 
home — all of us must stop at home — she '11 go into a consump- 
tion, there's no doubt of that; yes, sweet little angel! I've 
made up my mind to lose her, now. The child might have been 
saved ; but people can't save then children and throw away their 
five pounds too." 



GENUS AND SPECIES. 53 

Dean Swift, in his sarcastic "Advice to Servants," 
counsels them to act on the same fallacy. 

" The cook, the butler, the groom, the market-man, and every 
other servant who is concerned in the expenses of the family, 
should act as if his master's whole estate ought to be applied to 
that servant's particular business. For instance, if the cook com- 
putes his master's estate to be a thousand pounds a-year, he 
reasonably concludes, that a thousand pounds a-year will afford 
meat enough, and therefore he need not be sparing ; the butler 
makes the same judgment, so may the groom and the coachman ; 
and thus every branch of expense will be filled to your master's 
honour." 



SECTION III. 

THE EELATION OF GENUS AND SPECIES. 

This relation is founded upon the act of classification. 
Let us take a tree. There are many kinds of trees, as the 
oak, the elm, and there is a great number of oaks and 
elms. Here, then, a tree is the genus, oak, elm, are the 
species, and a particular oak or elm that we may happen 
to see, is an individual. 

In all the branches of natural history, classification is 
very generally introduced. It is a rule, that the genus 
can always be asserted of each species. Thus we can say, 
an oak is a tree, — an elm is a tree, — a vine is a tree. 
This shows that tree is a genus, and that oak, elm, and 
vine, are species under that particular genus. We may 
say — a horse is an animal, an ox is an animal, a dog is an 
animal. This proves that animal is a genus, and that dog, 
horse, and ox, are species under that genus. Each species 
may again be divided into inferior species, as there are 
various kinds of dogs, horses, and oxen. 

Genus and species have a reference to moral ideas, as 
well as to physical ones. Thus we may say, industry is a 
virtue, frugality is a virtue, temperance is a virtue. This 
shows that virtue is a genus, and that frugality, industry, 
and temperance are its species. 

You will observe that, although I call this, for brevity 



54 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

sake, the relation of genus and species, you must always 
remember that, while a genus may be divided into species, 
each species may again be subdivided into individuals, I 
use these words, genus and species, being words in common 
use, to express the general idea of classification. The word 
genus denotes a large class — the word species a small class 
included in the large class. This small class may some- 
times be again subdivided into smaller classes, and an 
individual is a single thing forming a part of the smallest 
class. It is clear that any single thing included in a 
smaller class must be included in a larger class. This is 
the foundation of all our reasonings from the relation of 
genus and species. 

1. The following are examples of classification: — 

" All flesh is not the same flesh : but there is one kind of flesh 
of men, another flesh of beasts, another of fishes, and another of 
birds."— 1 Cor. xv. 39. 

" Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as it is 
fit in the Lord. Husbands, love your wives, and be not bitter 
against them. Children, obey your parents in all things : for this 
is well pleasing unto the Lord. Fathers, provoke not your chil- 
dren to anger, lest they be discouraged." — Col. iii. 18 — 21. 

" Mountain water, as it is pure and cold to the taste, is also 
beneficial to the health for drinking. If it cannot be obtained, 
river water may be resorted to. Well water I put in the last 
place, although everywhere it is agreeable for its coldness. It is 
almost always hard, unsuitable for dissolving soap and for cooking 
vegetables. The water of lakes, even although they may contain 
the purest waters, and appear pellucid, nevertheless become tepid 
from their isolation, and are flat and vapid." — Report of the General 
Board of Health. 

" The capital of a manufacturer is of two hinds, fixed and cir- 
culating. The fixed capital remains always in his possession, as 
the mills, warehouses, &c. The circulating capital is always 
going out of his possession, as the materials of the manufacture, 
the wages of the workmen, &c. So the horses that draw the 
plough are part of the farmer's fixed capital, the sheep and oxen 
he sends to market for sale are part of his circulating capital." — 



" We are authorized to announce that J. W. Gilbart, Esq., 
F.R.S., will present the sum of One Hundred Pounds to the 
author of the best Essay which shall be written in reply to the 
following question : — ' Li what way can any of the articles col- 



GENUS AND SPECIES. 55 

lected at the Industrial Exhibition of 1851 be rendered especially 
serviceable to the interests of ' Practical Banking?' These articles 
may be architectural models that may suggest improvements in 
the hank-house or office — inventions by which light, heat, and 
ventilation may be secured, so as to promote the health and com- 
fort of the bank-clerks — discoveries in the fine arts by which the 
interior of a bank may be decorated, or the bank furniture ren- 
dered more eommodious — improvements in writing-paper, pens, 
ink, account-books, scales, letter-copying machines, or other in- 
struments used in carrying on the business — improvements in 
printing and engraving, by which banks may get their notes, 
receipts, letters of credit, and other documents of a better kind 
at a less expense, or so as to prevent forgery — new inventions 
in the construction of locks, cash-boxes, and safes, which shall 
render property more secure against fire or thieves — and generally 
all articles of every kind which can be so applied as to improve, 
cheapen, or facilitate any of the practical operations of banking." 
— Banker's Magazine for January, 1851. 

2. The rules for dividing a genus into its species, are 
similar to those for dividing a whole into its parts. A 
species is part of a genus. 

" Each part singly taken must contain less than the whole, but 
all the parts taken collectively, or together, must contain neither 
more nor less than the whole ; or, as logicians sometimes express 
it, the parts of the division ought to exhaust the whole thing 
which is divided." 

" In all distributions we should first consider the larger and 
more immediate kinds or species, or ranks of being, and not 
divide a thing at once into the more minute and remote." 

" The several parts of a distribution ought to be opposite ; that 
is, one species or class of beings in the same rank of division 
ought not to contain or include another ; so men ought not to be 
divided into the rich, the poor, the learned, and the tall; for poor 
men may be both learned and tall, and so may the rich." 

" Let not subdivisions be too numerous, without necessity ; 
therefore I think quantity is better distinguished at once into a 
line, a surface, and a solid ; than to say, as Ramus does, that 
quantity is either a line or a thing lined ; and a thing lined is 
either a surface or a solid. 

"Distribute every subject according to the special design you 
have in view, so far as is necessary or useful to your present in- 
quiry. Thus a politician distributes mankind according to their 
civil characters into the rulers and the ruled; and a physician 
divides them into the sick or the healthy; but a divine distri- 
Dutes them into Turks, heathens, Jews, or Christians." 



56 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

" It is to this doctrine of distribution of a genus into its several 
species, we must also refer the distribution of a cause according 
to its several effects, as some medicines are heating, some are 
cooling : or an effect, when it is distinguished by its causes ; as 
faith is either built upon divine testimony or human. It is to 
this head we refer particular artificial bodies, when they are dis- 
tinguished according to the matter they are made of, as a statue 
is either of brass, of marble, or wood, &c. ; and any other beings, 
when they are distinguished according to their end and design, as 
the furniture of body or mind is either for ornament or use. To 
this head also we refer subjects, when they are divided according 
to their modes or accidents ; as men are either merry, or grave, 
or sad ; and modes, when they are divided by their subjects, as 
distempers belong to the fluid, or to the solid parts of the 
animal.' 5 — Watts' Logic. 

3. The mode of reasoning from genus and species is 
merely to show that a certain species is properly classed 
under a certain genus, and then to affirm or deny of the 
species what you may affirm or deny of the genus.* 

Thus you may say, All fruit is useful to health : the 
apple is a kind of fruit, therefore the apple is useful to 
health. I may observe that this principle of reasoning 
from genus to species is the only kind of reasoning in 
which you gain anything by placing it in the form of a 
syllogism. And here, mind, the argument gains nothing 
in point of strength, but sometimes it gains a little in point 
of clearness ; or, at least, it gives a clearer statement of the 
meaning of the reasoner. 

The following are the examples given in the Logic of 
Dr. Watts :— 

" Every wicked man is truly miserable ; 
All tyrants are wicked men ; 
Therefore all tyrants are truly miserable. 
He that's always in fear is not happy ; 
Covetous men are always in fear ; 
Therefore covetous men are not happy. 
Whatsoever furthers our salvation is good for us ; 
Some afflictions further our salvation ; 
Therefore some afflictions are good for us. 

* This is the principle of the first figure of syllogistic reasoning ; or, as- Mr. 
Bailey calls it, "class reasoning." The maxim is, "Whatever is predicated 
universally of any class of things, may be predicated in like manner of anything 
comprehended in that class."— See Bailey, p. 64. 



GENUS AND SPECIES. 57 

Nothing that must be repented of is truly desirable ; 
Some pleasures must be repented of; 
Therefore there are some pleasures which are not truly 
desirable." 

Here you will observe, that in the first syllogism, the 
genus is, " Every wicked man," — that is, "All wicked men" 
— and the species, u all tyrants." 

In the second syllogism, " He that's always in fear," is 
the genus, and " covetous man " is the species under that 
genus. 

In the third syllogism, " Whatever furthers our salva- 
tion " is the genus, and " some afflictions " is the species. 

In the fourth syllogism, " Nothing that must be repented 
of" is the genus, and " some pleasures " is the species. 

In natural logic we need not use these syllogisms. We 
should, in the above cases, express our reasons in the 
following manner : — 

All tyrants are truly miserable, because they are wicked 
men. 

Covetous men are not happy, because they are always 
in fear. 

Some afflictions are good for us, because they further 
our salvation. 

Some pleasures are not truly desirable, because they 
must be repented of. 

4. The application of a general principle to a particular 
case, is another mode of reasoning, from the relation of 
genus and species. 

" Masters, give unto your servants that which is just and equal, 
knowing that ye also have a Master in heaven." * 

This general principle is thus applied with reference to 
the servants of public companies : — ■ 

" Be just in your appointments, and select those who are the 
most worthy and the best qualified for the duties they will have 
to discharge. Be just in the amount of your remuneration ; recol- 
lect that many of the servants of public companies have greater 
trusts and heavier responsibilities than the servants of individuals; 
and in this case, it is just and equal that they be rewarded accord- 
ingly. Be just in your promotions, and let not merit be supplanted 
by patronage or favouritism. Be just in the quantity of labour you 

* Col. iv. 1. 

d3 



58 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

exact. Appoint a sufficient number of servants to do the work 
easily. Do not compel them to keep late hours ; nor refuse 
reasonable holidays, for the purposes of health and recreation. 
Be just in your pensions, and let your aged and worn-out servants 
be treated with respect and liberality. Be just in your reproofs. 
Let not your censures or your punishments be more than 
proportionate to the offence; and be as ready at all times 
to acknowledge the merits of your servants as to notice their 
defects. All complaints, and all applications for increased re- 
muneration or privileges, from the servants of public companies, 
should receive mature consideration; and all refusals should be 
given with kindness and courtesy." — Gilbart's Practical Treatise 
on Banking. 

5. In the application of general proverbs we reason from 
the relation of genus and species. 

Thus, " Honesty is the best policy." Therefore, when a 
public company has sustained losses, it is the best policy to 
announce them in its annual report to the shareholders, as 
that is the most honest procedure. This is one of the 
numerous cases to which this maxim may be applied. Dr. 
Franklin describes several specific characters under the 
genus that they " paid too dear for their whistle." And in 
daily life we meet with people to whom is applied the 
maxim, that " they have too many irons in the fire ;" or 
that " they carry too many eggs in one basket ;" or that 
" they are penny wise and pound foolish." In these cases 
the proverb is regarded as the genus, and the particular 
case to which it is applied is the species. This will appear 
the more evident if placed in the form of a syllogism. 

It is unwise to have too many irons in the fire. 

The man who carries on more trades than he can attend 
to, has too many irons in the fire. 

Therefore, the man who carries on more trades than he 
can attend to, acts unwisely. 

6. Rules and examples in any art or science sustain the 
relation to each other of genus and species. 

Take the following general rule in grammar from Lindley 
Murray : — " Two or more nouns, &c. in the singular 
number joined together by a copulative conjunction, 
expressed or understood, must have verbs, nouns, and 
pronouns agreeing with them in the plural number.' 
Here is the general rule. Now, when we meet with two 



GENUS AND SPECIES. 59 

or more nouns, joined together in the manner stated, we 
apply the rule, and if we find that the verbs, nouns, and 
pronouns agreeing with them are put in the plural number, 
we infer that the sentence is grammatical ; but, if other- 
wise, we say the sentence is ungrammatical. Now then, 
try by this rule the following sentences : — " Socrates and 
Plato were wise, they were the most eminent philosophers 
of Greece." Here the rule is observed. " And so was also 
James and John, the sons of Zebedee, who were partners 
with Simon." Here the rule is violated. 

You perceive then that the application of any general 
rule to a particular case, is a logical process, and forms an 
argument on the principle of genus and species. I may 
also observe, that although in teaching an art systema- 
tically, we lay down our rules first, and then give the 
examples, yet, in the practical operations of teaching, espe- 
cially in conversation, it is usually best to state the example 
first, and then state the rule as a deduction from the 
example. Indeed, most general rules were probably in the 
first instance deduced from examples. Men did not invent 
grammar first, and then learn to speak, but speech existed 
before grammar. The same remark may be applied -very 
extensively. Poets existed before critics, and the practical 
arts before the sciences. 

7. Arguments from enumeration may justly be classed 
under genus and species, as the enumeration is either of 
the individuals of a species, or of the species of a genus. 

Sometimes we enumerate the several arguments by 
which an opinion may be supported. Public speakers at 
the close of their address often do this. And judges on 
the bench enumerate, or sum up, as it is called, the argu- 
ments that have been used by the advocates. 

Sometimes, to prove the advantages or disadvantages of 
any engagement or pursuit, we enumerate them. In order 
to show that there is a pleasure in science, Lord Brougham 
thus enumerates the pleasures that it tends to produce : — 

" It is easy to show that there is a positive gratification result- 
ing from the study of the sciences. If it be a pleasure to gratify 
curiosity — to know what we are ignorant of — to have our feelings 
of wonder called forth ; how pure a delight of this very kind does 
natural science hold out to its students ! Recollect some of the 



60 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

extraordinary discoveries of mechanical philosophy. Observe the 
extraordinary truths which optical science discloses. Chemistry 
is not behind in its wonders; and yet these are trifling when 
compared to the prodigies which astronomy opens to our view : 
the enormous masses of the heavenly bodies; their immense dis- 
tances ; their countless numbers ; and their motions, whose swift- 
ness mocks the uttermost efforts of the imagination. Then, if 
we raise our view to the structure of the heavens, we are again 
gratified by tracing accurate, but most unexpected resemblances. 
Is it not in the highest degree interesting to find that the power 
which keeps the earth in its shape, and in its path wheeling round 
the sun, extends over all the other worlds that compose the uni- 
verse, and gives to each its proper place and motion ; that the 
same power keeps the moon in her path round the earth; that the 
same power causes the tides upon our earth, and the peculiar 
form of the earth itself; — and that, after all, it is the same power 
which makes a stone fall to the ground ? To learn these things, 
and to reflect upon them, produces certain as well as pure grati- 
fication." — Sullivan's Literary Class Book. 

In the following quotation, the genus is "various 
writers ;" and Moses, the prophets, the evangelists, &c, are 
enumerated as the species. 

" The various writers of the Bible were themselves persuaded 
that they wrote under Divine inspiration, and claimed the acknow- 
ledgment of that inspiration from others. Moses ascended *the 
mount in the view of all the people, and, surrounded by the 
visible and refulgent glories of the present Deity, he there re- 
ceived the law immediately from his mouth. The economy of 
religion he established included, according to divine institution, 
the symbols of the presiding presence of God, and the means of 
infallibly ascertaining his will, giving the character of divinity to 
the whole. And all its several parts, relating both to faith and 
practice, were devoutly regarded by the Israelitish people, as 
'the words which the Lord their God had commanded them' to 
believe and to do. The prophets uniformly acknowledged their 
belief in the agency of divine influence, calling them from their 
respective avocations in life, revealing to them important religious 
truths previously unconceived, and commissioning them to pro- 
claim those truths in the hearing of the people: — in perfect 
accordance with such an acknowledgment, their several messages 
usually bear the affixment of a signature — at once descriptive of 
their character and origin as divine — ' Thus saith the Lord.' The 
evangelists, though in express terms they do not affirm their own 
inspiration, yet tell us that Christ promised to ' send the Spirit 
of truth to guide them into all truth, and to bring all things to 



GENUS AND SPECIES. 61 

their remembrance, whatsoever he had said unto them ;' and in 
recording such promises they obviously imply, 'that it was in 
virtue of their accomplishment, or by the promised assistance of 
the Spirit, that they were enabled to give a faithful narrative of 
the words and works of their Redeemer.' The apostles, in a 
great variety of texts, and in language the most unequivocal and 
clear, affirm, that 'the things which they taught, God had re- 
vealed them by his Spirit,' and that 'he who despised those 
things, despised not man but God.' The careful and specific 
notification of one or two matters as of private opinion, in con- 
tradistinction to the general tenor of their writings as of divine 
authority, is corroborative of their persuasion in this particular. 
The New Testament, speaking of itself, certifies that the Gospel 
it contains ' was not received of man, but by the revelation of 
Jesus Christ,' — speaking of the Old Testament, it asserts that 
' the prophecy came not in old time, by the will of man, but holy 
men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost ' — 
uniting the Old and the New together in one testimony, it 
declares that ' God, who at sundry times and in divers manners 
spake unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days 
spoken unto us by his Son ' — and in the union of the Old and 
New Testaments closing the canon of divine truth, it solemnly 
affirms ' All scripture is given by inspiration of God :' and ' If any 
man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the 
plagues that are written in this book : and if any man shall take 
away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take 
away his part out of the book of life, and out of the holy city, 
and from the things which are written in this book.' " — Lectures 
on the Holy Bible. By the Rev. Thomas Gilbart, Minister of York 
Street Chapel, Dublin, 1820. 

Sometimes, in regard to public questions, we enumerate 
the parties whose opinions are in favour of the proposed 
measure. There is an excellent example of this kind of 
argument in the Speech delivered in the House of Com- 
mons, by Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, on the Amelioration 
of the Criminal Code. It is copied into the Preface to his 
Life, written by his son. The following example is taken 
from a speech delivered at the Mansion House, in January 
1850, by Mr. Samuel Jones Loyd, now Lord Overstone, in 
favour of the Industrial Exhibition : — 

" It was no longer necessary for them to discuss its character 
or expediency; on these points the public were united. The 
scheme now went forth to the world stamped by the approbation 
and recommendation of our gracious Sovereign, as expressed in the 



62 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

act constituting the Royal Commission, and as further proved 
by the munificent donation with which she had headed the sub- 
scription. It was further stamped with the continued support of 
her illustrious Consort, whose original suggestion it was, and who 
had already been alluded to in terras not more complimentary 
than he deserved • for those who wished to know his true cha- 
racter should see hirn seated at the council board, and observe 
his capacity for conducting complicated public business with 
sagacity, perseverance, and energy. Beyond this the project 
went forth sanctioned by the authority of the Ministers of this 
country, as evidenced by their advising the Crown to issue the 
Royal Commission, and by their presence on this occasion, 
through which so much weight was given to the proceedings of 
the day. It was still further sanctioned by the recorded resolu- 
tions of the people of 'England assembled in almost every great 
district of the empire, and lastly, by the two great meetings held in 
the Egyptian-hall." 

8. Under this head of genus and species we may place 
reasoning from the definition. 

The genus and the specific difference, as we have already 
stated, are joined together to make a formal definition. 
Thus, in the example quoted from Dr. Watts, at page 25, 
juice is the genus, and pressed from grapes the specific 
difference, and those together, the juice of the grape, is the 
definition of wine. A definition formed in this way by the 
union of the genus and the difference, is called by scho- 
lastic logicians a formal definition. We cannot always 
obtain a definition of this kind, but when we can do so, we 
may reason from it in various ways. 

We may infer that everything to which this definition 
will apply are so many species under this generic term. 
Thus, port, sherry, claret, champagne, being all juices of 
grapes, are so many species of wine. All subjects will 
not, as we have said, admit of this formal definition. But 
you may generally commence your definition by stating 
the genus or general nature. Thus, if asked what is justice, 
you may say it is " a moral virtue." This is the genus. 
And then you may state wherein it differs from other 
moral virtues, as temperance, cleanliness, patience, &c. ; 
and you may say, Justice is a moral virtue which consists 
in giving to every one his due. So, if you have seen the 
hippopotamus, and are asked what sort of a thing it is, 
you may say it is an animal that resembles a pig. This is 



GENUS AND SPECIES. 63 

the genus. And then you may state the points wherein it 
differs from a pig ; and this will complete the description. 
Now, having got a definition, you may consider it as 
a species, and affirm of it what you may affirm of the 
genus. Thus, haying defined justice to be a moral virtue, 
you may infer that it ought to be cultivated, inasmuch as 
all the moral virtues ought to be cultivated. Then you 
may consider the definition as a general principle appli- 
cable to individual cases. And as the specific difference of 
justice consists " in giving to every one his due," you will 
infer that a master who defrauds his servant of his wages, 
a tradesman who cheats his creditors, a slanderer who 
speaks ill of worthy men, a magistrate who punishes the 
innocent, or who lets the guilty go free, does not act con- 
sistently with justice, as these parties do not give to every 
one his due. 

But you must not be too precise about this matter of 
definition. If your opponent is disposed to cavil, he may 
easily find fault with any definition you can give. Even 
men of great talent and learning cannot agree among 
themselves upon this subject. The most eminent poli- 
tical economists give different definitions of such plain 
words as capital, profit, rent, wages, — words that we use in 
our ordinary conversation, without fancying that there is 
any difficulty or mystery about them. Sydney Smith, the 
most witty man of his time, was at a loss to find a defini- 
tion for wit, and at the same time is very witty upon the 
definitions he quotes from other writers. Dryden's defini- 
tion of wit, he says, will apply to Blair's Sermons, and 
Pope's to the Funeral Orations of Bossuet. 

9. We reason erroneously from the relation of genus 
and species, when we place under the genus several species 
that do not belong to it, and then assert of each species 
what may be truly asserted of the genus. 

Mrs. Opie, who had previously become a member of the 
Society of Friends, published a book entitled, "Illustra- 
tions of Lying in all its Branches." Under the class of 
•'■' practical lies," she places the practice of wearing false 
hair. This we think is an erroneous classification ; for 
if we use the word liar in the sense in which it is usually 
employed, the wearer of false hair is not a species of that 



64 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

genus. A lie implies something immoral, but we do not 
think it is immoral to conceal defects that are inconvenient 
to the party himself, or that would be unpleasant to the 
beholders. Mrs. Opie's argument stands thus : — 

A liar is one who wishes to deceive. He who wears 
false hair wishes to deceive. Therefore he who wears false 
hair is a liar. 

We may refute this argument in the following ways :- — 
We may say that the words " wishes to deceive," have 
not the same meaning in the first or major proposition 
which they have in the second or minor proposition, and 
hence the two propositions are independent of each other, 
and they have no relation that can be a foundation for any 
reasoning respecting them. (See page 30.) 

Or, we may admit that in both propositions the words 
"wishes to deceive" have the same meaning. But then 
they merely denote a common property — not a specific 
difference — and hence they do not prove that the two 
subjects are the same. Gold is yellow, and saffron is 
yellow, but it does not follow that saffron is gold. So in 
the present case, the common attribute does not prove 
that the two subjects are the same. (See page 32.) 

Or we may reduce the conclusion to an absurdity, thus : 
— AH liars shall have their portion in the lake that burns 
with fire and brimstone. The man who wears false hair 
is a liar. Therefore the man who wears false hair shall 
have his portion in the lake that burns with fire and 
brimstone. This conclusion shows the absurdity of the 
classification. 

In actual life we often meet with erroneous classifica- 
tions of this kind. The words "want of courtesy" is a 
general term, often unjustly applied to individual actions. 
A person goes to transact some business at a public office, 
and is detained much longer than he expected. He be- 
comes irritated, and declares he is treated with want of 
courtesy ; whereas the delay may have been occasioned 
by the necessary forms of the office, or by his own igno- 
rance of those forms. When a servant for some trifling 
oversight is charged with " neglect of duty," it is a fallacy 
of the same kind. The words "neglect of duty," is a 
generic phrase that is applied only to cases of wilful or 



GENUS AND SPECIES. 65 

serious omissions. To apply it in trifling cases is to use 
it illogically. Whenever we wish to represent any act in 
its worst colours, we use generic terms of so wide a mean- 
ing as to include several species of offences of a deeper 
dye than that we are called upon to censure ; and, on the 
other hand, when we wish to extenuate, we employ generic 
terms that shall include only offences of a lighter hue. 
All these are fallacies arising from erroneous classification 
similar to that we have exemplified from Mrs. Opie. 

10. We must also avoid the error of confounding two 
or more species because they belong to the same genus. 

Thus when we find that two species resemble each other 
in some respects (which of course they always must do), 
we should not infer that they resemble each other in all 
respects. For example — 

" He that says you are an animal, says true. He that 
says you are a goose says you are an animal. Therefore he 
that says you are a goose says true." Here the two pre- 
mises are true, and yet the conclusion is absurd. It is true 
that you are an animal, and that a goose is an animal, and 
yet it is not true (of course I mean literally) that you are 
a goose : For you and the goose belong to different species, 
and although you resemble each other so far as to be 
properly classed under the same genus (animal), yet you 
cannot be asserted to be each other. So, dog, horse, camel, 
elephant, are species of animal, but a dog is not a horse, 
nor is a camel an elephant. 

In the case of the genus " animal" we are not in much 
danger of falling into error. But we meet with similar errors 
elsewhere. I have read a debate in the House of Commons 
in which Unitarians were called Mahometans. Both these 
bodies agree in disbelieving the doctrine of the Trinity. 
But under this generic description, they form two widely 
different species, and one cannot logically be confounded 
with the other. You will often observe this practice in 
party writers. They will class the party against whom 
they write with some other party that has a disreputable 
name, and confound them both together under some generic 
description. 

11. In reasoning on this principle we should always be 
on our guard against mere mental classifications. I mean 



66 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

such as exist only in the mind, and not in the nature of 
the things themselves. The following quotation from Dr. 
Watts will explain what I mean. 

" I may borrow a remarkable instance for my purpose almost 
out of every garden, which contains a variety of plants in it. 
Most or all plants agree in this, that they have a root, a stalk, 
leaves, buds, blossoms, and seeds : but the gardener ranges them 
under very different names, as though they were really different 
kinds of beings, merely because of the different use and service 
to which they are applied by men : as for instance, those plants 
whose roots are eaten, shall appropriate the name of roots to 
themselves ; such are carrots, turnips, radishes, &c. If the leaves 
are of chief use to us, then we call them herbs, as sage, mint, 
thyme; if the leaves are eaten raw, they are termed salad, as 
lettuce, purslain ; if boiled, they become pot-herbs, as spinage, 
coleworts ; and some of those plants which are pot-herbs in one 
family are salad in another. If the buds are made our food, they 
are called heads or tops ; so cabbage heads, heads of asparagus 
and artichokes. If the blossom be of most importance, we call 
it a flower ; such are daisies, tulips, and carnations, which are 
the mere blossoms of those plants. If the husk or seeds are 
eaten, they are called the fruits of the ground; as peas, beans, 
strawberries, &c. If any part of the plant be of known and 
common use to us in medicine, we call it a physical herb ; as car- 
duus, scurvy-grass ; but if we count no part useful, we call it a 
weed, and throw it out of the garden ; and yet, perhaps, our next 
neighbour knows some valuable property and use of it ; he plants 
it in his garden, and gives it the title of an herb, or a flower. 

" Now, when things are set in this clear Light, it appears how 
ridiculous it would be for two persons to contend, whether dan- 
delion be an herb or a weed; whether it be a pot-herb or a salad; 
when, by the custom or fancy of different families, this one plant 
obtains all these names, according to the several uses of it, and 
the value that is put upon it." 

A dispute somewhat similar to what is here intimated 
took place between Mr. Maculloch and Mr. Malthus upon 
the classification of labourers into productive and unpro- 
ductive. Mr. Malthus, following Adam Smith, applied the 
word productive to such labourers only whose exertions 
directly produced material wealth. Mr. Maculloch ex- 
tended the word so as to include those also whose labour 
indirectly produced wealth. Hence arose the important 
question, whether a dancer at the opera should be styled 
a productive or an unproductive labourer 1 Some good 



GENUS AND SPECIES. 67 

paper and printing were expended in this wordy warfare. 
And after all, it was only a dispute about classification, for 
in other respects the antagonists did not differ in opinion. 
This example may teach us to use caution in the choice 
of the words we employ to denote our classifications. The 
words productive and unproductive seem to convey praise 
and censure. Had other words been employed, Adam 
Smith's distinction would not probably have been thought 
worthy of so much reproach.* 

12. In reasoning from this relation of genus and species, 
we should carefully notice the kind of universality which 
is attributable to the genus ; for, if the general proposition 
be taken in too extensive a sense, the conclusion will be 
erroneous. On this subject we quote Dr. Watts : — 

" Universal terms may either denote a mathematical, a physical, 
or a moral universality. 

" A mathematical universality, is when all the particulars con- 
tained under any general idea have the same predicate belonging 
to them without any exception whatsoever ; or when the predi- 
cate is so essential to the universal subject, that it destroys the 
very nature of the subject to be without it ; as, All circles have 
a centre and circumference : All spirits in their own nature are 
immortal. 

" A physical or natural universality, is when, according to the 
order and common course of nature, a predicate agrees to all the 
subjects of that kind, though there may be some accidental and 
preternatural exceptions ; as, All men use words to express their 
thoughts, yet dumb persons are excepted, for they cannot speak. 
All beasts have four feet, yet there may be some monsters with 
five ; or maimed, who have but three. 

"A moral universality, is when the predicate agrees to the 
greatest part of the particulars which are contained under the 
universal subject; as, All negroes are stupid creatures : All men 
are governed by affection rather than by reason: All the old 
Romans loved their country: and the scripture uses this language 
when St. Paul tells us, ' The Cretes are always bars/ 

" Now it is evident, that a special or singular conclusion cannot 
be inferred from a moral universality, nor always and infallibly 
from a physical one, though it may be always inferred from a 
universality which is mathematical, without any danger or possi- 
bility of a mistake. 

* We fear Mr. Bailey has committed an error of this kind in dividing reasoning 
into demonstrative and contingent (page 5). In defiance of all explanation the 
mind -will associate some degree of uncertainty with the word " contingent." 



68 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

" Let it be observed also, that usually we make little or no 
distinction in common language, between a subject that is physi- 
cally or mathematically universal." 

You will find that some political economists lay down 
general propositions, and reason from them as though they 
possessed a mathematical universality. But, from the 
nature of the science, this cannot be the case. It is a 
moral science, and its general propositions have only a 
moral universality. I mean that these rules have a good 
many exceptions. For example ; ©ne of its principles is, 
that the Government should not interfere with matters of 
trade — a very good rule, as a general rule ; but when we 
are told that this rule is so inflexible that the Government 
must not interfere even in behalf of humanity and religion, 
then we contend that its advocates claim for this rule 
a universality to which it is not entitled. In this sense 
we deny the soundness of the rule. Nay, even those 
political economists who maintain most strongly this 
principle, maintain at the same time that the Govern- 
ment ought to pass laws for the regulation of the currency 
— a subject with which trade has a very close affinity. 

It is rarely that a mathematical universality can be 
obtained with regard to those propositions that we usually 
act upon in ordinary life. We believe that all noblemen 
have honourable and patriotic feelings — that all judges are 
impartial in their decisions — that all London merchants 
are honest in their dealings — that no clergyman would tell 
an untruth — that our friends, whose constancy we have 
tried, will never desert us — that a man who has main- 
tained a high reputation for thirty years will maintain it 
as long as he lives. But we have only moral evidence 
for all these propositions, and we can get no more. He 
who, in these and similar instances, would refuse to act 
until he should obtain mathematical evidence, would show 
a want of that wisdom and decision which are essential to 
the good administration of the affairs either of a family, a 
commercial establishment, or a political community. 

13. We may observe, that all arguments formed on the 
relation of subject and attribute may also be brought 
under the relation of genus and species. 

All subjects may be distributed into class:s, according to 



GENUS AND SPECIES. 69 

their attributes. Thus, some horses are of a grey colour, 
Now, we may consider grey as an attribute of the horses, 
or we may consider grey horses as forming a class, and our 
reasonings will be substantially the same, though, perhaps, 
changed in regard to form. Let us take an example from 
Dr. Watts :— 

" No liar is fit to be believed. 

Every good christian is fit to be believed. 

Therefore, no good christian is a liar." 

Here the words " fit to be believed" express an attri- 
bute, and, as this attribute will not apply to both the 
subjects, we infer that these subjects are different. See 
page 40. 

But let us suppose that these words " fit to be believed" 
denote a class, then the argument will stand thus : — 

" No man who is fit to be believed is a liar. 
Every good christian is fit to be believed. 
Therefore, no good christian is a liar." 

Here "fit to be believed" denotes a class of persons, and 
" a good christian " is one of that class. 

Let us take another instance of a different kind : — 

" Whosoever loves God shall be saved. 
All the lovers of God have their imperfections. 
Therefore, some who have imperfections shall be saved." 

Here we consider "shall be saved" and "have their 
imperfections," as denoting attributes, and as these attri- 
butes belong to the same subject, we infer they are not 
incompatible with each other. See page 39. But we may 
put the argument in a different form ; we may consider 
the words, " lovers of God," as denoting a class or genus, 
and " some who have imperfections," as a species under 
that class. The reasoning would then stand thus : — 

" All the lovers of God shall be saved. 

Some who have imperfections are lovers of God. 
Therefore, some who have imperfections shall be saved." 

14. So, arguments founded on the principle of cause and 
effect may be brought under the principle of genus and 
species. 

One of the examples taken from Dr. Watts will exem- 
plify this. " Some afflictions are good for us, because they 



70 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

further our salvation." Here we have evidently cause and 
effect, and this, in fact, is the best mode of stating the 
argument. But in the syllogism, Dr. Watts makes a class 
of " all those things that further our salvation," and then 
"some afflictions" become a subordinate class under that 
larger class, a species under a genus. 

Whatsoever furthers our salvation is good for us. 
Some afflictions further our salvation. 
Therefore some afflictions are good for us. 
Again, "A good education is highly valuable, for it 
softens the manners, and ameliorates the dispositions of 
the heart." Here is the relation of cause and effect. But 
a scholastic logician would not be satisfied with the argu- 
ment in this form, but would turn it into genus and 
species. This is done by making the effect a genus, and 
the cause a species, thus : — 

" Everything that softens the manners, and ameliorates 
the disposition of the heart, is highly valuable. 

But a good education softens the manners, and amelio- 
rates the dispositions of the heart. 

Therefore, a good education is highly valuable." 

You will observe, that this relation of genus and species 
does not strengthen your argument. It rather weakens 
it ; or, at least, it widens the field of objection. An 
opponent might deny your first proposition. He might 
say, "I do not admit that everything that softens the 
manners and ameliorates the disposition of the heart is 
highly valuable : For there are some things that produce 
these effects, but at the same time produce other effects of 
a dangerous character. Such things, for instance, it might 
be said, are theatrical exhibitions." Here you see a new 
field of argumentation is at once thrown open. Had you 
stuck to your original principle of cause and effect, you 
would have been on safer ground. It is never advisable 
in argumentation to put yourself in a position to be called 
upon to prove the affirmative of a universal proposition. 
If a single exception can be adduced, your proposition is 
refuted, and your argument is overthrown. 

It is generally best to argue from those principles of 
reasoning which arise from the relation of the things 



GENUS AND SPECIES. 71 

themselves, and not to attempt by mere verbal changes 
to bring your reasonings under a different principle. You 
should be on your guard against this practice, lest you fall 
into that system of scholastic logic which refers only to the 
use of words, and leaves unnoticed the nature of things. 



SECTION IV. 

THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT PHYSICAL CAUSES. 

The Relation of Cause and Effect is a principle of exten- 
sive use in the art of reasoning. But as causes are of 
various kinds, we must consider them separately in dif- 
ferent sections ; and in this section we shall confine our 
attention to those causes that refer to material substances, 
and are consequently styled physical. We shall, in the 
subsequent sections, consider those causes that are moral, 
conditional, and final. We may observe, with regard to 
these four kinds of causes — physical, moral, conditional, 
and final — the first has reference to the physical sciences, 
as botany, physiology, geography, chemistry, &c. ; the 
second has a reference to the sciences of politics and 
political economy ; the third has a reference to jurispru- 
dence and the affairs of ordinary life ; the fourth has a 
reference to ethics and theology. We do not mean an 
exclusive reference, but a general reference. 

1. The first class of causes we call physical causes. To 
this class of causes we refer all those effects which are pro- 
duced by the uniform and necessary operations of nature. 
Thus, it is an established law of nature that the earth 
should move round the sun, and that the moon should 
move round the earth. All the phenomena which result 
from the revolutions of the heavenly bodies are the result 
of natural causes. It is a law of nature that all bodies on 
the earth should tend towards the centre ; and that dif- 
ferent kinds of matter, whether fluid or solid, should have 
certain properties, and that some of them should have an 
affinity for each other. Hence, all reasonings connected 
with astronomy, mechanics, chemistry, and the other 



72 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

branches of experimental philosophy, are founded on 
natural causes. The reasonings founded on this class of 
causes amount to demonstration. The cause necessarily 
and invariably produces the effect. The following are 
examples : — 

" He sendeth the springs into the valleys, which run among 
the hills. They give drink to every beast of the field : the wild 
asses quench their thirst. By them the fowls of the heaven have 
their habitation, which sing among the branches. He watereth 
the hills from his chambers. He causeth the grass to grow for 
the cattle, and herb for the service of man : that he may bring 
forth food out of the earth ; and wine that maketh glad the heart 
of man, and oil to make his face to shine, and bread which 
strengthened man's heart/ 5 — Psalm civ. 10—15. 

" The benefits arising from the winds are almost innumerable ; 
they purify the air, moderate the heat, dry wet lands and damp 
houses, chase away the fogs and hazy weather, and bring us rain 
in due season ; also frost and snow, and even mild weather. 
They are particularly serviceable for navigation and commerce. 
When the air is so full of heavy vapours that it can no longer 
sustain them, then these small moist particles run together, and 
fall down in fine drops, which we call rain. The rain descending 
in drops is a further manifestation of Divine wisdom ; for if it 
fell in strong streams it would injure the earth, by washing away 
its fine light mould from the roots and seeds of plants ; and we 
should suffer great inconvenience from it." — Joyce's Catechism 
of Nature. 

11 The annual overflowing of the Kile is caused by the periodical 
rains in Ethiopia. The river begins to rise in the latter end of 
June, and attains its utmost height about the middle of August, 
when Egypt presents the appearance of a vast sea, while the cities 
and towns appear like so many islands ; after this the waters 
gradually subside, and about the end of November the river has 
returned to its ordinary limits. During this period the earth, or 
mud, which the waters held in solution, has fallen on the soil ; 
and on the retiring of the waters, the whole land is covered with 
a rich manure ; and, according to Herodotus, required so little 
cultivation, that, in some cases, it was only necessary that the 
seed should be thrown upon the surface, and trodden down by 
pigs." — Lectures on Ancient Commerce. 

2. There are four ways of reasoning in regard to these 
physical causes. First, from the existence of the cause, we 
may infer the existence of the effect ; if the sun has arisen, 



PHYSICAL CAUSES. 73 

we know it must be day ; if the earth comes between the 
sun and the moon, the moon will be eclipsed : if a body, of 
less specific gravity than water, be thrown into water, we 
know it will float. If fire be applied to gunpowder, an 
explosion will take place ; if the colours blue and yellow 
be mixed together, they will produce a green ; if a man 
has had his head cut off, we may infer that he is dead. 
The second mode of reasoning is, from the existence of 
the effect to infer the existence of the cause. All theories 
or systems are founded upon this mode of reasoning. We 
observe the appearances of nature, and we endeavour to 
ascertain the causes which have produced them : if we see 
an abundant harvest, we may infer that the land is good. 
The third mode of reasoning is, from the non-existence of 
the cause to infer the non-existence of the effect : in the 
deserts of Arabia there is no rain, consequently there can 
be no vegetation. The fourth mode of reasoning is, from 
the non-existence of the effect to infer the non-existence 
of the cause : the streets are not wet, therefore it cannot 
have rained recently. 

Upon the farther application of this principle to reason- 
ing we quote Dr. Watts : — 

" There is a system of beings round about us, of which we our- 
selves are a part, which we call the world, and in this world there 
is a course of nature, or a settled order of causes, effects, antece- 
dents, concomitants, consequences, &c. from which the Author of 
Nature doth not vary but upon very important occasions. 

"Where antecedents, concomitants, and consequents, causes 
and effects, signs and things signified, subjects and adjuncts, are 
necessarily connected with each other, we may infer the causes 
from the effects, and effects from causes, the antecedents from 
the consequents, as well as consequents from antecedents, &c, 
and thereby be pretty certain of many things both past, present, 
and to come. It is by this principle that astrondmers can tell 
what day and hour the sun and moon were eclipsed five hundred 
years ago, and predict all future eclipses as long as the world 
shall stand. They can tell precisely at what minute the sun rises 
or sets this day at Pequin in China, or what altitudes the dog-star 
had at midnight or midnoon in Rome on the day when Julius 
Caesar was slain. Gardeners upon the same principle can foretell 
the months when every plant will be in bloom, and the ploughman 
knows the weeks of harvest : we are sure, if there be a chicken, 
there was an egg ; if there be a rainbow, we are certain it rains, 



74 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

not far off ; if we behold a tree growing on the earth, we know it 
has naturally a root under ground. 

"Where there is a necessary connexion between causes and 
effects, antecedents and consequents, signs and things signified, 
we know also that like causes will have like effects, and propor- 
tionable causes will have proportionable effects, contrary causes 
will have contrary effects ; and observing men may form many 
judgments by the rules of similitude and proportion, where the 
causes, effects, &c. are not entirely the same. 

" Where there is but a probable and uncertain connexion be- 
tween antecedents, concomitants, and consequents, we can give 
but a conjecture, or a probable determination. If the clouds 
gather, or the weather-glass sinks, we suppose it will rain : if a 
man spit blood frequently with coughing, we suppose his lungs 
are hurt : if verv dangerous symptoms appear, we expect his 
death." 

3. We are in danger of false reasoning when we ascribe 
effects to wrong causes. 

Thus, for many ages the appearances of the celestial 
bodies were ascribed to their motion round the earth ; 
whereas it has since been demonstrated that these effects 
could not be produced by such a cause. The French 
philosopher, Des Cartes, imagined certain whirlpools in 
the atmosphere, by which he attempted to account for the 
appearances of nature. Thunder and lightning, earth- 
quakes and volcanoes, are effects which have been ascribed 
to a variety of causes, according to the hypotheses of 
different philosophers : The flux and reflux of the tide, 
the origin of rivers, the phenomena of electricity, and 
many other appearances connected with natural philo- 
sophy, have furnished curious specimens of false reasoning 
in assigning causes. 

" I would make this matter a little plainer still by instances 
borrowed from the peripatetic philosophy, which was once taught 
in all the schools. The professor fancies he has assigned the true 
reason why all heavy bodies tend downward, why amber will draw 
feathers or straws, and the loadstone draw iron, when he tells you 
that this is done by certain gravitating and attractive qualities, 
which proceed from the substantial forms of those various bodies. 
He imagines that he has explained why the loadstone's north pole 
shall repel the north end of a magnetic needle, and attract the 
south, when he affirms that this is done by its sympathy with one 
end of it, and its antipathy against the other end. Whereas in 



PHYSICAL CAUSES. 75 

truth, all these names of sympathy, antipathy, substantial forms, 
and qualities, when they are put for the causes of these effects 
in bodies, are but hard words, which only express a learned and 
pompous ignorance of the true cause of natural appearances." 
—Watts. 

Writers on metaphysics have also adopted theories cal- 
culated to weaken our confidence in the relation of physical 
causes and effects. The most remarkable of these writers 
is Bishop Berkeley — " Since, he asks, the mind does not 
perceive physical objects, but merely the images of those 
objects formed in the eye, how do you know that any such 
objects exist." To this we may reply, that the representa- 
tion formed in the eye, is the effect of the external objects, 
and is in itself a proof of their existence. When we look 
at an object through a telescope, we know that the object 
exists, though we see only the image formed by the specu- 
lum. Mr. Mill observes in his System of Logic : — 

(C I affirm that I saw my brother at a certain hour this morning. 
If any proposition concerning a matter of fact would commonly 
be said to be known by the direct testimony of the senses, this 
surely would be so. The truth, however, is far otherwise. I 
only saw a certain coloured surface, or rather I had the kind of 
visual sensations which are usually produced by a coloured sur- 
face, and from these, as marks known to be such by previous 
experience, I concluded that I saw my brother." — Mill's Lope, 
vol. ii. p. 208. 

Upon this theory we should suppose, that as soon as 
an infant can recognise its mother, it has begun to draw 
conclusions, and has also had sufficient experience in the 
arts to know that a human body may be represented on a 
coloured surface. 

To all theories of this description we may reply in the 
words of Dr. Watts : — 

" Though onr senses are sometimes liable to be deceived, yet 
when they are rightly disposed, and fitly exercised about their 
proper objects, with the just assistance of reason, they give us 
sufficient evidence of truth. 

" This may be proved by an argument drawn from the wisdom, 

goodness, and faithfulness of God onr Creator. It was he gave us 

our senses, and he would not make us of such a constitution as to 

be liable to perpetual deception, and unavoidable error, in using 

E2 



76 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

these faculties of sense in the best manner we are capable of, 
about those verj things which are the proper objects of them. 

" This may be proved also by the ill consequences that would 
follow from the supposition of the contrary. If we could have no 
certainty of the dictates of our senses, we could never be sure of 
any of the common affairs and occurrences of life. Men could 
not transact any of their civil or moral concerns with any cer- 
tainty of justice ; nor indeed could we eat or drink, walk or move, 
with safety. Our senses direct us in all these. 

"Again, the matters of religion depend in some measure upon 
the certainty of the dictates of sense: for faith comes by hearing ; 
and it is to our senses that God appeals in working miracles to 
prove his own revelation. Now if when our eyes and ears, and 
other organs of sense, are rightly disposed and exercised about 
their proper objects, they were always liable to be deceived, there 
could be no knowledge of the gospel, no proof of divine revela- 
tion by visions, voices, or miracles." 

4. To prove the connexion between a physical canse and 
its effects, is not the province of reasoning, but of obser- 
vation and experiment. 

During the middle ages, the scholastic logicians treated 
the physical sciences in the way intimated by Dr. Watts. 
Lord Bacon first advocated the necessity of a different 
course. Soon afterwards, the " Royal Society, for the im- 
provement of Natural Science," was established, and its trans- 
actions were very influential to leading to a more accurate 
mode of ascertaining the causes of natural phenomena. 

" But it must not be forgotten how much is due to Lord 
Bacon, who died only thirty-six years before the incorpo- 
ration of the Royal Society. With a comprehensive and 
commanding mind, patient in inquiry, subtile in discrimi- 
nation, neither affecting novelty, nor idolizing antiquity, 
Bacon formed, and in a great measure executed, his great 
work, on the Instauration of the Sciences, which being 
clearly connected in its main features with the Royal 
Society, connects itself with our inquiry. The design was 
divided into six capital divisions. The first proposes a 
general survey of human knowledge, and is executed in 
the admirable treatise, The Advancement of Learning. In 
this Lord Bacon critically examines the state of learning 
in its various branches at that period, observes and points 
our defects and errors, and then suggests proper means for 
supplying omissions and rectifying mistakes. 



PHYSICAL CAUSES. 77 

" The second, and the most considerable part, is the 
Novum Organum, in which the author, rejecting syllogism 
as a mere instrument of disputation, and putting no trust 
in the hypothetical systems of ancient philosophy, recom- 
mends the more slow, but more satisfactory method of 
induction, which subjects natural objects to the test of 
observation and experience, and subdues nature by experi- 
ment and inquiry. It will be seen how rigidly the early 
Fellows of the Royal Society followed Bacon's advice." 

" Whilst the memory of this great man was cherished, 
and the spirit of his philosophy abroad, the establishment 
of the Royal Society was accomplished. A great number 
of eminent men existed at that period in England, nearly 
all of whom were warmly interested in the progress of 
science ; and it thus only required the cessation of domestic 
troubles, to cause their attention to be turned to experi- 
mental philosophy." 

In the year 1662 the Royal Society obtained a charter 
of incorporation from Charles II. The following is an 
extract from the preamble : — 

" And, whereas we are well informed, that a competent 
number of persons, of eminent learning, ingenuity, and 
honour, concording in their inclinations and studies towards 
this employment, have for some time accustomed them- 
selves to meet weekly, and orderly, to confer about the 
hidden causes of things, with a design to establish certain, 
and correct uncertain theories in philosophy, and by their 
labours in the disquisition of nature, to prove themselves 
real benefactors to mankind ; and that they have already 
made a considerable progress by divers useful and remark- 
able discoveries, inventions, and experiments in the im- 
provement of mathematics, mechanics, astronomy, naviga- 
tion, physic, and chemistry, we have determined to grant 
our Royal favour, patronage, and all due encouragement 
to this illustrious assembly, and so beneficial and laudable 
an enterprise." — History of the Royal Society, by G. R. Weld. 

It has been asserted that the Incorporation of the 
Royal Society was the only wise act of Charles II. On 
one occasion the merry monarch is said to have asked 
a company of philosophers how they could account for 
the fact that if a live fish were put into a vessel of 



78 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

water, the vessel would weigh no heavier than before. 
Some of them learnedly discussed the question, broaching 
several theories respecting the properties of water and air, 
the phenomena of life, &c. At last the king said to one 
who had not previously spoken on the subject, "Well, 
doctor, how do you account for this 1 He replied, Before 
I assign any cause for it, I should like to ascertain the 
fact : suppose we make the experiment. A vessel of water 
was accordingly brought in and weighed; a live fish was 
then put into the water : and behold, the weight of the 
vessel was increased by precisely the weight of the fish. 

To form theories without investigating the facts was the 
method of the Aristotelian Philosophy. To ascertain the 
facts first by experiment was the method introduced and 
recommended by Lord Bacon. 

5. The sciences of medicine, politics, and political eco- 
nomy, are partly physical, partly moral. You maintain 
your health by wholesome diet, pure air, early rising, 
occupation, and exercise. These are physical causes. It is 
also maintained by the discipline of the mind, and the 
government of the passions. These are moral causes. 

Under the head of physical causes and effects we include 
those which refer to living animals. Our knowledge here 
is derived from observation. But still there is much room 
for reasoning. We may inflate a balloon with certainty 
whenever we please ; but we cannot with equal certainty 
fatten an ox. There is an art in this. Some kinds of 
cattle will fatten sooner than others ; and some kinds of 
food will produce fat sooner than others. To ascertain the 
cheapest and best modes of fattening, we must have recourse 
to experiments. The results of such experiments are exhi- 
bited at the agricultural shows. We sometimes read in 
the public papers complaints against the excessive fattening 
of cattle, inasmuch as these cattle become unfit for food. 
We think these complaints have no solid foundation. The 
cattle are not fattened for food ; they are fattened to teach 
the art of fattening : And whether these few cattle thus 
fattened to excess should be eaten or not, is a matter of 
little importance, as compared with the practical know- 
ledge which by this means the agriculturist may be able 
to obtain. 



PHYSICAL CAUSES. 79 

The human body is an animal. But from its union to 
mind it is less than other animals under the control of 
physical agencies. We cannot fatten a man with as much 
certainty as we can fatten an ox. A tradesman on the 
verge of bankruptcy, a lady languishing with a broken 
heart, would from anxiety of mind baffle all attempts to 
make them fat. But when the mind is unoccupied, the 
body will yield to physical treatment. Pugilists and 
pedestrians undergo a course of training previous to their 
performances. By a regular course of diet and exercise, 
strength and agility are greatly increased. 

The science of medicine is founded on experiments. 
What effect any substance taken into the stomach would 
produce generally upon the body could only be known at 
first by making the trial. But in the use of new medi- 
cines, and in the application of medicines generally to 
different constitutions, there is much need of sound rea- 
soning. But after all, the result is the only test of medical 
skill. The surest proof of good treatment is the recovery 
of the patient. 

Homoeopathy must likewise be tested by experiments. 
The homoeopathists contend that every disease has a specific 
remedy. This remedy will cure the disease with as much 
certainty as bark cures ague or as acids cure scurvy. They 
say they have discovered all these specifie remedies. This 
is the fundamental principle of the system. The doctrine 
of small doses is subordinate. - They say that by tritura- 
tion the power of medicines is so much increased, that a 
small dose will have a greater effect than a larger dose 
which has not undergone this operation. These are the 
two main principles of homoeopathy. Their truth must be 
proved by experiment, not by reasoning. But reasoning- 
may be useful in deciding on the best ways of making the 
experiments. 

The relation between physical causes and effects is first 
proved by observation and experiment. Having ascer- 
tained this, we employ reasoning for the purpose of apply- 
ing this knowledge to a practical purpose. For instance, 
we ascertain, not by reasoning, but by experiment or 
observation, that fire will turn water into steam ; and then 
by reasoning we apply that steam to work an engine. 



80 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 



SECTION V. 

THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT — MORAL CAUSES. 

While physical causes refer to the operations of matter, 
moral causes refer to the operations of mind. The former 
relate to the sciences of chemistry, geology, astronomy and 
other physical sciences. The latter relate to moral philo- 
sophy, political economy, and those other sciences that 
relate to the acts and habits of intelligent beings. We 
trace the operations of these causes, with reference to indi- 
viduals, families, and nations. 

1. The following are examples of moral causes and 
effects : — 

" Who hath woe ? Who hatli sorrow ? 
Who hath contentions ? Who hath babbling ? 
Who hath wounds without cause ? Who hath redness of eyes ? 
They that tarry long at the wine ; 
They that go to seek mixed wine." — Prov. xxiii. 29, 30. 

" Certainly," says Sydney Smith, " the two human beings who 
have had the greatest influence upon the understandings of mankind 
have been Aristotle and Lord Bacon. To Lord Bacon we are 
indebted for an almost daily extension of our knowledge of the 
laws of nature in the outward world ; and the same modest and 
cautious spirit of mquiry, extended to moral philosophy, will pro- 
bably at last give us clear, intelligible ideas of our spiritual nature. 
Every succeeding year is an additional confirmation to us that we 
are travelling in the true path of knowledge ; and as it brings in 
fresh tributes of science for the increase of human happiness, it 
extorts from us fresh tributes of praise to the guide and father of 
true philosophy. To the understanding of Aristotle, equally vast, 
perhaps, and equally original, we are indebted for fifteen hundred 
years of quibbling and ignorance, in which the earth fell under 
the tyranny of words, and philosophers quarrelled with one 
another, like drunken men in dark rooms, who hate peace without 
knowing why they fight, or seeing how to take aim." — Smith's 
Moral Philosophy. 

"It is a doctrine of Mr. Hume, in his 'Essay on Money,' that 
an influx of the precious metals gives great encouragement to 
industry, during the interval which elapses before the prices of 
commodities are adjusted to the increased quantity of specie. 



MORAL CAUSES. 81 

'We find/ says he, 'that in every kingdom into which, money 
begins to flow in greater abundance than formerly, everything 
takes a new face: labour and industry gain life; the merchant 
becomes more enterprising, the manufacturer more diligent and 
skilful, and even the farmer follows his plough with greater 
alacrity and attention. In my opinion,' he continues, ' it is only 
in this interval, or intermediate situation, between the acquisi- 
tion of money and rise of prices, that the increased quantity of 
gold and silver is favourable to industry. 5 " — Questions on Poli- 
tical Economy. 

" We hold that a Church Establishment is the most effective of 
all machines for the moral instruction of the people, and that, if 
once taken down, there is no other instrumentality by which it 
can be adequately replaced. We are aware, that it may be feebly 
and even corruptly administered; but the way to rectify tins, is 
not to demolish the apparatus, but to direct its movements. It 
is the means of turning so much unproductive into productive 
consumption. "Without a church the whole of our ecclesiastical 
wealth would have been in the hands of those who give no return 
for it. With a church we have the return of all its usefulness — 
its theological learning — the protection which it affords against a 
desolating infidelity — the service which it renders to the morality 
of the commonwealth — and, above all, to the eternal well-being 
of the individual members who compose it." — Br. Chalmen 
Political ~ 



" To all who desire a clear, common-sense, and eminently prac- 
tical system of logic, and do not object to the volume that 
contains it comprising also a most entertaining series of extracts 
from some of the ablest pieces of modern argumentation, we 
heartily commend this 'Logic for the Million.' We know not 
where a young man desirous of self-cultivation could more 
certainly or more pleasurably find it than in this volume. He 
will only have himself to blame if he does not rise from its study 
with clearer thought, invigorated powers, and a mind enriched by 
some of the best good sense of our best writers." — Weekly News. 

" Even with reference to the parts of any single nation, it is 
the lack of facility of intercourse which is the acknowledged cause 
of all that is defective in the rural population. It perpetuates 
peculiarities of idiom and of pronunciation, local prejudices, 
inactivity of mind, roughness of manner, and subjection to the 
power of superstition. Everything, therefore, which -quickens 
circulation or facilitates intercourse between either the different 
members of the same nation, or between members of different 
nations, is calculated to promote the general welfare." — The 
Great Exhibition Prize Essay. By the Rev. J. G. Whish, M.A. 
e3 



82 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

2. With regard to moral causes, we may adopt the fol- 
lowing modes of reasoning. 

First. From the existence of the cause we may infer the 
existence of the effect. Thus, if a man be industrious, vre 
may infer that he will get rich. If a man be given to 
intoxication, we may infer that he will reduce himself to 
beggary. If a man exercise his intellectual faculties, we 
know he will improve them. 

Secondly. From the existence of the effect we may 
infer the existence of the cause. Thus, if a servant enjoy 
in a high degree the confidence of his master, we may infer 
that he has served him well. If a man be involved in 
debts which he is unable to pay, we may infer that he has 
been either imprudent or unfortunate. 

Thirdly. From the non-existence of the cause, we may 
infer the non-existence of the effect. Thus, if a man has 
not been unfortunate nor improvident, we may argue that 
he cannot be poor. 

Fourthly. From the non-existence of the effect we may 
infer the non-existence of the cause. Thus, we may say, 
such a person is not poor; he cannot then have been 
extravagant. Such a person is not an intelligent man; he 
cannot, then, have spent much time in reading and study. 
He does not speak correctly; therefore he cannot have 
learned grammar. On one occasion when speaking to the 
working classes Rowland Hill observed, — "I don't think 
much of that man's religion who is without his Sunday 
coat, when a good Providence gives him plenty of work." — 
(Sherman.) 

3. In the relation of moral causes and effects, we have, 
generally, in the first instance, to prove by reasoning that 
such a relation exists. 

If, for instance, I contend that education produces good 
morals, and hence, ask my neighbours to assist me in esta- 
blishing a school for the poor, — I may be asked to prove, 
in the first instance, that education does produce good 
morals ; for, unless I can prove the relation of cause and 
effect in this case, my efforts will be unavailing. So in 
many of the acts of ordinary life, and in nearly all our 
public proceedings, whether a certain cause will produce a 
certain effect is, in fact, the whole question in dispute. 



MORAL CAUSES. 83 

In reasoning upon moral causes, we are exposed to much 
difficulty from the circumstance, that one effect is often 
produced by a variety of causes. 

The greatest sophistry arises from imputing to one par- 
ticular cause an effect which results from the joint opera- 
tion of many causes. Thus, the ruin of an individual may 
be the consequence of the accidental burning of his house ; 
of imprudent conduct ; of the treachery of friends, and of 
robbery by thieves. The fall of a state may be the effect 
of the united operation of a tyrannical government, a sedi- 
tious people, the encroachments of a foreign enemy, and 
pestilence and famine. Now, should a person take the 
effect, and argue that it was produced solely by one cause, 
he would be in error. 

We shall also fall into error if we deny the existence of 
any one cause, because other causes contributed to produce 
the effect. 

Thus, it has been contended that Sir Robert Peel's Act 
for Regulating the Currency, passed in the year 1844, was 
a cause of the commercial distress that occurred in the 
year 1847. In reply, it was contended, that the distress 
of 1847 was produced by the famine in Ireland and the 
speculations in railways. Now this is no refutation of the 
former opinion ; for all the three causes may have united 
in producing the same effect. 

We should also fall into error were we to infer, that of 
two events one is the cause of the other, merely because it 
occurred first in the order of time. 

This fallacy is often ridiculed by a reference to the 
building of Tenterden steeple being the cause of the Good- 
win sands. The story is told, I believe, by Bishop Latimer. 
There was a time when the Goodwin sands, which lie in 
the neighbourhood of Dover, did not exist. Sometime 
after they had collected, Government commissioners were 
appointed to ascertain the cause. They accordingly pro- 
ceeded to the spot to examine witnesses. Among others, 
an old man assured them that the cause of the Goodwin 
sands was the building of the Tenterden steeple. They 
asked him how this could be. He stated, he could not 
tell how, but he knew it was so ; for he recollected that 
when there was no steeple there were no sands, but soon 



84 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

after the building of the steeple in came the sands. He, 
therefore, inferred that the building of the steeple was the 
cause of the sands. 

We shall give an example of the way in which this allu- 
sion is applied. 

The following argument is taken from the " Sophisms 
of Free Trade, by a Barrister." 

" All great manufactures had their origin in the protective 
system. Take our own, the greatest and least sickly of any. 
All our own manufactures took their rise in a system of protective 
duties, so high as to amount to prohibitions. In addition to this, 
owing to the fearful hostilities that raged in Europe for nearly 
a quarter of a century before 1815, we enjoyed a further acci- 
dental monopoly of the manufacturing industry of the world. 
And this stringent protection has not only created manufactures, 
but created them where they would not naturally have existed, in 
spite of great natural disadvantages. Other nations have coal 
and iron ore as well as we. The United States are even richer 
in this respect. But other nations have, also, what we have not, 
they have native raw materials. It has been justly observed, that 
Great Britain is singularly poor in the raw materials which con- 
stitute the basis of the greater portion of her manufacturing in- 
dustry. We have no cotton, no silk, no fine wool. Even our best 
iron for the manufacture of hardware, comes from Sweden ; our 
oils, gums, colours, woods, from the ends of the earth. 

" Next to us in manufacturing industry, is France. Her 
manufacturing industry, thougli still inferior to ours, has never- 
theless, since the peace, augmented in an even greater ratio, but 
under strict and jealous protection." — Sophisms of Free Trade, by 
a Barrister.] 

The following reply is taken from " Free Trade and its 
so-called Sophisms." 

" There is no doubt that, until recently, the governments of 
almost all countries considered that the way to establish an 
industry, and make it prosper, was to 'protect' it; and conse- 
quently, whenever an industry flourishes simultaneously with 
the existence of protection, a great shout of triumph is raised, as 
if the former were dependent on the latter — the old fallacy of 
post hoe, ergo propter hoc. It is only necessary to refer to the 
well-known case of Tenterden steeple and the Goodwin sands for 
an illustration." — Free Trade and its so-called Sophisms. 

The reader will observe, that the Barrister's argument 
with regard to manufactures is, that in several countries 
protection preceded prosperity ; and he infers that pro- 



MORAL CAUSES. 85 

tection was the cause of prosperity. His opponent replies, 
that though protection preceded prosperity, it was not the 
cause of prosperity ; the two facts having no more relation 
to each other than Tenterden steeple and the Goodwin sands. 

In order to prove that two events sustain the relation 
to each other of cause and effect, it is necessary to show, 
first, that the two events did actually occur ; secondly, that 
the event which we call the cause, occurred in the order 
of time before the effect ; and, thirdly, that there was an 
adaptation in the cause to produce the effect. In refutation 
we may state, that one or both of the two events did not 
occur — or that they did not occur in the order of time — 
or that there was no adaptation in the one to produce the 
other. We may go further, and maintain that the alleged 
cause, so far from being the cause, was an obstruction to 
the effect. The words, " in spite of/' are sometimes used 
on such occasions. " Gentlemen, I contend that trade did 
not prosper in consequence of protection, but that it pro- 
spered in spite of protection." 

4. Public measures are usually approved or condemned 
on account of the effects they are alleged to produce. 

Here is a wide field for controversy. The affairs of a 
nation are so multifarious, so many causes are perpetually 
at work, that it is difficult to trace with certainty the pre- 
cise effects of any one cause. Even after measures have 
become law, and we have had some experience of their opera- 
tion, the same difference of opinion is still maintained. If 
a measure already adopted is applauded on account of the 
good effect it has produced, we may contend in opposition 
to this, that the event, called the effect, has not taken 
place — or admit that the event has taken place, but was 
not the effect of that cause. Or, we may go further, and 
admit that the event was the effect of the cause, but that 
the effect was a bad effect. Or, we may go still further, 
and admit that the effect was a good effect, and then 
contend that the same cause produced other effects of 
a different character, so that the bad consequences more 
than counterbalanced the good ones. 

Sometimes it is matter of dispute, w T hen two circum- 
stances sustain the relation of cause and effect, which is the 
cause and which is the effect. 



86 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

Heretofore the landlords have been accused of keeping 
up the price of corn, by demanding high rents : but Dr. 
Chalmers observes that there is no sounder principle in 
political economy than that the high prices of corn are not 
the effect, but the cause of high rents. The country bankers 
were accused of causing a general rise in prices by an ex- 
cessive issue of their notes ; but they stated in reply, that 
it was not the increased issue of notes that caused the high 
prices, but the high prices called out the notes. 

" The error of the Ricardo system of political economy on the 
subject of rent, has been well characterised by Mr. T. Perronet 
Thomson as the fallacy of inversion. It confounds the effect 
with the cause. It is not because of the existence of inferior 
soils that the superior pay a rent, but it is because the superior 
pay a rent that the inferior are taken into occupation. There 
does not occur to us any logical term by which to denominate the 
fallacy that is now under consideration ; but it is not less a fallacy 
notwithstanding." — Dr. Chalmers. 

If the effect may have been produced by several causes, 
and we can prove the absence of all the causes except one, 
this fixes the effect upon that one cause. We take the 
following extract from the Report of the General Board of 
Health on the Supply of Water to the Metropolis : — 

11 With respect to this case of Rotherhithe, the fact of the 
people in the first street mentioned having been the first victims 
m the great outbreak, shows that they must have been highly 
predisposed; and as they lived in decent houses, and were in 
comfortable circumstances, two of the more ordinary causes of 
the disease — overcrowding and poverty — could not have operated. 
Those considerations can leave no doubt that the one main cause 
of the great severity of the attack was the use for domestic pur- 
poses of polluted Thames water/' 

In investigating the relation of cause and effect, it is 
sometimes advisable not to stop at the immediate causes, 
but to go further back, and ascertain what are the original 
causes of that immediate cause. It has been disputed 
whether the price of food has any influence on the rate of 
wages. It has been answered, No ; for the rate of wages 
is regulated by the proportion between the demand for 
labour and the supply. Admitting the latter opinion to 
be correct, it does not refute the former ; For the demand 



MORAL CAUSES. 87 

and the supply of labour are influenced by anterior causes, 
and the price of food may be one of those anterior causes. 
So, we are told that the rate of interest is regulated by the 
proportion that may exist between the demand and the 
supply of capital. This throws but little light upon the 
matter, unless we are told at the same time what are the 
anterior causes that regulate this demand and this supply. 
If it be a matter of dispute whether two events sustain 
the relation of cause and effect, we may be able to solve 
the difficulty, if it is found that the removal of the supposed 
cause is followed by the removal of the supposed ejj 



" There was the case of a man who lived in the Coburg-road, in 
Camberwell parish, in a semi-detached house, in a healthy situa- 
tion, and with a garden behind the premises ; his wife had noticed 
that the water supplied to them was exceedingly bad, and, having 
been informed that it was likely to affect the health of her family, 
she invariably boiled and filtered it: all kept in perfect health 
except the father, who objected to drink this water, from its 
being flat and unaerated ; he would still drink it as it came from 
the water-butt, and the consequence was that he was attacked 
with choleraic-diarrhoea : he afterioards drank no more of it, and 
got well." — Report of the Board of Health. 

Thus, it was disputed whether the Act of 1844 for regu- 
lating the currency was the cause of the monetary pressure 
of 1847 ; but it was found that when the act was suspended 
in October, 1847, the pressure immediately ceased. A 
writer on this subject observes — " It has been denied that 
this pressure was produced or increased by the Act. But 
how stand the facts ? The Act was passed, and, as pre- 
dicted, a pressure came — the Act was continued, and the 
pressure increased — the Act was suspended, and the pres- 
sure went away. These are not opinions — they are facts." 

In reasoning upon moral causes and effects we should 
inquire whether at all times and under all circumstances 
the same causes will produce precisely the same effects. 

We often meet with cases of this kind in the consider- 
ation of historical and international questions. Thus it is 
said the Woollen Manufacture in England, and the Linen 
Manufacture in Ireland, prospered in consequence of pro- 
tective laws, and therefore the same laws would cause in- 
creased prosperity at the present time. The Navigation 



88 



LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 



Laws were useful to England at the time of Oliver Crom- 
well, therefore they would be useful still. A few years ago 
it was contended that Joint Stock Banks were adapted 
only for countries having little capital, such as Ireland and 
as Scotland when they were first established there, but 
were quite unsuitable for a wealthy country like England. 
The same argument is now employed against the introduc- 
tion of " Partnerships en Commandite," such as exist in 
France and America. 

5. We sometimes attempt to refute a doctrine by tracing 
the absurd consequences that must result from it. This is 
called by scholastic logicians a reductio ad absurdum — you 
reduce it to an absurdity. 

It is not necessary, however, in this mode of reasoning, 
that the deduction should be absurd, in the ordinary sense 
of the word. It is sufficient if it shows the unsoundness of 
the sentiment from which it is fairly inferred. 

To prove the utility of labour, of property, or of money, 
show the evils that would arise from its abolition. 

Labour. — " Were mankind not under the necessity of labour- 
ing for a subsistence, so far from becoming philosophers, I am in- 
clined to think that they would ever have remained a race of 
indolent savages, scarcely raised above the brute creation. What 
motive would they have had for exertion, what incentive to 
awaken their faculties, and rouse them from the apathy of indo- 
lence so natural to man ? The necessity of regular industry to 
secure subsistence appears to be the first step towards the de- 
velopment of their faculties, both physical and mental." — Mrs. 
Marcefs Conversations on Political Economy. 

Property. — " Can it be supposed that the poor would be 
better off if all the property of the rich were taken away and 
divided among the poor, and no one allowed to become rich for 
the future ? The poor would then he much worse off than they 
are now. They would still have to work for their living, as they 
do now ; for food and clothes cannot be had without somebody's 
labour. But they would not work near so profitably as they do 
now ; because no one would be able to keep up a large manu- 
factory or farm, well-stocked, and to advance wages to workmen 
(as is done now), for work which does not bring in any return 
for, perhaps, a year or two. And if a bad crop, or a sickly family, 
brought any one into distress, which would soon be the case with 
many, what could he do after he had spent his little property ? 
He would be willino; to work for hire : but no one could afford to 



MORAL CAUSES. 89 

employ him, except in something that would bring in a very 
speedy return. 

Money. — " What a useful thing is money ! If there was no 
such thing as money, we should be much at a loss to get anything 
we might want. The shoemaker, for instance, who might want 
bread, and meat, and beer, for his family, would have nothing to 
give in exchange but shoes. He must go to the baker, and oifer 
him a pair of shoes for as much bread as they were worth : and 
lie must do the same thing if he went to the butcher for meat, or 
to the brewer for beer." — Easy Lessons on Money Matters. 

Sometimes we meet with zealous advocates, who reduce 
their own principles to an absurdity by deducing from 
them extravagant conclusions. 

Dr. Chalmers adopted the Malthusian theory of popu- 
lation, and drew from it such startling, and yet apparently 
legitimate conclusions, that his readers were led to doubt 
the soundness of the theory : They judged of the tree by 
its fruits. Dr. Alexander of Edinburgh, in an address re- 
specting recent events, has pointed out a similar example 
in the conduct of some advocates of a popular principle : — 

" It is possible to drive a good horse to death ; it is equally 
possible to drive a sound principle to weakness and contempt. | Mr. 
Holloway's pills are, we believe, very fair and honest sort of 
pills, and very good for some purposes ; but when Mr. Holloway 
advertises them as good for every disease the human body is heii 
to, sensible people are apt to treat Mr. Holloway as a quack, and 
his pills as trash. We fear the voluntary principle is about to be 
served in the same way. With some people it seems the one 
truth for the age. It is the grand religious catholicon — the 
panacea of piety — like the mistletoe of the Druids, a heal-all for 
the ills of the community. We dread the effect of this indiscreet 
advocacy on the minds of the nation at large. We fear that it 
will retard, rather than promote, the cause of voluntaryism. We 
fear lest, when men are incessantly told that it is good for every- 
thing, they will turn from it in disgust, and hold it to be good 
for nothing." 

If an absurd conclusion can be legitimately deduced 
from any general principle, it is a sufficient proof that the 
principle is unsound ; but in this case we should carefully 
investigate the logical accuracy of the deduction, for weak 
or zealous advocates will sometimes make 
deductions from even sound principles. 



90 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

6. Akin to the reduction ad dbsurdum is an exposure 
of the fallacy called " proving too much." 

This fallacy is an argument that, if admitted to prove the 
point in dispute, would, if carried out to all its legitimate 
consequences, also prove other points that neither of the dis- 
putants admit to be true. 

As an example of proving too much, we may adduce 
all the arguments that go to prove the impropriety of 
closing the post-offices throughout the country on the 
Sunday ; for if these arguments prove the point in regard 
to provincial towns, they also prove the propriety of 
opening the post-office on Sunday in London. But if the 
argument fails when applied to London, then, a fortiori, 
it must be inconclusive when applied to a country town. 
This argument can be resisted only by showing that there 
are peculiar circumstances in the country which do not 
apply to London. 

So the argument of Mr. Cobden, against granting loans 
to the Emperor of Russia proves too much. For if it were 
immoral to lend money to the Emperor because he might 
employ it in carrying on war against the Hungarians, then 
by parity of reasoning it would also be immoral to have 
any transactions with him by which his finances might be 
improved. And hence, all trade with Russia should cease. 
Upon the same ground, we ought to abstain from the use 
of sugar and cotton, and all other commodities which are 
produced by the labour of slaves, if by using them we 
increase the property of those who, in defiance of all the 
principles of morality, hold in bondage then fellow-man. 

7. Arguments founded on the advantages or disadvan- 
tages that may result from any measure under considera- 
tion, come under the head of reasonings from the relation 
of cause and effect. 

As an illustration of this principle, we transcribe part of 
a prize essay, written by Mr. Briggs, a working millwright, 
upon the advantages likely to be gained by working men 
visiting the Industrial Exhibition of 1851 : — 

" The working man, let him be engaged in whatever kind of 
labour or handicraft, by attending the Exhibition, will find infor- 
mation, valuable and essentially useful to him. The mechanic, 
and the worker in metals, will be able there to trace the mineral 



MORAL CAUSES. 91 

as it appears when first dug from mother earth, through all its 
varied processes, till finished in the powerful and almost intel- 
lectual steam engine. The workers of textile fabrics will there 
be able to inspect the silk as produced from the silk-worm, and 
the cotton from the plant, tracing their progress until, by the aid 
of man and machinery, they appear in the finished fabric, exhi- 
biting the greatest beauty of design and skilful workmanship. 
The workman, at this Exhibition, will be able to compare the 
textile and other productions of France, the marble productions 
of Florence, and specimens of art and science from all parts of 
the Continent, with those exhibited by our country, and perceive 
that the respect in which our continental neighbours excel us is • 
in fertility and beauty of design. He will see that no nation 
executes so well as the English ; that we stand unrivalled in the 
superiority of our workmanship ; and that the only thing we are 
short of is design. And if a visit to the Exhibition conduce to 
the cultivation of a superior style of design among our artisans, 
it will repay a hundred-fold any expense they may incur by 
attending it, and confer lasting benefit on their country, for the 
acknowledged character of the British, as the most skilful of 
workers, added to that of superior designers, would always 
demand for us a trade which would proudly and successfully 
outstrip every other nation in the world in the race of competi- 
tion. The history of the marble trade in my native county of 
Derbyshire, is a striking illustration of the truth of this. Twenty 
or thirty years ago the art of inlaying in marble was not known 
there. And why is it known now ? Because the museums of 
Matlock and Buxton imported from Florence, Borne, and other 
parts of Italy, specimens of the art, which were seen and imitated 
by the workers of Derbyshire ; until at length they are able to 
equal, and, in some respects, surpass the productions of Florence. 
And if the small exhibition of Matlock has been the means of 
producing an entirely new and beautiful art amongst the inha- 
bitants of the Peak of Derbyshire, what may we confidently 
expect to result from this great and mighty Exhibition, which, in 
comparison to that at Matlock, is like the broad Atlantic to a 
gentleman's fish-pond. The great want of our country is design ; 
we have no other want that prevents us from successfully com- 
peting with foreigners. Then let our artisans attend this Exhi- 
bition, and ascertain where and in what they excel them ; and it 
will propel the current of improvement at home, and thus minister 
to their advantage, and to the comfort and happiness of the whole 
people." 

8. We shall close this section with a few examples of 
this principle of reasoning, applied to some measures of 
public interest : — 



92 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

"Early Marriages. — Lord Harewood, to get rid of the evil 
of over-crowding in country villages, refuses to permit his cottage 
tenantry to take lodgers, or to allow a son or daughter to marry 
from the cottage, and continue to occupy it with the wife or hus- 
band conjointly with the parents. The first of these regulations 
is one with which every landlord is familiar. The offence lies in 
the second, which has been interpreted to mean a prohibition to 
the poor to marry : and some country newspaper talks about 
feudal laws, and we know not what besides. Now the regulation 
means nothing of the sort. It is a simple refusal on the part of 
Lord Harewood to permit persons to continue his tenants who 
marry without the power of having a house of their own. 

" Now we are quite satisfied that it is the bounden duty of. a 
landlord to put every check in his power upon the mania of the 
poor for headlong marriages. God forbid we should attempt to 
restrain them from marrying at all. But in the name of morality 
and decency, let them wait till they have a chair and bed of their 
own. Without question or doubt, nine-tenths of agrarian misery, 
pauperism, and crime, arise from the extraordinary hurry and 
recklessness of the poor in marrying early. It is a madness — 
neither more nor less. A young woman in the country is never 
satisfied till she has got a sweetheart. As soon as she has caught 
her Lubin, she must needs fix him, lest, as she says, ' next time 
she should get a worse. 5 And so, in one half-year, a tidy lad 
and decent lass become a couple of ragged, ill-looking, slovenly 
trampers. Let them only do as all other members of society do, 
from the top of the ladder downwards, until it reaches themselves 
— let them be patient and provident — let them stay till they have 
bought a pot to boil their potatoes in, and a sack in advance ; — 
many a couple begin life without either. The poor obtain a 
multitude of advantages by delay; they start fair— they learn 
carefulness — they have an idea of comfort, and some notion of 
character ; and, more than all — Malthusian though the considera- 
tion be — they will find four children much easier to bring up than 
fourteen. 

" A landlord has an unquestioned right to keep bad characters 
from his cottages. He owes this duty to himself and to his 
honester tenants. He has an equal right to exclude those who, 
from their circumstances, are certain — we use the word advisedly 
— to become bad characters. In the last case he may prevent, 
not the contagion alone, but the evil itself. If this right were 
used, cautiously and yet firmly, throughout the country, the 
villages would not be what they are." — Atlas. 

" Crime — the cause oe its increase. — The case of Professor 
"Webster has excited among the philanthropists of the United 
States no small concern of late, giving intensity to the controversy 



MORAL CAUSES. 93 

which has for years been going on between the advocates of death 
punishment and its opponents, who have, in perfect consistency, 
clamoured most vehemently for the preservation of the life of 
this execrable monster of human depravity. But notwithstanding: 
the clamour of a few, the voice of the millions, as with the sounH. 
of many waters, has called for his execution. In truth, the people 
of Massachusetts were in some degree prepared for decision in 
this case, inasmuch as past leniency has materially contributed to 
the increase of crime, as will appear from the following extract 
from a transatlantic paper of great respectability : — 

" It appears from Governor Briggs's annual address to the 
Legislature, that there has been for the last ten years a great 
increase of convicts in our State Prison. The wav in which 
some, and, if we remember right, the Governor with the rest, 
account for the increase, is that the sentences of the courts have 
been much less severe than formerly. We will not undertake to 
say how much of the effect is to be attributed to this cause. But 
there has been another cause of more evident potency. The last 
ten years have been specially marked by the efforts of the so-called 
prisoner's friends, alias criminal's aids. The class of people, called 
by courtesy the Philanthropists, have worked with no little energy 
a broad machinery, not only against capital punishment, but really 
against all punishments. Prom them the sentiment has had a 
wide diffusion, that crime is a mere disease or misfortune, deserv- 
ing to be treated with medicine rather than with punishment ; 
and, to some extent, the idea has been conveyed, that the robber, 
thief, and murderer, have a sure passport to public sympathy. 
Now, what else could we expect, than that this class of operatives 
would be greatly increased ? "What is more natural than that the 
demand should create the supply ? 

" And if the leniency of the courts has been a cause cooperating, 
that itself has had a cause. If the courts have been unduly lenient 
in the administration of the laws, it has doubtless been by yielding 
to a morbid public sentiment, which to them has seemed to re- 
quire it. And how has that sentiment been created ? Either we 
come to the conclusion that it is our spurious philanthropists that 
have added so many recruits to the army that wars upon the 
peace, property, and lives of the community. At any rate, the fact 
that a time which has been distinguished for unusual leniency in 
punishments, has been as distinguished for the increase of crime, 
is a very effectual condemnation of the theory of those philan- 
thropists." — British Banner. 

"Abolition op the office of Lord-lieutenant of Ire- 
land. — In the first place, the office of Lord-lieutenant is an 
anomaly for which the reason and justification ceased, when the 
modern improvements in locomotion, both by sea and land, made 



94 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

the communication between London and Dublin as easy and 
regular as that between London and York. Secondly, the sepa- 
rate form of government tends to divide the people of Ireland 
from the people of Great Britain, to keep up separate views, ideas, 
and sentiments, unfounded notions of an opposition of interests, 
mutual jealousy, ignorance, and estrangement. Thirdly, it in- 
volves a division of responsibility, a clashing of authorities, a 
confusion of jurisdictions, which impede the march of government, 
and tend to weaken and retard it, when vigour and promptitude 
are of the most consequence. Fourthly, the local government of 
Ireland tends more than any other cause we know of, to encou- 
rage that inveterate and fatal habit to which Irishmen of all classes 
and positions are so notoriously addicted, — the habit of leaning 
upon Government in all their difficulties, instead of depending 
upon their individual resources, and relying upon themselves." — 
Edinburgh Review. 

The Convocation. — "I believe that there are formal and techni- 
cal difficulties attending the revival of the powers of Convocation, 
and the noble lord has already acknowledged that before it can act 
it must be remodelled : into these I will not enter. I will suppose 
that all such technicalities are overcome, all obstacles removed, 
her Majesty's advisers satisfied, her Majesty consenting, and 
Convocation called together; what would follow? Great dis- 
appointment, or great excitement. What business is to be 
despatched? Some would say 'the Liturgy requires revision. 
Some rubrics are inconsistent, and others unintelligible/ If the 
assembling of Convocation were to end in the reconciliation of 
some conflicting rubrics, or in supplying the deficiency of others, 
or even in the change of a few obsolete words or questionable 
phrases, the result would be little worth the cost of production. 
Thus far, then, you disappoint ; go further, and you excite. If 
more were attempted, and the doctrine of the Prayer-book were 
touched, even with the lightest hand, a flame would be lighted 
up from one end of the country to the other. Where we have 
now a smothered fire, hotter perhaps than is agreeable, but still 
managable, we should raise a conflagration which it would require 
all her Majesty's prerogative to extinguish. Suppose, then, the 
Liturgy untouched, and nothing more attempted than what we 
know to be desired by many members of the church — the issuing 
a declaration which should contradict a recent decision of the 
Privy Council, and define the effect of baptism more exactly than 
it is defined in our articles. Would peace follow? Can we 
suppose that this would prove a healing measure ? I cannot so 
interpret the spirit of the age as to believe that the great body 
of the church, laity or clergy, are prepared to restrict the liberty 
of opinion on matters hitherto undecided, which our forefathers 






CONDITIONAL CAUSES. 95 

have always enjoyed, and under which the church has flourished 
for three hundred years." — Speech of the Archbishop of Canterbury 
in the Rouse of Lords, July 12th, 1851. 



SECTION VI. 

THE EELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT CONDITIONAL CAUSES. 

A conditional cause is a circumstance, or state of things, 
which is necessary to the production of an effect, but 
which does not actively produce that effect. 

Thus, if a man fall from his horse, it is a necessary con- 
dition that he should previously have been on his horse, 
otherwise he could not have fallen. If a man is hanged 
for forgery, the active or efficient cause of his being hanged 
is the commission of the crime ; but if he had never learned 
to write, he could not have committed a forgery ; hence 
his knowledge of writing is a necessary condition. 

As the condition does not thus actively, or necessarily 
produce the effect, we do not usually use the words " con- 
ditional cause " and " effect," but we say the " condition," 
and the " sign." Thus, a physician feels the pulse of his 
patient, to ascertain the state of his health ; the state of 
health is the condition, the state of the pulse is the sign. 
Now, a man may be in a bad state of health, and yet his 
pulse may be regular : the existence of the condition is no 
proof of the existence of the sign. But if the pulse be irre- 
gular, it shows that the health is disturbed : the existence 
of the sign is a proof of the existence of the condition. 

So it is a necessary condition to the performance of any 
act, that the man who performs it should be alive. Now 
then, if a will is produced of a date some years subse- 
quent to the death of the alleged testator, it proves that 
the will is a forgery. The man might have been alive 
without making a will, but he could not have made a will 
unless he had been alive. The condition must have 
preceded the sign. 

1. This relation of condition and sign supplies us with 
various modes of reasoning. 

From the non-existence of the condition, we infer the 
non-existence of the sign. 



96 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

Qualifications, instruments, and opportunities are neces- 
sary conditions to the performance of any act. If we 
prove the absence of these we prove the non-performance 
of the act. If a man has committed murder, it is a neces- 
sary condition, that he should have been at the place when 
the murder was committed, and at the time the murder 
was committed. Now, if he can prove an alibi, (this word 
is Latin for elsewhere}) that is, if he can prove that he was 
at a distant place at the time the murder was committed, 
this proves that he did not commit the murder. The non- 
existence of the condition proves the non-existence of the 
sign. But you cannot reverse this rule. The existence of 
the condition will not of itself prove the existence of the 
sign ; for he might have been at the place where, and at 
the time when, the murder was committed, and yet might 
not have committed the murder. It might have been com- 
mitted by some of his companions. 

Again, from the existence of the sign we infer the exist- 
ence of the condition. 

Take the same instance. If a man is proved to have 
committed a murder, it proves the condition, that he was 
at the place where, and at the time when, the murder was 
committed. But if it is proved that he did not commit 
the murder, that is in itself no proof that he was not 
present when the murder was committed. The non- 
existence of the sign is no proof of the non-existence of 
the condition. 

Sometimes it is contended in favour of a proposed 
measure, that it is a necessary condition, i.e. a conditional 
cause, to some other measure of still greater importance. 

Thus the Earl of Shaftesbury advocated in the House of 
Lords the establishment of Lodging Houses for the poor, 
upon the ground that domestic comfort is a necessary con- 
dition to their intellectual and moral improvement. 

" Could their Lordships suppose that these physical evils pro- 
duced no mischievous moral consequences ? He was sorry to 
have to inform them that they produced the most fatal and deadly 
consequences. They generated habits of drinking — they led to 
the overthrow of decency. Every function of nature was per- 
formed in public — there was no retirement for any purpose — for 
any purpose ; — there was no domestic education — nay, education 



CONDITIONAL CAUSES. 97 

itself was useless, if children returned to their homes to unlearn 
by example what they had learned elsewhere by precept. He 
grieved to reflect that in these dens there could be no domestic 
training of that description which was more valuable than any 
other training — the training of the mother ; and that the want of 
such domestic training could not be compensated by any system 
of public education which could be devised. This he saw daily. 
He had, as many of their lordships perhaps knew, been for some 
time connected with the ragged schools recently established in 
the metropolis. Most of the ragged children whom they saw 
about the streets attended those schools, and not, he trusted, 
without benefit. A young boy or girl received there useful 
lessons, but they returned to the single room, in which six fami- 
lies might be residing, without any regard to the restraints which 
were necessary for a social, moral, and religious life ; and they 
lost, in one hour, all the decent impressions which they had gained 
in the previous six. Until this source of evil were removed, all 
your hopes to improve the morals of your people, all your efforts 
to give them a useful and religious education, will be vain. You 
must stop this welling fountain of disaster, if you would carry 
into execution the benevolent and provident views which you, in 
common with all who have property to protect, entertain towards 
the lower class." 

Dr. Hamilton uses the same kind of argument in his 
Sermon upon early closing the shops in London : — 

" Vainly, my friends, shall we multiply the means of rational 
instruction if we do not shorten the hours of labour. Yainly 
shall libraries and reading-rooms hold out their attractions, and 
vainly shall popular lectures and polytechnic exhibitions keep 
open till late at night, unless, along with, the lecture or the show, 
we give the leisure to look and listen. And vainly shall kind- 
hearted tradesmen treat their hands to an occasional holiday 
evening, in order to visit some instructive sight or hear some 
appropriate address, — unless the boon be prolonged and perpetua- 
ted : unless time be afforded to follow up the study, or drink 
again the stream they have once tasted." 

By a similar mode of reasoning we sometimes adduce 
a precept to prove a doctrine, the truth of which seems 
a necessary condition to the justice of the command. 
Thus the commands of Scripture to repent, believe, obey, 
imply as a necessary condition that man has the power to 
repent, believe and obey. The threatenings of punishment 
imply as a necessary condition that man is a free agent ; 
otherwise he could not justly incur punishment. So Arch- 



98 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

bishop Whately cites an injunction to almsgiving as a 
scriptural authority for the institution of property : — 

" It is plain from this, and from many other such injunctions 
of the apostles, that they did not intend to destroy, among Chris- 
tians, the security of property which leads to the distinction be- 
tween the rich and the poor. For, their exhortations to the rich, 
to be kind and charitable to the poor, would have been absurd, 
if they had not allowed that any of their people should be rich. 
And there could be no such thing as charity in giving anything to 
the poor, if it were not left to each man's free choice, to give or 
spend what is his own. Indeed, nothing can be called your own, 
which you are not left free to dispose of as you will. The very 
nature of charity implies that it must be voluntary ; for no one 
can be properly said to give anything that he has no power to 
withhold." — Easy Lessons on Money Matters. 

2. You will observe, that much erroneous reasoning has 
taken place from confounding the conditional with the 
active cause. 

In cases where a number of causes, some active, and 
some only conditional, conspire to produce the same effect, 
it is not always easy to distinguish between the active and 
the conditional causes. This difficulty is often experienced 
in the investigation of historical facts. Thus, it has been 
said that the Reformation was the cause of all the wars in 
Germany in the fifteenth century. The Reformation was 
certainly a condition, for if there had been no Reformation, 
there could have been no fighting about it. But it was 
only the condition, the active cause of those wars was the in- 
terference of those hostile parties, who would not allow the 
people to follow the convictions of their own judgments. 

In the following argument the existence of the condition 
is insisted on as essential to the sign. 

" No man will excel in his profession if he thinks himself above 
it ; and commerce will never flourish in any country where com- 
merce is not respected. Commerce flourished in England, be- 
cause there a merchant was respected, and was thought worthy 
of the highest honour his country could bestow. Commerce never 
flourished in .Prance, because there it was despised ; and the cha- 
racter of un riche bourgeois, a rich citizen, was the character which 
their dramatic writers were fond of introducing as the subject of 
ridicule. Commerce will never flourish in a country where young 
men, whose fathers are barely able to maintain a genteel appear- 
ance, think it beneath their rank to enter a counting-house, and 



CONDITIONAL CAUSES. 99 

prefer sustaining the character of segar-smoking loungers. Com- 
merce will never nourish in a country where property acquired 
by industry is considered less deserving of respect than property 
acquired by inheritance. Commerce will never nourish in a 
country where men in business, instead of bringing up their sons 
to the same business, think it more respectable to send them to 
professions. Commerce will never nourish in a country where 
men, as soon as they get a few thousand pounds by trade, are 
anxious to get out of trade, and to mix with the society of the 
fashionable world." — Lectures on Commerce. 

3. This principle of reasoning is used very extensively 
in the examination of evidence adduced in our Courts 
of Law. Sometimes parties are accused of crimes, to the 
perpetration of which there were no witnesses. Their guilt 
is inferred from the circumstances of the case. This is 
called " circumstantial evidence," and sometimes " pre- 
sumptive evidence," as the guilt is 'presumed from the cir- 
cumstances adduced. Some lawyers have maintained that 
circumstantial evidence is more conclusive than direct 
evidence, as there is no danger from the perjury of the 
witnesses. But others have thought differently. No certain 
rules can be given for circumstantial evidence. Each cause 
must depend upon itself. The reader will remember, that 
within a short period, several atrocious criminals have been 
convicted upon circumstantial evidence. 

The following are some general remarks on this kind of 
evidence : — 

" The force and effect of circumstantial evidence depend 
upon its incompatibility with, and incapability of, explana- 
tion or solution upon any other supposition than that of 
the truth of the fact which it is adduced to prove ; the 
mode of argument resembling the method of demonstra- 
tion by the reductio ad absurdum." 

" These circumstances may be considered under the heads 
of — motives to crime, — declarations indicative of inten- 
tion, — preparations for the commission of crime, — pos- 
session of the fruits of crime, — refusal to account for 
appearances of suspicion, or unsatisfactory explanations 
of such appearances, — evidence indirectly confessional, — 
and the suppression, destruction, simulation, and fabrica- 
tion of evidence." 

r2 



100 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

" The principal facts of circumstantial evidence, of an 
external character, relate to questions of identity, — (1) of 
person ; (2) of things ; (3) of hand-writing ; and (4) of 
time ; but there must necessarily be a number of isolated 
facts which admit of no more specific classification." 

" Since an action without a motive would be an effect 
without a cause, a presumption is created in favour of in- 
nocence from the absence of all apparent inducement to 
the commission of the imputed offence. But the investi- 
gation of human motives is often a matter of great diffi- 
culty from their latency or remoteness ; and experience 
shows that aggravated crimes are sometimes committed 
from very slight causes, and occasionally even without any 
ajDparent or discoverable motive. This particular pre- 
sumption would therefore seem to be applicable only to 
cases where the guilt of the individual is involved in doubt ; 
and the consideration for the jury in general is rather 
whether upon the other parts of the evidence the party 
accused has committed the crime, than whether he had 
any adequate motive." 

" Since falsehood, concealment, flight, and other like 
acts, are generally regarded as indications of conscious guilt, 
it naturally follows that the absence of these marks of 
mental emotion, and still more a voluntary surrender to 
justice, when the party had the opportunity of conceal- 
ment or flight, must be considered as leading to the 
opposite presumption ; and these considerations are fre- 
quently ruged with just effect as indicative of innocence } 
but the force of the latter circumstance may be weakened 
by the consideration that the party has been the object of 
diligent pursuit. It must be also remembered, that flight 
and other similar indications of fear may be referable to 
guilt of another and less penal character than that involved 
in the particular charge." 

" If it be proved that a party charged with crime has 
been placed in circumstances which commonly operate as 
inducements to commit the act in question, — that he has 
so far yielded to the operation of those inducements as to 
have manifested the disposition to commit the particular 
crime, — that he has possessed the requisite means and 
opportunities of effecting the object of his wishes, — that 



CONDITIONAL CAUSES. 101 

recently after the commission of the act he has become 
possessed of the fruits or other consequential advantages 
of the crime, — if he be identified with the corpus delicti 
by any conclusive mechanical circumstances, as by the 
impressions of his footsteps, or the discovery of any article 
of his apparel or property at or near the scene of the 
crime, — if there be relevant appearances of suspicion, con- 
nected with his conduct, person, or dress, and such as he 
might reasonably be presumed to be able to account for, 
but which nevertheless he cannot or will not explain, — if 
he be put upon his defence recently after the crime, under 
strong circumstances of adverse presumption, and cannot 
show where he was at the time of its commission, — if he 
attempt to evade the force of those circumstances of pre- 
sumption by false or incredible pretences, or by endeavours 
to evade or pervert the course of justice by conduct in- 
consistent with the supposition of his innocence, — the con- 
currence of all or of many of these cogent circumstances, 
unopposed by facts leading to a counter presumption, 
naturally, reasonably, and satisfactorily establishes the 
moral certainty of his guilt, — if not with precisely the same 
kind of assurance as if he had been seen to commit the 
deed, at least with all the assurance which the nature of the 
case and the vast majority of human actions admit. In 
such circumstances we are justly warranted in adopting, 
without qualification or reserve, the conclusions to which, 
' by a broad, general, and comprehensive view of the facts, 
and not relying upon minute circumstances with respect to 
which there may be some source of error,' the mind is thus 
naturally and inevitably conducted, and in regarding the 
application of the sanctions of penal law as a mere corol- 
lary. Nor can any practice be more absurd and unjust, 
than that perpetuated in some modern codes, which, while 
they admit of proof by circumstantial evidence, inconsis- 
tently denies to it its logical and ordinary consequences." — 
Will's Principles of Circumstantial Evidence. 

It may be observed that the conclusiveness of circum- 
stantial evidence does not depend upon the force of any one 
circumstance, but upon the strength of the whole united. 
If we see a man coming out of a house, with blood on his 
clothes, that is no proof that he has committed murder. 



102 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

There are many other ways in which his dress may have 
become bloody. But if we enter the house, and find there 
a person who has the appearance of having been recently 
murdered, this causes the former individual to become 
suspected. If, again, you find the hat of this person in 
the house of the murdered man ; and when this person is 
apprehended, he denies ever having been in the house ; 
and, moreover, you find concealed in his dress some pro- 
perty proved to have belonged to the man who was 
murdered ; — now, putting these and similar circumstances 
together, you may have sufficient proof of the prisoner's 
guilt ; for although you might easily assign other causes 
for any one of these circumstances separately, you cannot 
assign sufficient causes to account for them all, except on 
the supposition that the prisoner is the man who has com- 
mitted the crime. In cases of this kind the prisoner's 
counsel exercises his ingenuity in assigning other causes to 
account for these criminating appearances. And some 
barristers think themselves justified in doing this, even 
after the prisoner has confessed his guilt. Lawyers of 
high standing have declared that such conduct is not, in 
their judgment, a violation of 'professional morality. 

It must also be observed, that if the circumstances 
brought in evidence against a prisoner can be accounted 
for on any other supposition than his guilt, he is entitled 
to an acquittal. The evidence must prove, not merely 
that he may be guilty, but that he must be guilty. The 
circumstances adduced must be wholly incompatible with 
the supposition that he is innocent, and incapable of ex- 
plauation upon any other hypothesis than that of his 
guilt. It is upon this kind of evidence that most crimi- 
nals are convicted. As crimes are usually committed in 
secret, witnesses can rarely be obtained, and circumstantial 
evidence is the only evidence that can be adduced ; and 
Providence seems always to have arranged that all great 
crimes shall in this way be brought to light. Plans hatched 
with consummate ingenuity, and in profound secrecy, have 
in their execution been attended with some slight oversight, 
which has supplied a thread by which the whole plot has 
been unravelled. True, some persons convicted upon cir- 
cumstantial evidence have afterwards been proved to be inno- 



CONDITIONAL CAUSES. 103 

cent ; so also persons convicted upon direct evidence have 
afterwards been proved to be innocent. If, on the one 
hand, circumstances may seem to warrant an erroneous 
conclusion, on the other hand you may have mistaken or 
perjured witnesses. 

4. Circumstantial evidence is also employed by theo- 
logians. 

Under this principle of reasoning we may class Paley's 
Horoe Paulince, and similar works, designed to prove the 
authenticity of the sacred writings. This work of Paley 
is confined to the consideration of the Acts and the Epi- 
stles. It does not attempt to prove they are genuine, but 
to prove they are not forgeries. The result is the same, but 
the mode of reasoning is different. It is presumed that 
some party has accused these books of being forgeries ; 
and the reasoning is to show, by circumstantial evidence, 
that the accusation is not true. The evidence is derived 
from the writings themselves, and rests upon the inci- 
dental coincidences that occur between the "Acts of the 
Apostles" and the " Epistles." The following example is 
taken from Paley : — 

" In the Acts of the Apostles, in the sixteenth chapter, and at 
the first verse, we are told that Paul 'canie to Derbe andLystra: 
and, behold, a certain disciple was there, named Timotheus, the 
son of a certain woman, which was a Jewess, and believed ; but 
his father was a Greek.' In the epistle before us, in the first 
chapter, and at the fourth and fifth verses, St. Paul writes tD 
Timothy thus : ' Greatly desiring to see thee, being mindful of 
thy tears, that I may be filled with joy; when I call to remem- 
brance the unfeigned faith that is in thee, which dwelt first ia 
thy grandmother Lois, and thy mother Eunice ; and I am per- 
suaded that in thee also.' Here we have a fan, unforced example 
of coincidence. In the history Timothy was the ' son of a Jewess 
that believed:' in the epistle St. Paul applauds 'the faith which 
dwelt in his mother Eunice.' In the history it is said of the 
mother, 'that she was a Jewess, and believed:' of the father, 
s that he was a Greek.' Now when it is said of the mother alone 
' that she believed,' the father being nevertheless mentioned in 
the same sentence, we are led to suppose of the father that he 
did not believe, that is, either that he was dead, or that he re- 
mained unconverted. Agreeably hereunto, whilst praise is 
bestowed in the epistle upon one parent, and upon her sincerity iu 
the faith, no notice is taken of the other. The mention of the 



104 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

grandmother is the addition of a circumstance not fonnd in the 
history; but it is a circumstance which, as well as the names of 
the parties, might naturally be expected to be known to the 
apostle, though overlooked by Ms historian." 

A new edition of Paley's Horce Paulince has recently 
been published by the Religions Tract Society, with large 
additions, by the Rev. T. R. Birks, late Fellow of Trinity 
College, Cambridge. We take the following example from 
Mr. Birks :— 

" 2 Tim. iv. 13, 21. ' The cloak that I left at Troas with 
Carpus, when thou comest, bring with thee, and the books, but 
especially the parchments/ 

" ' Do thy diligence to come before winter.' 

" The deep and touching significance of this direction, however 
trivial it may seem, has been beautifully explained by Mons. 
Gaussen, in his Theopneustia. 

" ' During near thirty years he had been poor, in labours more 
abundant than others, in stripes above measure beyond them, in 
prisons more frequent than they : of the Jews he had five times 
received forty stripes save one, thrice he had been beaten with 
rods, once stoned, thrice shipwrecked, in journeyings often, in 
perils at sea, in towns, in deserts, among the heathen, and among 
his own countrymen, in watchings often, in hunger and thirst, in 
cold and nakedness, with the care of all the churches. He was 
now Paul the aged, and in his last prison at Rome, expecting the 
sentence of death, and ready to be offered • he had fought a good 
fight, finished his course, and kept the faith. Even his friends 
had shrunk from him on his first arraignment ; only Luke was 
with him, the rest had left or forsaken him ; the winter was about 
to set in, and in the chilly dungeons of Rome he was in want of 
his cloak, which he had left with Carpus at Troas, two hundred 
leagues away. The writer was himself in Rome last year, at the 
commencement of November ; and with what vivid reality, under 
the influence of the evening cold, could he imagine the aged 
apostle in the dungeons of the Capitol, dictating the last of his 
letters, regretting the absence of his cloak, and begging Timothy 
to bring it before winter.' 

" In another view, these passages bear the same impress of 
reality. The apostle had wintered at Nicopolis, journeyed north- 
ward early in the spring, dismissed Titus to Dalmatia, crossed 
Macedonia by the Egnatian Way to Neapolis, and embarked for 
Troas ; proceeded to Miletus, and in that neighbourhood been 
seized, examined, and sent off to Rome, from whence he writes 
to Timothy, in time for him to return, but only with a speedy 
journey, before winter sets in again. From this outline, deduced 



CONDITIONAL CAUSES. 105 

by a careful comparison of many scattered hints, about what time 
would he have passed through Troas ? Most probably, about the 
month of May. How natural for him to leave his cloak behind, 
when the summer months were now begun, and especially if he 
purposed to return by the same route, so as to winter in Thrace 
or Macedonia ! Yet, as Mr. Biley has justly observed, ' there 
is no allusion to the season in the first letter to Timothy ; no 
allusion to the proposed return to Asia after the winter, in that 
to Titus; no allusion to the winter at Nicopolis, or to the 
second interview with Timothy, in the present letter. The 
harmony is as completely hidden below the surface as it could 
possibly be !' " 

A similar work has been published by the Rev. J. J. 
Blunt, B.D. Margaret Professor of Divinity, Cambridge, en- 
titled, " Undesigned Coincidences in the Writings both of 
,the Old and New Testament, an Argument of their Vera- 
city." We take an example from this work : — 

"Towards the end of the famine caused by this drought, Elijah 
is commanded by God to ' get him to Zarephath, which belongeth 
to Zidon, and dwell there ;' where a widow woman was to sustain 
him.* He goes : finds the woman gathering sticks near the gate 
of the city ; and asks her to fetch him a little water and a morsel 
of bread. She replies, ' As the Lord thy God liveth, I have not 
a cake, but an handful of meal in a barrel, and a little oil in a 
cruse : and, behold, I am gathering two sticks, that I may go in 
and dress it for me and my son, that we may eat it, and die.'f 

" This widow-woman, then, it seems, dwelt at Zarephath, or 
Sarepta, which belongeth to Zidon. Now, from a passage in the 
book of Joshua,^ we learn that the district of Zidon, in the divi- 
sion of the land of Canaan, fell to the lot of Asher. Let us, 
then, turn to the thirty-third chapter of Deuteronomy, where 
Moses blesses the tribes, and see the character he gives of this 
part of the country : ' Of Asher he said, Let Asher be blessed 
with children ; let him be acceptable to his brethren, and let him 
dip his foot in oil;'\ indicating the future fertility of that region, 
and the nature of its principal crop. It is likely, therefore, that 
at the end of a dearth of three years and a half, oil should be 
found there, if anywhere. Yet this symptom of truth occurs once 
more as an ingredient in a miraculous history — for the oil was 
made not to fail till the rain came. The incident itself is a very 
minute one ; and minute as it is, only discovered to be a coinci- 
dence by the juxtaposition of several texts from several books of 
Scripture. It would require a very circumspect forger of the 

* 1 Kings xvii. 9. +1 Kings xvii. 12. 

% Josh. xix. 28. § Deut. xxxiii. 24. 

F3 



106 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

story to introduce the mention of the oil ; and when he had intro- 
duced it, not to be tempted to betray himself by throwing out 
some slight hint why he had done so." 

The same coincidences are observable in the Gospel his- 
tories. " In every narrative," observes Paley, " we perceive 
simplicity and undesignedness,— the air and the language 
of reality. When we compare the different narratives 
together, we find them so varying as to repel all suspicion 
of confederacy ; so agreeing under this variety, as to show 
that the accounts had one real transaction for their common 
foundation; often attributing different actions and dis- 
courses to the Person whose history, or rather memoirs of 
whose history, they profess to relate ; yet actions and dis- 
courses so similar as very much to bespeak the same charac- 
ter, which is a coincidence that, in such writers as they were,, 
could only be the consequence of their writing from fact, 
and not from imagination." — Evidences of Christianity. 

I know of no better mode of training the reasoning 
faculties than the perusal of works like these. — They re- 
quire not extensive information nor profound thinking. 
The mode of reasoning is familiar to the apprehension of a 
child. It is reasoning made easy. At the same time, the 
facts investigated are very interesting, and the lessons 
acquired are of the utmost importance. The circum- 
stances of each case, too, have so much similarity with the 
transactions of ordinaiy life, as to give an aptitude for 
discussing the affairs of daily occurrence. The reader will 
observe that all this reasoning is founded on the second 
rule of circumstantial evidence ; that is, from the existence 
of the sign we prove the existence of the condition ; or, as 
it has been otherwise expressed, the existence of the con- 
sequent proves the existence of the antecedent. Upon the 
supposition that these writings are forgeries, the circum- 
stances mentioned could not have occurred. "We know this 
from our own common sense, and from our knowledge of 
human nature and of human affairs. Upon the supposi- 
tion that these writings are genuine, these circumstances 
would naturally occur ; and hence, from the existence of 
the sign, we prove the existence of the condition. 

5. Circumstantial evidence is employed too with refer- 
ence to the affairs of ordinary life. 



CONDITIONAL CAUSES. v 107 

Bankers, merchants, and traders judge by this kind of 
evidence of the solvency and responsibility of the parties 
with whom they deal. The actual amount of a man's pro- 
perty is probably known only to himself. His standing on 
the exchange or in the market will depend upon his per- 
sonal character, his business habits, his conformity to esta- 
blished rules, and the extent to which he practises those 
moral virtues which are known to be the surest guide to 
wealth. We are told that " it is of great importance to a 
banker to have an ample knowledge of the means and 
transactions of his customers. The customer, when he opens 
his account, will give him some information on this sub- 
ject. The banker will afterwards get information from his 
own books. The amount of transactions that his customer 
passes through his current account, will show the extent of 
his business. The amount of his daily balance will show if 
he has much ready cash. The extent and character of the 
bills he offers for discount, will show if he trust large 
amounts to individual houses, and if these are respectable. 
On the other hand, the bills his customer may accept to 
other parties, and his payments, will show the class of 
people with whom he deals, or who are in the habit of 
giving him credit."* Another banker observes that, " Next 
in importance to a study of his accounts, the habits and 
character of a client are deserving of your attentive con- 
sideration. If a man's style of living, for example, becomes 
extravagant, and he gives himself over to excess, you can- 
not too promptly apply the curb, however regular the 
transactions upon his account may seem."t 

Now, this is judging from circumstantial evidence. By 
the same kind of evidence we are guided in our domestic 
adjudications. In this mode of reasoning we judge of the 
honesty of our servants, of the truthfulness of our children, 
and of many other transactions connected with family 
discipline. By this mode too we often judge of the sin- 
cerity of our friends, and of the character of public men. 

6. The Scriptures furnish us with a good many instances 
of both right and wrong judgments founded on circum- 
stantial evidence. 

* Gilbart's Practical Treatise on Banking. 

t The " Internal Management of a Country Bank." By Thomas Bullion. 



108 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

Saul put to the sword the priests of the Lord upon cir- 
cumstantial evidence. The high priest had given bread to 
David's troop, had supplied him with a sword, and had 
inquired of God for him. He made a most logical defence : 
— He had been in the habit of inquiring of God for him. 
David was the king's son-in-law ; he was a distinguished 
man in the nation ; and the high priest did not know that 
a rupture had taken place between him and Saul. Samuel 
convicted Saul of disobedience and falsehood by circum- 
stantial evidence. Saul said : " I have performed the com- 
mandment of the Lord." Samuel said : " What meaneth 
then this bleating of the sheep in mine ears, and the lowing 
of the oxen which I hear 1 ?" Peter was accused upon cir- 
cumstantial evidence. He was a Galilean ; he spoke a 
provincial dialect ; and he had been seen in the garden — 
all these circumstances seemed to warrant a suspicion that 
he also "was one of this man's disciples." St. Paul was 
accused upon circumstantial evidence. The charge was, 
that he had denied the temple : the proof was, that he had 
been seen walking the streets of Jerusalem in company 
with Trophimus, an Ephesian. The tribes beyond Jordan 
were accused of idolatry, upon circumstantial evidence. 
They had built an altar. It was shown that this altar was 
not intended for sacrifice. 

7. You will observe that arguments are often expressed 
in a conditional form when they have no reference to the 
relation of conditional cause and effect. ♦ 

In these cases, the relation is usually denoted by the words 
antecedent and consequent. The antecedent denotes what 
goes before, and the consequent denotes what follows after. 
The consequent is the result of the antecedent, or is a natural 
inference from the antecedent. Thus — If the sun be fixed, 
the earth must move. If there be no fire, there will be no 
smoke. If it be our duty to love our neighbours as our- 
selves, very few people perform their duty. " If we say, 
We have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Dr. Watts observes, 
that " the truth of these propositions depends not at all 
on the truth or falsehood of their two parts, but on the 
truth of the connexion of them ; for each part of them 
may be false, and yet the whole proposition true, as — " If 
there be no Providence, there will be no future punishment." 



FINAL CAUSES. 109 

In many cases, indeed, we do not intend to denote any 
kind of condition or contingency, but adopt this form of 
reasoning merely because it is a more forcible way of stating 
the argument. Arguments from analogy, and a fortiori, 
as will be explained hereafter, are almost always expressed 
in this form, as well as those advanced in the way of objec- 
tions. — " If the Lord be with us, why is all this evil be- 
fallen us?" — Judg. vi. 13. — "If Baal be a god, let him 
plead for himself, because one hath cast down his altar." — 
Judg. vi. 31. 



SECTION VII. 

THE RELATION OP CAUSE AND EFFECT FINAL CAUSES. 

With regard to intelligent beings, actions are the effects 
of motives or feelings. Hence the motive or design of 
an action is called its final cause. With regard to final 
causes and effects, the mode of reasoning is from the 
existence of the cause to infer the existence of the effect, or 
from the existence of the effect to infer the existence of the 
cause. Moral causes refer to habits, events, and institu- 
tions. Final causes refer generally to individual acts. 
1. The following are examples : — 

" And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, for 
to show hi thee my power ; and that my name may be declared 
throughout all the earth." — Exocl. ix. 16. 

" Dearly beloved brethren, the Scripture moveth us in sundry- 
places to acknowledge and confess our manifold sins and wicked- 
ness ; and that we should not dissemble nor cloke them before 
the face of Almighty God our heavenly Father ; but confess them 
with an humble, lowly, penitent, and obedient heart ; to the e?id 
that we may obtain forgiveness of the same by his infinite good- 
ness and mercy." — Prayer-Book. 

" The gentleman travels for pleasure. The lady rides for 
exercise. The merchant toils for wealth. The soldier fights for 
glory" 

" Smith has shown that labour is the real source of wealth : 
that the wish to augment our fortune and to rise in the world — 



110 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

a wish that comes with us from the womb and never leaves us till 
we go into the grave — is the cause of wealth being saved and 
accumulated." — Macculloch. 

"It is the interest of every master that the persons in his 
employment should be contented with their position, and feel a 
pride in everything which contributes to the success of the esta- 
blishment of which they form a part. The mere labourer for hire, 
who has no interest in his work beyond the performance of a con- 
tract, for which he is to obtain a certain amount of wages, will 
not be the same zealous workman as the man who brings to his 
work a feeling of anxiety to perform it in a manner which will 
redound the most to the credit of the master who employs him." 
— The Responsibilities of Employers. (Pickering.) 

2. The doctrine of final causes enters largely into the 
science of Natural Theology. 

From the adaptation of certain arrangements to answer 
certain purposes, we infer that these arrangements were 
designed to answer these purposes. Thus, the eye is adapted 
for seeing : we infer it was made to answer that purpose. 
And so we argue respecting hearing, and of all the other 
animal functions. You may see a large enumeration of 
similar instances in Paley's Natural Theology, and in the 
Bridgewater Treatises. 

From the manifold proofs of design in the world, . we 
infer the existence of a Designer. These effects denote 
intelligence, and hence we infer the existence of an Intel- 
ligent Cause. 

" He that planted the ear, shall he not hear ? he that formed 
the eye, shall he not see ? He that chastiseth the heathen, shall 
not he correct ? he that teacheth man knowledge, shall not he 
know ? "—Psalm xciv. 9, 40. . 

" But to proceed to show that in all science there was evidence 
of a God. Take a fount of types, and scatter them over the floor 
of Exeter-hall ; would they arrange themselves into the shape 
and order of Milton's 'Paradise Lost,' or one of Shakspeare's 
plays ? Certainly not ; but if, on the other hand, they found them 
arranged in the composing-stick in the shape and order of either 
the one or the other, would not the natural inference be, that it 
had been done by some person who had first designed the work, 
and then carried that design into execution ? Or if a man who 
had never seen a watch, found one in the desert, and on opening 
it discovered its wheels and cranks all working together, and 
some of them apparently in opposition to each other, yet all 



FINAL CAUSES. Ill 

combining to show the hour of the day — would he not infer that 
some ingenious and contriving person had been at work arranging 
all this delicate and complicated machinery for a definite result ? 
Again, if you took all the bricks of which London was composed 
and heaped them together, they would be bricks, but nothing 
more ; but when they were arranged and built up into buildings 
like that hall, into houses, streets, and squares, then there was 
evidence of design and aim. So with the universe; from the 
largest star that shone in the firmament to the minutest insect 
that floated in the sunbeam — in everything — the evidences of 
design were so various, so clear, so magnificent, so grand, that 
that man who would still say, c There is no Author here, all is 
chance,' must be blind or mad — as the Psalmist said, it was ' the 
fool who said in his heart, There is no God. 5 * * * * In the human 
eye, which, while lighting us on our way, was made capable of 
receiving the most pleasurable impressions from external objects 
— the ear, which, while performing its duty of warning us of 
danger, was made also the storehouse of the most exquisite 
sounds — the taste, which, while pressing us to eat, gave us satis- 
faction and delight in eating — the muscles of the body, which, 
while designed with the greatest strength, combined with that 
strength the greatest lightness and the utmost symmetry and 
elegance of form — all this, the Atheist would tell you, was the 
result of mere accident ; but the Christian said : c All this proves 
the design of a wise, a beneficent, and an omnipotent God.' So 
with everything in animal life, the wing of the bird, the cell of 
the bee, the adaptation of everything to its use and purpose, all 
was indicative of the same great design. * * * * Take another 
fact from science. During the months of June, July, and August, 
the rise in the temperature of the day was so great, that if the 
heat continued to increase from nine to twelve in the morning, at 
the same rate as it increased from six to nine, every green thing 
would be scorched, and the atmosphere would be unbearable. 
How was this heat modified ? Water, in process of conversion 
into steam, absorbed heat, and in summer, as the sun rose higher 
in the heavens, the heat of its rays converted the dew-drops on 
the flowers and the little pools of water on the ground into 
steam, and the heat was carried off by it. Again, when the sun 
went down, excessive cold was prevented by another arrange- 
ment. Those mists which the sun had taken up in the morning 
to keep the day cool, were again condensed at night into dew, 
and water going back from the state of steam to water gave out 
heat, and thus the night was made warm. And in winter, the 
rapid increase of cold was prevented by the frosts, which, by 
converting water into ice, compelled it to pass off its superabun- 
dant caloric into the atmosphere, which was thus warmed by it." 
— Dr. Gumming *s Sermon on God in Science. 



112 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

3. From the manifestation of certain attributes or qua- 
lities in the works of Creation and Providence, we infer the 
existence of these attributes and qualities in the Intelligent 
Cause. 

Hence we demonstrate the power, wisdom, goodness, and 
other attributes of God. Thus we prove the goodness of 
God by facts showing that the works of nature are so con- 
structed as to produce pleasure as well as utility to his 
intellectual creatures. 

" Nevertheless, he left not himself without witness, in that he 
did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, 
filling our hearts with food and gladness." — Acts xiv. 17. 

" But why was man so constituted, as to require food ? Is 
not the obvious answer to be found in that Divine benevolence 
by which enjoyment is spread so largely over all life ? There can 
be no question of the resources of Omnipotence; man might 
have been formed with no more necessity for food than the flower. 
But all know that food is capable of giving pleasure, and by this 
daily necessity a general pleasure was constantly combined with 
existence." 

" He who made the organs of nutrition might have adapted 
them to any food, or any food to them. Or he might have made 
but one species of food, or made that one repulsive, and yet 
nutritious. Yet, what is the reality ? He has given us food in 
astonishing variety, generally under forms of great beauty, and 
universally pleasing to the taste. But he has not merely diver- 
sified the necessary subsistence of man, and thus met the diversi- 
fied climates of the globe ; but he has given luxuries, unessential 
to the actual support of man : the syrups of the East, the spices 
of the South, the rich fruitage of the West, the refreshing pro- 
ducts of Southern Europe ; the lemon, the orange, the melon, 
and the vine, salutary luxuries in their own climates, delicious 
luxuries in all. 

" But now to take the world of vegetation in another aspect, 
and perhaps the most distinctly evidential of the Divme goodwill 
to man, — the beauty of the vegetable kingdom." 

"The progress of the fruit-tree is almost a succession, of beauty; 
from the springing foliage, the bud, the blossom, the formed fruit, 
to the ripened colouring. In all the loveliness of nature I know 
nothing lovelier than the orchard of our own country, under the 
varying lights of leaves and colour, of spring, summer, and 
autumn." 

" But another enjoyment still remains for man, — in the fra- 
grance of the vegetable world. Yegetation is almost the only 
source of fragrance, and yet how copious, how constant, and how 



FINAL CAUSES. 113 

exquisite is its enjoyment ! Who has not owned the delight of 
the morning air, as it comes freshened from the field ? Who has 
not felt the cool odours of the forest, as he walks under its shade, 
while the sun is blazing abroad ? Or, when the day goes down, 
who has not enjoyed the sudden sweetness of the flowers beginning 
to breathe under the dew ? or, at night-fall, has not scented the 
new-mown hay, and felt all this as a pleasure distinct from all 
others ; or which even more than pleases, awakening a finer sen- 
sibility than of sight, and seeming to soothe, and perhaps even to 
purify, the mind ? 

"But there is still an immense region of the vegetable king- 
dom which yet more strongly marks the Divine design of human 
happiness. — The whole boundless race of flowers ; whose chief 
conceivable purpose is for the enjoyment of the human sense. 
•Such subjects as those are familiar, but not trifling. Our Lord 
himself did not disdain to recall our thoughts to those works of 
his Almighty Father: 'Behold the lilies of the field, — Solomon, 
in all his glory, was not arrayed like one of these.' " — Br. Crolfs 
Sermons. 

4. The doctrine of final causes also enters largely into our 
reasonings on the nature and character of the human mind, 
and on the circumstances by which we are surrounded. 

From the properties, or qualities, or faculties of the mind, 
we infer the existence of a corresponding design. Man has 
a capacity for being happy — we infer he was designed to be 
happy. Man has a capacity for acquiring knowledge — we 
infer he was designed to acquire knowledge. Man has 
feelings and capacities adapted for society — we infer he was 
designed to live in society. Man has faculties and capa- 
cities adapted for an immortal state of existence — we infer 
he is destined to be immortal. 

" The Creator has put forth in his gifts a magnificence which 
should impress our hearts. What variety in those affectionate 
sentiments, of the delights of which our natures are susceptible ! 
Without going out of the family circle, I enumerate filial piety, 
fraternal affection, friendship, love, and parental tenderness. 
These different sentiments can all exist equally in our hearts, and 
so far from weakening, each tends to give vigour and intensity to 
the other." 

" The destiny of all the inferior orders that surround us, appears 
to terminate upon the earth. Ours alone is evidently not accom- 
plished here. The animals, exempt from vice, incapable of virtue, 
experience, in ceasing to live, neither hopes nor regrets. They 
die without the foresight of death. Man, in the course of an 



114 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

agitated life, degrades himself by follies and vices, or honours 
himself by generous and useful actions. Remembrances, loves, 
ties, in countless forms, twine about his heart. He is torn, in 
agony, from beings for whom he has commenced an affection that 
he feels might be eternal. Persecuted for his virtue, proscribed 
for his wisdom and courage, calumniated for his most conscien- 
tious acts, he turns to heaven a fixed look of confidence and hope. 
Has he nothing to perform beyond death ? Has the Author of 
nature forgotten his justice, only in completing his most perfect 
work ? 

" Our immortality is a necessary consequence of the existence 
of God. Let us not wander astray in vain discussions, which, 
with our present faculties, we can never master, such as relate to 
the nature of the soul. It is enough for me that there is a God. 
Virtue in misfortune must have hopes which do not terminate in 
the tomb." — The Art of being Happy. 

5. In the same way, from the attributes, qualities, and 
capacities of the animal creation, we infer the design or 
final cause of their creation. 

" All the wonderful instincts of animals, which, in my humble 
opinion, are proved beyond a doubt, and the belief in which has 
not decreased with the increase of science and investigation, — all 
these instincts are given them only for the combination or pre- 
servation of their species. If they had not these instincts, they 
would be swept off the earth in an instant. This bee, that under- 
stands architecture so well, is as stupid as a pebble-stone, out of 
his own particular business of making honey; and, with all his 
talents, he only exists that boys may eat his labours, and poets 
sing about them. JJt pueris placeas et declamatio fias. A peasant 
girl of ten years old puts the whole republic to death with a 
little smoke ; their palaces are turned into candles, and every 
clergyman's wife makes mead-wine of the honey ; and there is an 
end of the glory and wisdom of the bees ! Whereas, man has 
talents that have no sort of reference to his existence; and with- 
out which, his species might remain upon earth in the same safety 
as if they had them not. The bee works at that particular angle 
which saves most time and labour ; and the boasted edifice he is 
constructing is only for his egg : but Somerset house, and Blen- 
heim, and the Louvre, have nothing to do with breeding. Epic 
poems, and Apollo Belvideres, and Venus de Medicis, have nothing 
to do with living and eating. We might have discovered pig- 
nuts without the Royal Society, and gathered acorns without 
reasoning about curves of the ninth order. The immense super- 
fluity of talent given to man, which has no bearing upon animal 
life, which has nothing to do with the mere preservation of exist- 



FINAL CAUSES. 115 

ence, is one very distinguishing circumstance in this comparison. 
There is no other animal but man to whom mind appears to be 
given for any other purpose than the preservation of body." — 
Sydney Smith's Sketches of Moral Philosophy. 

The following argument, from the relation of final cause 
and effect, has been advanced in favour of sporting : — 

" As Nature, with a liberal but not lavish hand, has bestowed 
on her offspring those powers and propensities only, which their 
own necessities, or the general order and economy of the system 
require ; the gifts of scent to the hound, swiftness to the grey- 
hound, and sagacity to the pointer, denote the use which she 
intended man to make of these animals ; and, therefore, the 
diversions in question are justifiable, as fulfilling the •intentions 
of Nature herself." — Questions in Political Economy. 

6. It is a principle of moral philosophers, that the final 
cause or motive of an action forms the moral character of 
the action. 

" That the moral quality of the action resides in the intention, is 
evident from various considerations. 

"By reference to the intention, we inculpate or exculpate 
others, or ourselves, without any respect to the happiness or 
misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what 
it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention, 
or, on the same ground, we hold him innocent. Thus, also, of 
ourselves. We are conscious of guilt or of innocence, not from 
the result of an action, but from the intention by which we were 
actuated. 

"We always distinguish between being the instrument of 
1, and intending it. We are grateful to one who is the cause 
of good, not in the proportion of the amount effected, but of the 
amount intended." 

" As the right and wrong of an action reside in the intention, 
it is evident, that, where an action is intended, though it be not 
actually performed, that intention is worthy of praise or blame, 
as truly as the action itself, provided the action itself be wholly 
out of our power. Thus God rewarded David for intending to 
build the temple, though he did not permit him actually to build 
it. So, he who intends to murder another, though he may fail to 
execute his purpose, is, in the sight of God, a murderer. The 
meditation upon wickedness with pleasure, comes under the same 
condemnation. 

"As the right or wrong exists in the intention, wherever a 
particular intention is essential to virtuous action, the perform- 
ance of the external act, without that intention, is destitute of 



116 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

the element of virtue. Thus, a child is bound to obey his parents, 
with the intention of thus manifesting his love and gratitude. If 
he do it from fear, or from hope of gain, the act is destitute of 
the virtue of filial obedience, and becomes merely the result of 
passion or self-interest. And thus our Saviour charges upon the 
Jews the want of the proper intention, in all their dealings with 
God. C I know you/ said he, 'that ye have not the love of God 
in you. 5 " — Waylan&'s Elements of Moral Science. 

7. Under this head of final cause and effect, we may 
class those reasonings that are designed to prove the object 
or design of the laws of ancient nations. 

Montesquieu's " Spirit of Laws," and Michaelis's " Com- 
mentaries* on the Laws of Moses," are full of reasonings of 
this description,, In cases when a legislator has not him- 
self stated the object of his laws, their design can be gathered 
only from a consideration of the nature of the enactments 
in connexion with the character of the people among whom 
they were promulgated. In his pamphlet on " Marriage 
with the Sister of a Deceased Wife," Dr. Croly has made 
some striking remarks on " The Mosaic Code." 

" The first years of the Jewish people had been spent in con- 
tact with Syrian and Arabian life. ' A Syrian ready to perish was 
thy father.' Eroru this school of the harshest and most prejudiced 
habits of the East, they were given into the hands of the Egyp- 
tian, the most subtle, artificial, and superstitious nation of the 
ancient world. The Jews, in the course of four centuries, 
naturally acquired the habits of both. But, when about to be 
formed into a new nation in Palestine, the first step of their Moral 
Code was, to purify the national spirit ; to extinguish all the evil, 
that could be extinguished ; and to qualify all that was beyo?id 
extinction. 

" The law of Blood-revenge appears to have been universal in 
Western Asia and Arabia. By this law, the man who killed 
another, even by accident, was to be slain by the next kinsman. — 
The Mosaic Code, without insisting on the abandonment of the 
custom, provided six cities, three on each side of the river Jordan, 
to which the homicide might flee, and where he was secure, until 
formal trial. Thus, the principle was modified. 

" By an ancient oriental custom, the creditor was entitled to 
sell the debtor. — The Mosaic Code, without disputing the right, 
ordered that the bondage of the debtor, if an Israelite, should not 
continue beyond the Sabbatical year, except by his own choice; 
and that no Israelite bondman should, be sold into a foreign 
country. Thus the principle was modified. 



FINAL CAUSES. 117 

C( Polygamy was an established right throughout the East. — The 
Mosaic Code interfered, simply to forbid one of its frequent acts 
of injustice. It ordered, that the inheritance of the earlier wife's 
offspring should be secured against the favouritism of the second, 
or her offspring. The principle was modified" 

"Slavery was retained. — But a provision against its excess in 
numbers was enacted, by the Mosaic prohibitions of man-stealing, 
still so common among the nations of the South; and of that 
cruelty which so generally marks the trade in man. The master 
who killed his slave by an act of passion, must be put to death. 
Even the lower degrees of injury were punished ; the loss of an 
eye, or of a tooth, by the master's violence, entitled the slave, 
male or female, to freedom. The principle was modified. 

"Divorce was probably common in the earlier ages of Syria aud 
Arabia, for it was always regarded as an essential privilege ; and, 
in the more civilized times of Palestine, was still considered to be 
of so much importance, that even the disciples of our Lord pro- 
nounced its extinction a sufficient ground for declining marriage 
altogether. — In the Mosaic Code, formalities and delays were en- 
joined in practice, which must have greatly restricted the custom, 
and which, at least, softened the painful abruptness, of Divorce. 
A period of three months must pass before the separation could 
be valid ; during which time the husband and wife were to be 
allowed the opportunity of reconciliation. The principle was 
inodified. 

" In all Heathenism, and, of course, in Syria and Arabia, the 
father had the power of death over a rebellious child. Of a right 
so firmly established, it might have been impossible to prevent the 
exercise. — The Mosaic Code reduced the practice into an appeal 
to the public tribunals; thus rescuing the son from the immediate 
fury of the father, and giving his case over to impartial judg- 
ment. The principle was modified" — Marriage with the Sister of 
a Deceased Wife. 

8. The doctrine of final causes enters largely into the 
administration of the law. 

Sometimes this mode of reasoning is employed by the 
lawyers in fixing the meaning of an Act of Parliament. 
Our laws are made by the legislature, but their meaning is 
fixed by the judges. It sometimes happens that the word- 
ing is uncertain or obscure, and that one clause appears to 
contradict some other clause. In these cases the judges 
inquire into the intention of the act : that is, the intention 
of the legislature in passing the act. This intention is 
sometimes called the spirit of the act, and when a clause 
has two meanings, the judges will decide in favour of that 



118 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

meaning which is most i» conformity with the spirit of 
the act. Take for example the Reform Act passed in 1831. 
The intention of the act was to extend the privilege of 
voting for members of Parliament. In case, therefore, the 
meaning of any of the clauses should be doubtful, that 
meaning which is most favourable to the extension of the 
privilege of voting for members of Parliament is most in 
conformity with the spirit of the act. If you watch the 
proceedings of the Courts of Law you will observe many 
cases illustrative of this kind of reasoning. 

9. In judicial cases, also, this principle of final causes is 
acknowledged. 

From the effects of any motive, the law infers the existence 
of the motive. If a man commits murder, the law as- 
sumes that he intended to commit murder. So, if a dozen 
persons, who never saw each other before, should join in 
an illegal act, they may be indicted for a conspiracy ; for 
their acting in concert will be considered as a proof of an 
intention to act in concert. In the case of Dr. Webster, 
who was hanged at Boston in 1850 for the murder of Dr. 
Parkman, the following observations appeared in the Lite- 
rary World, a paper published at New York : — 

" Suppose the facts as stated in the confession had been proved 
by a witness present on the spot, but without the knowledge of 
the accused ; and then apply the law as laid down by the Chief 
Justice, and which we see no reason to question. 

" ' In murder, to escape the imputation of malice, the prisoner 
must prove the provocation, the accident, or any; other circum- 
stance which goes to preclude the malice ; otherwise it is argued 
from the act itself. No provocation of words, however oppro- 
brious, will mitigate the motive for a mortal blow, or one intended 
to produce death, where there is an intent to kill. If there is 
sufficient provocation, it is manslaughter ; but words are not a 
sufficient provocation. Malice is implied from any deliberate, 
cruel act against another, however sudden. "When there is a blow 
of a deadly weapon, with intent to do some great bodily harm, 
and death ensues, malice is presumed.' 

"Amongst the interstices of this net-work of distinctions, 
there may possibly be room to extricate the killing of Dr. Park- 
man from the category of murder ; but we confess the distinctions 
of the law seem framed to meet this very description of sudden, 
unjustifiable, passionate, revengeful, and reckless homicide. Were 
the contrary the case, few of the usual forms of murder would 






FINAL CAUSES. 119 

come within the definition. This confession of Dr. Webster may 
be only another link in the chain of fatalities which he has been 
forging for his own destruction." 

10. Final causes form an important part of the investi- 
gation in cases of circumstantial evidence. 

If we show that the prisoner had a strong motive for 
committing the offence, such as avarice, revenge, &c, or 
had stated beforehand a determination that he would com- 
mit it, this, with other circumstances, will be considered as 
tending to prove that he did commit it. 

" Motives are, with relation to moral conduct," says Mr. Wills, 
" what physical power is to mechanics ; and both of these kinds 
of impulse are equally under the influence of known laws. But 
in reasoning upon motives and their resulting actions, it is im- 
practicable to obtain the same sure data as when material phe- 
nomena only are involved, since it is not possible to discover all 
the modifying circumstances of human conduct, or to assign with 
unerring certainty the true character of the motives from which 
they spring. Nevertheless, we naturally, reasonably, and safely, 
judge of men's motives by their conduct, as we conclude from the 
nature of the stream the qualities of the fountain whence it 
proceeds. 

"An evil motive constitutes in law, as in morals, the essence of 
guilt ; and the existence of an inducing motive for the voluntary 
acts of a rational agent, is assumed as naturally as secondary 
causes are concluded to exist for material phenomena. The pre- 
dominant desires of the mind are invariably followed by corre- 
sponding volitions and actions. It is therefore indispensable, in 
the investigation of moral actions, to look at all the surrounding 
circumstances which connect the supposed actor with other 
persons and things, and may have influenced his motives. 

" The usual inducements to crime, are the desire of revenging 
real or fancied wrongs, — of obtaining some object of desire which 
rightfully belongs to another. — or of preserving reputation, either 
that of general character or the conventional reputation of sex or 
profession." — Wills' 's Circumstantial Evidence. 

" In many things which we do, we ought not only to consider 
the mere naked action itself, but the persons who act, the persons 
towards whom, the time when, the place where, the manner how, 
the end for which the action is done, together with the effects that 
must, or that may follow, and all other surrounding circumstances : 
these things must necessarily be taken into our view, in order to 
determine whether the action, which is indifferent in itself, be 
either lawful or unlawful, good or evil, wise or foolish, decent or 
indecent, proper or improper, as it is so circumstantiated. 



120 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

" Let me give a plain instance for the illustration of this matter. 
— Mario kills a dog, which, considered merely in itself, seems to 
be an indifferent action : now the dog was Timon's, and not his 
own ; this makes it look unlawful. But Timon bid him do it ; 
this gives it an appearance of lawfulness again. It was done at 
church, and in time of divine service ; these circumstances added, 
cast on it an air of irreligion. But the dog flew at Mario, and put 
him in danger of his life ; this relieves the seeming impiety of the 
action. Yet Mario might have escaped by flying thence ; there- 
fore the action appears to be improper. But the dog was known 
to be mad ; this further circumstance makes it almost necessary 
that the dog should be slain, lest he might worry the assembly, 
and do much mischief. Yet again, Mario killed him with a pistol, 
which he happened to have in his pocket since yesterday's journey; 
now, hereby the whole congregation was terrified and discomposed, 
and divine service was broken off ; this carries an appearance of 
great indecency and impropriety in it : but after all, when we con- 
sider a further circumstance, that Mario, being thus violently 
assaulted by a' mad dog, had no way of escape, and had no other 
weapon about him, it seems to take away all the colours of im- 
propriety, indecency, or unlawfulness, and to allow that the pre- 
servation of one or many lives will justify the act as wise and 
good. Now, all these concurrent appendices of the action ought 
to be surveyed, in order to pronounce with justice and truth con- 
cerning it." — Watts' 's Improvement of the Mind. 

11. Under the head of final causes we may place those 
reasonings that are founded on the presumed object of the 
measures we advocate. 

Thus, in regard to the punishment of criminals, one 
party contends that the main object is the punishment of 
the criminal ; another contends that the main object is the 
reformation of the criminal; and a third contends that 
the main object of punishment is the prevention of crime. 
The opinion any one may entertain as to the final cause or 
main object of punishment, will, of course, influence his 
sentiments as to the nature, duration, and severity of the 
punishments that ought to be inflicted. 

"The proper end of punishment is said by some to be the 
satisfaction of justice ; by others the prevention of crimes ; by 
others the reformation of the offender. The first^ doctrine is that 
which most immediately occurs to a mind beginning to reflect on 
the subject ; and it is often warmly defended, although it is now 
pretty nearly abandoned by systematic writers on legislation. One 
of the last instances of a laboured defence of it. which we have 



FINAL CAUSES. 121 

met with, is to be found in a dissertation by Lord Woodhouselee, 
appended to his life of Lord Karnes. The second opinion is sup- 
ported by the generality of writers, although they by no means 
reject the third object, as a subordinate consideration. Of late 
years, a few philanthropists have argued, that the principal object 
of punishment should be the reformation of the offender, and 
that other ends are of inferior consequence." 

"If crimes could be more effectually prevented by any one 
punishment than another, the tendency of that punishment to 
satisfy the demand for justice, or to reform the offender, would be 
a secondary consideration. If the crime of murder, for example, 
could be more effectually prevented by the penalty of death than 
by a term of imprisonment, which would give an opportunity for 
the reformation of the criminal, that penalty ought to be inflicted, 
and the reformation of the offender abandoned, otherwise we should 
be showing more regard for the life of a murderer than for the 
lives of innocent persons." — Questions in Political Economy. 

12. Political economists sometimes argue upon this prin- 
ciple. The j assign motives to different classes of society, and 
then infer that persons under the influence of such motives, 
would act in a certain manner ; and on the conduct thus 
assumed, they construct a theory. 

Thus, Mr. Macculloch states that " the wish to augment 
our fortunes comes with us from the womb, and never leaves, 
us till we go into the grave." This may be the case gene- 
rally in Scotland, but it is not so in Ireland, and it is not 
so universally anywhere. In all classes of society, many 
individuals are found who prefer present enjoyment to a 
future improvement of their condition. Another erroneous 
assumption is, that the uninstructed classes of society, 
when left to themselves, will always do that which is most 
conducive to their own advantage. This argument has 
been advanced in opposition to those acts of the legislature 
that refer to regulating the hours of labour in the manu- 
factories, and to the working of women and children in 
mines. The reasonings of some economists, with reference 
to these matters, will, on examination, be found to rest on 
erroneous assumptions. 

In tracing the progress of society, too, the economists 
assume that mankind were originally savages, then became 
hunters, then shepherds, then agriculturists, and at last 
merchants and manufacturers; and they attribute -to, 

G 



122 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 

mankind in these several stages, precisely the same feeling's 
and motives which men entertain in the highest degree of 
civilization. Some political economists have written very 
fallaciously on this subject. But, in the first place, there 
is no foundation for the theory that the savage life was the 
original state of man ; and, in the next place, man in a 
savage state does not possess within himself that thirst for 
knowledge and desire for improvement which is exhibited 
by man in a state of civilization. 

" Bat the opinion that all mankind were originally savages, is 
unsupported by either reason or history. Had they been created 
savages, they would probably have remained savages for ever. 
They could have formed no idea of a civilization which had never 
existed, nor have desired comforts, the want of which they did 
not feel. History does not record a single instance of a savage 
nation having become civilized by its own unassisted exertions. 
Civilization has never sprung up spontaneously from the soil ; it 
has always been imported from abroad. The Greeks derived their 
civilization from the Egyptians ; the Romans theirs from the 
Greeks ; the nations conquered by Rome became civilized from 
their intercourse with the Romans. But if we attempt to trace 
the origin of civilization in Egypt and Babylon, we are at a loss ; 
for neither history, nor even tradition, mentions any period at 
which these nations were not civilized. Eounded soon after the 
Elood, they possessed the knowledge of all the arts and sciences 
known to the antediluvian world. The fertility of their soils, and 
the extent of their plains, furnished ample provision for their 
population : hence, as population increased, their civilization in- 
creased. While, on the other hand, those tribes or families who 
wandered in quest of new settlements, became separated from the 
rest of mankind by mountains, and forests, and rivers ; and their 
time being wholly occupied in seeking supplies of food, they lost, 
in the course of a few generations, the knowledge they originally 
possessed, and fell into the savage state. It would thus appear, 
from history and from reason, that the savage state was not the 
original state of man, but a departure from that state, arising 
from a want of communication through several ages with the 
other branches of the family of mankind." — Lecture on the Philo- 
sophy of Language. 

13. As all actions result from the feelings of the mind, 
when we wish to induce any person to perform certain 
actions, we try to produce in the mind those convictions 
and feelings which are the usual cause of such actions. 

It is the great object of logic to teach us how to select 






FINAL CAUSES. 123 

and use those arguments that have an effect upon the 
judgment and understanding. But sometimes people are 
influenced more by their feelings than by their judgment. 
In this case, if we wish to convince or persuade them, we 
must adapt our arguments to their feelings. The parties 
who are thus influenced by their passions can hardly be 
said to reason ; but we who are trying to influence them 
may be reasoning nevertheless : We are using a means to 
accomplish an end ; we are selecting such arguments, and 
placing them in such a form, as are best adapted to pro- 
duce an impression on the mind of the individual with 
whom we converse. These arguments, according to Dr. 
Watts, are the following : — 

" There is yet another rank of arguments which have Latin 
names ; their true distinction is derived from the topics or middle 
terms which are used in them, though they are called an address 
to our judgment, our faith, our ignorance, our profession, our 
modesty, and our passions. If an argument be taken from the 
nature or existence of things, and addressed to the reason of man- 
kind, it is called argumentum ad judicium. When it is borrowed 
from some convincing testimony, it is argumentum ad fidem, an 
address to our faith. When it is drawn from any insufficient- 
medium whatsoever, and yet the opposer has not skill to refute or 
answer it, this is argumentum ad ignorantiam, an address to our 
ignorance. When it is built upon the professed principles or 
opinions of the person with whom we argue, whether the 
opinions be true or false, it is named argumentum ad hominem, an 
address to our professed principles. St. Paul often uses this argu- 
ment when he reasons with the Jews, and when he says, ' I speak 
as a man/ When the argument is fetched from the sentiments of 
some wise, great, or good men, whose authority we reverence and 
hardly dare oppose, it is called argumentum ad verecundium, an 
address to our modesty. I add finally. When an argument is bor- 
rowed from any topics which are suited to engage the inclinations 
and passions of the hearers on the side of the speaker, rather 
than to convince the judgment, this is argumentum ad passiones, 
an address to the passions ; or, if it be made publicly, it is called 
ad populum, or an appeal to the people" — Watts' 's Logic. 

The argument called Argumentum ad hominem requires 
a further illustration, and this we have in the Doctor's 
" Improvement of the Mind :" — 

'' Somethnes we may make use of the very prejudices under 
which a person labours, in order to convince him of some parti- 
G 2 



124 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

cular truth, and argue with him upon his own professed principles 
as though they were true. This is called argument-urn ad hominem, 
and is another way of dealing with the prejudices of men. 

" Suppose a Jew lies sick of a fever, and is forbidden flesh by his 
physician : but hearing that rabbits were provided for the dinner 
of the family, desired earnestly to eat of them ; and suppose he 
became impatient because his physician did not permit him, and 
he insisted upon it, that it could do him no hurt ; surely, rather 
than let him persist in that fancy and that desire, to the danger 
of his life, I would tell him that these animals were strangled, 
which sort of food was forbidden by the Jewish law, though I 
myself may believe that law is now abolished. 

" Encrates used the same means of conviction when he saw a 
Mahometan drink wine to excess, and heard him maintain the 
lawfulness and pleasure of drunkenness : Encrates reminded him 
that his own prophet Mahomet had utterly forbidden all wine to 
his followers : and the good man restrained his vicious appetite 
by his superstition, when he could no otherwise convince him 
that drunkenness was unlawful, nor withhold him from excess ! " 

14. The effects of circumstances upon the disposition of 
the mind may fairly be placed under this head, and they 
enter largely into our daily reasonings. 

On this ground Lord Ersjrine advocated his bill for pre- 
venting cruelty to animals. 

"In what I am proposing to your lordships, disinterested 
virtue, as in all other cases, will have its own certain reward. 
The humanity you shall extend to the lower creation, will come 
abundantly round in its consequences to the whole human race. 
The moral sense, which this law will awaken and inculcate, cannot 
but have a most 'powerful effect upon our feelings and sympathies for 
one another. The violences and outrages committed by the lower 
orders of the people, are offences more owing to want of thought 
and reflection than to any malignant principle; and whatever, 
therefore, sets them a-thinking upon the duties of humanity, 
more especially where they have no rivalries nor resentments, 
and where there is a peculiar generosity in forbearance and com- 
passion, has an evident tendency to soften their natures, and to 
moderate their passions in their dealings with one another. The 
effect of laws, which promulgate a sound moral principle, is 
incalculable ; I have traced it in a thousand instances, and it is 
impossible to describe its value." 

In conformity with this principle, if a man has received 
a good education, we expect to find him well informed ; 
if he has mixed in polite society, we presume his manners 



FINAL CAUSES. 125 

are courteous ; if he has held certain positions in society, 
we infer that he has the excellencies, and probably the 
defects, connected with that position ; and if we are wise, 
we shall consider the peculiar temptations to which our 
own circumstances expose us, and endeavour to guard our 
minds against them. 

" Different employments, and different conditions of life, beget 
in us a tendency to our different passions. Those who are exalted 
above others in their daily stations, and especially if they have to 
do with many persons under them, and in many affairs, are too 
often tempted to the haughty, the morose, the surly, and the more 
unfriendly ruffles and disturbances of nature, unless they watch 
against them with daily care. The commanders in armies and 
navies, the governors of workhouses, the masters of public 
schools, or those who have a great number of servants under 
them, and a multitude of cares and concerns in human life, should 
continually set a guard upon themselves, lest they get a habit of 
affected superiority, pride, and vanity of mind, of fretfulness, 
impatience, and criminal anger." — Anon. 

Upon this ground, we avoid dangerous society, knowing 
that evil communications corrupt good manners. 

"And here I would advise you to have no dealings with a man 
who is known to be a rogue, even though he should offer a 
bargain that may, in that instance, be for your advantage to 
accept. To avoid him is your duty, on the ground of morality ; 
but it is, moreover, your interest in a pecuniary point of view : 
for, depend upon it, although he may let you get money by him 
at first, he will contrive to cheat you in the end. An additional 
reason is, that your own reputation, and even your moral sensi- 
bilities, may be endangered by the contact. If you get money 
by a rogue, there is a danger that you will feel disposed to apolo- 
gize for his rogueries ; and, when you have once become an 
apologist for roguery, you will probably, on the first temptation, 
become a rogue yourself." — Lectures on Ancient Commerce. 

15. The doctrine of final causes enters largely into our 
reasonings on the ordinary affairs of human life. 

We act upon this principle in judging of other people. 
As actions are the effect of motives and feelings, we infer 
from the character of the actions the character of the mo- 
tives or feelings. " A good tree bringeth forth good fruit, 
and an evil tree bringeth forth evil fruit; for a tree is 
known by its fruits." 

In cases where the same action may arise from different 



126 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

motives, we endeavour to ascertain to which motive the 
action should be ascribed. Our usual mode of reasoning in 
this case is from circumstantial evidence : from the existence 
of the sign, we infer the existence of the condition. 

There are certain social relations which are usually 
attended with certain feelings; and hence we expect in 
such relations to find such feelings, and that the actions will 
correspond with such feelings. Where there is no such 
correspondence, we infer that the parties have been un- 
faithful to their duty. Hence, an unrighteous judge, a 
cruel husband, an unkind father, an undutiful son, are 
characters which mankind in all ages have unanimously 
denounced. 

And, finally, we endeavour to act towards other people 
in such a way as we judge, from the ordinary principles of 
human nature, is likely to procure for us their good 
opinion. On the best means of effecting this object, we 
subjoin the observations of an American writer : — 

" If we desire to be deemed religious, we have only to be reli- 
gious, and we must be thus deemed. If you desire to be deemed 
veracious, speak the truth habitually, and you must be thus 
deemed. If you desire to be deemed trustworthy, patriotic, 
benevolent, just, hospitable, philanthropic, studious, learned, be 
what you desire to be deemed, and your reputation must conform 
to what you are. While the senses and intellect of men are so 
organized that men must, as we have see?i, impute to us the qualities 
which we possess, tJw moral feelings of mankind are so organized 
that men must feel towards us according to the moral qualities 
■which we possess. If we are lovely, we must be loved ; if hateful, 
we must be hated ; if contemptible, we must be contemned ; if 
despicable, we must be despised." — Lectures to Young Men on the 
art of controlling others, by A. B. Johnson, JJtica, New York. 



PART III. 

THE PRINCIPLES OE REASONING— (continued.) 

We have now gone through the second part of our book. 
In the first, you will recollect, we considered the Introduc- 
tion to Reasoning. In the second part, we considered the 
Principles of Reasoning. In this part, we are going to 
consider still further the principles of reasoning. But these 
principles are of a different kind. In the former part the 
principles had a direct relation to the subject itself; we 
took the subject, and considered its attributes, its parts, 
its kinds, its causes, and its effects. In this part we shall 
consider the subject in its relation to other things. You 
may therefore, if you please, call the principles we have 
discussed, the internal principles of reasoning ; and those 
we are going to discuss, the external principles of reasoning. 
These we shall consider in separate sections, under the 
following heads : — Section 1. Reasoning from Examples. 

2. Reasoning from Analogy, Comparison, and Contrast. 

3. Reasoning from Parables, Fables, and Proverbs. 4. Rea- 
soning from Written Documents. 5. Errors in Reasoning. 



SECTION I. 

REASONING FROM EXAMPLES. 

In reasoning from examples we adduce examples in proof 
of the propositions we desire to establish. 

1. The following are instances : — 

" And it came to pass, that lie went through the corn fields on 
the sabbath day; and his disciples began, as they went, to pluck 
the ears of corn. And the Pharisees said unto him, Behold, why 
do they on the sabbath day that which is not lawful ? And he 



128 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

said unto them, Have ye never read what David did, when be had 
need, and was an hungred, he, and they that were with him ? 
How he went into the house of God in the days of Abiathar the 
high priest, and did eat the shewbread, which is not lawful to eat 
but for the priests, and gave also to them which were with him ? 
And he said unto them, The sabbath was made for man, and not man 
for the sabbath : therefore the Son of man is Lord also of the 
sabbajfck,"— Mark ii. 23—28. 

" It would be an extremely profitable thing to draw up a short 
and well-authenticated account of the habits of study of the most 
celebrated writers with whose style of literary industry we happen 
to be most acquainted. It would go very far to destroy the 
absurd and pernicious association of genius and idleness, by 
showing them that the greatest poets, orators, statesmen, and 
historians, — men of the most brilliant and imposing talents, — 
have actually laboured as hard as the makers of dictionaries and 
the arrangers of indexes ; and that the most obvious reason tohy 
they have been superior to other men is, that they have take?i more 
pains than other men. Gibbon was in his study every morning, 
winter and summer, at six o'clock ; Mr. Burke was the most 
laborious and indefatigable of human beings ; Leibnitz was never 
out of his library ; Pascal killed himself by study ; Cicero nar- 
rowly escaped death by the same cause ; Milton was at his books 
with as much regularity as a merchant or an attorney,— he had 
mastered all the knowledge of his time ; so had Homer. Haffaelle 
lived but thirty-seven years ; and in that short space carried the 
art so far beyond what it had before reached, that he appears to 
stand alone as a model to his successors. There are instances to 
the contrary ; but, generally speaking, the life of all truly great 
men has been a life of intense and incessant labour" — Rev. Sydney 
Smith's Moral Philosophy. 

" If then we consider the perpetual conflicts of savage tribes, 
the frequent wars of the rival republics of Greece with each other, 
and with their common enemies ; if we remember that the temple 
of Janus at Rome, always open in the time of war, was never 
closed during five centuries, till the end of the second Punic war, 
and then only for a short time ; if we advert to the desolation 
caused by the Scythians, Goths, Yandals, Tartars, and the de- 
struction of about two millions of human beings in the Crusades, 
it seems to be evident that wars were anciently, and before the 
general use of firearms and cannon, more frequent, protracted, de- 
structive, and cruel than they are now" — Aiken on War. 

" Yes, sir, if ever you was to Antwerp, you'd see what it is to 
lose colonies. When that place belonged to Holland, and had 
colonial trade, five thousand marchants used to meet on 'Change ; 



REASONING FROM EXAMPLES. 129 

now the Exchange is left, but the marchant is gone. Look at 
the great docks built there, at so much expense, and no shipping 
there. Look at one man-of-war for a navy that has a pennant as 
long as from to-day to the middle of next week, that can't get 
out for the Dutch forts, is of no use in, and if it did get out has 
no place to go to. Buonaparte said he wanted ships, colonies, 
and commerce ; Buonaparte was a fool, and didn't know what he 
was a-talkin' about, for colonies means all three." — Sam Slick. 

2. This mode of reasoning from examples is called by 
scholastic logicians induction, and is opposed to deduction. 

We will, then, illustrate the difference between reasoning 
by induction and reasoning by deduction. You have ob- 
served an individual come to poverty by a dishonest course 
of action, and another arrive at wealth by a life of recti- 
tude ; and you remark, "■ Honesty is the best policy." 
Here you reason by induction. From these individual 
cases you gather a proof of the general maxim, " Honesty 
is the best policy." But suppose a person should ask your 
advice how to act in a case wherein strict integrity might 
appear to be less advantageous than a more crooked pro- 
cedure, and you observe to him, " Honesty is the best 
policy ;" here you reason by deduction. You apply the 
general principle to an individual case ; you reason on the 
principle of genus and species. These two kinds of reason- 
ing are just the reverse of each other. When from one or 
more examples you infer a general principle, that is called 
induction, or reasoning from examples. When from the 
general principle you infer an individual case, that is called 
deduction, or reasoning from genus and species. Induction 
is reasoning from particulars to generals, and deduction is 
reasoning from generals to particulars. 

But you ask, How can I infer a general proposition from 
a small number of examples 1 Is it not a rule, that 
" generals cannot be inferred from particulars 1 " Very 
true. You cannot infer generals from particulars, unless 
you have reason to believe that all the particulars are 
alike. Our reasoning here must depend upon the uni- 
formity of the laws of nature. When the law is uniform, 
we can infer generals from particulars, because we know 
that all particulars are in fact generals. This is the case 
most frequently in the physical sciences. All animals of 
g3 



130 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

the same species are alike. I see that a horse has four 
legs : I may assert then that every horse in the world has 
four legs, though I have not seen them all. I decompose 
a glass of water, and find it is formed of oxygen and hydro- 
gen : I therefore assert that all water, everywhere, is com- 
posed of oxygen and hydrogen. But when this constant 
uniformity does not exist, I cannot reason so conclusively ; 
and my reasonings will be weaker and weaker in propor- 
tion to this want of uniformity ; and hence we shall have 
to descend from certain reasonings, to probable reasonings, 
and then lower, to doubtful reasonings, until at last our 
examples may be so few or so conflicting, that we may 
have no foundation for any reasoning at all respecting the 
matter in dispute.* 

" Be not too hasty to erect general theories from a few pecu- 
liar observations, appearances, or experiments. This is what the 
logicians call a false induction. When general observations are 
drawn from so many particulars as to become certain and indu- 
bitable, these are jewels of knowledge, comprehending great trea- 
sure in a little room : but 'they are therefore to be made with the 
greater care and caution, lest errors become large and diffusive, 
if we should mistake in these general notions." — Watts on the 
Improvement of the Mind. 

Some writers make a distinction between reasoning from 
example and reasoning from induction, — the example is one, 
induction is more than one. But there seems no ground for 
this distinction. The mode of reasoning is the same ; the 
only difference is in the degree of proof. The greater the 
number of examples, of course, the greater is the amount 
of evidence in proof of the general proposition, f 

In reasoning then from genus and species, we infer, you 
perceive, individual cases from universal rules. In reason- 
ing from examples, we reverse our mode of reasoning ; and 
from one or more examples we prove the general rule. 

* " When the grounds for believing anything are slight, we term the mental act 
or state induced, a conjecture ; when they are strong, we term it an inference or 
conclusion. Increase the evidence for a conjecture, it becomes a conclusion ; 
diminish the evidence for a conclusion, it passes into a conjecture. The process 
which ends in a conclusion, and the process which ends in a conjecture, are thus 
essentially the same, and differ only in degree, or in the force of the evidence." — 
Bailey, p. 31. 

t " It is obvious that whether we can draw an inference from a single fact, 
or whether it is needful to have a collection of facts, depends altogether on what 
is requisite for establishing a similarity in the influential circumstances of each 
case, and does not affect the character of the reasoning." — Bailey, p. 10. 



REASONING FROM EXAMPLES. 131 

• 

We use the inductive method in regard to the physical 
sciences, such as astronomy, chemistry, &c. We see seve- 
ral instances in which fire melts lead ; we infer it will 
always do so ; and when we are satisfied that this is the 
case, we call it a law of nature. It was also by this 
method that philosophers have discovered the laws of astro- 
nomy. By the same rule we discover the laws of medi- 
cine : if a medicine cures in a great number of cases, we 
infer that it will always cure in similar cases. In the 
science of morals, we also observe that certain vices lead to 
misery • and we infer that vice will always lead to misery, 
and virtue to happiness. In politics, we observe in the 
history of the world what institutions and what laws have 
conduced to the happiness of the people ; we gather toge- 
ther these instances, and thus form maxims for the govern- 
ment of nations. In political economy we observe, or 
should observe, the same practice. But political econo- 
mists have too often wandered into other paths. Instead 
of deducing their principles from facts, they have first 
formed their theories, and then made facts bend to their 
theories. Hence we have theories of population, theories 
of rent, theories of the currency, and theories of taxation, 
advanced and supported in a way more in accordance 
with the Aristotelian than with the Baconian system of 
philosophy. 

3. The following explanation of the nature of induction 
is taken from Mr. Hill's Logic : — 

" An induction in which every individual case is enumerated is 
a perfect demonstration. And in general, the more nearly we 
approach to the entire enumeration, the higher is the degree of 
probability attained by the induction : provided, at least, that no 
facts of an opposite tendency are discoverable ; or that if they 
occur, they are satisfactorily shown not to be really inconsistent 
with the principle deduced. The great error in induction is too 
great haste in drawing a conclusion without having premised a 
sufficient number of individual cases. Many, for example, if they 
have met with or heard of one or two dishonest lawyers, or observed 
a comet in a zoarm summer, think themselves authorized to draw 
the sweeping inference, that all lawyers are dishonest, or all comets 
occasion a warm, season" 

" A beautiful specimen of moral induction occurs, 2 Peter if. 
4—9. The conclusion is two-fold; and the sacred writer accord- 



132 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

• 

ingly adduces a double train, of individual instances, strikingly 
contrasted with each other. The substance of the arguments is 
this : The offending angels, — the antediluvian world, — the inhabi- 
tants of Sodom and Gomorrah, — were divinely punished ; therefore, 
all the unjust shall be divinely punished. Again, The holy angels 
who did not offend, — Noah, the preacher of righteousness, — and just 
Lot, — were delivered from trial; therefore, all the godly shall be 
delivered from trial. 

" The three introductory chapters of the Epistle to the Romans 
contain an inductive argument; in which the proposition, All have 
sinned, is inferred to be universally true, because it has been suc- 
cessively proved true, first concerning all Jews, and then concern- 
ing all Gentiles. 

"Again, the general conclusion in Psalm xxxvii. 23, 24, as de- 
duced from the train of observation mentioned in the subsequent 
verse; — and that in the 38th verse, as deduced from verses 35, 
36, are specimens of moral induction." 

" A correct and forcible instance of this mode of argument by 
analogy occurs in 1 Sam. xvii. 34 — 37. The examples also used 
by the Israelites in their lively remonstrance with the Reubenites, 
&c. (Josh. xxii. 17, 18, 20) ; by the Jewish elders in behalf of 
Jeremiah (Jer. xxvi. 17 — 19) ; and by Gamaliel in behalf of the 
apostles (Acts v. 36 — 39), are very apposite and striking. The 
speech of Rabshakeh, recorded in Isaiah xxxvi. 18 — 20, presents 
a fallacious instance of the same. The conclusion in this case is 
not drawn de simili ; there was no just comparison between the 
omnipotent God of Israel and the idol-gods of the heathen." 

If you turn to your Bible and read the texts to which 
Mr. Hill has referred, you will perceive that his illustra- 
tions are exceedingly apposite, and they will give you a 
very clear idea of the nature of induction, or reasoning 
from example. 

4. This kind of reasoning is very common throughout 
the Bible. 

It abounds in the Psalms ; the Prophets often used it ; and 
after the captivity, when Nehemiah reproved the Jew T s for 
their violation of the sabbath, he referred to the former 
instances wherein such a course of conduct had provoked 
the Divine displeasure. — Neh. xiii. 15 — 18. 

Reasoning by example abounds also in the New Testa- 
ment These examples are of various kinds, and adduced 
for various purposes. The eleventh chapter of the Epistle 
to the Hebrews is a chapter of examples, and the inference 



REASONING FROM EXAMPLES. 133 

from the whole is given in the first verse of the twelfth 
chapter : — 

" Wherefore seeing we also are compassed about with so great 
a cloud of witnesses, let us lay aside every weight, and the sin 
which doth so easily beset us, and let us run with patience the 
race that is set before us." 

First, we have examples to be imitated : — 
" Take, my brethren, the prophets, who have spoken in the 
name of the Lord, for an example of suffering affliction, and of 
patience. Behold, we count them happy which endure. Ye have 
heard of the patience of Job, and have seen the end of the Lord; 
that the Lord is very pitiful, and of tender mercy." — James v. 
10, 11. See also James v. 16—18 ; 1 Pet. iii. 5, 6. 

Examples are adduced to be avoided : — 

" Now as Jannes and Jambres withstood Moses, so do these also 
resist the truth : men of corrupt minds, reprobate concerning the 
faith. But they shall proceed no further : for their folly shall be 
manifest unto all men, as theirs also was." — 2 Tim. iii. 8, 9. See 
also 1 John iii. 11, 12 ; and 1 Corinthians x. 6 — 11. 

Examples are adduced worthy of imitation, in order to 
censure by contrast the conduct of the Jews : — 

"The men of Nineveh shall rise in judgment with this genera- 
tion, and shall condemn it : because they repented at the preaching 
of Jonas ; and, behold, a greater than Jonas is here. The queen 
of the south shall rise up in the judgment with this generation, 
and shall condemn it : for she came from the uttermost parts of 
the earth to hear the wisdom of Solomon ; and, behold, a greater 
than Solomon is here." — Matt. xii. 41, 42. 

Principles are often confirmed or,, illustrated by exam- 
ples. The following is adduced to show that a prophet 
has no honour in his own country : — 

"And he said, Yerily I say unto you, No prophet is accepted 
in his own country. But I tell you of a truth, many widows were 
in Israel in the days of Elias, when the heaven was shut up three 
years and six months, when great famine was throughout all the 
land ; but unto none of them was Elias sent, save unto Sarepta, 
a city of Sidon, unto a woman that was a widow." — Tjuke iv. 
24—27. 

The example of David, a man of decided piety, was 
adduced to show that, in a case of necessity, a positive 
law might be violated to satisfy hunger : — 



134 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

"At that time Jesus went on the sabbath day through the corn; 
and his disciples were an hungred, and began to pluck the ears of 
corn, and to eat. But when the Pharisees saw it, they said unto 
him, Behold, thy disciples do that which is not lawful to do upon 
the sabbath day. But he said unto them, Have ye not read what 
David did, when he was an hungred, and they that were with him ; 
how he entered into the house of God, and did eat the shewbread, 
which was not lawful for him to eat, neither for them which were 
with him, but only for the priests ? " — Matt. xii. 1 — 4. 

To prove that God had not cast away the Jewish people, 
allusion is made to the days of Elijah : — 

" I say then, Hath God cast away his people ? God forbid. 
For I also am an Israelite, of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe 
of Benjamin. God hath not cast away his people which he fore- 
knew. Wot ye not what the Scripture saith of Elias ? how he 
maketh intercession to God against Israel, saying, Lord, they have 
killed thy prophets, and digged down thine altars ; and I am left 
alone, and they seek my life. But what saith the answer of God 
unto him ? I have reserved to myself seven thousand men, who 
have not bowed the knee to the image of Baal. Even so then at 
this present time also there is a remnant according to the election 
of grace." — Romans xi. 1 — 5. 

Agreeably to the above models, divines are in the habit 
of enforcing moral injunctions by scriptural examples. 
The following is an extract from Barrow's Sermon on the 
Industry of a Gentleman : — 

" It is Iris business to administer relief to his poor neighbours, 
in their want and distresses, by his wealth ; to be such a gentleman 
and so employed as Job was ; who ' did not see any perish for want 
of clothing, or any poor without covering ;' who ' delivered the 
poor that cried, and the fatherless, and him that had none to 
help him.' 

"It is his business to be hospitable; kind and helpful to 
strangers ; following those noble gentlemen, Abraham and Lot, who 
were so ready to invite and entertain strangers with bountiful 
courtesy. 

" It is his business to maintain peace, and appease dissensions 
among his neighbours, interposing his counsel and authority in 
order thereto : whereto he hath that brave gentleman, Moses, 
recommended for his pattern. 

" It is his business to promote the welfare and prosperity of his 
country with his best endeavours, and by all his interest ; in which 
practice the Sacred History doth propound divers gallant gentlemen 
(Joseph, Moses, Samuel, Nehemiah, Daniel, Mordecai, and all 



REASONING FROM EXAMPLES. 135 

such renowned patriots) to guide him." — Knights Half-hours with 
the best Authors. 

5. The examples I have hitherto brought before you 
have been examples of persons. But there is another 
kind of examples you will often meet with in your reading. 
After an author has laid down a general principle, he will 
state an individual case by which that principle is proved 
or illustrated. Read the following quotations, and you 
will know what I mean : — 

"Be patient therefore, brethren, unto the coming of the Lord. 
Behold, the husbandman waiteth for the precious fruit of the 
earth, and hath long patience for it, until he receive the early and 
latter rain." — James v. 7. 

"Habit uniformly and constantly strengthens all our active 
exertions. Whatever we do often, we become more and more apt 
to do. A snuff-taker begins with a pinch of snuff per day, and 
ends with a pound or two every month. Swearing begins in 
anger : it ends by mingling itself with ordinary conversation." — 
Sidney Smith's Moral Philosophy. 

" Some labourers are paid higher than others. A carpenter earns 
more than a ploughman, and a watchmaker more than either ; and 
yet this is not from the one working harder than the other. 

" And it is the same with the labour of the mind as with that of 
the body. A banker's clerk, who has to work hard at keeping 
accounts, is not paid so high as a lawyer or a physician. 

" You see, from this, that the rate of wages does not depend on 
the hardness of the labour, but on the value of the work done." — 
Easy Lessons on Money Matters. 

" The invention of machinery, I allow, is often attended with 
much partial and temporary inconvenience and hardship ; but on 
the other hand, the advantages resulting from it are almost incalcu- 
lable both in extent and duration. When, for instance, the machine 
for weaving stockings was first invented, it was considered as a 
severe hardship on those who had earned a maintenance by knit- 
ting them ; but the superior facility with which stockings were 
made in the loom, rendered them so much cheaper, that those, 
who before were unable to purchase them, could now indulge in 
the comfort of wearing them, and the prodigious increase of 
demand for stockings enabled all the knitters to gain a livelihood 
by spinning the materials that were to be woven into stockings." 
— Mrs. Marcefs Conversations on Political Economy . 

" Ln all slave countries there is an aversion to labour, at least an 
aversion to that kind of labour which is performed by slaves. At 



136 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

the commencement of the Roman state, agriculture was con- 
sidered honourable, and the greatest of her sons worked at the 
plough ; but, when agriculture was performed by slaves, the citi- 
zens refrained from labour, and Rome imported her provisions 
from abroad. This change produced disastrous effects. As the 
poorer citizens could not engage in manual work, they were, when 
not engaged in war, dependent on the bounty of the state, and 
received a certain sum for their support. Had not slavery existed 
they might have become artisans ; but, as slaves were artisans, 
the citizens became paupers." — Lectures on Ancient Commerce. 

6. Reasoning by example is in great use among lawyers. 
One chief mode of reasoning with them is by what is 
called a case in point, that is, an example in point. When 
a case is in dispute, the plan is to show that a case similar 
to the present has already been decided. But the example 
or case adduced will not, of course, be the same in all its 
circumstances as the case under trial. If so, there would 
have been no ground for a law-suit, as the point would 
then have been already decided. But it is the object of 
the advocate to show that the case adduced establishes a 
principle, and that this principle thus established will 
apply to the case under consideration. 

I do not know that I can better illustrate the case in 
point than by considering the argument of the Apostle 
Paul. His object is to prove that the apostles ought to be 
supported by the churches. First, then, he appeals to 
the ecclesiastical law of the Jews : "Do ye not know 
that they which minister about holy things, live of the 
things of the temple 1 and they which wait at the altar, 
are partakers with the altar 1 " This is an example — a 
direct case in point. Secondly. He refers to the civil laws 
of Moses. There it is enacted : " Thou shalt not muzzle the 
mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn." It might 
be asked, How is this a case in point 1 What resemblance 
is there between the case of an unmuzzled ox and that of 
the apostle 1 The point is this ; the enactment respecting 
the ox establishes the principle that the labourer should 
partake of the fruit of his labour, and this principle ap- 
plied to the case of the apostles, proves that they which 
preach the gospel should live of the gospel. This case of 
the ox is then an indirect case in point. The reasoning is 
first by induction, and then by deduction. 



EEASONING FEOM EXAMPLES. 137 

7. Sometimes an individual case is adduced for the 
purpose, not of establishing, but of overthrowing a general 
principle. 

When your opponent tries to apply a general principle 
to an individual case, you have two methods of reply. You 
may either deny the general principle, or deny that it is 
applicable to the case under consideration. If you adopt 
the first mode, you will endeavour to show that the general 
principle is untrue, or unjust, or inexpedient, according to 
the object you have in view. Here again I can give you 
a Scriptural example : — 

" Then came to Jesus Scribes and Pharisees, which were of 
Jerusalem, saying, "Why do thy disciples transgress the tradition 
of the elders ? for they wash not their hands when they eat bread. 
But he answered and said unto them, Why do ye also transgress 
the commandment of God by your tradition? Eor God com- 
manded, saying, Honour thy father and mother : and, He that 
curseth father or mother, let him die the death. But ye say, 
Whoever shall say to his father or his mother, It is a gift, by 
whatsoever thou mightest be profited by me: and honour not his 
father or his mother, he shall be free. Thus have ye made the 
commandment of God of none effect by your tradition." — Matt. 
xv. 1—6. 

Here the argument of the Scribes is, that the disciples 
ought to have observed the tradition of the elders ; that 
these traditions prohibited the taking of food with un- 
washed hands, and that the disciples, therefore, had vio- 
lated the tradition. The reply does not deny the fact that 
the disciples had violated the tradition, but it attacks the 
tradition itself — not this individual tradition, but the whole 
body of traditions, — by showing that in one instance, at 
least, they were in opposition to the moral law. As some 
of these traditions were thus shown to be in direct oppo- 
sition to the Divine law, the authority of all the traditions 
was impeached, and consequently, the one the disciples had 
violated was not obligatory. 

As examples can often be adduced on both sides of a 
question, we shall have to balance one set of examples 
against another, in order to judge of the probability of the 
case under consideration. You doubt whether you will 
buy any shares in a Railway Company. Your friend, who 
is a director, tells you of several cases in which parties 



138 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

have become wealthy, by taking shares in such companies. 
Your wife tells you of other cases in which the parties 
have been ruined. Here you must decide according to 
what is called " the doctrine of chances," or more properly, 
the doctrine of probabilities. 

" We may observe these three rules, in judging of probabilities 
which are to be determined by reason, relating either to things 
past or things to come. 

"That which agrees most with the constitution of nature 
carries the greatest probability in it, where no other circumstance 
appears to counterpoise it : as, if I let loose a greyhound within 
sight of a hare upon a large plain, there is great probability the 
greyhound will seize her ; that a thousand sparrows will fly away 
at the sight of a hawk among them. 

" That which is most conformable to the constant observations 
of men, or to experiments frequently repeated, is most likely to 
be true : as, that a winter will not pass away in England without 
some frost and snow ; that if you deal out great quantities of 
strong liquor to the mob there will be many drunk ; that a large 
assembly of men will be of different opinions in any doubtful 
point ; that a thief will make his escape out of prison if the doors 
of it are unguarded at midnight. 

" In matters of fact, which are past or present, where neither 
nature, nor observation, nor custom gives us any sufficient infor- 
mation on either side of the question, there we may derive a pro- 
bability from the attestation of wise and honest men by word or 
.writing, or the concurring witnesses of multitudes who have seen 
and known what they relate, &c. Tins testimony in many cases 
will arise to the degree of moral certainty. So we believe that 
the plant tea grows in China ; and that the emperor of the Turks 
lives at Constantinople; that Julius Caesar conquered France; 
and that Jesus, our Saviour, lived and died in Judea; that 
thousands were converted to the Christian faith hi a century 
after the death of Christ ; and that the books which contain the 
Christian religion are certain histories and epistles, which were 
written above a thousand years ago." — Watts' 's Improvement of 
the Mind. 

8. Among the modes of reasoning from example, we 
may place the practice of divines, who in commentating 
on the historical parts of Scripture, raise from individual 
facts some general principle, containing a lesson in morals, 
or religion. 

" Historical passages must be discussed by way of observation. 
I have seen no expositor who affords more obvious, pertinent, 



REASONING FROM EXAMPLES. 139 

and edifying observations, than our excellent Mr. Henry. Those 
parts of holy Scripture which seem at first sight the least instruc- 
tive, furnish in the hand of this ingenious man much instruction, 
or, at least, much opportunity of instruction. What in Scripture 
seems less interesting to us than, that Ebedmelech the Ethiopian 
drew Jeremiah out of a dungeon with cords, old cast clouts, and 
rotten rags ? Yet our expositor observes several useful articles 
in this history. 

" 'Fad. — Ebedmelech took old clouts and rags from under the 
treasury in the king's house. 

" ' Observation.— -No waste should be made even in knits' 
palaces : broken linen, like broken meat, should be preserved for 
the use of the poor. 

" ' Fact. — Ebedmelech directed Jeremiah to put the soft rags 
under his arm-holes. 

" ' Observation. — Distressed people should be relieved with 
tenderness. 

" ' Fact. — Ebedmelech did not throw the rags down ; but let 
them down by cords. 

Observation. — The poor should be relieved with respect.' " 
's Notes to Claude. 



Philosophical historians adopt the same course. From 
the facts they relate they make observations, which, from 
their great importance and general application, may justly 
be denominated principles. And then they establish these 
principles by adducing other facts not connected with their 
immediate history. Thus Mr. Macaulay, after giving a 
dismal account of the character of the clergy of that day, 
observes : " It would be a great error to imagine, because 
the country rector was in general not regarded as a gentle- 
man, because he could not dare to aspire to the hand of one 
of the young ladies at the manor house, because he was not 
asked into the parlours of the great, but was left to drink 
and smoke with grooms and butlers, that the power of the 
clerical body was smaller than at present." Then follows 
the observation or principle he raises or founds on these 
facts. The influence of a class is by no means proportioned 
to the consideration which the members of that class enjoy in 
their individual capacity. This principle requires a further 
confirmation. Here it is : "A cardinal is a much more 
exalted personage than a begging friar, but it would be a 
grievous mistake to suppose that the college of cardinals 
has exercised a greater dominion over the public mind of 



140 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

Europe, than the order of St. Francis. In Ireland at present, 
a peer holds a far higher station in society than a Eoman 
Catholic priest, yet there are in Munster and Connaught 
few counties where a combination of priests would not 
carry an election against a combination of peers." — Macau- 
lay s History of England, vol. i. p. 333. 

9. Examples are often employed in conversational dis- 
cussion. 

In this case they usually assume the form of anecdotes. 
The word anecdote signifies not published, a meaning that 
does not apply in our times, as all anecdotes are sure to 
be published, and we have volumes of them upon almost 
every subject. 

All anecdotes are arguments. They all prove some- 
thing, or may be so applied as to prove something ; and 
they should, when related, be associated with the principle 
they are adapted to prove. " A writer of penetration," 
says Disraeli, " sees connexions in literary anecdotes which 
are not immediately perceived by others : in his hands 
anecdotes, even should they be familiar to us, are suscep- 
tible of deductions and inferences which become novel and 
important truths. Facts of themselves are barren : it is 
when these facts pass through reflections, and become 
interwoven with our feelings or our reasonings, that they 
are the finest illustrations ; that they assume the dignity 
of ' philosophy teaching by example ;' that in the moral 
world they are what the wise system of Bacon inculcated 
in the natural knowledge deduced from experiments— the 
study of nature in her operations. ' When examples are 
pointed out to us,' says Lord Bolingbroke, ' there is a 
kind of appeal, with which we are flattered, made to our 
senses as well as to our understandings. The instruction 
comes then from our authority — we yield to fact when we 
resist speculation.' " — Curiosities of Literature. 

The principles of morality and religion are enforced by 
collections of anecdotes. We have seen books, both in 
French and English, entitled " The Beauties of History," 
in which the anecdotes gleaned from history are classified 
under the names of the moral virtues, as Industry, Filial 
affection, Humanity, &c. An " Encyclopedia of Religious 
Anecdotes " has recently been published by the Rev. Geo.. 



REASONING FROM EXAMPLES. 141 

Cheever of New York ; and Mr, Wilson, a Wesleyan clergy- 
man, has published a collection under the title of " Facts 
and Incidents, illustrative of the Scripture Doctrines as 
set forth in the First and Second Catechisms of the Wes- 
leyan Methodists." 

As an anecdote records only one example, it may not of 
itself amount to proof ; but it may be an additional item 
in the accumulated proofs by which a certain proposition 
is established. All travellers relate anecdotes denoting 
the peculiar characters of the people amoDg whom they 
have travelled. This is in fact the chief kind of evidence 
we can have upon the subject. Travellers into the East 
have recorded many anecdotes tending to explain some 
of the passages of the Holy Scriptures. On this ground 
" Burder's Oriental Customs" and the writings of Dr. Kitto 
are exceedingly valuable. Some anecdotes refer only to 
individual character. You have an abundance of them in 
Boswell's Life of Johnson. 

Anecdotes have often a good effect when discreetly re- 
lated at public meetings. The Rev. R Bickersteth of 
Clapham, in a speech before the Tract Society, thus illus- 
trates the advantages that may be obtained from the 
union of a great number of small exertions : — 

" He remembered, to have heard of a vessel being wrecked in 
one of the beautiful bays on the coast of that beautiful island — 
Jersey. A number of the inhabitants crowded the cliff, and 
looked on with feelings of despair, for they felt that it was hope- 
less to attempt doing anything for the crew. At length it was 
suggested by one present that they should all hurry away, to find 
as much rope as possible, and then return to try to aid those who 
were in such jeopardy. The advice was acted upon, and some 
brought long pieces, and some short. Joining them all together, 
they stretched the united rope from cliff to cliff, suffering the 
middle of it to dip down into the unfortunate vessel stranded on 
the rocks. By that means the poor mariners were enabled to 
lash themselves to the cord, and were drawn up safely to the top 
of the cliff. Those who went to fetch the rope did not argue, 
because they could not bring a long piece, that therefore their 
contribution was useless ; but they brought as much as they 
could, and all joined together effected the rescue." 

We transcribe the following anecdotes from Sydney Smith, 
as illustrating the nature of wit, of a pun, and of a bull : — 



142 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

"Wit. — Louis XIV. was exceedingly molested by the solici- 
tations of a general officer at the levee, and cried out loud enough 
to be overheard, c That gentleman is the most troublesome officer 
in the whole army. 5 The officer replied, ' Your majesty's enemies 
have more than once said the same thing.' " — " A Pun. — Miss 
Hamilton, in her book on education, mentions the instance of a 
boy so very neglectful that he could never be brought to read 
the word patriarchs, but whenever he met with it he always 
pronounced it partridges. A friend of the writer observed to 
her that it could hardly be considered as a mere piece of negli- 
gence, for it appeared to him that the boy, in calling them par- 
tridges, was making game of the patriarchs." — "A Bull. — A 
gentleman, in speaking of a nobleman's wife of great rank and 
fortune, lamented very much that she had no children. A 
medical gentleman who was present observed, that to have no 
children was a great misfortune, but he thought he had remarked 
that it was hereditary in some families." 



The following anecdote may be related to illustrate the 
rule that when you have advanced arguments enough to 
prove your point you should advance no more. 

" Eighteen Reasons eob, Absence. — The Prince of Conde 
passing through Beaune, the public authorities went to meet him 
at the gates of the town. After many high-flown compliments, 
the mayor added : — ' To display our joy, we wished to receive you 
with the reports of a numerous artillery, but we have not been 
able to fire the cannons for eighteen reasons ; — in the first place, 
we have none : secondly,' — ' My good friend,' said the prince, 
' the first reason is so good, I will excuse the other seventeen.' " 
— Laughing Philosopher. 

It is well to store our minds with anecdotes. But every 
anecdote should be associated with some principle that it 
is adapted to prove or to illustrate. Then the recollection 
of the anecdote will remind us of the principle, and the 
recollection of the principle will remind us of the anecdote. 
When you relate them, they should be related in illustration 
of the principle that may be the subject of the conversation, 
and introduced with propriety and good taste. Do not tell 
long anecdotes, as they will become tedious. If any other 
person is about to relate an anecdote that you know, do 
not interrupt him, but observe how he relates it, that you 
may learn to relate it better yourself. There is an art in 
this as in other things. It is generally best to begin with 
the time or occasion when the event occurred, then the 






REASONING FROM ANALOGY. 143 

persons, and then the actions. The following will illustrate 
the order I mean : — " In the beginning God created the 
heavens and the earth." " While he was teaching in the 
temple the Pharisees came unto him." The gist or point 
of the anecdote should always be related last. To learn 
how anecdotes may be related argumentatively, read Dis- 
raeli's Curiosities of Literature. 



SECTION II. 

REASONING FROM ANALOGY, COMPARISON, AND CONTRAST. 

Analogy is different from either deduction or induction. 
The word analogy means resemblance. By " reasoning 
from analogy " we mean reasoning about one thing from its 
resemblance to another thing. 

1. The following are examples of this kind of reasoning: 

" And, behold, there was a man which had his hand withered. 
And they asked him, saying, Is it lawful to heal on the sabbath 
days ? that they might accuse him. ■ And he said unto them, What 
man shall there be among you, that shall have one sheep, and if 
it fall into a pit on the sabbath day, will he not lay hold on it, 
and lift it out ? How much then is a man better that a sheep ? 
Wherefore it is lawful to do well on the sabbath days." — Matt. 
xii. 10—12. 

" It would be a very curious question to agitate, how far under- 
standing is transmitted from parent to child ; and within what 
limits it can be improved by culture : whether all men are born 
equal with respect to then understanding ; or whether there is 
an original diversity antecedent to all imitation and instruction. 
The analogy of animals is in favour of the trans missibility of 
mind. Some ill-tempered horses constantly breed ill-tempered 
colts ; and the foal never has seen the sire, — therefore, in this, 
there can be no imitation. If the eggs of a wild duck are hatched 
under a tame duck, the young brood will be much wilder than 
any common brood of poultry : if they are kept all their lives in 
a farm-yard, and treated kindly, and fed well, then- eggs hatched 
under another bird produce a much tamer race." — Sydney SmiWs 
Sketches of Moral Philosophy. 

"I suppose it will be allowed, that, to advance a direct false- 
hood, in recommendation of our wares, by ascribing to them some 
quality which we know that they have not, is dishonest. Now, 
compare with this the designed concealment of some fault, which 



144 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

we know that they have ; the motive in these two cases is the 
same, and the prejudice to the buyer is also the same. 

" The practice of passing bad money is sometimes defended by 
a vulgar excuse, that we have taken the money for good, and must 
therefore get rid of it. . Which excuse is much, the same as if one 
who had been robbed on the highway, should imagine he had a 
right to reimburse himself out of the pocket of the first traveller 
he met." — Foley's Moral Philosophy. 

2. We shall now show the application of this kind of 
reasoning to several of the sciences. 

" In almost every department of human knowledge," 
says Mr. Blakey, " analogical reasonings are employed to a 
great extent, and are found to be of great utility. In the 
science of comparative anatomy, for example, it is of sin- 
gular importance to trace out the resemblances between 
the structures of different animals, their organs of sensa- 
tion, digestion, and motion ; and from this analogical 
inquiry we may draw useful conclusions for the govern- 
ment of our own conduct and constitution, and the promo- 
tion of our interests. For example, we make experiments 
with certain kinds of food on the digestive organs of dogs, 
and from these we infer or draw conclusions that such and 
such effects will result to ourselves from taking these same 
kinds of food : and these experiments have often led to 
the formation of rules of diet and regimen of considerable 
importance to our bodily health. Many highly beneficial 
discoveries in medicine may be traced to experiments and 
observations made upon the inferior animals, founded 
upon the resemblance between their functions of life and 
our own." — Essay on Logic. 

The principle of analogy has been applied to some of our 
reasonings in connexion with astronomy. We have given 
you one example of this at page 42. Here is another — 

" A person on the earth can no more be sensible of its undis- 
turbed motion on its axis, than one in the cabin of a ship on 
smooth water, can be sensible of the ship's motion, when it turns 
gently and uniformly round. It is, therefore, no argument against 
the earth's diurnal motion, that we do not feel it, nor is the 
apparent revolution of the celestial bodies, every day a proof oi 
the reality of these motions, for whether we or they revolve, the 
appearance is the very same. A person looking through the cabin 
windows of a ship, as strongly fancies the objects on land to go 



REASONING FROM ANALOGY. 145 

round when the ship turns, as if they were actually in motion." 
— Encyclopedia Britannica. 

The principle of analogy is also often employed in our 
moral reasonings. 

"Public companies are analogous to other collective bodies 
who are acknowledged to be moral agents. 

" It will not be denied that a nation may declare an unjust war 
— may carry it on in a cruel manner — may treat a conquered 
nation with oppression, or may conduct a treaty of peace with 
duplicity and fraud. Nor will it be denied, that a nation may 
become immoral by the extinction of moral feeling in its rulers, 
and throughout the population." 

" As, then, large bodies of men, like nations, are rewarded or 
punished in their collective capacity, for their virtuous or vicious 
actions, it would seem to follow, that smaller bodies of men, like 
public companies, may be subjected to the same moral discipline. 

" A public company, like a nation, is composed of a number of 
individuals who have a government for the regulation of their 
affairs, and whose acts are considered as the acts of the whole 
body. It is true that a public company is composed of a smaller 
number of persons than a nation, but that cannot affect the moral 
character of its actions. It is also true, that while a nation 
must always act through its government, a public company may, 
and often does, at the general meeting of its shareholders, act 
independently of its government ; but neither can this alter its 
moral agency, for whether the form of government be aristocratical 
or democratical, the duties of a nation, or of a public company, 
remain the same. 

" In opposition to this doctrine, it may be contended that, to 
render public bodies of men responsible in their collective capacity, 
would be destructive of personal or individual responsibility. But 
this is not the case. A nation may be punished for its national 
crimes, and yet the individual who may have caused these crimes, 
may sustain an individual punishment. Thus, Jeroboam, Ahab, 
and other kings of Israel were individually punished, while, at 
the same time, the nation was also punished in its collective 
capacity. So a public company may be punished or rewarded 
for its actions, while, at the same time, any individual who caused 
these actions, may also be personally rewarded or punished. It 
may too be objected, that if a public company is to be punished, 
as such, for its acts, then all the partners would share in the 
punishment, though many of them may have been quite innocent 
of the crime. To this we answer, that the same objection would 
apply to the doctrine of national responsibility.* It is not pos- 

* The logical reader need not be reminded, that in arguments from analogy it 
is a sufficient answer to an objection to show that the objection applies with equal 
H 



146 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

sible in the case of a large body of men, for every individual to 
take part in its actions. The act of the authorized government, 
or of the majority of the members, must be regarded as the act 
of the whole community, and every individual must share, in the 
prosperity or adversity resulting from such acts." — Gilbarfs Prac- 
tical Treatise on Banking. 

Analogy is also used in legal argumentation : — 

<c When a point of law has been once adjudged, neither that 
question, nor any which completely and in all its circumstances 
corresponds with that, can be brought a second time into dispute : 
but questions arise, which resemble this only indirectly and in part, 
in certain views and circumstances, and which may seem to bear 
an equal or a greater affinity to other adjudged cases ; questions 
which can be brought within any affixed rule only by analogy, and 
which hold a relation by analogy to different rules. It is by the 
urging of these different analogies that the conte?ition of the bar is 
carried on : and it is in the comparison, adjustment, and reconci- 
liation of them with one another ; in the discerning of such dis- 
tinctions, and in the framing of such a determination, as may 
either save the various rules alleged in the cause, or, if that be 
impossible, may give up the weaker analogy to the stronger, that 
the sagacity and wisdom of the court are seen and exercised. 
Amongst a thousand instances of this, we may cite one of general 
notoriety, in the contest that has lately been agitated concerning 
literary property. The personal industry which an author ex- 
pends upon the composition of his work, bears so near a resem- 
blance to that by which every other kind of property is earned, 
or deserved, or acquired; or rather there exists such a corre- 
spondency between what is created by the study of a man's mind, 
and the production of his labour in any other way of applying it, 
that he seems entitled to the same exclusive, assignable, and per- 
petual right in both ; and that right to the same protection of law. 
This was the analogy contended for on one side. On the other 
hand, a book, as to the author's right in it, appears similar to an 
invention of art, as a machine, an engine, a medicine : and since 
the law permits these to be copied and imitated, except where an 
exclusive use or sale is reserved to the inventor by patent, the 
same liberty should be allowed in the publication and sale of 
books. This was the analogy maintained by the advocates of an 

force to the doctrine from which the analogy is drawn. Thus, in the text, the 
moral responsibUity of nations is assumed as admitted by all parties, and, there- 
fore, requiring no further proof. From the resemblance, or analogy between the 
two cases, we infer the moral responsibility of public companies. It is, therefore, 
a sufficient answer to any objection against the latter doctrine, to show that it will 
equally apply to the former. Indeed, the more numerous the objections, if they 
will apply equally in both cases, the more the argument is strengthened ; as they 
are confirmatory of the soundness of the analogy. 






REASONING FROM ANALOGY. 147 

open trade. And the competition of these opposite analogies 
constituted the difficulty of the case, as far as the same was argued, 
or adjudged upon principles of common law. — One example may 
serve to illustrate our meaning : but whoever takes up a volume 
of Reports, will find most of the arguments it contains capable 
of the same analysis ; although the analogies, it must be confessed, 
are sometimes so entangled as not to be easily unravelled, or even 
perceived." — Foley s Moral Philosophy. 

Analogy is used in political economy. 
The following analogy is drawn between interest and 
rent : — 

" I have said that there is no real difference between paying 
for the loan of money, and for the loan of anything else. For 
suppose I have one hundred pounds lying by me, you will easily 
see that it comes to the same thing, whether I buy a house or a 
piece of land with the money, and let it to my neighbour at so 
much a-year, or whether I lend him the money to buy the house 
or the land for himself, on condition of his paying me so much 
a-year for the use of my money. But in the one case his yearly 
payment would be called Rent ; and in the other case it gets the 
name of Interest." — Easy Lessons on Money Matters. 

Mr. Macculloch's fondness for generalization has some- 
times led him into singular analogies. Thus, when dis- 
cussing the utility of machinery, he observes : " Every 
individual who has arrived at maturity, though he may 
not happen to be initiated in any particular art or profes- 
sion, may with perfect propriety be viewed as a machine 
which has. cost twenty years of assiduous attention, and 
the expenditure of a considerable capital to construct.'" 
A further outlay of capital may improve the machine. 
" And if a further sum has been laid out in educating, 
or qualifying him for the exercise of a business or profes- 
sion requiring manual skill, his value will be proportionably 
increased, and he will be entitled to a greater reward for 
his exertions : — just as a machine becomes more valuable 
when new powers are given to it by the expenditure of 
additional capital or labour in its construction." 

Arguments from analogy are often employed in theology 
to refute objections that have been advanced against Divine 
revelation. 

Thus, should one object to Christianity that God is re- 
presented as refusing to pardon offences even upon the 
h2 



148 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

sincere repentance of the offender, it may be replied, that 
in the moral government of the world, we do not find that 
the effects of sin are removed even upon sincere repentance : 
thus, if a man gamble away his property, sincere repent- 
ance will not bring it back ; should he ruin his constitution 
by intemperance, and then repent, his repentance will not 
restore his health ; should he, by a mean, or unjust action, 
damage his reputation, and then repent of his crime, his 
repentance will not bring back his good name. Thus, it 
is not a doctrine of natural any more than of revealed reli- 
gion, that God will pardon sin upon repentance without an 
atonement. 

In the present life your happiness or misery will in many 
cases depend upon your own actions. It is therefore pos- 
sible that your happiness or misery in the future world will 
depend upon your actions in the present world. 

If it be objected that the duration of happiness or 
misery in the future world is disproportionate to the dura- 
tion of the crime, it may be replied, that such is the case 
to a certain degree in the present world, for one short act 
of imprudence or folly committed in early years will some- 
times embitter a whole life. 

Many similar cases may be seen in "Butler's Ana- 
logy." 

This kind of argument is used rather to remove objec- 
tions than to adduce proof. 

Analogical reasoning abounds in the Holy Scripture : — 
" A son honoureth his father, and a servant his master : 
if then I be a father, where is mine honour 1 and if I be a 
master, where is my fear?" (Malachi i. 6.) 

" And the ruler of the synagogue answered with indig- 
nation, because that Jesus had healed on the sabbath day, 
and said unto the people, There are six days in which men 
ought to work : in them therefore come and be healed, 
and not on the sabbath day. The Lord then answered 
him, and said, Thou hypocrite, doth not each one of you 
on the sabbath loose his ox or his ass from the stall, and 
lead him away to watering ? and ought not this woman, 
being a daughter of Abraham, whom Satan hath bound, 
lo. these eighteen years, be loosed from this bond on the 
sabbath day?" (Luke xiii. 14—16.) 



REASONING FROM ANALOGY. 149 

Some divines occasionally preach analogically ; that is, 
they apply their text to some topic different from that 
to which it originally referred. The Kev. Matthew Wilks 
preached sometimes from singular, but at the same time 
appropriate texts. A sermon of his, on " Unsanctified 
Prosperity," was preached from " Jeshurun waxed fat and 
kicked ;" another, on " Little Sins," from " Catch us the 
foxes, even the little foxes, that spoil the vines." His 
sermon before the London Missionary Society was from 
Jeremiah vii. 18 : — " The children gather wood, and the 
fathers kindle the fire, and the women knead their dough, 
to make cakes to the queen of heaven, and to pour out 
drink offerings unto other gods, that they may provoke 
me to anger." From "The children gather wood," he 
urged the formation of Juvenile Missionary Societies. We 
have read a printed sermon, entitled " The devil driving 
his hogs to market ;" the text was Mark v. 12, 13 : — " And 
all the devils besought him, saying, Send us into the 
swine, that we may enter into them. And forthwith Jesus 
gave them leave. And the unclean spirits went out, and 
entered into the swine : and the herd ran violently down a 
steep place into the sea, (they were about two thousand ;) 
and were choked in the sea." The possessed swine that 
ran violently down a steep place till they perished in the 
sea, were considered to represent vicious men, who under 
the influence of the devil are urged forward in a course 
that ends in their destruction. It is said that when 
Mr. Pitt, the prime minister, then a young man, visited 
one of the universities, a dignitary of the Church preached 
from John vi. 9 : — " There is a lad here, which hath five 
barley loaves, and two small fishes : but what are they 
among so many V And a pleasant anecdote is related of 
the Duke of Ormond (whose family name was Butler), 
when Viceroy of Ireland, being reminded of a promise 
of preferment he had made to a worthy clergyman named 
Joseph, by a sermon which the latter preached in the 
Castle Chapel, from Gen. xl. 23 :*," Yet did not the chief 
butler remember Joseph, but forgat him." 

The Rev. John Newton defended forms of prayer upon 
the analogy that exists between such forms and psalms and 
hymns — all being acts of devotion ; — 



150 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

" Crito freely will rehearse 
Forms of prayer and praise in verse : 
Why should Crito then suppose 
Forms are sinful when in prose ?" 






3. Analogy influences our reasonings very much by 
the extent to which it has contributed to the formation of 
language. 

"The faculty of association is not employed merely in the 
formation of new words, but it leads also to the application of 
old words to new ideas. Sometimes the material of which any- 
thing was formed was employed to denote the thing itself, as a 
stick, a horn, a stone. The name of one object was also applied 
to some other, to which it seemed to bear a resemblance. Thus, 
the word branch, which denotes a part of a tree, is applied to a 
part of almost every object that is capable of division; hence we 
speak of the branch of a road, the branch of a river, the branch 
of a family, the branch of a discourse. 

" Words which were originally employed to denote sensible 
objects were afterwards applied to intellectual ideas. The last 
object to which man directs his attention, and that which he finds 
the most difficult to comprehend, are the powers of his own mind. 
Hence mankind have usually a large stock of words denoting 
sensible ideas before they think of naming those ideas which are 
intellectual. And the operations of the mind can scarcely be 
understood but by comparison with external objects. Mankind, 
therefore, having found or fancied some resemblance between 
sensible and intellectual ideas applied the same words to both. 
In all languages we find that words denoting intellectual ideas, 
when traced to their origin, are taken from sensible objects, and 
were at first metaphors. The words understanding, evidence, 
reflection, as well as the words I have employed to denote the 
faculties of invention, association, and abstraction, are all taken 
from objects of sense. These words have now lost their meta- 
phorical meaning, and have become quite literal, through being so 
frequently used. So we still speak of a man being burning with 
zeal, inflamed with anger, swollen with rage, and inflated with 
pride ; and by the same figure of speech we talk of a man having 
a hard heart, or a soft heart ; a thick head, or a long head ; a 
fertile imagination, a sound judgment, a strong memory, polished 
manners. And when we recommend circumspection to an indi- 
vidual, we tell him to ' look sharp.' 

" By the same principle of association, we apply to inanimate 
objects words denoting ideas peculiar to animals. Thus we speak 
of the head of a river, the face of a country, a neck of land, and 
an arm of the sea ; of a running stream, and a standing pool ; 



REASONING FROM ANALOGY. 151 

we say the ground thirsts for rain ; the earth smiles with plenty ; 
and so we speak of a learned age, a happy period, and a melan- 
choly disaster." — Lecture on the Philosophy of Language. 

Analogy is the foundation of nearly the whole of our 
figurative language. Lindley Murray observes that " figure? 
of speech frequently give us a much clearer and more 
striking view of the principal object than we could have if 
it were expressed in simple terms and divested of its 
accessory idea. By a well-chosen figure even conviction is 
assisted, and the impression of a truth upon the mind 
made more lively and forcible than it would otherwise be. 
We perceive this in the following illustration of Young — 
i When we dip too deep into pleasure we always stir 
a sediment that renders it impure and noxious :' and 
in this instance, ' A heart boiling with violent passions 
will always send up infatuating fumes to the head.' An 
image that presents so much congruity between a moral 
and a sensible idea serves like an argument from ana- 
logy to enforce what the author asserts and to induce 
belief." 

The language of satire is usually the language of analogy. 
Logic and wit are far oftener associated than opposed, and 
satire will sometimes succeed where reasoning fails. Writers 
on public questions often employ this weapon. The poli- 
tical and religious parties that existed in England in the 
reign of George I. were represented by Dean Swift in his 
description of the parties in Lilliput. The political parties 
were distinguished from each other by the high and low 
heels of their shoes. The heir apparent (afterwards George 
II.) wore one heel higher than the other, which gave him 
a hobble in his gait — he was evidently halting between 
two opinions. The religious parties were styled the Big- 
endians and the Little-endians ; the former always broke 
their eggs before they ate them on the big end, the latter 
on the little end. The words of their prophet were, " Let 
all true believers break their eggs on the most convenient 
end." A few statesmen thought this meant " that every 
true believer should break his egg on that end which 
seemed to him to be the most convenient." But this con- 
struction was not generally admitted, and many hundred 
large volumes had been published on the controversy. In 
his " Tale of a Tub" the Dean has, in the supposed adven- 



152 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

tures of three brothers, Peter, Martin, and Jack, given what 
he deems a representation of the Catholic, Lutheran, and 
Calvinistic churches. 

All caricatures are founded on the principle of analogy. 
So are the weekly representations in Punch. The proro- 
gation of Parliament in 1850 was represented by "Lord 
John Russell shutting up shop," and the opening of the 
following session by " The Writing Lesson," in which Lord 
John Russell is guiding the hand of the Queen when 
writing the speech from the throne. This kind of repre- 
sentation is sometimes found in the sacred writings. 

" Then Aniaziak sent messengers to Jehoash, the son of 
Jehoahaz son of Jehu, king of Israel, saying, Come, let us look 
one another in the face. And Jehoash the king of Israel sent to 
Amaziak king of Judah, saying, The thistle that was in Lebanon 
sent to the cedar that was in Lebanon, saying, Give thy daughter 
to my son to wife : and there passed by a wild beast that was in 
Lebanon, and trode down the thistle. Thou hast indeed smitten 
Edom, and thine heart hath lifted thee up: glory of this, and 
tarry at home : for why shouldest thou meddle to thy hurt, that 
thou shouldest fall, even thou, and Judah with thee ?" — 2 Kings 
xiv. 8—10. 

And Elijah addressed the priests of Baal in the language 
of satire : — 

" And it came to pass at noon, that Elijah mocked them, and 
said, Cry aloud : for he is a god ; either he is talking, or he is 
pursuing, or he is in a journey, or peradventure he sleepeth, and 
must be awaked." — 1 Kings xviii. 27. 



This is sound reasoning as well as satire. It contains 
an argument from the relation of subject and attribute. 
A God must possess omnipresence and omniscience, and 
as Baal did not possess these attributes, it was a proof that 
he was no God. 

4. An analogy means a relation or agreement between 
two or more things, which in other respects are entirely 
different. But when there are several points of agreement, 
it is not then an analogy, but a comparison. 

In the book of Proverbs, comparisons abound : — 
"Better is a little with righteousness, 
Than great revenues without right. 
He that is slow to anger is better than the mighty ; 
And he that ruleth his spirit, than he that taketh a city." 
See also John viii. 53 ; xix. 11; 1 Cor. xih\. 8— 13. 



REASONING FROM COMPARISON. 153 

Dr. Watts gives the following examples of arguments 
founded on comparison : — " Knowledge is better than 
riches ; virtue is better than knowledge ; therefore, virtue 
is better than riches. A dove will fly a mile a minute.; a 
swallow flies swifter than a dove ; therefore a swallow will 
fly more than a mile a minute." * 

The following comparison is drawn by the Rev. Sydney 
Smith, between books and conversation : — 

" A book has no eyes, and ears, and feelings ; the best are apt 
every now and then to become a little languid ; whereas a living 
book walks about, and varies his conversation and manner, and 
prevents you from going to sleep. There is certainly a great evil 
in this, as well as a good ; for the interest between a man and his 
living folio becomes sometimes a little too keen, and in the com- 
petition for victory they become a little too animated towards, 
and sometimes exasperated against each other; whereas a man 
and his book generally keep the peace with tolerable success ; and 
if they disagree, the man shuts his book, and tosses it into a 
corner of the room, which it might not be quite so safe or easy 
to do with a living folio. It is an inconvenience in a book, that 
you cannot ask questions ; there is no explanation ; and a man is 
less guarded in conversation than in a book, and tells you with 
more honesty the little niceties and exceptions of his opinions ; 
whereas, hi a book, as his opinions are canvassed where they 
cannot be explained and defended, he often overstates a point for 
fear of being misunderstood ; but then, on the contrary, almost 
every man talks a great deal better in his books, with more sense, 
more information, and more reflection, than he can possibly do in 
his conversation, because he has more time." — Moral Philosophy. 

The following is a comparison of different places in the 
vicinity of London : — 

""Twoulcl add thirty years to your life — and think what a 
blessing that would be to me ; not that I shall live a tenth part 
of the time — thirty years, if you'd take a nice little house some- 
where at Brixton. You hate Brixton ? I must say it, Caudle, 
that's so like you : any place that's really genteel, you can't abide. 
Now Brixton and Balaam Hill I think delightful. So select ! 
There, nobody visits nobody, unless they're somebody. To say 
nothing of the delightful pews that make the churches so re- 
spectable. 

" ' However, do as you like. If you won't go to Brixton, what 
do you say to Clapham Common ? Oh, that's a very fine story ! 
Never tell me ! No ; you woiddn't be left alone, a Robinson 
h3 



154 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

Crusoe with, wife and children, because you're in the retail way. 
What ! The retired wholesales never visit the retired retails at 
Clapham? Ha! that's only your old sneering at the world, Mr. 
Caudle ; but I don't believe it. And after all, people should keep 
to their station, or what was this life made for ? Suppose a tallow- 
merchant does keep himself above a tallow-chandler, — I call it 
only a proper pride. What ? You call it the aristocracy of fat ? 
I don't know what you mean by aristocracy ; but I suppose it's 
only_ another of your dictionary words, that's hardly worth the 
finding out. 

" ' What do you say to Hornsey or Muswell Hill ? Eh ? Too 
Ugh ? What a man you are ! Well, then — Battersea ? Too low ? 
You 're an aggravating creature, Caudle, you must own that ! 
Hampstead, then ? Too cold ? Nonsense ; it would brace you up 
like a drum, Caudle ; and that's what you want. But you don't 
deserve anybody to think of your health or your comforts either. 
There's some pretty spots, I'm told, about Eulham. Now, Caudle, 
I won't have you say a word against Eulham. That must be a 
sweet place : "dry, and healthy, and every comfort of life about 
it — else is it likely that a bishop would live there?'" — Mrs. 
Caudles Curtain Lectures. 

Comparison is a principle of extensive use in reasoning. 
In deliberating upon any step we are about to take, we 
make a comparison between the good and the evil effects 
it is likely to produce. We make comparisons between 
different men, and different qualities, and different actions, 
and between the laws and customs of different countries ; 
and we approve or disapprove, according to the award of 
our judgments. And indeed our descriptions of persons, 
places and things, consist chiefly of points of comparison 
with other persons, places and things. 

" Lord Campbell says of Holt : — ' Of all the lawyers in our 
annals, Holt has gained the highest reputation, merely by the 
exercise of judicial functions. He was not a statesman like 
Clarendon — he was not a philosopher like Bacon — he was not an 
orator like Mansfield ; yet he fills nearly as great a space in the 
eye of posterity ; and some enthusiastic lovers of jurisprudence 
regard him with higher veneration than any English judge who 
preceded or has followed him.' " — Lives of the Chancellors. 

" In America all our farms a'most have what we call the rough 
pastur' — that is, a great rough field of a hundred acres or so near 
the woods, where we turn in our young cattle, and breedin' mares, 
and colts, and dry cows, and what not, where they take care of 
themselves, and the young stock grow up, and the old stock grow 



REASONING FROM COMPARISON. 155 

fat. It's a grand outlet that to the farm, that would he over- 
• stocked without it. We could not do without it nohow. Now, 
your colonies are a great field for a redundant population, a grand 
outlet" — Sam Slick. 

" Let us consider some of those points in "which other nations 
offer us a high example. We may mention, for instance, that there 
is among the continental nations a general amenity of manners, 
a freedom of intercourse between the various classes of society, 
which certainly gives them the appearance of great amiability, 
besides that it is the source of other advantages. Again, we find 
in the nations that belong to the Roman Catholic Church, a 
straightforward unaffected boldness in the profession of their 
religion, which is worthy of a purer creed. There is also in 
Roman Catholic countries a regard to the outward forms of reli- 
gion which, though not in itself all that is required of the Chris- 
tian, nor even the most important part of his duty, is yet the 
natural manner in which a real spirit of religion should exhibit 
itself. It is, however, in the eastern world that religious feeling 
is exhibited in the most natural manner. We may perhaps have 
among the approaching throng of interested spectators some of 
the followers of Mahomet, whose well-known custom it is fre- 
quently to ejaculate their brief confession of faith, and who would 
never think of writing a book without prefacing it by an inscrip- 
tion of praise to God. We shall doubtless have a close criticism 
instituted upon our mode of education, and inquiry as to the 
degree in which it meets the wants of our population. The in- 
habitants of those countries where attendance upon schools is 
compulsory upon children of a suitable age, or of those in which 
it is universally adopted from a real estimation of the benefits to be 
derived therefrom, may perhaps be surprised at the defects and im- 
perfections which are allowed to exist in our system. The ample 
provision which has been made in many of the American States, 
for this purpose, at a very early period too after their first establish- 
ment, deserves to be noticed as affording an example most worthy 
of imitation. We might go on in the same strain and speak of that 
high sense of filial duty, which the disciples of Confucius would 
expect to find in us, and which is among themselves an effectual 
principle of government, or of that tenderness towards dumb 
animals, and that strong feeling of brotherhood pervading the 
different sects, and superseding all necessity for poor-houses, which 
are so generally manifested by the worshippers of Brahma, and 
which may therefore be considered by them as the best evidences 
of moral excellence." — Great Exhibition Prize Essay. 

5. In reasoning from analogy or comparison, if the case 
to be proved appears to be stronger even than the case 
with which it is compared, the analogy is called by scho- 



156 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

lastic logicians, an argumentum ct fortiori, that is, "a 
stronger argument." 

This kind of argument is often denoted in Scripture by 
the words, " How," " How much more," or " How much 
rather." The following are examples : — 

" And David answered Rechab and Baanah his brother, the 
sons of Rimmon the Beerothite, and said unto them, As the Lord 
liveth, who hath redeemed my soul out of all adversity, when one 
told me, saying, Behold, Saul is dead, th inking to have brought 
good tidings, I took hold of him, and slew him in Ziklag, who 
thought that I would have given him a reward for his tidings : 
how much more, when wicked men have slain a righteous person 
in his own house upon his bed ? shall I not therefore now require 
his blood of your hand, and take you away from the earth ? " — 
2 Sam. iv. 9—11. 

" And why take ye thought for raiment ? Consider the lilies 
of the field, how they grow ; they toil not, neither do they spin : 
and yet I say unto you, That even Solomon in all his glory was 
not arrayed like one of these. Wherefore, if God so clothe the 
grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the 
oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith ?" — 
Matt. vi. 28—30. See also Matt. vii. 11 ; Matt, xxiii. 16—19 ; 
2 Chron. vi. 18 ; Rom. viii. 32 ; Heb. ii. 1—3 ; Jonah iv. 10, 11 ; 
Job iv. 19 ; 1 Tim. hi. 5 ; Heb. ii. 2, 3 ; ix. 13, 14 ; xii. 9. 

The text, Matt. xix. 9 — " And I say unto you, Who- 
soever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, 
and shall marry another, committeth adultery : and whoso 
marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery" — 
contains an <% fortiori argument against polygamy. For 
if it is criminal for a man to put away his wife and marry 
anpther, then, cb fortiori, it must be criminal for him to 
many another without putting the first away. 

The following is a comparison of this kind that formed 
part of the indictment of Guy Fawkes : — 

" The matter that is now to be offered to you, my Lords the 
Commissioners, and to the trial of you the knights and gentlemen 
of the jury, is matter of treason; but of such horror and mon- 
strous nature, that before now the tongue of man never delivered, 
the ear of man never heard, the heart of man never conceited, 
nor the malice of hellish or earthly devil ever practised. For if 
it be abominable to murder the least ; if to touch God's anointed 
be to oppose themselves against God ; if (by blood) to subvert 
princes, states, and kingdoms, be hateful to God and man, as all 



REASONING FROM COMPARISON. 157 

true Christians must acknowledge ; then how much more than too 
monstrous shall all Christian hearts judge the horror of this 
treason, to murder and subvert such a king, such a queen, such a 
prince, such a progeny, such a state, such a government, so com- 
plete and absolute ; that God approves : the world admires : all 
true English hearts honour and reverence : the Pope and his dis- 
ciples only envy and malign." 

The following h fortiori argument is used by the Hon. 
Joshua R. Giddmgs, Member of Congress for the state of 
Ohio, with reference to the Fugitive Slave Bill. This bill 
requires the inhabitants of the free states to assist in 
apprehending the fugitive slaves, and delivering them back 
to the state from which they had escaped : — 

" Thus, fellow-citizens, you and I are liable at any hour, to be 
called upon to pursue the flying bondman as he hastens towards 
a land of freedom. We have become a nation of slave-hunters, 
and slave-catchers. 

" The man who shall seize a slave upon the African coast, is 
by our law consigned to the gallows, and deemed unworthy of an 
existence among civilized, and even barbarous people ; but how 
much greater must be the guilt of him who seizes the enlightened 
and intelligent Christian, one who holds the same religion, and 
trusts in the same salvation as himself, and riveting the cold 
iron upon his trembling limbs, sends him back to bondage and 
suffering. 

" We know that the benighted African is unconscious of his 
rights, and incapable of appreciating his degradation : yet we 
hang the man who arrests and consigns him to slavery. This we 
regard as just : but what penalty can be regarded as commen- 
surate with the crime of seizing upon our fellow-man whose mind 
has been enlightened, who knows the rights with which God has 
endowed him, who comprehends the crime committed against 
him, and of sending him back to a land of chains, and whips, and 
suffering ? In my opinion, such crime far transcends that of the 
ordinary pirate. Indeed, I think the thief or the pirate far more 
entitled to our friendship, than he who under such circumstances 
will lend himself to the commission of the crimes which the law 
requires us to perpetrate." 

Sometimes clergymen take a text referring to temporal 
affairs and apply it to such as are spiritual, contending 
that the duty enforced in reference to things of this life 
is still more important when applied to the life to come. 
Thus, from the text, " Be thou diligent to know the state 



158 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

of thy flocks, and look well to thy herds," the preacher 
remarked, that if diligence be a duty in reference to our 
temporal affairs, a fortiori, it was a duty still more impera- 
tive in regard to our eternal interests. And the Apostle 
Paul uses a similar argument in 1 Corinthians ix. 11, in 
reference to the support of the Christian ministry : — "If 
we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great thing 
if we shall reap your carnal things 1 " 

6. Sometimes we compare two things together, not so 
much to discover wherein they agree, but wherein they 
differ; and we rest our argument upon the contrast. — 
Matt. vi. 19, 20 ; 2 Cor. iv. 17 ; Proverbs iii. 35. " • 

The Earl of Carlisle in his Lecture on America, delivered 
before the Leeds Mechanics Institution, has pointed out 
a want of resemblance between England and America with 
reference to the question of Religious Establishments : — 

" It is my wish to touch very lightly upon any point which 
among us, among even some of us now here, may be matter of 
controversy; I, however, honestly think that the experience of 
the United States does not as yet enable them to decide on 
either side the argument between the established and voluntary 
systems in religion; take the towns by themselves, and I think 
the voluntary principle appears fully adequate to satisfy all reli- . 
gious exigencies; then it must be remembered that the class 
which makes the main difficulty elsewhere, scarcely, if at all, 
exists in America; it is the blessed privilege of the L'nited 
States, and it is one which goes very far to counterbalance any 
drawbacks at which I may have to hint, that they really have 
not, as a class, any poor among them. A real beggar is what you 
never see. On the other hand, over their immense tracts of ter- 
ritory, the voluntary system has not sufficed to produce sufficient 
religious accommodation ; it may, however, be truly questioned, 
whether any establishment would be equal to that function. This 
is, however, one among the many questions which the republican 
experience of America has not yet solved. As matters stand at 
present, indifference to religion cannot be fairly laid to her 
charge ; probably religious extremes are pushed further than else- 
where ; there certainly is a breadth and universality of religious 
liberty which I do not regard without some degree of envy." 

Some have contended for universal suffrage upon the 
ground that it exists in America. An opponent of this 
sentiment shows wherein America differs from England 
in this respect : — 






REASONING FROM COMPARISON. 159 

" The United States are, singularly enough, taken by both the 
advocates and the opponents of universal suffrage as a conclusive 
example for and against the same system ; and it is not the least 
curious part of the paradox that the principal cause of the facts 
which are pleaded and exaggerated by both parties lies out of the 
sphere of politics altogether. It is to the prodigious amount of 
fertile soil, compared with the smallness of the population, and 
to the consequent cheapness of land and dearness of labour, that 
North America owes, in a great measure, the prosperity, morality, 
and contentment of her people, and the comparative security of 
life and property. And it is to the same cause that we should 
attribute the major part of that spirit of speculation, that rabid 
thirst for wealth, that inferiority in arts and literature, that 
absence of refinement, that selfish kimboing, jostling race through 
life, of which brother Jonathan is sometimes justly, and oftener 
unjustly, accused : the United States are, and must long remain, 
a country of material production, with its advantages and its 
disadvantages. It follows, that the conditions under which com- 
plete consistent democracy has been tried on the other side of 
the Atlantic are so unlike those of Europe, that we cannot infer, 
with any certainty, from the success of the institutions of the 
former, that they would succeed on our more crowded shores.' 
Christian ~ 



The contrast between Protestant and Catholic states is 
thus described by Mr. Macaulay : — 

"From the time when the barbarians overran the Western 
Empire, to the time of the revival of letters, the influence of the 
Church of Rome had been generally favourable to science, to 
civilization, and to good government. But during the last three 
centuries, to stunt the growth of the human mind has been her 
chief object. Throughout Christendom, whatever advance has 
been made in knowledge, in freedom, in wealth, and in the arts of 
life, has been made in spite of her, and has everywhere been in 
inverse proportion to her power. The loveliest and most fertile 
provinces of Europe have, under her rule, been sunk in poverty, 
in political servitude, and in intellectual torpor, while Protestant 
countries, once proverbial for sterility and barbarism, have been 
turned by skill and industry' into gardens, and can boast of a long 
list of heroes and statesmen, philosophers and poets. Whoever, 
knowing what Italy and Scotland naturally are, and what four 
hundred years ago they actually were, shall now compare the 
country round Rome with the country round Edinburgh, will be 
able to form some judgment as to the tendency of Papal domina- 
tion. The descent of Spain, once the first among monarchies, to 
the lowest depths of degradation; the elevation of Holland, in 



1G0 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

spite of many natural disadvantages, to a position such as no 
commonwealth so small has ever reached, teach the same lesson. 
Whoever passes, in Germany, from a Roman Catholic to a Pro- 
testant principality ; in Switzerland from a Roman Catholic to a 
Protestant canton ; in Ireland from a Roman Catholic to a Pro- 
testant county, finds that he has passed from a lower to a higher 
grade of civilization. On the other side of the Atlantic the same 
law prevails. The Protestants of the United States have left far 
behind them the Roman Catholics of Mexico, Peru, and Brazil. 
The Roman Catholics of Canada remain inert, while the whole 
continent round them is in a ferment with Protestant activity 
and enterprise." — History of England. 

The following are examples of contrasts in literary 
criticism : — 

"The hook answers its title, and is well calculated to fami- 
liarize the million with the forms of logical reasonings. — -We hope 
that e Logic for the Million ' will be read by the Million. It will 
advance their knowledge, and improve their taste, their style of 
writing, and their skill in reasoning." Economist. — " This anony- 
mous publication is as unfit for the Million as it is unworthy to 
be called Logic." — Athenaeum. 

" The illustrations he has given, in order to show the faculty 
in action, are selected with admirable judgment, and are in them- 
selves so instructive, readable, and entertaining, that they would 
alone suffice to make the volume well worth its purchase money." 
Weekly News. — " To call such a jumble of odds and ends 'Logic 
for the Million' is absurd in the extreme." — u ' " 



"No young man desirous of improving himself in the art of 
reasoning could more profitably employ his leisure hours_than in 
studying this volume; indeed we heartily recommend it for 
general perusal." Oxford Journal. — "If the Million want to 
learn Logic they must not come here." — Athenaeum. 

"We cannot lay down this admirable little treatise without 
recommending its perusal to the masses, for whom it has been 
specially written, and especially to the learned, who will find in 
its pages logic without jargon, and literary illustration without 
pedantry." The Globe. — " One would think from many passages 
that it was intended to be a burlesque on Logic and Logicians — 
a sort of Don Quixote or Hudibras in a small way — rather than 
a serious treatise on the subject." — Athenceum. 

" By the production of the first really popular work on a 
subject of no mean importance our P.R.S. has added to his own 
laurels, and conferred a signal service on the whole community." 
Morning Post. — " The author of this work has done well in 



FALLACIOUS ANALOGIES. 161 

concealing his name. His present performance is too worthless 
to derive any weight from his other literary achievements, though 
it is quite capable of damaging a good reputation." — Athenaeum. 

The principle of contrast is much used in theology : — 

" Contrast Words and Actions.— This is, as our author 
presently expresses it, one of the finest topics of illustration. 
There is no end of the utility of it in theology. It illustrates 
revelation by contrasting it with all systems of natural religion. 
* Never man spake like this man.' It illustrates Christianity by 
placing it opposite to Judaism. c Ye are not come to Mount 
Sinai : but ye are come to Mount Zion.' It distinguisheth true 
ministers of Christ from pret* nders. * We are not as many who 
corrupt the word of God : bul we speak as of God.' It displays 
the beauty of a true church b» comparing it with the deformity 
of false religion. Of Mohanr-.iedism, Popery, and all political 
religions, it may safely be as<ed, 'What agreement hath the 
temple of God with idols ?' ] * is of excellent use in preaching 
the law, by contrasting what IK en are with what they ought to 
be. It is excellently adapted to comfort, by comparing the 
wisdom of Providence with the lolly of him who complains of it ; 
the sufficiency of pardoning mercy with the abundance of a 
sinner's unworthiness ; the pleasures of piety with the amuse- 
ments of sin ; the privileges of a saint with the licentiousness of 
a sinner; the aids of the Holy Spirit with the efforts of the 
tempter ; the joys beyond death with the agonies of dying. It is 
useful to recover a backslider, by comparing his present state 
with a former state. c Did I appear to the house of thy father ? ' 
&c. In these, and in a thousand other cases, contrast is lovely 
beyond conception, and Scripture abounds with it. Contrasts 
may be taken from person : ' What God hath cleansed, call not 
thou common,' — from place : ■' Pass over the isles, send unto 
Kedar, and see, hath a nation changed their idols : but my people 
[in Judea] have changed their glory ; ' — from time, relation, &c. 
&c." — Robinson's Notes to Claude. 

7. Having now taken a view of analogy, comparison, 
and contrast, we will conclude this section by taking a view 
of fallacious analogies. 

Analogies are of two kinds. They may denote a resem- 
blance between two things themselves, or merely a resem- 
blance between the circumstances in which they are placed. 
Thus, when Sydney Smith argues that dispositions are 
hereditary, from the analogy between men and animals, 
the resemblance is between the things themselves. But 
when he tells us we ought not to decry the science of 



162 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

Moral Philosophy, inasmuch as several other sciences are 
liable to the same objections, the analogy is between the 
circumstances in which these sciences are placed. We 
are thus liable to make two mistakes. When we find there 
is an analogy between the things themselves, we may erro- 
neously infer there is an analogy in their circumstances. 
Or when we find an analogy in their circumstances, we 
may infer there is an analogy in the things themselves. 

The first error is exhibited very often in the analogies 
drawn between men and animals. There is, no doubt, a 
resemblance between reason and instinct. Hence some 
have inferred that there is an analogy between men and 
animals in their rights with reference to each other. Paley 
and others have contended on this ground that men have 
no right to kill animals for food. We think they are in- 
correct in their analogies. 

" The reasons alleged in vindication of this practice, are the 
following: that the several species of brutes being created to 
prey upon one another, affords a kind of analogy to prove that 
the human species were intended to feed upon them ; that, if let 
alone, they would overrun the earth, and exclude mankind from 
the occupation of it ; that they are requited for what they suffer 
at our hands, by our care and protection. 

" Upon which reasons I would observe, that the analogy con- 
tended for is extremely lame ; since brutes have no power to 
support life by any other means, and since we have; for the 
whole human species might subsist entirely upon fruit, pulse, 
herbs, and roots, as many tribes of Hindoos actually do. The 
two other reasons may be valid reasons as far as they go ; for, 
no doubt, if man had been supported entirely by vegetable food, 
a great part of those animals which die to furnish his table, would 
never have lived; but they by no means justify our right over 
the lives of brutes to the extent in which we exercise it. What 
danger is there, for instance, of fish interfering with us, in the use 
of their element ? or what do we contribute to their support or 
preservation ? " — Foley's Moral 



In his speech at the Peace Congress held in Frankfort, 
Mr. Cobden contended for the principle of arbitration 
between nations, upon the ground of the analogy between 
nations and individuals : " It is done in private life con- 
tinually. Scores and hundreds of British Acts of Parlia- 
ment have been passed, requiring that such disputes should 



FALLACIOUS ANALOGIES. 163 

be settled by arbitration : and the principle you find good 
for individuals you will find good for nations." Here there 
is a want of analogy in the circumstances of the parties. 
If two individuals in a state refer their dispute to arbi- 
tration, the law will compel them to abide by the de- 
cision of the arbitrator. But in the case of nations, if either 
party chooses to dispute the decision of the arbitrator, 
who is to enforce obedience, and by what means, except 
by war 1 

The second error is when, from an analogy in circum- 
stances, we infer an analogy in the things themselves. 

Archbishop Whately defends logic by the analogical 
mode of reasoning ; and when he confines his analogies 
merely to the circumstances in which logic resembles other 
sciences, his reasoning is generally conclusive. But some- 
times he goes beyond this, and finds, or fancies, analogies 
between the nature of logic and that of other sciences to 
which it bears no resemblance. For example, he finds 
an analogy between logic and chemistry. I quote Mr. 
Blakey : — 

" In an able work recently published by Archbishop Whately, 
on the use of the syllogistic theory, the author observes, that 
' Logic, which is as it were the grammar of reasoning, does not 
bring forward the regular syllogism as a distinct mode of argu- 
mentation, designed to be substituted for any other mode ; but 
as the form to which all correct reasoning may be ultimately 
reduced ; and which, consequently, serves the purpose (when we 
are employing logic as an art) of a test to try the validity of any 
argument ; in the same maimer as by chemical analysis we de- 
velop and submit to a distinct examination the elements of which 
any compound body is composed, and are thus enabled to detect 
any latent sophistication and impurity. 5 

" It appears to me, that the Archbishop has fallen into error 
regarding the nature and importance of the syllogism, from in- 
stituting certain analogies between it and some other departments 
of knowledge, such as chemistry, grammar, and arithmetic. He 
compares the analysis of a piece of reasoning, to the chemical 
analysis of any material substance ; he imagines that the logic 
of syllogisms bears the same relation to general reasoning that 
grammar does to language ; and the technical terms in which the 
syllogistic process is couched, are viewed as resembling the arbi- 
trary signs affixed to arithmetical quantities. A very slight atten- 
tion, however, to these analogical illustrations will be sufficient 



164 9 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

to convince the reader that they are by no means perfect." — 
Essay on Logic. 

Archbishop Whately usually argues by analogy. In 
reading through his book on logic, I have marked with a 
pencil thirty-four instances of his arguing by analogy. But 
the most striking example he has given of this principle of 
reasoning is in his pamphlet, entitled ' Historic Doubts 
relative to Napoleon Buonaparte.' The object of this 
pamphlet was to show that by the same reasoning through 
which infidel writers have attempted to cast doubts on the 
New Testament history, they might cast doubts on the 
history of Napoleon Buonaparte; and as we know the 
history of Napoleon Buonaparte to be true, although it is 
exposed to these objections, so the history of the New 
Testament may be true, although it has been attacked by 
similar objections. We shall have occasion hereafter to 
make a few extracts from this singular pamphlet. 

Another kind of fallacious reasoning is when the analogy 
is merely verbal, or metaphorical, and there is no real 
resemblance between the things, or their circumstances. 

" Among the metaphors which conceal an altogether fatal 
theory, there is none more commonly used than that put forward 
hi the words tribute, tributary. 

" These words have become so common, that they are used as 
synonymes of purchase, purchaser, and the "words are used indif- 
ferently, for the one or the other. 

" But nevertheless, there is as great a difference between tri- 
bute and purchase, as between theft and exchange, and I would 
just as soon hear it said that Cartouche has broken open a strong 
box and has purchased a thousand crowns, as I would hear our 
honourable deputies repeat : We have paid to Germany a tribute 
for a thousand horses which she has sold to us. 

"Eor that which renders Cartouche's action no purchase is, 
that he has not put, and with my consent, into my strong box, 
a value equivalent to that -which he has taken out. 

" And that which causes the payment of 500,000 francs, which 
we have made to Germany, to be no tribute, is because she has 
not received it gratuitously, but by giving us in exchange a thou- 
sand horses which we ourselves have judged to be worth our 
500,000 francs/; 

" How has this improper trope found its way into the rhetoric 
of the monopolists ? Some money leaves the country to satisfy 
the rapacity of a victorious enemy. Some more money leaves the 



FALLACIOUS ANALOGIES. 165 

country also to pay for merchandise. They establish the analogy 
between the two cases by only taking into account the circum- 
stances in which they resemble each other, and leaving out of the 
question those in which they differ." — Basiiafs " Popular Falla- 
cies respecting General Interests" translated by 67. R. Porter. 

In using the principle of analogy you must be careful 
that your analogical case is one that is sound, or at least 
is admitted to be sound by the party you are anxious to 
convince. Your opponent may, and probably will, deny 
the analogy between the two cases. This is a fair reply, 
and brings the argument to a practical discussion. But if 
your opponent takes a different view from yours of the 
parallel case that you adduce, you have been unfortunate 
in the choice of your analogy. For instance, suppose you 
are disputing with a person who contends that a man ought 
to be allowed to marry the sister of his deceased wife, and 
you say, " Upon this ground you ought to admit that a 
woman should be allowed to marry the brother of her 
deceased husband." He might reply, " So I do; I contend 
for both." Here your analogy has missed fire ; and the 
ground of controversy must be changed. But if your op- 
ponent denies the latter case, but contends for the former, 
then your argumentation will naturally take the form of 
analogy. 

I shall conclude this section by noticing a very inge- 
nious argument, drawn from the doctrine of analogy. In 
reasoning from analogy, w T e usually compare good things 
with good things, and evil things with evil things. Hence 
Mr. Aiken considers that the analogies drawn in the New 
Testament between a Christian and a soldier, are a proof 
of the innocency of war. He has put this argument very 
forcibly in the following words : — ■ 

" It appears, on the grounds already stated, that reason and the 
natural law of self-preservation, and our duty to ourselves, rela- 
tions, friends, and countrymen, also that the Divine command 
and permission to the Jews, all prove that war may be necessary 
and just; and such a war is not expressly prohibited by the 
Clnistian religion. On the contrary, there are frequent allusions 
to war in the New Testament, in which no censure is implied or 
expressed. The trumpet, the weapons, the armour of war, are 
often employed as images to illustrate the Christian warfare. 
Here the analogy is, that the Christian is a spiritual warrior, 



166 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

in a good cause, against an evil adversary. Thus the apostle 
Paid speaks of Epaphroditus and Archippus as Mis fellow-soldiers. 
If war were only and absolutely criminal, the analogy would be 
unsuitable. How could the Christian apostle have addressed, in 
a good sense, Epaphroditus my fellow-robber, and Archippus my 
fellow-murderer ? It is at least remarkable, that although the 
Saviour drove the money-changers and sellers of doves from the 
temple, he never found fault with soldiers for their occupation, 
but commended the Centurion's faith." — Aiken on War. 



SECTION III. 

reasoning' from parables, fables, and proverbs. 

We take the following explanation of the word parable from 
Dr. Black's " Student's Manual." " Para-ble, from para, 
side by side, and hallo, I put. Thus parable means a simili- 
tude, or one thing compared to another. It is usually em- 
ployed to designate a fable or allegorical instruction founded 
on something real or apparent in nature, or history, from 
which a moral is drawn, by comparing it with something in 
which the people are more immediately concerned." 

The word parable is applied in the New Testament to 
four different kinds of literary compositions. These are 
tales, comparisons, parables strictly so called, i. e. allegories, 
and fables. We will give an example of each. 

The following is a tale : — 

" And he spake a parable unto them, saying, The ground of a 
certain rich man brought forth plentifully : And he thought 
within himself, saying, What shall I do, because I have no room 
where to bestow my fruits ? And he said, This will I do : I will 
pull down my barns, and build greater ; and there will I bestow 
all my fruits and my goods. And I will say to my soul, Soul, 
thou hast much goods laid up for many years ; take thine ease, 
eat, drink, and be merry. But God said unto him, Thou fool, 
this night thy soul shall be required of thee : then whose shall 
those things be, which thou hast provided ? So is he that layeth 
up treasure for himself, and is not rich toward God." — Luke xii. 
16—21. 

A tale differs from a parable, strictly so called, in having 
no reference beyond itself. The above tale illustrates the 
futility and uncertainty of riches, but it has no allegorical 



REASONING FROM PARABLES. 167 

meaning. It is not employed as a similitude or com- 
parison, to illustrate anything else. The same observation 
may be applied to the parables, as they are called, of the 
rich man and Lazarus (Luke xvi. 19 — 31); the pharisee 
and publican (Luke xviii. 9 — 14) ; the unprofitable servant 
(Luke xix. 12 — 24) ; and the unfeeling servant, (Matt. 
xviii. 23 — 34) ; which, viewed as literary compositions, are, 
strictly speaking, not parables but tales. 

The mode of reasoning from tales is the same as reason- 
ing from examples. Tales are records of events that have 
occurred, or are so probable, t],iat they might have occurred. 
The lessons drawn from these tales are the general prin- 
ciples which the facts tend to prove. It is a mode of 
reasoning by induction. We have discussed this subject 
in the first section of this part of our work. 

The following is a comparison : — 

" Another parable put he forth unto them, saying, The king- 
dom of heaven is like to a grain of mustard-seed, which a man 
took and sowed in his field: Which indeed is the least of all 
seeds : hut when it is grown it is the greatest among herbs, and 
becometh a tree, so that the birds of the air come and lodge in 
the branches thereof." — Matt. xhi. 31, 32. 

A comparison differs from a tale in that it is employed 
to illustrate something beyond itself. It differs from a para- 
ble in that the illustration is confined generally to one point. 
In the above example, the comparison between the illus- 
tration and the thing illustrated, is confined to one quality, 
that of rapid and extensive increase. There is no general 
resemblance in other respects between the two things com- 
pared. An attempt to discover such resemblances would 
be ridiculous. To the same class of compositions belong, 
the two foundations (Matt. vii. 24 — 26) ; the leaven hid 
in the meal (Matt. xiii. 33) ; the treasure hid in a field 
(Matt. xiii. 44) ; the merchant seeking goodly pearls (Matt, 
xiii. 45, 46); the net cast into the sea (Matt. xiii. 47, 48) ; 
the fig-tree (Luke xxi. 29); and several others. 

Of comparison as a principle of reasoning we have 
already treated. Here comparison is brought before us in 
the way of metaphor. In this point of view it can never 
amount to proof. But, nevertheless, its consideration is 
fairly within the province of logic. One part of our duty 



168 LOGIC FOR- THE MILLION. 

as logicians is to state clearly the propositions we intend 
to prove. Metaphorical comparisons are of great use 
in enabling us to make this clear statement. Half the 
disputes that exist among men arise from their misunder- 
standing one another. We should endeavour to acquire 
the art of stating clearly and vividly what it is that we 
mean. And when we have done this, we shall in most cases 
have obviated the necessity for any further controversy. 

The following is a parable in the strict sense of the 
word : — 

" Hearken ; Behold, there went out a sower to sow : And it 
came to pass, as he sowed, some fell by the way-side, and the 
fowls of the air came and devoured it up. And some fell on 
stony ground where it had not much earth ; and immediately it 
sprang np, because it had no depth of earth ; But when the sun 
was up it was scorched ; and because it had no root, it withered 
away. And some fell among thorns, and the thorns grew up and 
choked it, and it yielded no fruit. And other fell on good ground, 
and did yield fruit that sprang up and increased, and brought 
forth, some thirty and some sixty, and some an hundred." — 
Mark iv. 3—8. 

The parable strictly so called is an allegory. It is em 
ployed to illustrate something that seems at first to have 
no connexion with it, and the machinery of the composition 
must correspond with the several parts of the matter to be 
illustrated. The following explanation of the above parable 
will exemplify this in a very striking manner : — 

"The sower soweth the word. And these are they by the 
way-side, where the word is sown ; but when they have heard, 
Satan cometh immediately, and taketh away the word that was 
sown in their hearts. And these are they likewise which are sown 
on stony ground ; who, when they have heard the word, imme- 
diately receive it with gladness ; and have no root in themselves, 
and so endure but for a time : afterward, when affliction or perse- 
cution ariseth for the word's sake, immediately they are offended. 
And these are they which are sown among thorns ; such as hear 
the word, arid the cares of this world, and the deceitfulness of 
riches, and the lusts of other things entering in, choke the word, 
and it becometh unfruitful. And these are they which are sown 
on good ground; such as hear the word, and receive it, and 
bring forth fruit, some thirty-fold, some sixty, and some an 
hundred." — Mark iv. 14 — 20. 






REASONING FROM PARABLES. 169 

To this class of compositions belong the parable of the 
tares (Matt. xiii. 24 — 30 ) ; the day labourers (Matt. xx. 
1 — 15); the nuptial entertainment (Matt. xxii. 1 — 13); the 
ten virgins (Matt. xxv. 1 — 12) ; the faithless husbandmen 
(Mark xii. 1 — 9) ; and several others. There are also 
many examples of this kind of composition in the Old 
Testament. Such are the royal bramble (Judges ix. 
8 — 15) ; the ewe lamb (2 Sam. xii. 1 — 7) ; the fruitless 
vineyard (Isaiah v. 1 — 6) ; the eagles and the vine tree 
(Ezekiel xvii. 3 — 8). In minuteness of illustration the 
parables have an advantage over comparisons. But the 
application of minute portions of the parable should not 
be strained. I have heard of a divine, who, in explaining 
the parable of the good Samaritan, stated that the " two 
pence " denoted the Old and the New Testament. 

Parables, like comparisons, are not proofs. They are, 
however, vivid illustrations; and the more minute the 
particulars, the stronger is the illustration. There is, of 
course, always an analogy between the illustration and the 
matter to be illustrated. But we must distinguish between 
a logical and a metaphorical analogy. For instance, the 
analogy between an animal who had fallen into a pit, and a 
man who was lame, was a logical analogy, and it was clear 
that if one might be relieved on the sabbath-day, so might 
the other. But the analogy between the kingdom of heaven 
and a grain of mustard seed, was a metaphorical analogy, 
and the rapid increase of the mustard seed was no proof 
of the future rapid spread of Christianity, though it was a 
vivid representation of it. 

I may state to you, that sometimes the same composition 
may be either a tale, a comparison, a fable, or a parable, 
according to the manner in which it is viewed. Thus, " The 
good Samaritan," if viewed as an answer to the question, 
Who is my neighbour 1 and as inculcating the exercise of 
kindness and benevolence, is a tale. But if the condition 
of the man who fell among thieves is considered as repre- 
senting the moral state of mankind, and the good Samaritan 
as representing the Saviour of the world, (and divines often 
take this view,) then it is a parable. So a comparison be- 
comes a parable when we can trace more than one or two- 
points of resemblance. The fable of the rebellion of the; 

I 



170 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

members against the stomach, when related as a represen- 
tation of the rebellion of the Roman citizens against the 
senate, is more properly a parable. 

The following letter from a young tradesman is a 
parable : — 

" Sir, — In reply to your complaints, allow me to tell you a 
story. Once on a time, two persons were walking on the sea- 
shore, when one of them picked up a valuable article which had 
been washed in by the tide. His companion cried, ' Half ! ' The 
finder was annoyed at this, and to prevent his companion having 
the half, he threw the article back into the sea. You have for 
many years carried on a profitable trade in this town. The in- 
creasing population led me to suppose there might be room for 
me. I had no wish to undersell you; I wished only to share 
your profits. To prevent my getting any portion of these profits, 
you now sell your goods at a price that yields no profit to 
yourself." 

The dreams and visions which are recorded in Scripture 
may be regarded as comparisons or parables, and the in- 
terpretations were the facts they were designed to prefigure 
or illustrate. The soldier's dream (Judges vii. 13 — 15) 
may be regarded as a comparison, and St. Peter's vision 
(Acts si. 4 — 8) as a parable. 

We now proceed to Fables. 

We need hardly observe that we do not use the word 
fable in any disreputable sense, as denoting falsehood, but 
merely as the name of a certain kind of literary com- 
position. 

The following is a fable : — 

"And he spake a parable unto them to this end, that men 
ought always to pray, and not to faint : saying, There was in a 
city a judge, which feared not God, neither regarded man : and 
there was a widow in that city ; and she came unto him, saying, 
Avenge me of mine adversary. And he would not for a while : 
but afterward he said within himself, Though I fear not God, nor 
regard man ; yet, because this widow troubleth me, I will avenge 
her, lest by her continual coming she weary me." — Luke xviii. 
1 — 5. 

The fable is a composition designed to illustrate a pro- 
position, which is called the moral of the fable. It is not 
necessary that the machinery of the fable should bear any 
resemblance to any moral process to which the proposition 






REASONING FROM FABLES. 171 

may be applied. Herein it differs from the parable. The 
machinery of the parable, or allegory, must correspond 
with the moral processes it is intended to illustrate. The 
machinery of the fable represents nothing. It is required 
only that the result shall illustrate a proposition, and this 
proposition must seem to flow from the plot of the fable. 
In the fable we have quoted, the proposition to be proved 
or illustrated, is the advantage of perseverance in prayer. 
But there is no correspondence between the machinery of 
the fable and the parties to whom reference is made. In 
fact, the fable derives no small portion of its force from 
this want of resemblance. It amounts to an a fortiori 
argument. The reasoning is thus : if an unjust judge is 
induced by importunity to grant a request, how much 
rather shall the Judge in heaven grant the requests of his 
servants. This is the application in the subsequent verses : 
" And shall not God avenge his own elect, which cry day 
and night unto him, though he bear long with them 1 I 
tell you that he will avenge them speedily." The same 
lesson is taught by the fable of the midnight visitor, Luke 
xi. 5 — 8. 

Fables occupied in ancient times a more honourable 
station in the estimation of mankind than they do at 
present They are now employed chiefly as the means of 
imparting instruction to children, or as the profitable 
amusement of a leisure hour. In former days, the con- 
struction of fables was the serious employment of states- 
men and philosophers. It always ensured to such as were 
successful a degree of literary eminence, and sometimes 
even conferred upon them political distinctions. But 
though we are not now accustomed to consider fables as 
the most eminent literary productions, they are by no 
means the least useful. It is from fables that the greater 
part of mankind derive their first lessons in moral science, 
at a time when their minds are incapable of abstract 
reflection, and when no other mode of instruction would 
be either so entertaining or so efficacious. The knowledge 
thus acquired becomes interwoven with the earliest recol- 
lections of the mind, and often regulates the conduct in 
maturer years. The design of fable is to place some 
important truth in a striking point of view. The proposi- 
i2 



172 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

tion we wish to exhibit appears to flow from the plot of the 
fable, and thus makes deeper impression on the mind than 
if it had been expressed in literal terms. This truth is 
commonly a moral one, and hence it is called the moral of 
the fable ; but it is not necessarily connected with ethics, 
for it may be connected with politics, or with the ordinary 
affairs of life. The subject of a fable should not be a 
truth so obvious that it could not have escaped the most 
ordinary observation. It would be ridiculous to invent a 
fable to show that every man is subject to death. But the 
observation, that, although in our distress we may some- 
times call out for death, yet that when he arrives we receive 
him with reluctance, may properly become the subject of a 
fable, and it has been well illustrated in the story of the 
old man and his bundle of sticks. 

A fable is different from an example. Upon the relative 
merits of fables and examples, Aristotle makes the follow- 
ing remarks : " The occasion wherein fables are more in 
point, and employed with the greatest success, is in popular 
addresses, and in debates upon great questions. They have 
this advantage over example, that it is difficult to find in 
history circumstances perfectly relevant to what we would 
wish to prove ; whereas a fable is easily invented ; and, in 
order to this, nothing more is necessary than to draw a 
parable, which any man may do who knows in what resem- 
blance consists, a thing by no means difficult to the least 
proficient in philosophy:" 

" Example, however, surpasses fable in this respect, that 
its proofs, which are founded upon the truth of history, 
and the decided allegation of events, are of much greater 
effect in deliberation, and more appropriate to persuasive 
oratory. This happens on account of the great resemblance 
between all occurrences, inasmuch as it may be said that 
the past is commonly a presage of the future ; and that 
nothing almost is done now-a-days which was not for- 
merly done." 

The German fabulist, Lessing, controverts this opinion ; 
but here we think that Aristotle is right. Let us suppose 
that in the senate of our land a measure is introduced 
which involves the question, whether standing armies are 
unfriendly to liberty. Let a speaker, who wished to prove 



REASONING FROM FABLES. 173 

the affirmative of this question, adduce the fable cited 
by the author, of the horse, who allowed the man to 
get on his back, that he might be revenged on the deer. 
Let another speaker attempt to prove the same proposition 
from historical examples — let him adduce the numerous 
instances in which despotic and tyrannical governments 
have been supported by means of standing armies — let 
him refer to the times of Julius Csesar, of Cromwell, and 
of Napoleon — let him do this, and then we will ask, 
Which speaker is the more likely to carry conviction to 
the mind % In fact, the evidence derived from fables, and 
particularly from fables in which animals are introduced, 
never can amount to proof. How easily, for instance, 
might the fable we have mentioned, excellent as it is, be 
overturned : for if the horse were a rational animal, as 
the fable supposes him to be, could he not easily throw 
the man from his back 1 and hence, might not an oppo- 
nent contend, that the citizens being rational beings, might 
with equal ease throw off a military government as soon as 
they found it oppressive % Facts, however, are stubborn 
things, and their testimony is not so easily refuted. 

The following examples of fables are taken from Lessing. 
Fable the twelfth exposes those who take credit to them-' 
selves for abstaining from vices they cannot practice : — 

" The Sick Wolf. — The wolf being at the point of death, cast 
a retrospective glance on his past life. ' I am certainly a sinner,' 
lie plaintively observed, ' but, I trust, not one of the greatest. I 
have doubtless committed evil ; but I have also done much good. 
I remember that once, when a lamb, which had strayed from the 
flock, came so near me, I might have devoured it with the 
greatest ease; I forebore to do so. About the same time, I 
listened to the abuse of an angry sheep with the most edifying 
indifference, although no watch-dog was to be feared. 5 ' To all 
this I can bear witness,' said the fox, who was assisting his 
ghostly preparations : ' I recollect all the particulars. It was 
just at the time you suffered so much from the bone in your 
throat.' " 

To deny the excellencies of a man while he lives, and 
to praise him after he is dead, is a common practice, and 
is thus exhibited : — 

" The Oak Tree. — One stormy night the raging north wind 
exercised its strength on a lofta oak, which it levelled with the 



174 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

ground, where it lay with many small trees crushed beneath it. 
A fox, whose den was not far distant, happened to pass the next 
morning : ' What a noble tree !' exclaimed he ; ' I never thought 
it so great while standing.' " 

The twenty-fifth fable is designed to show that friend- 
ship is more permanent between persons who excel in 
different kinds of merit, than it is between those whose 
excellence is of the same kind : — 

"The Nightingale and the Peacock. — A social nightin- 
gale found among the singers of the wood many enviers, but no 
friends. ' Perhaps I shall find one in another species/ said the 
nightingale, and flew with confidence to the peacock. • 

" ' Handsome peacock, I exceedingly admire you.' c And I 
equally admire you, lovely nightingale,' exclaimed the one to the 
other. ' Then let us be friends,' continued the latter ; ' we shall 
not be tempted to envy each other. You are as agreeable to the 
eye as I am to the ear.' " 

Eminence in one kind of merit is often associated with 
deficiency in another : — 

"The Nightingale and the Hawk. — A mellifluous night- 
ingale was one day pounced upon by a hawk. ' As you sing so 
charmingly,' he exclaimed, ' how deliciously must you taste !' " 

No gratitude is due for favours conferred ninten- 
tionally. 

" The Oak-teee and the Swine. — A greedy swine fed under 
a lofty oak, on the fruit which plentifully fell from its boughs ; 
and while he cracked one acorn with his teeth, devoured another 
with his eyes. 

" ' Ungrateful beast,' exclaimed the oak, ' you feed rapaciously 
on my fruit, without casting up one grateful look to me !' 

" The swine was silent for a moment, and then grunted an 
answer : - My grateful look should not be wanting, was I certain 
that you threw down your acorns for the love of me.' " 

The vanity of rank is thus exposed : — 

"The Knight in Chess.— Two boys who wished to play at 
chess, being deficient in a knight, constituted one out of a super- 
fluous pawn, by placing a mark upon it. 

" ' How ! ' cried the other knights. ' Keep your place, sir ; one 
step at a time.' 

" The boys, who overheard their insolence, exclaimed. * Silence ; 
it performs exactly the same service as yourselves.' * 



REASONING FROM FABLES. 175 

If a man claim more merit than is due to him, man- 
kind will give him less than his due : — 

"The Peacock and the Crow. — A foolish crow adorned 
itself with the cast plumage of the peacock, and when it con- 
ceived itself sufficiently ornamented, mingled with the brilliant 
birds of Juno ; being quickly recognised, the peacocks, with their 
sharp bills, soon stripped her of her deceptive apparel. 

" ' Cease/ the crow at last exclaimed, ' you have now got back 
all that belongs to you.' But the peacocks, perceiving a few 
brilliant feathers in the crow's own plumage, answered, 'Be 
silent, impostor, even these camiot belong to you.' " 

The direction of Solomon, " Go to the ant, thou slug- 
gard ; consider her ways, and be wise," has often been 
quoted to reprove slothfulness ; it contains also another 
lessoD, which has hitherto been overlooked : — 

" The Spirit of Solomon. — An aged man, in order to plough 
his field and to strew the fruitful seed in the willing bosom of the 
earth, bore up against the toil of his employment and the heat of 
the weather. On a sudden, a divine spectre stood before him 
under the broad shadow of a lime-tree. The old man started : 

" ' I am Solomon,' said the phantom emphatically. c What are 
you doing here, old man ? ' 

" ' If you are Solomon,' replied the old man, ' why need you 
ask ? You sent me in my youth to the ant. I attended to its 
ways, and became industrious, and what I then learned, I am 
still practising.' 

" ' You have learned but half the lesson,' returned the shadow. 
' Repair once more to the ant, and let it teach you to repose in 
the winter of your years, and enjoy what you have already 
gathered/ " 

Parables, we have already observed, do not prove, they 
only illustrate. Indeed, they are rarely used for the 
purposes of controversy. They serve to explain what was 
previously obscure, and thus enable the mind to perceive 
the truths more clearly, and hence to believe them more 
firmly. Fables are of a more controversial character. 
Many of them were originally invented for political pur- 
poses. Their object is to illustrate a general proposition, 
which general proposition is applied to the particular case 
that we wish to demonstrate. In the composition of the 
fable, we invent a series of supposed facts, which, by a 
species of induction, are designed to prove, as far as they 



176 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

go, a general proposition, which is called the moral of the 
fable. We then take this general proposition, and apply 
it to any case, or to all the cases to which it will apply. 
This is deduction. It is a kind of argument that we have 
classed under the relation of genus and species, and would 
rank under the first figure of syllogisms in scholastic logic. 
The design of fables, then, is to teach us general maxims 
and propositions, which we are to apply as we may have 
occasion, to practical purposes, in our progress through 
the world. Hence the propriety of teaching them to 
children. By this means, they acquire at an early age 
lessons of profound wisdom, in an interesting and agreeable 
manner, which is likely to make a deep impression on the 
memory. 

We shall further explain the mode of reasoning through 
the application of fables, by an example from the fables 
of iEsop. In most of these fables we find that actions 
are attributed to animals. The reason is, that certain 
animals are supposed to represent certain characters or 
dispositions. Thus, the lion is the representative of' 
courage and magnanimity ; the fox of cunning ; the pea- 
cock, of beauty. This, however, is not a necessary feature 
in the composition of a fable. We have many excellent 
fables, both ancient and modern, in which no animals are 
introduced. 

The following is a well-known fable, taken from ^Esop, 
with the application of Dr. Croxall : — 

" The Wind and the Sun. — A dispute once arose betwixt the 
north-wind and sun, about the superiority of their power ; and 
they agreed to try their strength upon a traveller, which should be 
able to get his cloak off first. The north- wind began, and blew a 
very cold blast, accompanied with a sharp driving shower : but 
this, and whatever else he could do, instead of making the man 
quit his cloak, obliged him to gird it about his body as close as 
possible. Next came the sun, who, breaking out from a thick watery 
cloud, drove away the cold vapours from the sky, and darted his 
warm, sultry beams upon the head of the poor weather-beaten 
traveller. The man growing faint with the heat, and unable to 
endure it any longer, first throws off his heavy cloak, and then 
flies for protection to the shade of a neighbouring grove. 

" The Application. — There is something in the temper of men 
so averse to severe and boisterous treatment, that he who endea- 



REASONING FROM FABLES. 177 

vours to carry his point that way, instead of prevailing, generally 
leaves the mind of him, whom he has thus attempted, in a more 
confirmed and obstinate situation than he found it at first. Bitter 
words and hard usage freeze the heart into a kind of obduracy, 
which mild persuasion and gentle language only can dissolve and 
soften. Persecution has always fixed and riveted those opinions 
which it was intended to dispel ; and some discerning men have 
attributed the quick growth of Christianity, in a great measure, 
to the rougli and barbarous reception which its first teachers met 
with in* the world. The same may have been observed of our 
Reformation : the blood of the martyrs was the manure which 
produced that great Protestant crop, on which the Church of 
England has subsisted ever since. Providence, which always 
makes use of the most natural means to attain its purpose, has 
thought fit to establish the purest religion by this method : the 
consideration of which may give a proper check to those who are 
continually endeavouring to root out errors by that very manage- 
ment which so infallibly fixes and implants all opinions, as well 
erroneous as orthodox. When an opinion is so violently attacked, 
it raises an attention in the persecuted party, and gives an alarm 
to their vanity, by making them think that worth defending and 
keeping at the hazard of their lives, which, perhaps, otherwise, 
they would only have admired awhile for the sake of its novelty, 
and afterwards resigned of their own accord. In short, a fierce, 
turbulent opposition, like the north-wind, only serves to make a 
man wrap his notions more closely about him ; but we know not 
what a kind, warm, sunshiny behaviour, rightly applied, would 
not be able to effect." 

The Rev. Samuel Lysons has published some of the fables 
of JEsop, accompanied with an evangelical application. 
The following is his application of the above fable : — 

"Moral. — In Scripture, religion is frequently compared to a 
cloak or garment. Job (xxix. 14) says, e I put on righteousness, 
and it clothed me.' Isaiah (lix. 17) says, ' he was clad with zeal 
as a cloak.' The rude blasts and storms of affliction and adversity 
are far less likely to make men throw off their religion, than the 
sunny warmth of prosperity. We perceive the former to be 
enemies and are on our guard, we hold closer to our protection ; 
but the latter, coming under the specious guise of friendship, in- 
sinuates itself, and strips us bare of our religion, and renders us 
open to the attacks of a thousand other enemies to our souls. 
We should be most especially on our guard in the sunny days of 
prosperity, lest our religion get a chill in the groves of worldly 
pleasure and wanton enjoyment." 

i 3 



178 logic for the million. 

We now proceed to Proverbs. 

Disraeli has an article on the Philosophy of Proverbs. 
He observes that some difficnlty has occurred in the defi- 
nition. I shall assume that you know what is meant by 
a proverb ; and when a thing is well known, definition 
may do more harm than good. Formal logical definitions 
of things well known, sometimes lead to verbal quibbling ; 
and after all can seldom be so worded as to include every 
individual of the species. A lady asked a gentleman the 
meaning of a Pun. He was puzzled to find a definition, 
but he replied, " Give me a subject, and I will make one." 
The lady replied, " Well, I give you the queen." He replied, 
" The queen is no subject." Some one has observed that 
a proverb should have " sense, shortness, and salt." 

" From the antiquity of proverbs, they may be denned 
the primitive language of mankind, in which knowledge 
was preserved prior to the invention of letters. In the 
early stages of society, its progress is retarded by three 
causes : the scarcity of words to express ideas ; the feeble- 
ness of memory, from the absence of intellectual exertion ; 
and the want of a durable character, by which the dis- 
coveries of one generation may be retained and transmitted 
to another. Proverbs are well adapted for removing these 
first obstacles to improvement : by a figurative expression 
they supply the place of verbal description ; their brevity 
is an aid to memory ; while, by being connected with local 
circumstances and surrounding objects, they form a visible 
type, in which passing occurrences and observations may 
be recorded. Accordingly, we find that all nations have 
had recourse to aphoristic language, and doubtless it was 
in this style the first knowledge of the world, its laws, 
morals, husbandry, and observations on the weather, were 
preserved. 

" Proverbs formed the encyclopaedia of former times, 
comprising all the existing observations on human nature, 
natural phenomena, and local history. Men acquired 
wisdom, not from books, but oral communication. All 
the apparatus of the modern system of education — Horn- 
books, Reading Made Easys, and Pleasing Instructors, were 
unknown. Children did not learn their alphabet, nor their 
catechism ; but an adult system prevailed, in which grown 



REASONING FROM PROVERBS. 179 

persons were taught the arts of life — the mysteries of good 
housekeeping, of economy, longevity, husbandry and mete- 
orology, in some traditionary maxim, handed down from 
generation to generation, time out of mind." — Fielding's 
Select Proverbs of all Nations. 

" One permanent use of the Book of Proverbs deserves 
to be particularly noticed, because it has hitherto been 
overlooked by critics and commentators. I refer to the 
use and value of this book as a standing witness to the 
veracity of the Old Testament historians. If I am not 
mistaken, this collection of national proverbs furnishes a 
branch of historical evidence substantially the same in 
kind with that by which the acute and sagacious Paley 
has demonstrated the truth of the Scripture history of St. 
Paul. The argument of that master of reasoning is founded 
on the undesigned coincidences between certain passages in 
St. Paul's Epistles, and some particulars of the Apostle's 
life and labours as related by St. Luke in the Acts ; and 
every intelligent reader of his Treatise will admit that he 
has pointed out and illustrated such a series of minute and 
ud designed agreements between those two narrations, as 
can in no way be accounted for but by a supposition of 
their truth. Similar latent proofs of harmony and verity 
may, I think, be detected by comparing the allusions in 
the Book of Proverbs with the Old Testament history. 
Just as Dr. Paley, by placing the Pauline Epistles and St. 
Luke's narrative, as it were, in the witness-box, and sub- 
jecting them to a searching cross-examination, has elicited 
from both that kind of testimony which has most weight 
with judge and jury — coincident testimony so minute and 
circumstantial as to exclude the suspicion of collusion ; so, 
I apprehend, a critic of competent learning and acuteness 
might without much difficulty produce from the Book of 
Proverbs a rich assemblage of most decisive, because un- 
designed, corroborations of the sacred annals of the Jews." 

« Proverbs are, in fact, themselves of the nature of his- 
tory; for when arranged in the order of their respective 
dates, they form a continuous record of the prevailing 
opinions and feelings of a nation. They usually go back 
to its infancy ; they grow with its growth ; they vary with 
its various changes of fortune : and owing their origin and 



180 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

currency to the impressions made on the national mind by 
particular events and institutions, they necessarily reflect 
and retain not a little of the colour and character of these 
events and institutions." — Dr. M'Culloclis Literary Cha- 
racteristics of the Holy Scriptures. 

Mr. Nicholls, M.A. of Queen's College, Cambridge, has 
published a work entitled, " The Book of Proverbs Ex- 
plained and Illustrated from Holy Scripture." He makes 
the following observations on the Proverbs of Solomon : — 

" A proverb, strictly speaking, is a short moral sentence, 
which means something further than what the words lite- 
rally imply. It is : as apples of gold in a net-work of silver/ 
grave and profound sentiment, the truth of which acquires 
additional beauty when partially discovered through the 
veil of elegant fiction and imagery. But most of Solo- 
mon's proverbs are rather to be called maxims or sentences. 
The distinction between a proverb strictly so called, and a 
maxim, or sentence, may be thus illustrated : When Solo- 
mon says, ' Trust in the Lord with all thine heart, and 
lean not to thine own understanding,' this is no proverb, 
but a moral sentence. When he says, ' Drink waters out 
of thine own cistern,' this is a proverb ; and it means, 
meddle not with that which belongs to another." 

" Out of the vast treasures of learning left us in this 
small volume, the best advice is furnished to princes, 
counsellors, judges, and other public ministers, to all sorts 
of subjects in their several relations, and in every condition ; 
to make them both pious and politic; to direct them in the 
choice of their comforts, in the education of their children, 
in the management of domestic affairs, and in their trans- 
actions with other men ; in contracting or conducting their 
friendships, in giving or taking good counsel and reproof, 
in making or preserving peace, in judging of men, and of 
the event of their designs. This book bridles the injurious 
tongue, corrects the wanton eye, and ties the unjust hands 
in chains. It persecutes sloth, chastises all absurd desires, 
teaches prudence, raises men's courage, and represents tem 7 
perance and chastity after such a fashion, that one cannot 
but have them in .veneration • — and thus is, as Basil says, 
an universal direction for all men, and for the whole of life. 
It, moreover, not only gives such universal directions, but 






REASONING FROM PROVERBS. 181 

enforces attention to them from those motives which can 
alone secure obedience to them, such as the authority of 
God, his exact notice of all men's ways and hearts, the 
rewards which attend righteousness, and the punishments 
which follow wickedness, by his just appointment, both in 
this world and the next." 

The mode of illustration adopted by Mr. Nicholls, is to 
state the proverb, and then to cite those instances in 
which the principle has been exemplified in Scripture 
History. These facts, like an argument from induction, 
tend to prove the truth of the proverb. We give the fol- 
lowing as an example : — 

" The merciful man doeth good to his own soul. — Prov. xi. 17. 

"Joseph had sorrows of his own (Psalm cv. 18), but he took 
an interest in those of his fellow-prisoners, the chief butler and 
the chief baker. (Gen. xl. 6.) This led them to unburden the 
cause of their sorrow to him ; and hence arose the opportunity 
of interpreting their dreams which ultimately led to his own ad- 
vancement. (Gen. xli. 9 — 14.) — The Kenites ; the kindness shown 
by them to the Israelites was gratefully remembered many hun- 
dreds of years after, to the benefit of their descendants. 1 Sam. 
xv. 6. Eccles. xi. 1. — David's compassion to the Egyptian slave 
was the means of his signal success. 1 Sam. xxx. 11 — 20. — Jona- 
thans kindness to David led to his children's preservation. 2 Sam. 
ix. 7 ; xxi. 7. — Job, in seeking mercy for others, found good to 
himself. He eat good by the fruit of his mouth. (Prov. xiii. 2.) 
The Lord turned the captivity of Job when he prayed for his 
friends. Job xlii. 10. — The centurion, having built the Jews a 
synagogue, they interceded for him; and his anxiety for the wel- 
fare of his sick servant was the means of confirming his own faith 
in Christ. (Luke vii. 2 — 10.) Let thy soul love a good servant. 
Ecclus. vii. 21. — Cornelius. Acts x. 4. Prov. xii. 14. — The bar- 
barous people ; their mercy to those who had been wrecked on 
their coast, and the blessing they received. Acts xxviii. 1 — 10." 

Proverbs are often the morals of fables. They are not 
usually capable of being proved by reasoning, They are 
proved by observation and experience, and are many of 
them the results of the experience of ages. But, referring 
chiefly to morals and manners, they possess only a moral 
universality, and hence it is often easy to point out some 
cases in which they are not realized. Thus — " The diligent 
hand maketh rich ;" " Train up a child in the way he 



182 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it," 
are sound maxims ; but cases do sometimes occur in 
which they will not apply. This is no valid objection to 
them as rules for our guidance. In human affairs we can 
have no certain and infallible rule. "We must be contented 
with a high degree of probability. It is the part of true 
wisdom to submit our conduct to the guidance of this 
high degree of probability. " To be indecisive and reluc- 
tant to act," says Mr. Mill, " because we have not evidence 
of a perfectly conclusive character to act upon, is a defect 
sometimes incident to scientific minds, but which, wherever 
it exists, renders them unfit for practical emergencies. If 
we would succeed in action, we must judge by indications, 
which, although they do not generally mislead us, some- 
times do, and must make up as far as possible for the in- 
complete conclusiveness of any one indication, by obtaining 
others to corroborate it." 

The mode of reasoning from proverbs, as we have shown 
at pages 58 and 129, is by the application of a general 
principle to an individual case, and falls under the class of 
genus and species. We shall now give a further illustra- 
tion from Dr. Franklin's Poor Richard's Almanack : — 

"It would be thought a hard government that should tax its 
people one-tenth part of their time to be employed in its service : 
but idleness taxes many of us much more : sloth, by bringing on 
diseases, absolutely shortens life. 'Sloth, like rust, consumes 
faster than labour wears, while the used key is always bright/ as 
poor Richard says. ' But dost thou love life, then do not squander 
time, for that is the stuff life is made of,' as poor Richard says. 
How much more than is necessary do we spend in sleep ! for- 
getting that 'The sleeping fox catches no poultrv,' and that 'there 
will be sleeping enough in the grave,' as poor Richard says." 

" But with our industry we must likewise be steady, settled, 
and careful, and oversee our own affairs with our own eyes, and 
not trust too much to others, for, as poor Richard says, 

" ' I never saw an oft removed tree, 
Nor yet an oft removed family, 
That throve so well as those that settled be. 

And again, 'Three removes is as bad as a fire;' and again, 
'Keep thy shop, and thy shop will keep thee;' and again, 'If 
you would have your business done, go ; if not, send ; ' and 
again, 



REASONING FROM PROVERBS. 183 



; He that by the plough would thrive, 
Himself must either hold or drive/ 



And again, c The eye of the master will do more work than both 
his hands;' and again, 'Want of care does us more damage than 
want of knowledge ; ' and again, ' Not to oversee workmen, is to 
leave them your purse open/ Trusting too much to others' care 
is the ruin of many ; for ' In the affairs of this world, men are 
saved, not by faith, but by the want of it ;' but a man's own care 
is profitable, for ' If you would have a faithful servant, and one 
that you like, serve yourself. A little neglect may breed great 
mischief ; for want of a nail the shoe was lost ; for want of a shoe 
the horse was lost ; and for want of a horse the rider was lost,' 
being overtaken and slain by the enemy ; all for want of a little 
care about a horse-shoe nail. 

" So much for industry, my friends, and attention to one's own 
business ; but to these we must add frugality, if we would make 
our industry more certainly successful. A man' may, if he knows 
not how to save as he gets, 'keep his nose all his life to the 
grindstone, and die not worth a groat at last. A fat kitchen 
makes a lean will ;' and, 

" ' Many estates are spent in the getting, 

Since women for tea forsook spinning and knitting, 
And men for punch forsook hewing and splitting/ 

If you would be wealthy, think of saving as well as of getting. 
The Indies have not made Spain rich, because her out- goes are 
greater than her in-comes/ " 

" This doctrine, my friends, is reason and wisdom ; but, after 
all, do not depend too much upon your own industry, and fru- 
gality, and prudence, though excellent things ; for they may all 
be blasted without the blessing of Heaven; and, therefore, ask 
that blessing humbly, and be not uncharitable to those that at 
present seem to want it, but comfort and help them. Remember, 
Job suffered, and was afterwards prosperous. 

" And now to conclude, * Experience keeps a dear school, but 
fools will learn in no other,' as poor Richard says, and scarce in 
that ; for it is true, ' We may give advice, but we cannot give 
conduct/ However, remember this, ' They that will not be 
counselled, cannot be helped;' and further, that, c If you will 
not hear reason, she will surely rap your knuckles/ as poor 
Uichard says." 



184 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

SECTION IV. 

REASONING FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. 

Written documents give rise to a vast deal of argu- 
mentation. Different meanings are attached to letters, to 
agreements, to wills, and to many other writings. To decide 
the questions which are thus raised, we must have recourse 
to reasoning. Sometimes the authenticity of the document 
is denied. We have then to prove that it was written by 
the author whose name it bears ; and in the case of wills, 
we have also to prove that the party was of sound mind 
when he affixed his signature. At other times, the dispute 
has reference to the meaning of the document. Here we 
have to show what was the meaning intended by the author. 
Wlien there is no doubt about either the authenticity or 
the meaning, the questions raised will have a reference to 
the character of those cases to which the terms of the 
document may be applied. For example, the written law 
prohibits murder. If, then, one man kills another in a 
duel, is that murder, or only manslaughter? The law 
prohibits swindling. If, then, a man borrows money, know- 
ing that he cannot repay it, is that swindling, or is it an 
ordinary debt 1 

The trials that take place in our civil and criminal 
courts, with a view to ascertain the facts of the case, are not 
reasonings from written documents. The object is merely 
to prove the facts. The evidence received is either direct 
or indirect. Direct evidence is the testimony of witnesses, 
and here reasoning is employed only in regard to the cha- 
racter and credibility of the witnesses. The other kind of 
evidence is indirect, or, as it is called, circumstantial. We 
have explained this kind of evidence in the Section on 
Conditional Causes, at page 95. When points of law are 
reserved for the opinions of the judges, or cases are argued 
in banco, the reasonings have a reference to written 
documents — that is, to the meaning and application of 
the laws. 

I. — The Statute Law. 

All our statute laws are written documents. They are 
enacted by the three estates of the realm, — King, Lords, 






REASONING FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. 185 

and Commons. But the laws sometimes require to be 
explained. The duty of explaining the laws devolves on 
the judges. But the judges explain only those portions 
respecting which there is any doubt : and these portions 
are pointed out to them by the disputes that arise between 
the citizens. These disputes refer to various points. Some- 
times two laws appear to contradict one another. In this 
case the judges will fix upon the meaning that is supposed 
to be most in accordance with the intentions of the legis- 
lature ; for the judges always pay the legislature the com- 
pliment to suppose that it did not intend to enact contra- 
dictory laws. In these cases, the principle of reasoning is, 
as we have already seen, from final cause and effect. 
Sometimes the question is, whether a certain action, or a 
certain class of actions, is included within certain phrase- 
ology : here the reasoning is between genus and species. 
Often the question is, whether laws passed in former times 
do apply to modern inventions or practices : here the rea- 
soning is often by analogy. 

This mode of reasoning from written documents, so far 
as it refers to the laws of our country, will, perhaps, be 
best explained by a practical illustration. And for this 
purpose we shall notice the legal decisions that have taken 
place with reference to joint-stock banking. 

At the renewal of the Bank of England Charter, in the 
year 1708, a clause was introduced which prohibited any 
other company, consisting of more than six persons, "to 
borrow, owe, or take up any sum or sums of money on 
their bills or notes, payable on demand, or at a less time 
than six months from the borrowing thereof." 

This clause, intended" to prohibit the issue of notes, 
was supposed to prevent the formation of any banks con- 
sisting of more than six persons, even should they not 
issue notes. 

But in the year 1833, when the Bank Charter was 
about to be again renewed, a doubt arose as to whether 
this was the meaning of the law. The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Lord Althorp, required the opinion of the 
Attorney and the Solicitor-General, who stated that the law 
did not prohibit the formation of banks having more than 
six partners, provided they did not issue notes. Two other 



186 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

counsel of equal eminence gave their opinion the other 
way. To remove all doubts, a clause was ultimately intro- 
duced, which " declared and enacted," that such companies 
might be formed. Here was an instance of the uncertainty 
of the law being removed, not by an appeal to the judges, 
but by a declaratory enactment. 

The law having thus sanctioned the establishment of 
joint-stock banks in London, a joint-stock bank was 
formed, and, like other banks in London, accepted bills of 
exchange drawn by its country connexions. But the Bank 
of England alleged that this was a violation of the above 
prohibition against "borrowing, owing, or taking up 
money," &c. Here the reasoning was on the relation 
of genus and species. The words prohibited a certain 
class of actions, and the question was, whether accepting 
bills, as well as issuing notes, was included in the pro- 
hibited class. The law decided that it was ; and an 
injunction was obtained in 1837, prohibiting the accept- 
ance of all bills drawn at less than six months after date. 
In the year 1844, an Act of Parliament granted to such 
banks the same privileges as are exercised by private 
bankers. 

The lawyers have always maintained that a strict 
analogy exists between private partnerships and public 
companies. The only difference, they contend, is- in the 
number of the partners. And hence the laws passed 
originally with reference to small partnerships they think 
ought to be applied to large partnerships. From this 
cause has arisen much litigation, and many appeals to the 
Government to amend the laws. In the following cases, 
the appeals have been successful. 

The law requires that the names of all the partners in a 
firm that is either plaintiff or defendant in a suit, should be 
placed on the record. When joint-stock banks were first 
allowed in England, in 1826, beyond sixty-five miles from 
London they were allowed to sue or be sued in the name of 
one or two partners, who were registered for that purpose at 
the Stamp Office. But this privilege was not granted to the 
banks formed in London. Hence, previous to 1844, those 
banks were compelled to make a special agreement with 
every customer, whereby he held himself answerable per- 



REASONING FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. 187 

sonally to the trustees for any sum he might become 
indebted to the bank. 

It is against the law for any clergyman to be a trader. 
Several clergymen became shareholders in joint-stock 
banks. It was contended, and successfully, that the 
clergyman having become a partner in a trading com- 
pany, was a trader. The company was therefore illegal, 
and consequently could neither sue nor be sued in a court 
of law. An act of parliament was obtained to remedy 
this defect. 

The Northern and Central Bank at Manchester had 
occasion to sue for debt some of its own shareholders. 
No private partnership can sue a member of its own firm. 
It was held that the same rule held in regard to joint- 
stock banks. The action was lost. But the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Mr. Spring Rice, (now Lord Monteagle,) 
brought in an act of parliament to meet the case. 

The manager of a joint-stock bank at Walsal was tried 
for robbing the bank of about 7,000£. At the trial it 
was shown that he was a partner in the company. His 
advocate contended that he was a joint owner of the pro- 
perty, and therefore could not be guilty of robbery. The 
judge took the same view, and he was acquitted. This 
evil, too, was amended by a new act of parliament. 

Lord Denman brought in an act for allowing share- 
holders in joint-stock banks, and other parties in similar 
circumstances, to be examined as witnesses. (6 & 7 Vic. 
c. 86.) It was enacted, that " no person should be ex- 
cluded by reason of incapacity from crime or interest from 
giving evidence" in a court of law. But the act contained 
a proviso that excluded the plaintiff himself. An action 
was brought by a public company, and one of the wit- 
nesses was a shareholder in the company. The question 
was raised, whether he could be legally examined as a 
witness. The Court of Exchequer^ decided that he could 
not. Thus a shareholder in a public company was consi- 
dered to be the same as a partner in a private firm. So 
far, therefore, as concerns the shareholders in joint-stock 
banks, this proviso annihilated the act. 

By the Act to Amend the Law of Evidence (14 & 15 
Vic. c. 99), passed in the Session of 1851, the proviso in 



188 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

Lord Denman's Act is repealed, and the shareholders in 
joint-stock banks, and in all other public companies, may 
be examined as witnesses even in cases where those compa- 
nies may be either plaintiffs or defendants. 

II. — The Ecclesiastical Law. 

In ecclesiastical, as well as in civil law, we have to 
*eason from written documents. 

" The ecclesiastical laws have been, for the most part, derived 
from the authority exercised by the Roman Pontiff, in the dif- 
ferent states and kingdoms of Europe. The decrees and canons 
of the Church are said to have been adopted in England as early 
as the seventh century; but the system of laws at present in 
force depends upon the decretals and constitutions compiled and 
promulgated under the influence of successive popes at various 
periods. In England, the authority of the canon law has been at 
all times much restricted, being considered, in many points, 
repugnant to the law of the land, or incompatible with the juris- 
diction of the courts of common law. So much of it as has been 
received, has been gradually accommodated by our lawyers to the 
habits and customs of the country; and the ecclesiastical laws 
may now be described, in the language of our statutes, ' laws 
which the people have taken at their free liberty by their own 
consent, to be used among them, and not as the laws of any 
foreign prince, potentate, or prelate.' " — M'Calloch's Statistical 
Account of the British Empire. 

With reference to the questions that may arise in the 
ecclesiastical courts, that call for the exercise of reasoning, 
in regard to written documents, we cannot adduce a better 
illustration than by referring to the case that has recently 
excited so much interest, between the Bishop of Exeter and 
the Rev. Mr. Gorham. Our quotations are taken from the 
decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, as 
reported in the Times of the 9th March, 1850. We take, 
however, such portions only as will serve to exemplify the 
method of interpretation with regard to ecclesiastical law :«— 

" Gokhah v. the Bishop or Exeter. — The judgment in this 
important appeal, which has been looked forward to with so 
much interest by the public, was pronounced at two o'clock 
yesterday by the Judicial Committee of Privy Council. The 
members of the committee present were, the Marquis of Lans- 
downe, Lord Campbell, Lord Brougham, Lord Langdale, Dr, 
Lushington, Mr. Pemberton Leigh, and Sir Edward Ryan." 



REASONING FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. 189 

" Lord Langdale read the printed judgment of the committee, 
which was as follows : — 

"This is an appeal by the Rev. George Cornelius Gorham 
against the sentence of the Dean of the Arches Court of Canter- 
bury, in a proceeding termed a duplex querela, in which the 
Right Rev. the Lord Bishop of Exeter, at the instance of Mr. 
Gorham, was called upon to show cause why he had refused to 
institute Mr. Gorham to the vicarage of Brampford Speke. 

" The judge pronounced that the bishop had shown sufficient 
cause for his refusal, and thereupon dismissed him from all 
further observance of justice in the premises ; and, moreover, 
condemned Mr. Gorham in costs. 

"From this sentence Mr. Gorham appealed to Her Majesty in 
Council. The case was referred by Her Majesty to this com- 
mittee. It has been fully heard before us ; and, by the direction 
of Her Majesty, the hearing was attended by my Lords the 
Archbishops of Canterbury and York, and the Bishop of London, 
who are members of Her Majesty's Privy Council. We have 
satisfaction in being authorized to state, that the Most Rev. 
Prelates the Archbishops of Canterbury and of York, after having 
perused copies of this judgment, have expressed their approba- 
tion thereof. The Bishop of London does not concur. 

"The facts, so far as it is necessary to state them, are as 
follow : — 

"Mr. Gorham, being vicar of St. Just-in-Penwith, in the 
diocese of Exeter, on the 2d of November, 1847, was presented 
by Her Majesty to the vicarage of Brampford Speke, in the 
same diocese, and soon after applied to the Lord Bishop of 
Exeter for admission and institution to the vicarage. 

"The bishop, on the 13th of November, caused Mr. Gorham 
to be informed that his Lordship felt it his duty to ascertain, by 
examination, whether Mr. Gorham was sound in doctrine, before 
he should be instituted to the vicarage of Brampford Speke. 

"The examination commenced on the 17th of December, and 
was continued at very great length for five days in the same- 
month of December, and (after some suspension) for three more 
days in the following month of March. 

" The questions proposed by the bishop related principally to 
the sacrament of baptism, and were very numerous, much varied 
in form, embracing many points of difficulty, and often referring 
to the answers given to previous questions." 

"Mr. Gorham, being refused institution, commenced pro- 
ceedings in the Arches Court of Canterbury ; and at his promo- 
tion, a monition with intimation issued on the 15th June, 1848, 
and thereby the bishop was monished to admit Mr. Gorham to 
the vicarage, and to institute and invest him therein, or otherwise 
to appear to show cause why Mr. Gorham should not be admitted 



190 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

and instituted by the official Principal of the Arches Court of 
Canterbury." 

" Adopting this course, the doctrine held by Mr. Gorham 
appears to us to be this — that baptism is a sacrament generally 
necessary to salvation, but that the grace of regeneration does 
not so necessarily accompany the act of baptism that regene- 
ration invariably takes place in baptism ; that the grace may be 
granted before, in, or after baptism ; that baptism is an effectual 
sign of grace, by which God works invisibly in us, but only in 
such as worthily receive it, — in them alone it has a wholesome 
effect; and that, without reference to the qualification of the 
recipient, it is not in itself an effectual sign of grace. That 
infants baptized, and dying before actual sin, are certainly saved ; 
but that in no case is regeneration in baptism unconditional. 

" These being, as we collect them, the opinions of Mr. Gorham, 
the question which we have to decide is, not whether they are 
theologically sound or unsound — not whether, upon some of the 
doctrines comprised in the opinions, other opinions opposite to them 
may, or may not be held with equal or even greater reason by other 
learned and pious ministers of the Church, but whether these 
opinions now under our consideration are contrary or repugnant 
to the doctrines which the Church of England, by its articles, 
formularies, and rubrics, requires to be held by its ministers, so 
that upon the ground of those opinions the appellant can lawfully 
be excluded from the benefice to which he has been presented. 

" This question must be decided by the articles and liturgy, 
and we must apply to the construction of those boohs the same rules 
which have long been established, and are by the law applicable to 
the construction of all written instruments. We must endeavour 
to attain for ourselves the true meaning of the language employed, 
assisted only by the consideration of such external or historical 
facts as we may find necessary to enable us to understand the 
subject matter to which the instruments relate, and the meaning 
of the words employed. 

" In our endeavours to ascertain the true meaning and effect of 
the articles, formularies, and rubrics, we must by no means inten- 
tionally swerve from the old established rules of construction, or 
depart from the principles which have received the sanction and 
approbation of the most learned persons in times past, as being 
on the whole the best calculated to determine the true meaning of 
the documents to be examined. If these principles are not adhered 
to, all the rights, both spiritual and temporal, of Her Majesty s 
subjects would be endangered. 

" If it were supposed that all points of doctrine were decided 
by the Church of England, the law could not consider any point 
as left doubtful. The application of the law, or of the doctrine 
of the Church of England, to any theological question which 



EEASONING FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. 191 

arose, must be the subject of decision; and the decision would be 
governed by the construction of the terms in which the doctrine of 
the Church is expressed, viz. the construction which, on the whole, 
would seem most likely to be right. 

" But if the case be, as undoubtedly it is, that in the Church 
of England, many points of theological doctrine have not been 
decided, then the first and great question which arises in such 
cases as the present is, whether the disputed point is or was meant 
to be settled at all, or whether it is left open for each member of 
the Church to decide for himself according to his own conscien- 
tious opinion. If there be any doctrine on which the articles 
are silent, or ambiguously expressed, so as to be capable of two 
meanings, we must suppose that it was intended to leave that doc- 
trine to private judgment, unless the rubrics and formularies clearly 
and distinctly decide it. If they do, we must conclude that the 
doctrine so decided is the doctrine of the Church. But, on the 
other hand, if the expressions used in the rubrics and formularies 
are ambiguous, it is not to be concluded that the Church meant 
to establish indirectly as a doctrine that which it did not establish 
directly as such by the articles of faith — the code avowedly made 
for the avoiding of diversities of opinion, and for the establishing 
of consent touching true religion. 

" We must proceed, therefore, with the freedom which the ad- 
ministration of the law requires, to examine the Articles and the 
Prayer-book, for the purpose of discovering what it is, if any- 
thing, which, by the law of England, or the doctrine of the Church 
of England as by law established, is declared as to the matter now 
in question ; and to ascertain whether the doctrine held by Mr. 
Gorham, as we understand it to be disclosed in his examination, is 
directly contrary or repugnant to the doctrine of the Church." 

" On a consideration of the articles, it appears that, besides this 
particular point, there are others which are left undecided. It is 
not particularly declared what is the distinct meaning and effect 
of the grace of regeneration, — whether it is a change of nature, 
a change of condition, or a change of the relation subsisting be- 
tween sinful man and his Creator; and there are other points 
which may very plainly be open to different considerations in dif- 
ferent cases. 

" Upon the points which were left open, differences of opinion 
could not be avoided, even amongst those who sincerely subscribed 
to the articles ; and that such differences amongst such persons 
were thought consistent with subscription to the articles, and 
were not contemplated with disapprobation, appears from a pas- 
sage in the Royal Declaration, now prefixed to the articles, and 
which was first added in the reign of King Charles I., long after 
the articles were finally settled : — ' Though some differences have 
been ill-raised, yet we take comfort in this, that all clergymen 



192 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

within our realm have always most willingly subscribed to the 
articles established ; which is an argument to us that they all 
agree in the true usual literal meaning of the said articles, and 
that even in those curious points in which the present differences 
lie, men of all sorts take the articles of the Church of England to be 
for them, which is an argument, again, that none of them intend 
any desertion of the articles established.' 

" If the articles which constitute the code of faith, and from 
which any differences are prohibited, nevertheless contain expres- 
sions which unavoidably admit of different constructions, — and mem- 
bers of the Church are left at liberty to draw from the articles 
different inferences in matters of faith not expressly decided, and 
upon such points to exercise their private judgments, — we may 
reasonably expect to find such differences of opinion allowable in the 
interpretation of the devotional services, which were framed, not 
for the purpose of determining points of faith, but of establish- 
ing (to use the expression of the statute of Elizabeth) an uniform 
order of common prayer, and of the administration of sacraments, 
rites, and ceremonies of the Church of England." * * 

"We express no opinion upon the theological accuracy of 
these opinions, or any of them. The writers whom we have cited 
are not always consistent with themselves, and other writers of 
great eminence, and worthy of great respect, have held and pub- 
lished very different opinions. 33ut the mere fact that such opinions 
have been propounded, and maintained by persons so eminent, and 
so much respected, as well as by very many others, appears to us 
sufficiently to prove that the liberty which was left by the articles 
and formularies, has been actually enjoyed and exercised by the 
members and ministers of the Church of England. 

" The case not requiring it, we have abstained from expressing 
any opinion of our own upon the theological correctness or error 
of the doctrine of Mr. Gorham, which was discussed before us at 
such great length and with so much learning. His Honour the 
Vice-Chancellor Knight Bruce dissents from the opinion we have 
formed, but all the other members of the Judicial Committee who 
were present, are unanimously agreed in opinion — that the doc- 
trine held by Mr. Gorham is not contrary or repugnant to the de- 
clared doctrine of the Church of England as by law established ; 
and that Mr. Gorham ought not by reason of the doctrine held 
by him, to have been refused admission to the vicarage of Bramp- 
ford Speke. 

" And we shall, therefore, humbly report to Her Majesty that 
the sentence pronounced by the learned Judge in the Arches 
Court of Canterbury ought to be reversed ; and that it ought to 
be declared that the Lord Bishop of Exeter has not shown suffi- 
cient cause why he did not institute Mr. Gorham to the said 
vicarage." 



REASONING FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS, 193 

III. — The Sacred Scriptures. 

The doctrines and precepts of our holy religion are also 
contained in written documents. On this subject a few 
quotations from theologians of high reputation will pro- 
bably be more acceptable to the reader than any language 
of my own : — 

I. A Summary of the principal Evidences for the 
Truth and Divine Origin of the Christian Revelation. 
By Bishop Porteus. 

" 1. From considering the state of the heathen world, 
before the appearance of our Lord upon earth, it is evident 
that there was an absolute necessity for a revelation of 
God's will, and, of course, a great probability beforehand, 
that such a revelation would be granted. 

" 2. At the very time when there was a general expec- 
tation in the world of some extraordinary personage mak- 
ing his appearance in it, a person called Jesus Christ did. 
actually appear upon earth, asserting that he was the Son 
of God, and that he was sent from heaven to teach mankind 
true religion ; and he did accordingly found a religion, 
whicli from him was called the Christian Religion, and 
which has been professed by great numbers of people from 
that time to the present. 

" 3. The books of the New Testament were written by 
those persons to whom they are ascribed, and contain a 
faithful history of Christ and his religion ; and the account 
there given of both, may be securely relied upon as strictly 
true. 

" 4. The Scriptures of the Old Testament (which are 
connected with those of the New) are the genuine writings 
of those whose names they bear ; and give a true account 
of the Mosaic dispensation, of the historical facts, the 
divine commands, the moral precepts, and the prophecies 
which they contain. 

" 5. The character of Christ, as represented in the Gos- 
pels, affords, very strong ground for believing that he was a 
divine persom 

" 6. The sublimity of his doctrines, and the purity of! 
his moral precepts, confirm this belief. 



194 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

" 7. The rapid and successful propagation of the Gospel 
by the first teachers of it, through a large part of the world, 
is a proof that they were favoured with divine assistance 
and support. 

" 8. A comparison betwixt Christ and Mahomet, and 
their respective religions, leads us to conclude, that as 
the religion of the latter was confessedly the invention of 
man, that of the former was derived from God. 

" 9. The predictions delivered by the ancient prophets, 
and fulfilled in our Saviour, show that he was the Messiah 
expected by the Jews, and that he came into the world by 
divine appointment, to be the great Deliverer and Re- 
deemer of mankind. 

" 10. The prophecies delivered by our Saviour himself, 
j>rove that he was endued with the foreknowledge of future 
events, which belongs only to God, and to those inspired 
by him. 

"11. The miracles performed by our Lord demonstrate 
him to have possessed divine power. 

" 12. The resurrection of our Lord from the "dead, is 
a fact fully proved by the clearest evidence, and is the seal 
and confirmation of his divinity, and of the truth of his 
divinity." 

II. Internal Evidences op the Divine Inspiration op 
the Scriptures. By Dr. Baffles. 

" The Christian Religion assumes that the Bible is the 
word of God, that the books of the Old and New Testa- 
ment are Divinely inspired, and that, being so, they con- 
tain a revelation of his will. Now, the proof of this 
proposition is of two kinds ; the first embracing those 
evidences which are external, arising from prophecy, from 
miracles, from the testimony of ancient heathen writers, 
and the like ; the second embracing those which are in- 
ternal, and which are furnished by the character and the 
discoveries of the book itself, the principles and spirit by 
which it is pervaded, and the influence which it exerts upon 
the condition and conduct of mankind. It is to this latter 
kind of evidence that your attention is to be directed this 
evening. And I may be permitted to observe, that while 
the external evidences of Divine Revelation have been most 



REASONING FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. 195 

frequently adduced and illustrated, I cannot but regard 
the internal evidences, after all, as most satisfactory and 
conclusive. 

" I now proceed to enumerate the principal articles of 
internal evidence of the Divine inspiration and authority 
of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament. 

" The first I would specify is, The noble and rational 
theology of the Old Testament, compared with the low state 
of literature and philosophy amongst the Jews. In the 
second place, I would specify, as another article of internal 
evidence. The moral precepts, especially of the New Tes- 
tament. Thirdly, the Bible supplies the purest, noblest, 
and most powerful motives to holiness and virtue — motives 
indeed which deists reject, though they cannot but admire 
the effects they uniformly produce in the character and 
conduct of such as live habitually beneath their influence. 
I proceed to specify, fourthly, The spirit breathed through- 
out the Holy Scriptures. It is such as highly becomes 
what they profess to be — a revelation from God. In the 
fifth place, I would mention the candour and impartiality 
of the writers of the New Testament. In the sixth place, 
There is in the Bible, and especially in the discourses of 
our Lord, an originality of manner which one would 
imagine could not fail to strike even the most careless and 
inattentive reader. In the seventh place, An argument 
of great importance is derived from the perfect conformity 
of the facts and occurrences mentioned or alluded to by 
the sacred writers, and especially of the New Testament, 
with the accounts preserved in history, and other authen- 
tic records altogether foreign and independent. But a 
still more powerful argument, in the eighth place, in 
favour of the inspiration of the sacred Scriptures, arises 
from the perfect, and, on their part, obviously undesigned, 
coincidences between the sacred writers themselves. We 
now proceed, in the ninth place, to mention as another 
article of internal evidence, The positive institutions ob- 
served both by Jews and Christians. That there are 
such institutions observed to the present hour, is a thing 
sufficiently notorious. As, for instance, the Passover, the 
Feast of Tabernacles, and Circumcision, amongst the Jews ; 
and Baptism, the Lord's Supper, and the Ministry of the 
k 2 



196 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION". 

Gospel amongst Christians." In the tenth place, the most 
inveterate opponents of Christianity cannot bnt admire 
its effects on the character and conduct of those who feel 
the strong influence of its motives, and act under the 
guidance of its principles. Finally ; we may specify, as 
the last article of internal evidence of the Divine inspira- 
tion of the Scriptures, Their influence on the general 
condition of society. Never did a nation become worse 
for its reception of the Gospel. On the contrary, wherever 
it has been introduced, in proportion to the cordiality 
with which it has been welcomed, have been its salutary 
and beneficial consequences in the moral and social condi- 
tion of that people." 

" And now, on a review of the argument, at what con- 
clusion are you prepared — are you compelled — in all 
honesty and fairness, to arrive 1 There is the book ; there 
is the system. Whence is it — from earth or heaven] 
What is its origin— human or divine 1 Human it cannot 
be ; for, if it were, it would be a fable and a forgery — a 
fable and a forgery too cunningly devised for human skill, 
and in the principles and spirit with which, it is pervaded, 
too pure and holy for so base a purpose, or so gross an 
origin. Human ingenuity could not produce it ; human 
depravity would not if it could. Then, if it be not human, 
there is no other alternative — 4t must be Divine ! " — Lec- 
ture to Young Men. 

III. Bible Landmarks. By the Rev. R. Bickersteth, 
A.M. 

" The apocrypha is not inspired. I gave, in the discourse of 
this morning, my reasons for saying so ; its writers do not claim 
inspiration ; the Jews never considered it to be inspired ; there is 
not a single quotation from the apocrypha in either the Old or 
New Testament ; it contains statements that are false and con- 
tradictory ; (for example, the Book of Wisdom pretends to have 
been written by Solomon, and yet the writer, whoever he may 
have been, quotes many passages from Isaiah and Jeremiah, who 
did not prophecy till many ages after the time of Solomon. It 
also represents the Israelites as under subjection to their enemies, 
w-hereas, during the reign of Solomon, they enjoyed the utmost 
freedom and prosperity.) Besides all this, the apocryphal books 
sanction doctrines that are false, and practices that are immoral. 



REASONING FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. 197 

• Alms,' we are therein told, c make an atonement for sin.' And 
from the books of the apocrypha it is easy to defend falsehood, 
suicide, murder, and the practice of magic. We shrink from the 
admission of books like these into a position of co-ordinate autho- 
rity with the word of God, and we cannot forbear repeating, that 
while the Church of England does permit the occasional use of 
certain portions of the apocrypha in the course of her public 
services, she has most carefully guarded, by her sixth Article, 
against the supposition that the apocryphal writings are to rank 
with inspired compositions, or to be ever made the source of 
appeal to establish any point of doctrine. 

"With reference to the use of tradition, I have shown you, 
from various quotations of Scripture, the light in which tradition 
is placed by God's word; our Saviour mentioned it, never to 
approve, but invariably to rebuke its authority. Inspired apostles 
equally disown it. ' Forasmuch,' writes St. Peter, ' as ye know 
that ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and 
gold, from your vain conversation received by tradition from your 
fathers.' Tradition is therefore condemned by Scripture. Its 
tendency is invariably represented to be to the subversion of 
truth, the fostering of error, and the perversion of the command- 
ments of God. I look upon the Romish use of tradition, there- 
fore, first, as wholly unnecessary ; the written word is by itself 
perfect and all-sufficient. 1 look upon it, secondly, as forbidden 
by the teaching of our Lord and his apostles. And I look upon 
it, thirdly, as the prop to error, and the bane of godliness." — 
Bickerstettis Bible Landmarks. 

IV. — Different Degrees of Assent. By Dr. Watts. 

" There are many things even in religion, as well as in 
philosophy and civil life, which we believe with very 
different degrees of assent ; and this is, or should be, always 
regulated according to the different degrees of evidence 
which we enjoy: and, perhaps, there are a thousand grada- 
tions in our assent to the things we believe, because there 
are thousands of circumstances relating to different ques- 
tions, which increase or diminish the evidence we have 
concerning them, and that in matters both of reason and 
revelation. 

" I believe there is a God, and that obedience is due to him 
from every reasonable creature : this I am most fully assured of, 
because I have the strongest evidence, since it is the plain dictate 
both of reason and revelation. 

" Again, I believe there is a future resurrection of the dead, 



198 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

because Scripture tells us so in the plainest terms, though reason 
says nothing of it. I believe also that the same matter of our 
bodies which died (in part at least) shall arise ; but I am not so 
fully assured of this circumstance, because the revelation of it is 
not quite so clear and express. Yet further I believe that the 
good men who were acquainted here on earth, shall know each 
other in heaven ; but my persuasion of it is not absolutely cer- 
tain, because my assent to it arises only from circumstantial 
reasoning of men upon what God has told us, and therefore my 
evidences are not strong beyond a possibility of mistake." 

"What is said before concerning truth or doctrines maybe 
also affirmed concerning duties ; the reason of both is the same ; 
as the one are truths for our speculation, the others are truths for 
our practice. Duties which are expressly required in the plain 
language of Scripture, or dictated by the most evident reasoning 
upon first principles, ought to bind our consciences more than 
those which are but dubiously inferred, and that only from occa- 
sional occurrences, incidents, and circumstances : as, for instance, 
I am certain that I ought to pray to God; my conscience is 
bound to this, because there are most evident commands for it to 
be found in Scripture, as well as to be derived from reason. I 
believe also that I may pray to God either by a written form, or 
without one, because neither reason nor revelation expressly 
requires either of these modes of prayer at all times, or forbids 
the other. I cannot, therefore, bind my conscience to practise 
the one so as utterly to renounce the other; but I would practise 
either of them as my reason and other circumstances direct met" 
— Wang's Improvement of the Mind. 

V. — Literary Characteristics op the Bible. By Dr. 
McCulloch. 

" An ordinary writer who had a new theory of doctrine and 
duty to propound, would probably throw his materials into a sys- 
tematic form. But the Bible, instead of being a compact and 
orderly treatise, consists of a series of independent works, charac- 
terised by the utmost diversity of structure. Instead of presenting 
the principles of our religion in the form of a system, it sets them 
before us in a miscellaneous and incidental manner — scattering 
them here and there, from one end to another of a collection of 
historical, devotional, prophetic, and epistolary compositions. In 
a systematic work, you can refer to the very section where infor- 
mation as to any given doctrine may be found. You cannot do 
this with the Scriptures. The given doctrine may be detailed 
more at large in one book or in one chapter than in another : but 
the whole truth concerning it is not to be found in any single 
chapter or even in any single book : it is to be discovered only by 
'searching' the Scriptures, by comparing Scripture with Scrip- 



REASONING FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. 199 

ture, and thus supplementing the partial information of one portion 
by the fuller information of another. Nay, not only so; but 'the 
truth,' even where most fully revealed, is generally stated in an 
indirect and incidental form. I know not that a single instance 
can be produced of a doctrine announced in the shape of an 
abstract proposition. The articles of our faith are all exhibited ; 
but they are not propounded in their naked form, as in human 
creeds and confessions : — they are never introduced but in con- 
nexion with something of a practical nature. If we are taught, 
for example, the doctrine of the Trinity, we are taught it not in 
express terms, but indirectly, as in Christ's commission to the 
apostles. If we are taught the doctrine of the atonement, we 
are taught it — not abstractly as a mere article of faith, but prac- 
tically as an illustration of the Divine love, or as a proof of the 
malignity of sin, or as an incentive to gratitude and holiness. In 
short, the Christian doctrines are revealed — not in an insulated 
form, but obliquely and incidentally — here in a ftarrative of facts, 
there in the course of an argument — here as things to be pre- 
supposed, there as things to be inferred, — now in plain and literal 
terms, now under the veil of metaphor and allegory. So that, in 
order to ascertain the real amount of the system of theology and 
morals which the Bible reveals, it is necessary to explore the 
whole sacred territory — to compare book with book and passage 
with passage —to collect from each its peculiar contribution — and 
to collate the whole into one systematic body." 

" The Bible, observe, is not one book, but a collection of sixty- 
six different books. It is the production, not of one writer, but of 
thirty-six different writers — men of every diversity of rank, talent, 
and mental culture — from the monarch to the gatherer of syca- 
more fruit, from the accomplished pupil of Gamaliel to the un- 
lettered fisherman of Galilee. It is a work, moreover, not of one 
age, but of many and distant ages. The opening books date six 
hundred years earlier than any other literary composition extant, 
while the closing book is a production of the age of the Caesars ; 
the whole is the connected literature of a period not short of 
fifteen centuries. Then how various are the books in kind. Some 
are histories ; some, biographies ; some, poems ; some, digests of 
public law ; some, collections of national proverbs ; some, epistles 
to churches ; some, private letters to friends. Nor are their 
subjects less diversified than the dates and the authors. Instead 
of discussing only one or two points, they discuss a thousand — 
and these the most profound and perplexing within the whole 
range of human inquiry, the most unfavourable to unity of senti- 
ment, the most vexed by controversy and debate. 

" Now certainly it could never have been expected beforehand, 
on any ordinary grounds of probability, that a series of works, 
open to so many sources of diversity, should exhibit such a thing 



200 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

as uniformity of sentiment, or congruity of design. The analogy of 
all other instances in the history of literature, would have led us 
to anticipate the utmost diversity of doctrine, no less than of 
style and execution. Anything like a systematic unity of thought 
and purpose would have been pronounced impossible. Neverthe- 
less, the perfect doctrinal agreement of the sacred books is one 
of their most indisputable properties. The Scripture authors, 
though living in ages very distant from each other, and writing 
under circumstances as dissimilar as can well be imagined, are not 
only entirely at one on all the subjects which they touch, but un- 
designedly contribute, each his contingent, towards the comple- 
tion of a magnificent Unity." — McCullocKs Literary Character- 
istics of the Holy Scriptures. 

VI. Rules op Interpretation. By Robert Robinson. 

" Every author proposes some end in writing ; this end 
must needs agree with his general character, peculiar 
circumstances, &c. To observe this design is no small 
help, towards understanding the biblical writers. On the 
contrary, to consider the whole Bible as we consider the 
book of Proverbs, and to ground enormous doctrines on 
detached sentences, are gross absurdities, manifest abuses 
of the word of God." 

" ' Consult good sense,' adds 'Mr. Claude. Very proper 
advice, for good natural sense will go far in understanding 
plain primitive Christianity : and, indeed, will often take 
a hint from the most common incident on any subject. A 
friend of mine, disgusted with the common representation 
of the devil carrying our Saviour in his claws, as a bird of 
prey carries a dove through the air, and setting him on a 
pinnacle of the temple, tried Mr. Claude's experiment. 
He set a sensible little boy to read the fourth of Matthew, 
and after he had read the fifth verse, 'The devil taketh 
him up into the holy city, and setteth him on a pinnacle 
of the temple,' he asked the little gentleman, ' How do 
you think the devil took Jesus Christ, and set him on 
a pinnacle of the temple 1 ' { Why, sir,' replied the little 
expositor, ' as you would take me up to the top of St. 
Paul's.' 1 ' — Robinsons Notes to Claude. 



ERRORS IN REASONING. 201 

SECTION V. 

ERRORS IN REASONING. 

"The art of false reasoning is of great antiquity. It is 
nearly as old as the creation. We learn from the Bible, 
that it was first discovered and successfully made use of 
by the Angel of Deceit, when, in the apparent light of 
reason, he availed himself of the serpent's ingenuity to 
seduce our first parents from their state of happiness to his 
own state of misery — from a state of peaceful enjoyment, 
the natural consequence of obedience to their Creator, to 
a state of misery, the never-failing result of disobedience. 
This art is very simple in itself, and may easily be acquired 
by any one who possesses an ordinary share of the actor's 
talent, and is endowed with a persuasive tongue and an 
unscrupulous conscience. 

" The process, as set forth in the third chapter of the 
first book in the Bible, is very short and simple. A doubt 
as to the truth of God's word is first ingeniously suggested 
— ' Yea, hath God said, Ye shall surely not eat of every 
tree of the garden 1 ' Then the truth of that word is 
positively denied — * Ye shall not surely die.' And, lastly, 
the expediency of acting in opposition to the command 
of God is adroitly introduced into the argument of the 
arch-deceiver, namely, the beauty of the fruit, and its 
virtue to make wise those that partake of it — ' God doth 
know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall 
be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.' 

" This kind of reasoning seldom fails to succeed with 
persons who are themselves unconscious of deceit, if they 
once begin to palter with the truth, — if error be allowed 
to insinuate the first doubt of the truthfulness of God's 
word. But to perfect the delusion, the plea in a false 
argument should not be altogether false — a little truth 
should be interwoven with it — truth so stated as to con- 
stitute a practical lie. In the case just stated, the great 
deceiver spoke truth when he told the woman that after 
she had tasted the forbidden fruit her eyes would be 
opened to discern both good and evil — so it proved : 
k 3 



202 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

hitherto Adam and herself had known only good ; now, 
to their sorrow, they knew what evil was also. 

" But in these latter days, the art of false reasoning has 
been greatly elaborated. The short straightforward pro- 
cess adopted by the inventor of the science would scarcely 
answer the purposes to which it is now applied. The mis- 
chievous result which was then attained in a day, is now 
often made the work of years, requiring the support of 
many positive and reiterated denials of the truth for its 
completion. Sometimes we see one error established, and 
the supposed impossibility of uprooting it made the rea- 
son for engrafting upon it many others. At other times 
a dexterous transposition of the right order of things — 
inverting the order of cause and effect, or, in other words, 
'putting the cart before the horse' — proves a very suc- 
cessful method of thwarting the truth, and of preparing 
the way for the establishment of false conclusions. But 
when the truth to be opposed is so self-evidently true as to 
baffle every attempt to find a plausible argument against 
it, the advocate of error may even then possibly succeed 
by availing himself of the power of ridicule — the power 
of which is oftentimes the greater in its effect upon shal- 
low-minded men, in proportion as the truth which it assails 
is grave and important. This may occasionally be seen 
when the sacred truths of Scripture are made the subject 
of profane jokes. Ridicule may, however, be used with 
great effect in support of the truth as well as against it, as 
is evident in the conflict which the prophet Elijah had 
with the prophets of Baal. It is a powerful weapon for 
good or evil, just as the object to which it is made sub- 
servient is true or false. 

"We may safely assume that no wise man, however 
clever he may be, will ever think of studying the art of 
false reasoning with the intention of practising it ; but 
although no wise man would wish to make use of this 
delusive art himself, he may find it very useful to be so 
far acquainted with it, as to enable him to see through the 
ingenuity of those who are disposed to use it, and thus 
to avail himself of the serpent's wisdom to neutralize its 
sting. To be very skilful in the practice of the science, 
it requires the professor to possess several qualifications 



ERRORS IN REASONING. 203 

natural and acquired ; but to guard against its mischievous 
power, the only qualifications which are essentially neces- 
sary, are a sound judgment and a sincere love of the truth ; 
and these qualifications are happily within the reach of 
every honest man, though his sphere may be ever so 
humble, and his literary acquirements equally small. When 
it has fallen to the lot of any of these humble disciples of 
the truth to become its active advocates, they have often 
accomplished, by a few words judiciously spoken, effects 
most beneficial to mankind. We are told that the truly 
great General Washington rarely required so much as ten 
minutes to give utterance to the remarks which he had to 
offer to the American Senate, and it may generally be 
assumed that where a practised speaker requires an hour 
or two to make a speech on a simple question, and has the 
power of charming his hearers for that length of time, 
there is great reason for his audience to be on their guard, 
lest the brilliancy of the orator should conceal some dupli- 
city in his argument ; but, wherever this duplicity does 
exist, the more any one is acquainted with the devices of 
the false reasoner, the better able he will of course be to 
detect and expose the cloven foot, which even in these days 
may sometimes be found under a garment of light." — The 
Art of false Reasoning exemplified. 

The different kinds of false reasons are called sophisms 
or fallacies. We shall take our description of these falla- 
cies chiefly from Dr. Watts, but classified according to our 
own arrangement of the principles of reasoning. 

False reasons may assume any of the following forms : — 

I. — Fallacies arising from not understanding the ques- 
tion. (See page 24.) 

1. Proving a different question from that in dispute : — 

"The first sort of sophism is called ignoratio elenchi, 
or a mistake of the question ; that is, when something 
else is proved, which has neither any necessary connexion ' 
or consistency with the thing inquired, and consequently 
gives no determination to the inquiry, though it may seem 
at first sight to determine the question : as, if any should 
conclude that St. Paul was not a native Jew, by proving 



204 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

that lie was born a Koman ; or if they should pretend to 
determine that he was neither Roman nor Jew, by proving 
that he was born at Tarsus in Cilicia : these sophisms are 
refuted by showing that all these three may be true ; for 
he was born of Jewish parents in the city of Tarsus, and 
by some peculiar privilege granted to his parents, or his 
native city, he was born a denizen of Rome. Thus there 
is neither of these three characters of the apostle incon- 
sistent with each other, and therefore the proving one of 
them true does not refute the others." — Watts s Logic. 

2. Assuming as true the question in dispute : — 

" The next sophism is called petitio principii, or a sup- 
position of what is not granted : that is, when any propo- 
sition is proved by the same proposition in other words, or 
by something that is equally uncertain and disputed ; as 
if any one undertake to prove that the human soul is 
extended through all the parts of the body, because it 
resides in every member, which is but the same thing in 
other words. ' Or, if a Papist should pretend to prove that 
his religion is the only Catholic religion, and is derived 
from Christ and his apostles, because it agrees with the 
doctrine of all the fathers of the Church, all the holy 
martyrs, and all the Christian world throughout all ages ; 
whereas this is the great point in contest, whether their 
religion does 'agree with that of all the ancients and the 
primitive Christians, or no, 

" That sort of fallacy which is called a circle, is very 
near akin to the petitio principii ; as when one of the 
premises in a syllogism is questioned and opposed, and we 
intend to prove it by the conclusion ; or, when in a train 
of syllogisms we prove the last by recurring to what was 
the conclusion of the first. The Papists are famous at 
this sort of fallacy ; when they prove the Scripture to be 
the word of God by the authority or infallible testimony 
of their Church ; and when they are called to show the 
infallible authority of their Church, they pretend to prove 
it by the Scripture." — Ibid. 

3. Abusing the ambiguity of words, which may be done 
in different ways : — 



ERRORS IN REASONING. 205 

" The next sort of sophisms arises from our abuse of the 
ambiguity of words, which is the largest and most exten- 
sive kind of fallacy ; and indeed several of the other falla- 
cies might be reduced to this head. 

" When the words or phrases are plainly equivocal, they 
are called sophisms of equivocation ; as, if we should argue 
thus : ' He that sends forth a book into the light, desires 
it to be read ; he that throws a book into the fire, sends it 
into the light ; therefore, he that throws a book into the 
fire, desires it to be read.' 

" This sophism, as well as the foregoing, and all of the 
like nature, are solved by showing the different senses of 
the words, terms, or phrases. Here light in the major 
proposition signifies the public view of the world ; in the 
minor it signifies the brightness of flame and fire ; and 
therefore the syllogism has four terms, or rather it has no 
middle term, and proves nothing. 

" But where such gross equivocations and ambiguities 
appear in arguments, there is little danger of imposing 
upon ourselves or others. The greatest danger, and which 
we are perpetually exposed to in reasoning, is, where the 
two senses or significations of one term are near akin, and 
not plainly distinguished, and yet they are really suffi- 
ciently different in their sense to lead us into great mis- 
takes, if we are not watchful. And indeed the greatest 
part of controversies in the sacred or civil life, arise from 
the different senses that are put upon words, and the dif- 
ferent ideas which are included in them." — Ibid. 

II. — Fallacies connected with the relation of subject and 
attribute. (See page 31.) 

1. Judging of a thing by that which only belongs to it 
accidentally : — 

" The next is called fallacia-accidentis, or a sophism 
wherein we pronounce concerning the nature and essential 
properties of any subject according to something which is 
merely accidental to it. This is akin to the former, and is 
also very frequent in human life. So if opium or the Peru- 
vian bark has been used imprudently, or unsuccessfully, 
whereby the patient has received injury, some weaker 



206 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

people absolutely pronounce against the use of the bark or 
opium upon all occasions whatsoever, and are ready to 
call them poison. So wine has been the accidental occa- 
sion of drunkenness and quarrels; learning and printing 
may have been the accidental cause of sedition in a state ; 
the reading of the Bible, by accident, has been abused to 
promote heresies or destructive errors ; and for these rea- 
sons they have all been pronounced evil things. Mahomet 
forbade his followers the use of wine ; the Turks discourage 
learning in their dominions ; and the Papists forbid the 
Scripture to be read by the laity. But how very unreason- 
able are these inferences, and these prohibitions which are 
built upon them 1" — Ibid. 

2. Passing from what is true in some respects to what 
is true absolutely : — 

" The next sophism borders upon the former ; and that 
is, when we argue from that which is true in particular 
circumstances, to prove the same thing true absolutely, 
simply, and abstracted from all circumstances : this is 
called in the schools a sophism, a dicto secundum quid 
ad dictum simpliciter ; as, That which is bought in the 
shambles is eaten for dinner ; raw meat is bought in the 
shambles : therefore raw meat is eaten for dinner. Or 
thus, Livy writes fables and improbabilities when he de- 
scribes prodigies and omens ; therefore Livy's Roman 
History is never to be believed in anything. Or thus, 
There may be some mistake of transcribers in some part 
of Scripture ; therefore Scripture alone is not a. safe guide 
for our faith. 

" This sort of sophism has its reverse also ; as when we 
argue from that which is true simply and absolutely, to 
prove the same thing true in all particular circumstances 
whatsoever ; as if a traitor should argue from the sixth 
commandment, ' Thou shalt not kill a man,' to prove 
that he himself ought not to be hanged : or if a madman 
should tell me, ' I ought not to withhold his sword from 
him, because no man ought to withhold the property of 
another.' 

" These two last species of sophisms are easily solved, 
by showing the difference betwixt things in their absolute 



ERRORS IN REASONING. 207 

nature, and the same thing surrounded with peculiar cir- 
cumstances, and considered in regard to special times, 
places, persons, and occasions ; or by showing the differ- 
ence between a moral and a metaphysical universality, and 
that the proposition will hold good in one case, but not iu 
the other.''-— Ibid. 

3. The two errors in reasoning to which Scholastic 
Logicians give the names of " Undistributed Middle," and 
" Illicit Process," may be classed under this head. The 
"undistributed middle" is when we argue that because 
two things have a common attribute, therefore they are 
the same thing ; as, " Gold is yellow, and saffron is yellow 
— therefore saffron is gold." The " illicit process " is when, 
because two things are not the same thing, we infer 
they have not a common attribute ; as, " Gold is yel- 
low ; saffron is not gold : therefore, saffron is not yel- 
low." * (See page 32.) We sometimes meet with fallacies of 
this description in the controversy respecting religious 
education. Thus, u Religion produces morality ; education 
produces morality ; therefore, education is religion ;" and, 
on the other side, " Eeligion produces morality ; educa- 
tion is not religion ; therefore, education does not produce 
morality." 

III. — Fallacies connected with the relation of a whole 
and its parts. (See page 45.) 

Passing from a divided sense to a connected sense, or 
from a connected sense to a divided sense : — 

" The sophisms of composition and division come next to 
be mentioned. The sophism of composition is when we infer 
anything concerning ideas in a compounded sense, which is 
only true in a divided sense. And when it is said in the Gospel 
that Christ made the blind to see, and the deaf to hear, and 
the lame to walk, we ought not to infer hence that Christ 

* Mr. Bailey thinks these fallacies when clearly stated are too absurd to be com- 
mitted, and that the technical rules for their discovery are intricate and unneces- 
sary. See Theory of Reasoning, pp. 139, 148, 150. The rules given by Mr. Bailey 
in these cases are, 1. The possession of one quality, or one set of qualities, in 
common with a given class, does not of itself prove the possessors to belong to the 
ciass. 2. Your not belonging to a given class, is no proof that you do not possess 
any quality in common with the class. 



208 



LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 



performed contradictions ; but those who were blind before, 
were made to see, and those who were deaf before, were 
made to hear, &c. So when the Scripture assures us the 
worst of sinners may be saved, it signifies only, that they 
who have been the worst of sinners may repent and be 
saved, not that they shall be saved in their sins. Or if 
any one should argue thus : Two and three are even and 
odd ; five are two and three ; therefore five are even and 
odd. Here that is very falsely inferred concerning two or 
three in union, which is only true of them divided. 

" The sophism of division is when we infer the same 
thing concerning ideas in a divided sense, which is only 
true in a compounded sense ; as, if we should pretend to 
prove that every soldier in the Grecian army put an 
hundred thousand Persians to flight, because the Grecian 
soldiers did so. Or if a man should argue thus : Five is 
one number ; two and three are five ; therefore two and 
three are one number." — Ibid. 

IV — Fallacies connected with the relation of genus and 
species. (See page 53.) 

1. Misapplication of general principles : — 

" A third example is the opposition sometimes made to 
legitimate interferences of government in the economical 
affairs of society, grounded upon a misapplication of the 
maxim, that an individual is a better judge than the govern- 
ment of what is for his own pecuniary interest. This objec- 
tion was urged to Mr. Wakefield's system of colonization, 
one of the greatest practical improvements in public affairs 
which have been made in our time. Mr. Wakefield's prin- 
ciple, as most people are now aware, is the artificial concen- 
tration of the settlers, by fixing such a price upon un- 
occupied land as may preserve the most desirable proportion 
between the quantity of land in culture, and the labouring 
population. Against this it was argued, that if individuals 
found it for their advantage to occupy extensive tracts of 
land, they, being better judges of their own interest than 
the legislature (which can only proceed on general rules), 
ought not to be restrained from doing so. But in this 
argument it was forgotten that the fact of a mans taking 



ERRORS IN REASONING. 209 

a large tract of land is evidence only that it is his interest 
to take as mnch as other people, but not that it might not 
be for his interest to content himself with less, if he could 
be assured that other people would do so too ; an assurauce 
which nothing but a government regulation can give. If 
all other people took much, and he only a little, he would 
reap none of the advantages derived from the concentration 
of the population and the consequent possibility of pro- 
curing labour for hire, but would have placed himself, 
without equivalent, in a situation of voluntary inferiority. 
The proposition, therefore, that the quantity of land which 
people will take when left to themselves is that which it 
is most for their interest to take, is true only secundum 
quid: it is only their interest while they have no guarantee 
for the conduct of one another. But the argument dis- 
regards the limitation, and takes the proposition for true 
simpliciter." 

" Under the same head of fallacy (a dicto secundum quid 
ad dictum simpliciter) might be placed all the errors which 
are vulgarly called misapplications of abstract truths : that 
is, where a principle, true (as the common expression is) in 
the abstract, that is, all modifying causes being supposed 
absent, is reasoned upon as if it were true absolutely, and 
no modifying circumstances could ever by possibility 
exist." — MilVs Logic. 

2. Reasoning from loose definitions : — 

" Those who are familiar with the writings of Madame 
de Stael, know how constantly it was the practice of that 
acute and plausible writer, to have recourse to what may 
be called the fallacy of definition, which consists in giving 
an arbitrary meaning to some well-known expression, 
sufficiently large to include, or sufficiently narrow to ex- 
clude, the subject under discussion. Never was this fallacy 
more adroitly employed than in the very able and inge- 
nious speech of Mr. Roundell Palmer, in Friday night's 
debate ; a speech, the very ability and ingenuity of which 
render it peculiarly satisfactory to those who, like ourselves, 
entertain the opposite opinion, because we feel that few are 
likely to succeed where so adroit an advocate has failed. 
The familiar term which Mr. Palmer sought unduly to 



210 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

extend by definition, is 'religious liberty.'" — Times, March 
17, 1851. 

Y. — Fallacies connected with the relation of cause and 
effect, — whether the cause be physical, moral, conditional, 
or final. See pages 71, 80, 95, 109. 

Taking for a cause that which is not a cause : — 

" The next kind of sophism is called non causa pro causd, 
or the assignation of a false cause. This the peripatetic 
philosophers were guilty of continually, when they told us 
that certain beings, which they called substantial forms, 
were the springs of colour, motion, vegetation, and the 
various operations of natural beings in the animate and 
inanimate world ; when they inform us that nature was 
terribly afraid of a vacuum ; and that this was the cause 
why the water would not fall out of a long tube if it was 
turned upside down : the moderns, as well as the ancients, 
fall often into this fallacy, when they positively assign the 
reasons of natural appearances, without sufficient experi- 
ments to prove them. 

" Astrologers are overrun with this sort of fallacies, and 
they cheat the people grossly by pretending to tell for- 
tunes, and to deduce the cause of the various occurrences 
in the lives of men from the various positions of the stars 
and planets, which they call aspects. 

" When comets, and eclipses of the sun and moon, are 
construed to signify the fate of princes, the revolution of 
states, famine, wars, and calamities of all kinds, it is a 
fallacy that belongs to this rank of sophisms. 

" There is scarce anything more common in human life 
than this sort of deceitful argument. If any two acci- 
dental events happen to concur, one is presently made the 
cause of the other. If Titus wronged his neighbour of a 
guinea, and in six months after he fell down and broke his 
leg, weak men will impute it to the divine vengeance on 
Titus for his former injustice. This sophism was found 
also in the early days of the world ; for when holy Job 
was surrounded with uncommon miseries, his own friends 
inferred, that he was a most heinous criminal, and charged 
him with aggravated guilt as the cause of his calamities; 



ERRORS IN REASONING. 211 

though God himself by a voice from heaven solved this 
uncharitable sophism, and cleared his servant Job of that 
charge. 

" How frequent is it among men to impute crimes to 
wrong persons ! We too often charge that upon the wicked 
contrivance and premeditated malice of a neighbour, which 
arose merely from ignorance, or from an unguarded tem- 
per. And on the other hand, when we have a mind to 
excuse ourselves, we practise the same sophism, and charge 
that upon our inadvertence or our ignorance, which per- 
haps was designed wickedness. What is really done by a 
necessity of circumstances, we sometimes impute to choice. 
And again, we charge that upon necessity which was really 
desired and chosen. 

" Sometimes a person acts out of judgment in opposition 
to his inclination; another person perhaps acts the same 
thing out of inclination, and against his judgment. It is 
hard for us to determine with assurance what are the in- 
ward springs and secret causes of every man's conduct ; 
and therefore we should be cautious and slow in passing a 
judgment where the case is not exceedingly evident : and if 
we should mistake, let it rather be on the charitable than 
on the censorious side." — Watts 9 s Logic. 

"And when Paul had gathered a bundle of sticks, and laid 
them on the fire, there came a viper out of the heat, and fastened 
on his hand. And when the barbarians saw the venomous beast 
hang on his hand, they said among themselves, No doubt this man 
is a murderer, whom, though he hath escaped the sea, yet ven- 
geance suffereth not to live. And he shook off the beast into tiie 
fire, .and felt no harm. Howbeit they looked when he should 
have swollen, or fallen down dead suddenly : but after they had 
looked a great while, and saw no harm come to him, they changed 
their minds, and said that he was a god." — Acts xxviii. 3 — 6. See 
also Jeremiah xliv. 15—18. 

VI. Fallacies connected with reasoning from examples. 
(See page 127.) 

Drawing a general conclusion from a defective induc- 
tion : — 

" There is, after all these, another sort of sophism, which 
is wont to be called an imperfect Enumeration, or a False 
Induction, when from a few experiments or observations 



212 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

men infer general theorems and universal propositions." — 
Watts's Logic. 

" Nivio in his youth observed, that on three Christmas 
days together there fell a good quantity of snow, and now 
hath writ it down in his almanack, as a part of his wise 
remarks on the weather, that it will always snow at Christ- 
mas. — Euron, a young lad, took notice ten times, that 
there was a sharp frost when the wind was in the north- 
east ; therefore in the middle of last July he almost ex- 
pected it should freeze, because the weathercocks showed 
him a north-east wind ; and he was still more disappointed, 
when he found it a very sultry season. It is the same 
hasty judgment that hath thrown scandal on a whole 
nation for the sake of some culpable characters belonging 
to several particular natives of that country ; whereas all 
the Frenchmen are not gay and airy ; all the Italians are 
not jealous and revengeful ; nor all the English overrun 
with the spleen." — Watts on the Improvement of the Mind. 

" I have already said that the mode of Simple Enume- 
ration is still the common and received method of Induc- 
tion in whatever relates to man and society. Of this a 
very few instances, more by way of memento than of instruc- 
tion, may suffice. What, for example, is to be thought of 
all the ' common-sense' maxims for which the following 
may serve as the universal formula : ' Whatsoever has 
never been^ will never be.' As for example : Negroes have 
never been as civilized as whites sometimes are, therefore 
it is impossible they should be so. Women, as a class, 
have not hitherto equalled men as a class in intellectual 
energy and comprehensiveness, therefore they are neces- 
sarily inferior. Society cannot prosper without this or 
the other institution ; e.g. in Aristotle's time, without 
slavery ; in later times, without an established priesthood, 
without artificial distinctions of ranks, &c. One working 
man in a thousand, educated, while the nine hundred and 
ninety-nine remain uneducated, has usually aimed at raising 
himself out of his class, therefore education makes people 
dissatisfied with their condition in life. Bookish men, 
taken from speculative pursuits, and set to work on some- 
thing they know nothing about, have generally been found 
or thought to do it ill ; therefore, philosophers are unfit for 



ERRORS IN REASONING. 213 

business, &c. &c. All these are inductions by simple 
enumeration." — Mill's Logic. 

VII. — Fallacies connected with the relation of analogy, 
comparison, and contrast. (See page 143.) 

" But this is only one of the modes of error in the 
employment of arguments of analogy. There is another, 
more properly deserving the name of fallacy ; namely, when 
resemblance in one point is inferred from resemblance in 
another point, although there is not only no evidence to 
comiect the two circumstances by way of causation, but the 
evidence tends positively to disconnect them. This is pro- 
perly the Fallacy of False Analogies. 

" As a first instance, we may cite that favourite argu- 
ment in defence of absolute power, drawn from the analogy 
of paternal government in a family, which government is 
not, and by universal admission ought not to be, controlled 
by (though it sometimes ought to be controlled for) the 
children. Paternal government, in a family, works well ; 
therefore, says the argument, despotic government in a 
state will work well : implying that the beneficial working 
of parental government depends, in the family, upon the 
only point which it has in common with political despotism, 
namely, irresponsibility. Whereas it does not depend upon 
that, but upon two other attributes of parental govern- 
ment, the affection of the parent for the children, and the 
superiority of the parent in wisdom and experience ; neither 
of which properties can be reckoned upon, or are at all 
likely to exist, between a political despot and his subjects ; 
and when either of these circumstances fails, even in the 
family, and the influence of the irresponsibility is allowed 
to work uncorrected, the result is anything but good 
government. This, therefore, is a false analogy. 

" Another example is the not uncommon dictum, that 
bodies politic have youth, maturity, old age, and death, 
like bodies natural : that after a certain duration of pro- 
sperity, they tend spontaneously to decay. This also is a 
false analogy, because the decay of the vital powers in an 
animated body can be distinctly traced to the natural pro- 
gress of those very changes of structure which, in their 
earlier stages, constitute its growth to maturity ; while in 



214 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

the body politic the progress of those changes cannot, gene- 
rally speaking, have any effect but the still further con- 
tinuance of growth : it is the stoppage of that progress, and 
the commencement of retrogression, that alone would con- 
stitute decay. Bodies politic die, but it is of disease, or 
violent death : they have no old age." — Mill's Logic. 

VIII. — Fallacies connected with reasoning from parables, 
fables, and proverbs. (See page 166.) 

A similitude or parable " should not be false in itself, as 
in this case the mind revolts not only against the thing 
itself but against the conclusion drawn from it. On this 
rule I shall take the liberty of making the following obser- 
vations : — Several of the ancients illustrated and endea- 
voured to prove the truth and certainty of the resurrection 
by the history of the Phoenix, a bird supposed to be pro- 
duced in Arabia once in one hundred years, — there never 
being more than one at a time. It is reported that, when 
this bird finds its end approaching, it builds itself a nest 
of the most fragrant spices and aromatic plants, which, 
being set on fire by the rays of the sun, the bird is 
consumed in it ; but from its ashes a worm or grub 
is formed, out of which another Phoenix in process 
of time arises. Others say, that it dies in the nest, 
and a grub is formed out of the marrow of its bones. Both 
these relations are equally true. Herodotus, Dion Cassius, 
Tacitus, and Pliny, mention this fabulous animal ; and I 
have met with this account seriously produced by Clemens 
Alexandrinus, and other Christian fathers, to prove the 
resurrection of the body. Now it is well known no such 
bird ever did or ever could exist, that the supposed fact 
is impossible, and that the conclusion drawn from it, is not 
only not solid and convincing, but absurd, because the pre- 
mises are all false." — Br. Adam Clarke s Commentary on the 
Bible, Matt xiii. See ahoUzeh xviii. 1 — 4. Lukeiv. 2B — 27. 

IX. — Fallacies connected with reasonings from written 
documents. (See page 184.) 

1. — Forced interpretation. 

" Next winter, a player, hired for the purpose by the Corpora- 
tion of Eringemakers, acted his part in a new comedy, all covered 






ERRORS IN REASONING. 215 

-with silver fringe, and according to the laudable custom gave rise 
to that fashion. Upon which the brothers, consulting their father's 
will, to their great astonishment found these words : ' Item, I 
charge and command my said three sons, to wear no sort of silver 
fringe upon or about their said coats,' &c., with a penalty in case 
of disobedience too long here to insert. However, after some 
pause, the brother so often mentioned for his erudition, who was 
well skilled in criticisms, had found in a certain author, which he 
said should be nameless, that the same word which in the will is 
called fringe, does also signify a broomstick ; and doubtless ought 
to have the same interpretation in this paragraph. This, another 
of the brothers disliked, because of that epithet, silver, which 
could not, lie humbly conceived, in propriety of speech be reason- 
ably applied to a broomstick ; but it was replied upon him, that 
this epithet was understood in a mythological and allegorical 
sense. However, he objected again, why their father should 
forbid them to wear a broomstick on their coats, a caution that 
seemed unnatural and impertinent ; upon which he was taken up 
short, as one that spoke irreverently of a mystery, which doubt- 
less was very useful anjl significant, but ought not to be over- 
curiously pried into, or nicely reasoned upon. And in short, 
their father's authority being now considerably sunk, this expe- 
dient was allowed to serve as a lawful dispensation for wearing 
their full proportion of silver fringe." — Bean Swiff 's Tale of a Tub. 

2. — Verbal quibbling. 

" Dr. Franklin had no taste for verbal criticism. On one occa- 
sion, when the Senate of Pennsylvania were engaged in a long 
discussion upon the wording of a resolution, he retired to one of 
the back seats, and engaged in conversation with a friend on this 
subject. He said : ' When I was a journeyman printer, a young 
tradesman, named John Owen, who was about to set up business 
as a ropemaker, came into the printing-office, and asked us what 
writing he should place over his shop window. The foreman 
immediately wrote on a board, " John Owen, Ropemaker, makes 
and sells ropes;" with a coil of rope at the end. One man 
objected to the word ropemaker, as superfluous; for if he made 
ropes, he was certainly a ropemaker. This word was accordingly 
struck out. Another objected to makes. He said, "Your work- 
men make the ropes, not you, and if you sell good ropes, people 
won't care whether you make them or not." The sentence then 
stood — "John Owen sells ropes." "John Owen sells ropes!" 
exclaimed another ; "why, who would suppose that you intended 
to give them away ? what do you open a shop for but to sell 
them?" The word sells was then struck out, and ropes followed 
of course. Nothing then remained but "John Owen," and a 
coil of rope.' " — Anon. 



216 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

X. — Miscellaneous fallacies. 

1. — Historical evidence — Napoleon Buonaparte: 

" I suppose it will not be denied, that the three following are 
among the most important points to be ascertained, in deciding 
on the credibility of witnesses; first, whether they have the 
means of gaining correct information; secondly, whether they 
have any interest in concealing truth, or propagating falsehood ; 
and, thirdly, whether they agree in their testimony. Let us 
examine the present witnesses upon all these points. 

" First, what means have the editors of newspapers for gaining 
correct information ? We know not, except from their own state- 
ments. Besides what is copied from other journals, foreign or 
British, (which is usually more than three-fourths of the news 
published,) they profess to refer to the authority of certain ' pri- 
vate correspondents ' abroad ; who these correspondents are, what 
means they have of obtaining information, or whether they exist 
at all, we have no way of ascertaining. We find ourselves in the 
condition of the Hindoos, who are told by their priests that the 
earth stands on an elephant, and the elephant on a tortoise ; but 
are left to find out for themselves what the tortoise stands on, or 
whether it stands on anything at all. 

" So much for our clear knowledge of the means of information 
possessed by these witnesses ; next, for the grounds on which we 
are to calculate on their veracity. 

" Have they not a manifest interest in circulating the won- 
derful accounts of Napoleon Buonaparte and his achievements, 
whether true or false ? Few would read newspapers if they did 
not sometimes find wonderful or important news in them ; and 
we may safely say that no subject was ever found so inexhaustibly 
interesting as the present." 

" Still it will be said, that unless we suppose a regularly pre- 
concerted plan, we must at least expect to find great discre- 
pancies in the accounts published. Though they might adopt 
the general outline of facts one from another, they would have to 
fill up the detail for themselves ; and in this, therefore, we should 
meet with infinite and irreconeileable variety. 

" Now this is precisely the point I am tending to ; for the fact 
exactly accords with the above supposition; the discordance and 
mutual contradictions of these witnesses being such as would 
alone throw a considerable shade of doubt over their testimony. 
It is not in minute circumstances alone that the discrepancy 
appears, such as might be expected to appear in a narrative sub- 
stantially true ; but in very great and leading transactions, and 
such as are very intimately connected with the supposed hero. 
For instance, it is by no means agreed whether Buonaparte led 
in person the celebrated charge over the bridge of Lodi, (for 



ERRORS IN REASONING. 217 

celebrated it certainly is, as well as the siege of Troy, whether 
either event ever really took place or no,) or was safe in the rear, 
while Augereau performed the exploit. The same doubt hangs 
over the charge of the Prench cavalry at Waterloo. The peasant 
Lacoste, who professed to have been Buonaparte's guide on the 
day of battle, and who earned a fortune by detailing over and 
over again to visitors all the particulars of what the great man 
said and did up to the moment of flight, — this same Lacoste has 
been suspected by others, besides me, of having never even been 
near the great man, and having fabricated the whole story for the 
sake of making a gain of the credulity of travellers." 

"It appears, then, that those on whose testimony the existence 
and actions of Buonaparte are generally believed, fail in all the 
most essential points on which the credibility of witnesses depends ; 
first, we have no assurance that they have access to correct infor- 
mation ; secondly, they have an apparent interest in propagating 
falsehood ; and, thirdly, they palpably contradict each other in the 
most important points." 

" ' But what shall we say to the testimony of those many 
respectable persons who went to Plymouth on purpose, and saw 
Buonaparte with their own eyes? must they not trust, their 
senses ?' I would not disparage either the eyesight or the vera- 
city of these gentlemen. I am ready to allow that they went to 
Plymouth for the purpose of seeing Buonaparte ; nay, more, that 
they actually rowed out into the harbour in a boat, and came 
alongside of a man-of-war, on whose deck they saw a man in a 
cocked hat, who, they were told, was Buonaparte. This is the 
utmost point to which their testimony goes ; how they ascer- 
tained that this man in the cocked hat had gone through all the 
marvellous and romantic adventures with which we have so. long 
been amused, we are not told." 

" There is one more circumstance which I cannot forbear 
mentioning, because it so much adds to the air of. fiction which 
pervades every part of this marvellous tale- and. that is the 
nationality of it. 

" Buonaparte prevailed over all the hostile states in turn except 
England ; in the zenith of his power, Ins fleets'- were swept from 
the sea, by England; his troops always defeat an equal, and fre- 
quently even a superior number of those of any other nation, 
except the English; and with them it is just the reverse; twice, 
and twice only, he is personally engaged against an English com- 
mander, and both times he is totally defeated ; at Acre, and at 
Waterloo ; and to crown all, England finally crushes this tremen- 
dous power, which had so long kept the continent in subjection 
or in alarm ; and to the English he surrenders himself prisoner ! 
Thoroughly national, to be sure ! It may be all very true ; but 
I would only ask, if a story had been fabricated for the express 

L 



218 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

purpose of amusing the English nation, could it have been con- 
trived more ingeniously ? " — Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon 
Buonaparte. See page 164. 

2. — Time-serving in religion : — 

" By-ends. — My brethren, we are, as you see, going all on pil- 
grimage ; and for our better diversion from things that are bad, 
give me leave to propound unto you this question. 

" Suppose a man, a minister or a tradesman, &c, should have an 
advantage lie before him to get the good blessings of this life, yet 
so as that he can by no means come by them, except, in appear- 
ance at least, he becomes extraordinary zealous in some points of 
religion that he meddled not with before ; may he not use this 
means to attain his end, and yet be a right honest man ? 

"Money-love. — I see the bottom of your question; and, with 
these gentlemen's good leave, I will endeavour to shape you an 
answer. And, first, to speak to your question as it concemeth a 
minister himself: suppose a minister, a worthy man, possessed 
but of a very small benefice, and has in his eye a greater, more 
fat and plump by far ; he has also now an opportunity of getting 
it, yet so as by being more studious, by preaching more frequently 
and zealously, and, because the temper of the people requires it, 
by altering of some of his principles ; for my part, I see no reason 
why a man may not do this, provided he has a call, ay, and more, 
a great deal besides, and yet be an honest man. For why ? 

" 1. His desire of a greater benefice is lawful, (tins cannot be 
contradicted,) since it is set before him by Providence ; so then 
he may get it if he can, making no question for conscience sake. * 

" 2. Besides, his desire after that benefice makes him more 
studious, a more zealous preacher, &c, and so makes him a better 
man, yea, makes him better improve his parts, which is according 
to the mind of God. 

" 3. Now, as for his complying with the temper of his people, 
by deserting, to serve them, some of his principles, this argue th, 
1. That he is of a self-denying temper. 2. Of a sweet and 
winning deportment. And, 3. So more fit for the ministerial 
function. 

" 4. I conclude, then, that a minister that changes a small for 
a great, should not, for so doing, be judged as covetous ; but 
rather, since he is improved in his parts and industry hereby, be 
counted as one that pursues his call, and the opportunity put into 
his hand to do good. 

" And now to the second part of the question, which concerns 
the tradesman you mentioned. Suppose such an one to have but 
a poor employ in the world, but by becoming religious, he may 
mend his market, perhaps get a rich wife, or more and far better 



ERRORS IN REASONING. 219 

customers to his shop ; for my part, I see no reason but this may- 
be lawfully done. For why ? 

" 1. To become religious is a virtue, by what means soever a 
man becomes so. 

" 2. Nor is it unlawful to get a rich wife, or more custom to 
my shop. 

" 3. Besides, the man that gets these by becoming religious, 
gets that which is good of them that are good, by becoming good 
himself: so then here is a good wife, and good customers, and 
good gain, and all these by becoming religious, which is good ; 
therefore, to become religious to get all these is a good and pro- 
fitable design." — Bunyarfs Pilgrim's Progress. 

3. — Mental reservation : — 

" Verity and falsity being proprieties of an enunciative speech, 
as Aristotle teacheth us, that is, of that speech either conceived 
only in the mind or uttered by words or writing, by which we 
affirm or deny anything — which we call a proposition — that we 
may the better discern this verity and falsity, we must needs 
consider the variety of propositions. And we may say with the 
logicians, that there be four kinds of propositions. The first is 
a mental proposition, only conceived in the mind, and not uttered 
by any exterior signification : as when I think with myself these 
words, ■ God is not unjust.' The second is a vocal proposition, 
as when 1 utter those words with my mouth. The third is a 
written proposition, as if I should set the same down in writing. 
The last of all is a mixed proposition, when we mingle some of 
these propositions or parts of them together, as in our purpose, 
when being demanded whether John at Style be in such a place, 
I, knowing that he is there indeed, do say nevertheless, ' I know 
not/ — reserving or understanding within myself these other 
words, {to the end for to tell you.) Here is a mixed proposition 
containing all this, — c I know not to the end for to tell you/ 
And yet part of it is expressed, part reserved in the mind." 

"Our Saviour said to his disciples that he himself knew not 
the day of judgment, but his Father only, which by consent of 
the holy Fathers is to be understood that he knew it not for to 
utter it, although they were never so desirous to know it ; whereas 
his Father knowing it, had uttered it unto him as man : for other- 
wise we know that St. Peter truly said, ' Lord, thou knowest 
all things/ And St. Paul affirmeth that in Christ were hidden 
all the treasures of the wisdom and knowledge of God. So that' 
it is a Catholic verity that he knew the day and hour of his 
dreadful judgment, notwithstanding this equivocal sentence, 
wherein he seemeth to deny that he had any such knowledge." 

" Besides these kinds of propositions which we have hitherto 
defended not to be lies, although by them always some truth is 
l 2 



220 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

concealed, there be some other ways, whereby, without a lie, a 
truth may be covered, which I will briefly set down. 

"1. First, we may use some equivocal word which hath many 
significations, and we understand it in one sense, which is true, 
although the hearer conceive the other, which is false. So did 
Abraham and Isaac say, that their wives were their sisters, which 
was not true as the hearers understood it, or in the proper mean- 
ing, whereby a sister signifieth one born of the same father or 
mother, or of both, but in a general signification, whereby a 
brother or sister signifieth one near of kindred, as Abraham called 
Lot his brother, who was but his brother's son; and our Lord is 
said to have had brothers and sisters, whereas properly he had 
neither. The like unto this were if one should be asked whether 
such a stranger lodgeth in my house, and I should answer, ' He 
lieth not in my house,' meaning that he doth not tell a lie there, 
although he lodge there. 

" 2. Secondly, when unto one question may be given many 
answers, we may yield one and conceal the other. So Samuel, 
being commanded by God to go to Bethlehem to anoint David 
king, said unto God, ' How shall I go ? for Saul will hear of it, 
and kill me. 5 And our Lord said, ' Thou shalt take a calf out of 
the herd, and shalt say, I come to do sacrifice to our Lord.' And 
Samuel did as our Lord said unto him, and came into Bethlehem. 
But the ancients of the city, wondering thereat, met him and 
said, 'Is thy coming peaceable?' who answered, 'It is peace- 
able ; I am come to do sacrifice unto our Lord.' Here Samuel 
uttered the secondary cause of his coming, and warily dissembled 
the principal, which notwithstanding they principally intended to 
know, and by this answer were put out of suspicion thereof. So 
may it happen that one coming to a place to hear mass may an- 
swer them who ask the cause of his coming, that he came to 
dinner or to visit some person who is there, or with some other 
true alleged cause satisfy the demanders. 

" 3. Thirdly, the whole sentence which we pronounce, or some 
word thereof, or the manner of pointing or dividing the sentence, 
may be ambiguous, and we may speak it in one sense true for our 
own advantage. So it is recorded of St. Erancis, that being asked 
of one who was sought for to death, whether he came not that 
way, he answered (putting his hand into his sleeve, or, as some say, 
into his ear), ' he came not this way! " 

" 4. To these three ways of concealing a truth by words if we 
add the other of which we spoke before, that is, when we utter 
certain words, which of themselves may engender a false conceit in 
the mind of the hearers, and yet with somewhat which we under- 
stand and reserve in our minds, maketh a true proposition, then 
shall we have four ways how to conceal a truth without making 
of a lie." — A Treatise on Equivocation. 



PART IV. 

THE FORMS OE REASONING. 

We have now, gentle reader, passed through three parts of 
our work. In the First Part we considered the Introduc- 
tion to Reasoning. In the Second Part we considered some 
of the Principles of Reasoning. In the Third Part we 
considered another class of the Principles of Reasoning. 
In this, the Fourth Part, we are going to consider the 
Forms of Reasoning. But you may ask what is the differ- 
ence between the principles of reasoning and the forms of 
reasoning 1 The difference is this, — the principle refers to 
the nature of the reason, the form refers to the manner of 
expressing it ; the principle refers to ideas, the form refers 
to the language and the method. We will explain this by 
an example. Suppose in the morning, your wife advises 
you to put on your great-coat, to prevent your taking cold. 
Here the principle of the argument is the relation of cause 
and effect. And the validity or strength of this argument 
must depend upon the soundness of this principle in its 
application to the present case ; that is, upon the proba- 
bility that you will take cold if you do not wear your 
great-coat. But this argument may be proposed in a variety 
of forms. She may say, " My dear, put on your great-coat, 
this morning ; if you don't, you'll be sure to take cold." 
Or she may speak interrogatively: "Why don't you put 
on your great-coat this morning 1 Do you wish to take 
cold again as you did before % What's the use of having a 
great- coat, if you don't wear it such a day as this." Or she 
may speak syllogistically, and say, " Whenever you are in 
danger of taking cold, you should put on a great-coat ; I 
am sure you are in danger of taking cold this morning ; 
therefore, this morning you should put on your great- 
coat." 

You will perceive, then, that by the forms of reasoning, 



222 LOGIC FOR THE MILLTON. 

we mean the different ways in which reasons may be placed 
before us. The strength of an argument must depend 
upon the soundness of its principles : but the readiness 
with which that strength is perceived, will depend very 
often upon the manner in which the argument may be 
presented to the mind. Hence, different arguments are 
drawn up in different forms, according to the subjects dis- 
cussed, and the character of the audience to whom they 
are addressed. These different forms chiefly refer to the 
method, and the style. To be able to reason with the 
greatest effect, we should study not only the rules of logic, 
but also the rules of grammar, and endeavour to acquire 
a facility of expressing the same ideas in different words. 
Dr. Watts, in his Improvement of the Mind, has given us 
some rules for the acquisition of this useful talent : — 

" 1. Accustom yourselves to read those authors who think and 
write with great clearness and evidence, such as convey their 
ideas into your understanding, as fast as your eye or tongue can 
run over their sentences : this will imprint upon the mind a habit 
of imitation; we shall learn the style with which we are very 
conversant, and practise it with ease and success. 

" 2. Get a distinct and comprehensive knowledge of the sub- 
ject which you treat of; survey it on all sides, and make yourself 
perfect master of it ; then you will have all the sentiments that 
relate to it in your view, and under your command, and your 
tongue will very easily clothe those ideas with words which your 
mind has first made so familiar and easy to itself. 

Scribendi rede sapere est et principium etfons, 
Verbaque provisam rem non invito, sequentur. 

Hoe. de Arte Poet. 
Good teaching from good knowledge springs ; 
Words will make haste to follow things. 

" 3. Be well skilled in the language which you speak ; acquaint 
yourself with all the idioms and special phrases of it, which are 
necessary to convey the needful ideas on the subject of which you 
treat, in the most various and most easy manner to the under- 
standing of the hearer : the variation of a phrase in several forms 
is of admirable use to instruct ; it is like turning all sides of the 
subject to view ; and if the learner happens not to take in the 
ideas in one form of speech, probably another may be successful 
for that end. 

" Upon this account I have always thought it a useful manner 
of instruction, which is used in some Latin schools, which they 



FORMS OP REASONING. 223 

call variation. Take some plain sentence in the English tongue, 
and then turn it into many forms in Latin ; * as, for instance, A 
wolf let into the sheep-fold will devour the sheep : If you let a 
wolf into the fold, the sheep will be devoured: The wolf will 
devour the sheep, if the sheep-fold be left open : If the fold be 
not left shut carefully, the wolf will devour the sheep : The sheep 
will be devoured by the wolf, if it find the way into the fold 
open : There is no defence of the sheep from the wolf, unless it 
be kept out of the fold : A slaughter will be made among the 
sheep, if the wolf can get into the fold. Thus, by turning the 
active voice of verbs into the passive, and the nominative case of 
nouns into the accusative, and altering the connexion of short 
sentences by different adverbs or conjunctions, and by ablative 
cases with a preposition brought instead of the nominative, or by 
participles sometimes put instead of the verbs, the negation of 
and the contrary, instead of the assertion of the thing first pro- 
posed, a great variety of forms of speech will be created, which 
shall express the same sense. 

" 4. Acquire a variety of words, a copia verborum. Let your 
memory be rich in synonymous terms, or words expressing the 
same happy effect with the variation of the same thing : this will 
not only attain the phrases in the foregoing direction, but it will 
add a beauty also to your style, by securing you from an appear- 
ance of tautology, or repeating the same words too often, which 
sometimes may disgust the ear of the learner. 

"5. Learn the art of shortening your sentences, by dividing 
a long complicated period into two or three small ones. When 
others connect and join two or three sentences in one by relative 
pronouns, as which, whereof, wherein, whereto, &c, and by paren- 
theses frequently inserted, do you rather divide them into distinct 
periods ; or at least, if they must be united, let it be done rather 
by conjunctions and copulatives, that they may appear like distinct 
sentences, and give less confusion to the hearer or reader. 

" I know no method so effectual to learn what I mean, as to 
take now and then some page of an author, who is guilty of such 
a long involved parenthetical style, and translate it into plainer 
English, by dividing the ideas or the sentences asunder, and multi- 
plying the periods, till the language become smooth and easy, and 
intelligible at first reading. 

" 6. Talk frequently to young and ignorant persons upon sub- 
jects which are new and unknown to them, and be diligent to 
inquire whether they understand you or not ; this will put you 
upon changing your phrases and forms of speech in a variety, till 
you can hit their capacity, and convey your ideas into their un- 
derstanding.''' — Waits s Improvement of the Mind. 

* This can be done in English as well as in Latin. See Lindley Murray's 
Exercises. 






224 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

SECTION I. 

DESCRIPTIVE REASONING. 

I must tell you what I mean by descriptive reasoning. 
I mean a description which forms part of a piece of reason- 
ing. I told you at the commencement of my book that 
any fact in history, or any object in nature, might become 
the subject of an argument. Now then, if we describe an 
object with a view to reason about it, I call that descriptive 
reasoning. For example, were a lecturer on anatomy to 
describe the eye, with the view of showing its construction 
to his pupils, that would be a description, and nothing 
more. Were a theologian to describe the eye in order to 
show that it must have had an intelligent author, then the 
description would become a piece of descriptive reasoning. 
Archdeacon Paley has done this : — 

" Observe a new-born child first lifting up its eyelids. What 
does the opening of the curtain discover ! The anterior part of 
two pellucid globes, which, when they come to be examined, are 
found to be constructed upon strict optical principles ; the self- 
same principles upon which we ourselves construct optical instru- 
ments. We find them perfect for the purpose of forming an 
image by refraction ; composed of parts executing different offices : 
one part having fulfilled its office upon the pencil of light deliver- 
ing it over to the action of another part ; that to a third, and so 
onward: the progressive action depending for its success upon 
the nicest and minutest adjustment of the parts concerned ; yet 
these parts so in fact adjusted, as to produce, not by a simple action 
or effect, but by a combination of actions and effects, the result 
which is ultimately wanted. And forasmuch as this organ would 
have to operate under different circumstances, with strong degrees 
of light, and with weak degrees, upon near objects, and upon 
remote ones, and these differences demanded, according to the 
laws by which the transmission of light is regulated, a correspond- 
ing diversity of structure ; that the aperture, for example, through 
which the light passes, should be larger or less ; the lenses rounder 
or flatter, or that their distance from the tablet, upon which the 
picture is delineated, should be shortened or lengthened ; this, I 
say, being the case, and the difficulty to which the eye was to be 



DESCRIPTIVE REASONING. 225 

adapted, we find its several parts capable of being occasionally 
changed, and a most artificial apparatus provided to produce that 
change." — Paley's Natural Theology. 

In all our reasonings, great use is made of description. 
When a member of parliament proposes a new law, he 
commences with describing the present state of the law, 
shows what improvement is necessary, and then proposes 
his remedy. A barrister opens his address to the jury by 
a statement of the case ; this statement is descriptive ; 
and descriptions of past events, and of good and bad 
characters, form a large portion of the addresses from the 
pulpit. In long speeches, generally, there is often much 
minute detail, and reporters w T ho cut down these speeches 
for the newspapers usually shorten or omit the descrip- 
tions. The reasoning process by which the description is 
connected with the point to be proved, may exist only in 
the mind, or it may be expressed in a subsequent stage of 
the argument. 

I. A description is a statement of the particular circum- 
stances by which persons, places, and objects, are distin- 
guished from other persons, places, and objects. 

The description of a person sometimes refers only to his 
fgure and countenance. " Leah was tender-eyed, but 
Iiachael was beautiful and well-favoured." " Joseph was a 
goodly person, and well-favoured." " In all Israel there 
was none to be so much praised as Absalom for his beauty ; 
from the sole of his foot even to the crown of his head, 
there was no blemish in him." " The stature of William 
the Conqueror was tall, and the composition of his bones 
and muscles uncommonly strong." " The exterior of 
Henry V., as well as his deportment, was engaging. His 
stature was somewhat above the middle size. His coun- 
tenance beautiful, his limbs genteel and slender, but full 
of vigour." 

Descriptions of a person sometimes refer only to appear- 
ance, manners, or habits. " And he said unto them, What 
manner of man was he which came up to meet you, and 
told you these words ? And they answered him, He was 
an hairy man, and girt with a girdle of leather about his 
l3 



226 



LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 



loins. And lie said, It is Elijah the Tishbite." — 2 Kings, 
i. 7, 8. 

The poet Southey, in Dec. 1823, went to hear Mr. Hill 
preach, who, at that date, must have been seventy-nine 
years of age. The following description is extracted from 
one of his letters : — 

" ' Rowland, a fine tall old man, with strong features, very like 
his portrait, began by reading three verses for his text, stooping 
to the book in a very peculiar manner. Having done this, he 
stood up erect, and said, " Why, the text is a sermon, and a very 
weighty one too." I could not always follow his delivery, the 
loss of his teeth rendering his words sometimes indistinct, and 
the more so, because his pronunciation is peculiar, generally giv- 
ing e the sound of ai, like the Erench. His manner was animated 
and striking, sometimes impressive and dignified, always remark- 
able, and so powerful a voice I have rarely or never heard. Some- 
times he took off his spectacles, frequently stooped down to read 
a text, and on these occasions, he seemed to double his body, so 
high did he stand. He told one or two familiar stories, and used 
some odd expressions, such as, " A murrain on those who preach, 
that, when we are sanctified, we do not grow in grace ! " And 
again, "I had almost said I had rather see the devil in the pulpit 
than an Antinomian." The purport of his sermon was good; 
nothing fanatical, nothing enthusiastic ; and the Calvinism it ex- 
pressed was so qualified as to be harmless. The manner, that of 
a performer, as great in his line as Kean or Kernble ; and the 
manner it is which has attracted so large a congregation about 
him, all of the better order of persons in business.' " — Sherman's 
Anecdotes of Rowland Hill. 

Sometimes the description of a person refers to his 
mental faculties or attainments. u Behold, I have seen a 
son of Jesse the Beth-lehemite, that is cunning in playing, 
and a miglny valiant man, and a man of war, and prudent 
in matters, and a comely person, and the Lord is with 
him." — 1 Sam. xvi. 18. 

" John Wesley at Oxeord. — At college he continued his 
studies with all diligence, and was noticed there for his attain- 
ments, and especially for his skill in logic, by which he frequently 
put to silence those who contended with him in after life. No 
man, indeed, was ever more dexterous in the art of reasoning. 
A charge was once brought against him that he delighted to per- 
plex his opponents by his expertness in sophistry. He repelled 
it with indignation. ' It has been my first care/ says he, ' to see 
that my cause was good, and never either in jest or earnest to 



DESCRIPTIVE REASONING. 227 

defend the wrong side of a question, and shame on me if I can- 
not defend the right after so much practice, and after having been 
so early accustomed to. separate truth from falsehood, how artfully 
soever they are twisted together.' " — Southefs Life of Wesley. 

Sometimes the description is not of a person, but of a 
character. This description consists in an enumeration of 
particulars. See the description of a good wife in the last 
chapter of Proverbs. See also I Tim. iii. 2 — 7. 

A description of a place may include its situation, cli- 
mate, productions, both of nature and art, and its peculiar 
beauties, curiosities, advantages, and inconveniences. But 
such full descriptions occur chiefly in books of history or 
geography. A description intended to be used in reason- 
ing embraces only the chief point in which that country, 
city, town, village, &c, differs from others of the same class. 
See a description of Tyre in the 27th chapter of the 
Prophet Ezekiel. See also a description of the Land of 
Canaan, at page 33. 

Descriptions of objects are of two kinds, — one relating 
to living forms, and the other to such, as are inanimate. 
The latter refer to those which are the works of nature, 
and to those which are produced by art. 

" Hast thou given the horse strength ? hast thou clothed his 
neck with thunder? Canst thou make him afraid as a grass- 
hopper ? the glory of his nostrils is terrible. He paweth in the 
valley, and rejoiceth in his strength : he goeth on to meet the 
armed men. He mocketh at fear, and is not affrighted ; neither 
turneth he back from the sword. The quiver rattleth against 
him, the glittering spear and the shield. He swalloweth the 
ground with fierceness and rage : neither believeth he that it is 
the sound of the trumpet. He saith among the trumpets, Ha, 
ha, and he smelleth the battle afar off, the thunder of the cap- 
tains, and the shouting." — Job xxxix. 19 — 25. 

" I went by the field of the slothful, and by the vineyard of 
the man void of understanding; and, lo, it was all grown over 
with thorns, and nettles had covered the face thereof, and the 
stone wall thereof was broken down. Then I saw, and consi- 
dered it well: I looked upon it, and received instruction." — 
Prov. xxiv. 30—32. 

II. A description of past events is called a narrative. A 
narrative is an account of events, and of the persons or 



228 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

objects concerned in them. It includes detached events, 
biography, and history. 

Detached events are single circumstances generally pre- 
served on account of some particular instruction or amuse- 
ment which they convey. Such are fables and anecdotes, 
and they are often used to inculcate a mere principle or 
opinion, or to illustrate the truth or efficacy of an opinion 
or principle previously stated. Dr. Watts has given us 
several examples of this in his "Improvement of the 
Mind:" — 

" In learning any new thing, there should be as little as possible 
first proposed to the mind at once, and that being understood, and 
fully mastered, proceed then to the next adjoining part yet unknown. 
This is a slow but safe and sure way to arrive at knowledge. If 
the mind apply itself at first to easier subjects and things near 
akin to what is already known, and then advance to the more 
remote and knotty parts of knowledge by slow degrees, it will 
be able in this manner to cope with great difficulties, and prevail 
over them with amazing and happy success. Mathon happened 
to dip into the two last chapters of a new book of geometry and 
mensurations ; as soon as he saw it, and was frightened with the 
complicated diagrams which he found there, about the frustums 
of cones and pyramids, &c, and some deep demonstrations among 
conic sections, he shut the book again in despair, and imagined 
none but a Sir Isaac Newton was ever fit to read it. But his 
tutor happily persuaded him to begin the first pages about lines. 
and angles ; and he found such surprising pleasure in three weeks-'' 
time in the victories he daily obtained, that at last he became one 
of the chief geometers of his age." 

Biography is a successive account of the events which 
have affected or distinguished particular individuals. In 
biography we relate the particular qualities for which the 
person is admired or esteemed, and observe the instances 
which are given of those qualities. 

" Dr. Watts. — Isaac Watts was born at Southampton, July 
17, 1674. He was the eldest of eight children, and was named 
after his father, who kept a respectable boarding-school in that 
town, and was a deacon of the Independent Church. His mother 
was a Miss Taunton. Mr. Watts had suffered for his Noncon- 
formity, both in his paternal property and in person, having been 
more than once imprisoned. During his incarceration, Mrs. Watts 
was to be seen sitting on a stone near the prison -door, nursing 
her infant-son Isaac. Mr. Watts, nevertheless, brought up his 



DESCRIPTIVE REASONING, 229 

large family in much respectability, and had the happiness of sur- 
viving to see his eldest son ' eminent for literature and venerable 
for piety : ' he died in a good old age, February 10, 1736-7. 
Young Isaac gave early indications of a precocious intellect. At 
four years old he began to learn Latin ; at seven, he lisped in 
numbers. He received his early education in the Eree-School at 
Southampton, then under the ilev. Mr. Pinhorne, Hector of All 
Saints', to whom the grateful pupil, at the age of twenty, ad- 
dressed an elegant Latin Ode. In his sixteenth year, having 
declined a generous offer made for his support at one of the 
Universities, he was sent to an Academy of some repute in Lon- 
don, kept by the Rev. Thomas Howe, pastor of the Independent 
Church then meeting at Girdler's Hall ; and, three years after- 
wards, being in his nineteenth year, he joined in communion with 
that church. His constitution received irreparable injury from 
the intemperate ardour with which he at this time pursued his 
studies. At the age of twenty, he returned to his father's house, 
where he continued for two years, preparing himself more ex- 
pressly for the work of the ministry. The state of his health 
may have rendered it advisable that he should remain for some 
time under his father's roof. The first engagement which he 
accepted, was that of tutor in the family of Sir John Hartopp, 
Bart., at Stoke Newington. In 1696, he appears to have been 
called to the ministry ; but his first sermon was preached on the 
birth-day that completed his twenty-fourth year, a. d. 1698." 

" His ' Treatise on Logic,' originally composed for the use of 
his pupil, young Hartopp, was published in 1724, and was soon 
adopted as a text-book in the Dissenting Academies. It was also 
introduced into the Universities, and therefore, says Dr. Johnson, 
' wants no private recommendation.' " 

" The closing scene was worthy of his saintly career : and he 
expired without a struggle, Nov. 25, 1748, in his seventy-fifth 
year." — Cinder's Poet of the Sanctuary. 

History is a successive and connected account of the 
events which have affected nations or people. Such are 
the History of England, the History of the Jews, &c. The 
substance of history is called chronology, which is merely 
a list of the events which have occurred to any nation 
or people, with the date when each of those events hap- 
pened. In writing history, we should observe the geo- 
graphical situation of the country where the events took 
place, its latitude and longitude, climate, the countries ad- 
joining, &c. ; and we should ascertain the chronology of 
the events, and observe what was passing at the same time 



230 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

in the countries with which the country under considera- 
tion had intercourse. We should also remark what is the 
religion of the people, and its particular ceremonies. And 
we should observe the form of government, whether 
monarchical, aristocratical, democratical, or mixed; and 
in what way it is administered, whether generally by 
priests, soldiers, or civilians. We shall have occasion to 
speak further of history, in the next part of our work. 

III. Every principle of reasoning will give rise to descrip- 
tions. The relation of subject and attributes supplied the 
descriptions we have given at page 33. The relation of a 
whole and its parts sometimes will also give rise to de- 
scriptive reasoning : the description consists in the enume- 
ration of all the parts that compose the whole. Thus Job 
describes his former prosperity (Job xxix. 7 — 17). The 
punishment of the wicked is described with the same 
minuteness. (See Job xxi. 17 — 20; xxvii. 13 — 23; and 
xviii. 5 — 21.) The relation of genus and species also 
gives rise to descriptive reasoning. The description con- 
sists in the enumeration of the species. Thus Job describes 
the various kinds of wrongs perpetrated by wicked men 
(Job xxiv. 1 — 12). And we have also an enumeration 
of the various kinds of blessings bestowed on the 
righteous (Job xxii. 23 — 29). The relation of cause and 
effect also is a source of description. The description 
is usually a portraiture of the effect. Examples are 
narratives, and are descriptions of past events. (See the 
Section on Examples.) Analogies, comparisons, and con- 
trasts are sometimes formed by lengthened descriptions. 
(See Job iv. 3 — 5 ; xiv. 7 — 10.) Thus Job contrasts his 
prosperity (xxix. 7 — 25) with his adversity (xxx. 1 — 31.) 
Parables, fables, and allegories are of course descriptions. 
(See Psalms lxxx. 8 — 14.) In Sacred poetry we often find 
that descriptions are given in the form of interrogations. 
We have examples of this frequently in the Psalms and 
the Prophets, and more especially in the thirty-eighth and 
thirty-ninth chapters of the Book of Job. 

Descriptions are sometimes rendered more vivid by the 
use of that figure of rhetoric which is called amplification. 
This is often used in describing; moral effects. All the 



DESCRIPTIVE REASONING. 231 

circumstances are mentioned, and placed in such a way 
that the impression shall increase as you proceed, and 
end in a climax. Thus it has been stated, that in London 
one thousand young men die every year of consumption, 
in consequence of their late hours of employment. Dr. 
Hamilton, in a sermon on the subject, thus amplifies the 
statement : — 

"When a physician tells you that a thousand young men die 
every year of consumption, caused by the shop-system of the 
capital, the statement makes little impression. It is a statistical 
fact, and makes no appeal to the feelings. But what does it 
imply ? It means, that in consequence of this system, if they all 
be collected in one consumption hospital, a thousand young men 
are stricken down before the prime of life, with incurable and 
lingering disease. It means, that at the period of existence when 
the pulse should be the firmest, and the zest of life the fullest, 
a thousand youths are wasting away in racking pain, and in the 
dreariness and dejection of hopeless invalidism. It means, that 
when the yearly battle of competition is ended, trade burie's a 
thousand of its soldiers, and votes no pensions to the widows, 
whom it has bereft of sons, or the sisters, whom it has robbed of 
brothers. It means, that a thousand graves are digged and filled, 
and that in these graves are entombed the hopes of many a 
family. It means, what statistics cannot tell ; it means — this list 
of a thousand untimely deaths— it means misery and mourning, 
blasted prospects, broken hearts, desolate homes, and (it is to be 
feared, sometimes) the forfeited hope of heaven." 

In the same way the apprehension of a fugitive slave is 
thus described in a newspaper called the New York Inde- 
pendent : — 

"Last week, on Wednesday, an honest and intelligent man, 
guilty of no crime, who had peacefully supported himself by his 
industry and economy in this city for two years past, to whom 
life was as dear and liberty as sweet as to any of us, was taken 
by an oificer of the United States Govermnent, under the order 
of another officer of the same Government, and consigned to a 
bondage in the comparison of which no temporary imprisonment 
would be other than insignificant ; to a bondage that puts him 
completely at the disposal of an irresponsible master ; that denies 
him the right to wife or children, except so long as the master 
allows; that deprives him of property, of liberty, and of the 
Bible; that makes him a chattel to be sold at will, and dooms 
him to labour through life for another. He is to be ' sold South/ 



232 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

it is said, that his chance of again escaping may thereby be dimi- 
nished ; and the fearful probability is, that he will never again 
taste the sweetness of freedom. The rest of his years must be 
spent under oppression. It is the United States Government 
that has done this ; the Government which represents the citi- 
zens of the North as well as of the South ; and for which we ail 
together are responsible. Because this man was poor and op- 
pressed from his birth — because his every faculty of body and of 
mind has been thus far through his life used by another without 
return — because the master, in concert with others, has passed a 
law that he shall work thus hereafter — therefore he is forced 
back to this bondage, after having escaped it." 

Moral descriptions are sometimes given in the form of 
personification. See Prov. iii. 13 — 17. 

"The objects of war and of commerce are the same; that is, 
to obtain possession of what we do not possess. But though 
the object is the same, the means are different. War exclaims : 
' See ! the people of yonder country have comforts and luxuries 
which our country does not produce ; we are stronger than they, 
let us go and kill them, and take their country for ourselves.' 
' No ! ' says Commerce, ' while their country produces commo- 
dities which ours does not, our country produces commodities 
which theirs does not ; let us then take some of the commodities of 
which we have a greater abundance than we need, and offer them 
in exchange for those commodities we wish to acquire. By this 
course we shall avoid the guilt of a quarrel, and the danger of a 
defeat ; we shall obtain an ample supply of all the enjoyments 
we need ; and we shall promote the happiness of other nations as 
well as our own.' " — Lectures on Ancient Commerce. 

As an example of a description of a peculiar kind, I now 
give you an advertisement of the late Mr. George Robins. 
He was remarkable for the mode in which he described 
those properties which, as an auctioneer, he was entrusted 
to sell. His advertisements are curious, even if viewed 
only as specimens of his professional ingenuity. They are 
still more interesting if regarded as a satire on that florid 
style of description in which some authors are apt to 
indulge. 

The Colosseum, in the Regent's Park. 

"Mr. George Robins respectfully makes known to all those 
who would speculate where risk appears so far removed, that he 
is directed to offer by public competition, at the Auction Mart, 



DESCRIPTIVE REASONING. 233 

London, on Thursday, April 27, at 12, the Colosseum, in the 
Regent's Park. Fortunately this Cyclopean structure has ac- 
quired a fame that relieves the individual who is honoured by the 
direction of the sale from the necessity to exert his inventive 
faculties, or to give a lengthened description of its prominent 
features. It may suffice for the present to say, the Colosseum is 
ihe most classical building throughout Europe; where descrip- 
tion fails to portray 

c Its eloquent proportions, 
Its mighty graduations,' • 

which even when seen, 

' Thou seest not all, but piecemeal thou must break, 
To separate contemplation, the great whole.' 

The dome, it is believed, is of larger dimensions than any other 
of a similar nature, being 

' To art a model — 

Simple, erect, severe, austere, sublime, 

It looks tranquillity.' 

The most celebrated construction of antiquity does not surpass 
the gigantic elegance of this building. The solidity of this 
enormous mass of classic architecture is equal to its colossal 
dimensions, and is calculated to stand the rigid test of time. 
' Glorious dome, 
Shalt thou not last ?' 
This mighty labour, the modern Babylon, has secured for many 
years an income varying from £3,000 to £5,000 a-year, without 
the slightest artificial aid, and it is placed beyond doubt that in 
the hands of a talented and ingenious possessor this income will 
be in due time greatly increased. The picture of London has 
been its great feature, and 2,800 persons have paid for their 
admission in one day. There are magnificent conservatories, 
fountains, and jets d'eau, a Swiss cottage with its lakes and 
woods, a hall of mirrors, and an extensive theatre, together with 
a large frontage in Albany-street. It needs only the magic influ- 
ence of Stanfield's pencil to place it high above all contempora- 
ries. The tenure may be assimilated to freehold, inasmuch as the 
ground rent is a mere bagatelle, and the lease from the Crown 
hath 70 years still unexpired. Descriptive particulars will be 
ready a month antecedent to the sale ; in the meantime principals 
may obtain information from Messrs. Eladgate, Young, and 
Jackson, solicitors, Essex-street, Strand; and at Mr. George 
Hobins's offices, Covent-garden. It is open as usual, or it can 
be seen by tickets, to be procured at Mr. George Robins' s offices, 
at Is. each, or cards for four persons at 2s. Qd." — Times. 



234 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

IV. The following are practical applications of descrip- 
tive reasoning. 

In tracing the effects of any measure that we wish to have 
altered or abandoned; the effects are sometimes described 
very minutely : — 

" The reasons against extracting a revenue out of soap are 
obvious and unanswerable. In the first place, it is a tax upon a 
necessary of life. Moreover, it presses on the poor in a dispro- 
portionate degree as compared with the rich, since, the duty being 
uniform on all descriptions of the article, the commoner qualities 
pay of course a much larger per centage to the Exchequer than 
those of higher price. But the particular mode in which this 
duty affects the humbler classes, makes it especially injurious to 
then* interests. It operates as a discouragement to cleanliness — 
a premium pro tanto upon dirt and disease. To enhance, by fiscal 
regulations, the price of a commodity which is indispensable to 
the purification of the dwellings, the apparel, and the persons of 
the poor, is, to say the least, a glaring contravention of the policy 
-which has but lately taken the health of the people under legisla- 
tive protection, and which regards baths and washhouses, drain- 
age and ventilation, as fit objects of public care and official 
supervision." 

"But we have not yet done with the evils of the soap tax. 
Another well-founded objection against it is, that it operates, like 
all Excise duties on articles of manufacture, injuriously upon 
production — exposing us to a disadvantageous rivalry with the 
foreign maker, and depressing what might otherwise be a flourish- 
ing branch of trade. The same arguments, in fact, which induced 
Sir It. Peel to take off the glass duties, might be urged with 
almost the same force for repealing the duty upon soap. Lastly, 
to complete the case of inexpediency, the tax to which we refer 
does not extend to Ireland ; a preference not only indefensible 
on grounds of justice, but furthermore conducive, as is well 
known, to a great amount of evasion and fraud. It has been a 
common practice to export English soap, with the benefit of the 
drawback, to the sister country, and afterwards to smuggle the 
same back again to England, thus defrauding at once the revenue 
and the manufacturer who honestly pays the duty." — Morning 
Chronicle. 

In describing acts of injustice or oppression, it is seldom 
necessary to have recourse to any forms of reasoning. The 
description itself will usually in this country produce all the 
impression that could be obtained by the most profound 
argumentation. So also, in regard to the abuses of the law, 






DESCRIPTIVE REASONING. 235 

to show that they ought to be corrected, it is enough to 
describe them : — 

" A. has an estate left to kis wife, with remainder to her 
children upon her death. B., the executor, being about to sell 
some of the houses and lands, for the purpose of satisfying debts 
due from the testator, A., believing that sufficient assets were in 
B.'s hands to meet the demands upon the estate, files a bill in 
Chancery for an account. This was in 1833. B. puts in answers 
— the bill is amended, and amended answers follow. In 1835 
A.'s wife bears a child. The Lord Chancellor insists upon the 
infant being brought into court. The suit is ' abated ' — a supple- 
mental bill has to be filed, making the infant a plaintiff, and all 
the other parties have again to put in answers. The child, how- 
ever, dies a few weeks after birth. A. has then- to take out 
letters of administration to the estate of the deceased infant, and 
to file another supplemental bill, demanding another edition of 
answers. In 1836 A.'s wife bears him a second child, which has 
to be presented in court. This babe also dies, and all the form- 
alities necessary in the former case are repeated in this. In 1838 
another child is born to A., and the whole process has to be gone 
through again; and in 1840 a fourth child, and the necessary 
Chancery consequences. In 1841 one of the executors dies, 
when another supplemental bill has to be filed, and all parties in- 
terested to put in their answers. After this occurs a bankruptcy, 
when there is another repetition of the whole case. It comes at 
last before the Lord Chancellor for a hearing, who decrees to 
refer it to the Master, ' to take the accounts in the usual way/ 
Twelve months are consumed in drawing up the decree — five 
years in going through the accounts, which might have been 
gone through in five hours — and, at last, a re-hearing of the suit 
is reached. The Master's report is given in, the Court confirms 
it, and makes a decree, that the estates shall be sold to pay the 
costs, the balance, if any, to be paid into the Bank, ' to await the 
further directions of the Court? The minutes of the decree, how- 
ever, have to be settled by counsel, who spend over them two 
years more. Meanwhile, another bankruptcy occurs — the process 
has again to be gone through. The case is not yet ended, and 
costs considerably more than half the original legacy have already 
been incurred." — Nonconformist. 

V. A logical description will have an adaptation to the 
points it is designed to prove. Thus, the description of a 
town by a physician, an architect, a political economist, or 
a clergyman, will probably have a reference to its health- 
fulness, its buildings, its manufacture, or its spiritual des- 
titution, and hence the descriptions, though all correct, will 



236 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 

be different from each other. Logical descriptions shonld 
not be too long. Dr. Young observes in his Paraphrase 
on the Book of Job, that the description of an object is 
complete, when you can add nothing but what is common 
to other objects. Hence we read in that poem, of the 
beauty of the peacock, the migration of the hawk, the 
swiftness of the ostrich, and the sharp-sightedness oi the 
eagle, these being the main points by which they are 
respectively distinguished. 

In descriptive reasoning, all the reasoning is in the 
mind. There may be no reasoning process manifest in the 
description. But though no reasoning is required to prove 
the truth of the description, there is still a reasoning process 
going on in the mind. It is admitted, for example, that 
the eye is correctly described. The only reasoning in the 
mind is whether this description is a proof of an intelligent 
maker. When you have finished your description, you have 
proved your proposition. For the other part of the argu- 
ment, that " an instrument so constructed must have had 
an intelligent maker," is a "truth of intellect," that re- 
quires not to be proved by reasoning. 

There are two cases in which descriptions may lead us 
to erroneous conclusions. 

The first is when the description is incorrect. A friend 
who recommends a servant, may give an incorrect, or at 
least, a defective account of his character. A party who 
wishes to sell us an estate, may give a description that shall 
prepossess us too strongly in its favour. Or a traveller into 
a foreign country may give a description, either of the 
scenery or of the inhabitants, that shall lead us into false 
judgments either in regard to the conveniences of the 
country, or the character of its inhabitants. 

In the second place, the description may be correct, and 
hence we may too readily embrace the reasoning with 
which it is connected. How often have we heard vivid, 
and probably correct descriptions of the misery of Ireland ! 
But the accuracy of the description was no proof that the 
specific measure which the speaker proposed would relieve 
that misery. An honourable member may correctly enough 
describe the inconveniences of an existing law, but this 
is no proof that the remedy he proposes would remove 



INTERROGATIVE REASONING. 237 

those inconveniences, or that it would not introduce more 
weighty evils. So we may sometimes have appeals to our 
charity, made on behalf of people in great distress, but 
the relief solicited might have the effect of increasing the 
misery it is intended to relieve. A talent for vivid de- 
scription is a great advantage to a public speaker. But 
we should always recollect that the description is only half 
the argument, and like the half of a pair of scissors, will be 
quite inoperative unless well united to the other half. 



SECTION II. 



INTERROGATIVE REASONING. 



By Interrogative reasoning we mean reasoning by asking 
questions. Dr. Young observes, in his Paraphrase of the 
Book of Job, that an interrogation differs from an ordi- 
nary argument as much as telling a man to hang himself 
differs from a common execution. By putting an appro- 
priate question, you compel the party to pass sentence on 
himself. 

Sometimes interrogation is employed for the purpose of 
more emphatic assertion, and often gives much additional 
force to the expression. Thus : " King Agrippa, believest 
thou the prophets ? I know that thou believest " — is more 
forcible than, " King Agrippa, I know that thou believest 
the prophets." " Is he the God of the Jews only 1 Is 
he not also of the Gentiles 1 Yes, of the Gentiles also." 
This is more forcible than, " He is not only the God of the 
Jews, but also of the Gentiles." (See also Jer. xlvii. 6, 7.) 

Interrogation i? the proper language of majesty incensed. 
(See Job xxxviii. 1 — 7 ; Ezek. xviii. 23 — 25.) It is also 
the language of compassionate reproof. (Hosea xi. 8 ; vi. 4.) 
It is also the language of wonder and adoration. (See 
Job xi. 7 — 9 j Isaiah xl. 12 — 14.) It is also the language 
of fervent importunity. (Psalms lxxvii. 7 — 10 ; lxxxviii. 
10—14 ; lxxxix. 46—49.) 

Interrogation is sometimes employed, as we have inti- 



238 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

mated in the last Section, to give a more vivid description. 
(See Isaiah Iviii. 3—10 ; lxiii. 1—4 ; Matt. xi. 7—9.) 

But we are more particularly to observe the use of 
questions as employed in reasoning. Interrogative reason- 
ing is of various kinds. 

1. The first kind is the Socratical form of reasoning. 
The following description of it is taken from Dr. Watts's 
" Improvement of the Mind :" — 

" The Socratical Way of Disputation. — This method 
of dispute derives its name from Socrates, by whom it was 
practised, and by other philosophers in his age, long before 
Aristotle invented the particular forms of syllogism in 
mood and figure, which are now used in scholastic dispu- 
tations. The Socratical way is managed by questions and 
answers, in such a manner as this, viz. if I would lead a 
person into the belief of a heaven and a hell, or a future 
state of rewards and punishments, I might begin in some 
such manner of inquiry, and suppose the most obvious and 
easy answers. 

" Quest. Does not God govern the world ? 

" Ans. Surely he that made it governs it. 

" Q. Is not God both a good and righteous governor ? 

" A. Both these characters doubtless belong to him. 

" Q. "What is the true notion of a good and righteous governor? 

" A. That he punishes the wicked, and rewards the good. 

" Q. Are the good always rewarded in this life ? 

" A. No, surely ; for many virtuous men are miserable here, 
and greatly afflicted. 

" Q. Are the wicked always punished in this life ? 

" A. No, certainly ; for many of them live without sorrow, and 
some of the vilest of men are often raised to great riches and 
honour. 

" Q. Wherein then doth God make it appear that he is good 
and righteous ? 

" A. I own there is but little appearance of it on earth. 

" Q. Will there not be a time when the tables shall be turned, 
and the scene of things changed, since God governs mankind 
righteously ? 

" A. Doubtless there must be a proper time, wherein God will 
make that goodness and that righteousness to appear. 

" Q. If this be not before then* death, how can it be done ? 



INTERROGATIVE REASONING. 239 

" A. I can think of no other way bnt by supposing man to 
have some existence after this life. 

" Q. Are you not convinced, then, that there must be a state 
of reward and punishment after death ? 

" A. Yes, surely ; I now see plainly that the goodness and 
righteousness of God, as governor of the world, necessarily re- 
quire it. 

" Now the advantages of this method are very con- 
siderable. — It represents the form of a dialogue, or common 
conversation, which is much more easy, more pleasant, and 
a more sprightly way of instruction, and more fit to excite 
the attention, and sharpen the penetration of the learner, 
than solitary reading, or silent attention to a lecture. Man 
being a sociable creature, delights more in conversation, 
and learns better this way, if it could always be wisely 
and happily practised. — This method hath something very 
obliging in it, and carries a very humble and condescending- 
air, when he that instructs seems to be the inquirer, and 
seeks information from him who learns. — It leads the 
learner into the knowledge of truth as it were by his own 
invention, which is a very pleasing thing to human nature ; 
and by questions pertinently and artificially proposed, it 
does as effectually draw him on to discover his own 
mistakes, which he is much more easily persuaded to 
relinquish when he seems to have discovered them himself. 
—It is managed in a great measure in the form of the 
most easy reasoning, always arising from something asserted 
or known in the foregoing answer, and so proceeding to in- 
quire something unknown in the following question, which 
again makes way for the next answer. Now such an exer- 
cise is very alluring and entertaining to the understanding, 
while its own reasoning powers are all along employed, 
and that without labour or difficulty, because the querist 
finds out and proposes all the intermediate ideas or 
middle terms." 

2. The second kind of Interrogative reasoning is the 
catechetical form. 

Dr. Watts intimates that the Socratical mode of dispu- 
tation might be introduced into catechisms for the in- 
struction of children ; and Mrs. Marcet seems to have 



240 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

followed this form of reasoning in some of her interesting 
" Conversations." We take the following quotation from 
her " Willy's Grammar :" — 

" The following morning Willy came into the school-room with 
Lis grammar in his hand as usual. ' What am I to learn to-day, 
sir ?' said he ; ' I begin to like my grammar : especially now that 
there are stories belonging to it.' 

" ' I am very glad to hear it/ observed Mr. Thompson ; ' to- 
day you shall learn what an adjective is.' 

" ' Pray explain it, sir, for it is a very hard word.' 

"'Let us see first what the grammar says about it, Willy;' 
and he read, — ' "An adjective is a word added to a noun, to ex- 
press its quality ; as, a good child, a wise man." ' 

" ' Oh, but sir, I do not know what " to express its quality " 
means : you must tell me all about it, or I shall never under- 
stand it.' 

" ' Quality,' replied Mr. Thompson, ' means the sort of thing. 
Tell me what sort of a table this is.' 

"Willy, after looking at the table a few seconds, said, e It is a 
round table.' 

"'Well, then, round is an adjective, because it points out the 
quality of the table.' 

" ' But it has other qualities, sir ; it is a large table ; is large 
an adjective too ?' 

" ' Yes, every word added to a noun which expresses a quality 
is an adjective.' 

" ' If that is all, an adjective is not half so difficult as I thought ; 
I dare say that I can find out some more adjectives for the table. 
Let me think a little : it is a wooden table : so wooden must be 
an adjective ; then it is a pretty table, and pretty must also be au 
adjective ; besides, it is an old table, for it has been in the room, 
I believe, before I was born. I can't think of any more adjec- 
tives for the table,' said Willy ; and, starting up suddenly to look 
at a bird that flew across the window, he upset an inkstand which 
stood upon the table. At first he was frightened, thinking he 
had broken it, but finding he had only spilled some of the ink, 
he said, ' Oh, sir, it is only another adjective for the table; for 
now,' added he, 'it is a dirty table.' Then taking a piece of 
blotting-paper, he soaked up the ink, and wiping the table care- 
fully, said, ' And now it is a clean table.' 

" ' You have gained two adjectives for the table,' said Mr. 
Thompson, ' and one for yourself.' 

" ' One for me, sir ? what is that ?' 

" ' Do not you think that you are an awkward child, to have 
overset the inkstand ? ' 

" ' Yes ; but, then, 1 am a tidy one, for having wiped the table 



INTERROGATIVE REASONING. 241 

clean ; so there is another adjective for me. But, sir, this other 
table has different adjectives ; for it is square and small, not round 
and large, like the other.' " — Mrs. Marcet. 

Catechisms as they are generally constructed, are not 
pieces of interrogative reasoning. The question merely 
asks for information what is supplied by the answer. They 
do not, therefore, come under our present notice. I may 
observe that in the catechisms of the Wesleyan Methodists 
the answer to each question is put in the form of a complete 
proposition, embodying the entire sense of both the question 
and the answer. Thus : " How many sacraments hath Christ 
ordained in his Church 1 Christ hath ordained two sacra- 
ments in his Church, Baptism and the Lord's Supper." 

3. Sometimes we ask questions in order to answer them 
with the view of removing from the discussion the topics 
to which they refer, or to increase the force of our 
expression. 

Thus a writer on agricultural distress commences with 
questions in the form of inquiries to which he replies : — 

" There is no denial, and there can be no doubt, that the whole 
agriculture of England is menaced at this moment with ruin. . . . 
But what is the cause? Has Heaven stricken the land with 
barrenness ? — the late harvest has been remarkably productive. 
Has the land been trampled by insurrection ? — it has exhibited a 
contrast to all Europe in its tranquillity. Has commercial failure 
driven away its credit ? — the panic of 1847 has virtually invigo- 
rated, by purifying, speculation. Has the country been stripped 
of its coin ? — fifteen millions of bullion are lying in the cellars of 
the Bank, Consols are at 96, a Russian loan of five millions is 
taken up in five hours, and the grand difficulty of moneyed life 
now is to know what to do with money. . . . Again we ask, what 
is the cause ? The cause is simply this," &c. — Britannia. 

The following address of Curran to a jury contains a 
good many interrogations : — 

" Upon what are you to found your verdict ? Upon your 
oaths. And what are they to be founded upon ? Upon the oath 
of the witness. And what is that founded upon? Upon this, 
and this only, that he does believe there is an eternal God — an 
intelligent Supreme Existence — capable of inflicting eternal 
punishment for offences, or conferring eternal compensation upon 
man, after he has passed the boundary of the grave. But where 
the witness believes that he is possessed of a perishing soul, and 
that there is nothing upon which punishment or reward can be 

M 



242 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

exerted, lie proceeds, regardless of the number of his offences, 
and undisturbed by the terrors of excited fancy, which might 
save you from the fear that your verdict is founded upon perjury. 
Suppose he imagine that the body is actuated by some kind of 
animal machinery — I know not in what language to describe his 
notions — suppose his opinion of the beautiful system framed by 
the Almighty hand to be, that it is all folly and blindness, com- 
pared to the manner in which he considers himself to have been 
created, or his abominable heart conceives his ideas, or his abomi- 
nable tongue communicates his notions ; suppose him, I say, to 
think so, what is perjury to him? He needs no creed, if he 
thinks his miserable body can take eternal refuge in the grave, 
and the last puff of his nostrils sends his soul into annihilation ! 
He laughs at the idea of eternal justice, and tells you that the 
grave, into which he sinks as a log, forms an intrenchment 
against the throne of God, and the vengeance of exasperated 
justice ! Do you not feel, my fellow-countrymen, a sort of anti- 
cipated consolation in reflecting upon the religion which gave us 
comfort in our early days, enabled us to sustain the stroke of 
affliction, and endeared us to one another ; and when we see our 
friends sinking into the earth, fills us with the expectation that 
we rise again — that we but sleep for a while to wake for ever ? 
But what kind of communication can you hold, what interchange 
expect, M r hat confidence place, in that abkject slave — that con- 
demned, despaired of wretch, who acts under the idea that he is 
only the folly of a moment, that he cannot step beyond the 
threshold of the grave ? That which is an object of terror to the 
best, and of hope to the confiding, is to him contempt or despair. 
Bear with me : I feel my heart running away with me : the 
worst men only can be cool. What is the law of this country ? 
If the witness does not believe in God, or in a future state, you 
cannot swear him. What swear him upon ? Is it upon the book 
or the leaf ? You might as well swear him by a bramble or a 
coin. The ceremony of kissing is only the external symbol by 
which man seals himself to the precept, and says, ' May God so 
help me as I swear the truth!' He is then attached to the 
Divinity on condition of telling truth; and he expects mercy 
from Heaven as he performs his undertaking. But the infidel, 
by what can you catch his soul ? Or by what can you hold it ? 
You repulse him from giving evidence, for he has no conscience, 
no hope to cheer him, nor punishment to dread." — Mr. Phillips' 
Life of Curraii. 

" Baptismal Regeneration. — When was it ever asserted by 
Jesus Christ, or by his apostles, that the mere act of baptizing 
conferred the grace of regeneration ? In the primitive adminis- 
tration of this rite, it was the sign or symbol of regeneration ; 



INTERROGATIVE REASONING. 243 

and its observance by adults afforded a presumptive proof of 
their actual regeneration. But what in their case was the design 
of the ordinance ? It was the evidence of their faith, and the 
attestation of their conversion to Christianity. Faith was inva- 
riably presupposed as the moral requisite, which justified the 
application of the outward rite. To whom did Peter on the day 
of Pentecost administer this sacramental rite ? To those who by 
his preaching 'were pricked to the heart, 5 and whom he pre- 
viously exhorted to repentance. On what did Philip insist, as 
essential to baptism, on the part of the eunuch? 'If thou 
believest with all thine heart, thou mayest.' What compelled 
Peter to baptize Cornelius and his family ? The visible proof of 
their having received the Holy Ghost : ' Can any man forbid 
water, that these be not baptized, who have received the Holy 
Ghost as well as we ?' Not a single instance can be adduced to 
afford rational support to the notion of baptism conferring rege- 
neration, from the records of the New Testament." — Fletcher s 
Lectures. 

4. Sometimes we place in the form of questions thjose 
objections which our opponents might advance against ns. 
St. Paul often reasons in this way. See the third, fourth, 
sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and eleventh chapters of the 
Komans. 

" It is much to be regretted that people who have realized a 
little money by trade should retire and take out their capital, and 
thus reduce the commercial capital of the country. What reason 
can you assign for this ? Do you say you are independent ? Go 
on, get wealthy. Do you say you are wealthy? Go and get 
more wealth. The more wealth you get, the more you serve 
your country, and the greater power you have of doing good to 
others. Do you say you are getting old ? Take a young partner : 
do you find capital and knowledge, and let him find labour and 
activity. Do you say you have toiled long enough ; you wish to 
retire and enjoy yourself? Retirement will be no enjoyment to 
you : to a man of your active habits, solitude and idleness will 
have no charms. The most effectual means you can adopt to 
make yourself wretched, and to shorten your days, will be to 
place yourself in a situation where you will have nothing to do. 
But do you say, you think it will be more respectable to be out 
of business — to have an establishment like a nobleman — and to 
introduce your sons and daughters into fashionable society ? Oh, 
if that is the reason, by all means go ; if you have become so high 
that you look down upon your business, the sooner you leave it 
the better. I have now nothing more to say to you." — Lectures 
on Ancient Commerce. 

M 2 



244 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

5. The relation of cause and effect is often intimated by 
interrogations. When a wrong cause, as we think, has been 
assigned for an effect, and we desire to intimate the true 
cause, we can do this by asking questions. 

" One man pines under a broken constitution. But let us ask 
him, whether he can, fairly and honestly, assign no cause for this, 
but the unknown decree of heaven? Has he duly valued the 
blessing of health, and always observed the rules of virtue and 
sobriety ? Has he been moderate in his life, and temperate in all 
his pleasures ? If now he is only paying the price of his former, 
perhaps his forgotten indulgences, has he any title to complain as 
if he were suffering unjustly ? . . . But you, perhaps, complain of 
hardships of another kind— of the injustice of the world; of the 
poverty which you suffer, and the discouragements under winch 
you labour ; of the crosses and disappointments of which your 
life has been doomed to be full. Before you give too much scope 
to your discontent, let me desire you to reflect impartially upon 
your past train of life. Has not sloth, or pride, or ill temper, or 
sinful passions, misled you often from the path of sound and wise 
conduct ? Have you not been wanting to yourselves, in improv- 
ing those opportunities which Providence offered you, for better- 
ing and advancing your state ? If you have chosen to indulge 
your humour, or your taste, in the gratification of indolence or 
pleasure, can you complain, because others, in preference to you, 
have obtained those advantages which naturally belong to useful 
labours, and honourable pursuits ? Have not the consequences of 
some false steps, into which your passions, or your pleasures, have 
betrayed you, pursued you through much of your life; tainted, 
perhaps, your characters, involved you in embarrassments, or 
sunk you into neglect ?" — Anon. 

6. Points of comparison are often brought forward by 
questions. 

" There is no country upon earth whose inhabitants have a 
juster right to boast of their social progress. In what country 
beside do you find, I will not say a greater, where do you find an 
equal degree of civil, political, and religious freedom ? Where do 
you find a system of jurisprudence more wisely contrived, or 
more impartially administered ? Where do you find power more 
nicely balanced, or subjection more cheerfully rendered ? Where 
do you find a greater respect for the laws, or a more perfect union 
of all classes to maintain the supremacy of legitimate authority ? 
Where else is there a stricter regard felt for the rights of all 
classes ? Where is there more of practical effort to mitigate the 
woes of human life, in all their diversified forms ? — nobler, more 



INTERROGATIVE REASONING. 245 

expansive, and further-reaching endeavour to ameliorate the phy- 
sical and the moral condition of humanity ? Where does there 
exist greater security of person, property, life, and limb ? Where 
do you discover finer safeguards for public morality ? more effi- 
cient measures to detect or repress crime ? Take and compare 
England with any other civilized nation upon the face of the 
globe, in all these respects, and I venture to affirm that the com- 
parison will serve to place in bolder relief her own surpassing 
preeminence." — Bicker&tetlts National Obligation to the Bible. 

7. Arguments from analogy, and more especially a for- 
tiori arguments, are expressed in an interrogative form : — 

" Why should there be all these difficulties about the letting 
or selling an estate or a piece of land ? — difficulties common to 
England and Ireland, but felt in Ireland more severely than in 
England, from a difference of practice prevailing between land- 
lord and tenant. If a merchant goes into a linen or a cloth hall 
to purchase goods to the amount of several thousands of pounds, 
he does not find it necessary to employ a lawyer to examine the 
rights of the merchant from whom he buys it, to its possession, 
and back from one owner to another, until he finds that the seller 
of the raw material came by it legally, not to say honestly. Why 
should there not be the same facility in selling a piece of land as 
in selling a steam-engine or a piece of cloth ? Why should land 
be protected more than tallow, cotton, wool, or other merchan- 
dise ?" — Irish paper. 

When we reprove any inconsistency in the opinions or 
the conduct of the party we address, we often do it in the 
form of inquiry. Mr. Seymour, in his " Mornings with 
the Jesuits," asks how the Church of Rome can maintain 
that the state of celibacy is one of superior purity, and 
at the same time contend that marriage is a sacrament 
which confers additional grace ? 

" But when I saw that they walked not uprightly according to 
the truth of the gospel, I said unto Peter before them all, If 
thou, being a Jew, livest after the manner of Gentiles, and not as 
do the Jews, why compellest thou the Gentiles to live as do the 
Jews?"— Gal. ii. 14. 

" Then said Paul unto him, God shall smite thee, thou whited 
wall : for sittest thou to judge me after the law, and commandest 
me to be smitten contrary to the law?" — Acts xxiii. 3. 

"Literary Institutions. — f But then such institutions in- 
crease the number of smallerers.' To be sure they do. And is 



246 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

it not one of the most desirable of all things that they should be 
increased? If you plant 50,000 oaks in five acres, have you not 
a better chance of fine trees than when you only plant 10,000 in 
one acre ? Has the production of eggs ever yet been considered 
as unfavourable to the growth of chickens ? Or has any reasoner 
yet contended that in any country where boys and girls are very 
numerous, men and women must be very scarce ? Every one in 
every art and science is of course at first nothing but a smatterer. 
Of these some cannot advance, from stupidity ; others wall not 
advance, from idleness. Some get in the wrong road, from error ; 
some quit the right, from affectation. A few only reach the des- 
tined point. But of course the number of these last will be 
directly and immediately in the proportion of those who started 
for the race." — Sidney Smith's Moral Philosophy. 

8. We often ask a series of questions immediately after 
one another, in order to bring our arguments to bear more 
forcibly upon the subject under discussion. See Rom. 
viii. 31—37 • Mai. ii. 10 ; 1 Cor. iv. 7. 

" Eor whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be 
saved. How then shall they call on him in whom they have not 
believed ? and how shall they believe in him of whom they have 
not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and 
how shall they preach, except they be sent?" — Horn. x. 13 — 15. 

" Immoral Poetry. — Was it for this that Poesy was endued 
with all those allurements that lead the mind away in a pleasing 
captivity ? Was it for this she was furnished with so many in- 
tellectual charms, that she might seduce the heart from God, the 
original beauty, and the most lovely of beings ? Can I ever be 
persuaded that those sweet and resistless forces of metaphor, wit, 
sound, and number, were given with this design, that they should 
be all ranged under the banner of the great malicious spirit, to 
invade the rights of heaven, and to bring swift and everlasting 
destruction upon men ! How will these allies of the nether-world, 
the lewd and profane versifiers, stand aghast before the great 
Judge, when the blood of many souls, whom they never saw, shall 
be laid to the charge of their writings, and be dreadfully requited 
at their hands ! " — Preface to Watts y s Lyric Poems. 

" It is a favourite argument in vindication of the papal hier- 
archy, that it bears an analogy to the constitution of the Jewish 
Church. According to this idea, the high priest of the Mosaic 
economy is succeeded by the supreme pontiff of the Christian 
dispensation ; and the various orders of the clergy are the priests 
and the Levites ! It is easy for an ingenious fancy to trace 
analogies on any subject, and substitute them for proofs ; but on 



INTERROGATIVE REASONING. 247 

the point before us, the great question is — whether Jesus Christ 
and his apostles intended that the Jewish economy should furnish 
a model for the arrangements and discipline of the Christian 
church ? If this be assumed, where, I ask, is the evidence of 
this intention ? Why are the pastors of the Christian church 
never termed priests or sacrificers? Why is their office never 
represented as sacerdotal? Why is Jesus Christ alone 'the 
High Priest of our profession/ and the priesthood under the law 
considered as symbolical, not of the ministers in particular, but 
of the whole collective body of the Christian church in general ? 
Why is it, that we find no remote or incidental allusions to this 
resemblance ? Why is nothing recorded about degrees of office — 
the extent of episcopal jurisdiction— the adaptation of the system 
to the different orders of civil society — the nature of the apo- 
stolic succession, on which depends the validity of sacramental 
rites ? Why is there such an inexplicable silence pervading the 
oracles of inspiration on these c weighty matters V " — Fletcher '$ 
Lectures. 

9. By asking questions you will sometimes be able to 
throw the onus probandi upon your opponent. It is gene- 
rally much easier to ask questions than to answer them, 
and it is often an advantage in disputation, if you can put 
your antagonist into a defensive position. He had better 
be employed in defending himself than in attacking you. 
This is usually the case when positive proof cannot be 
adduced on either side. 

"Dr. Watts was aware — he could not indeed fail to perceive — 
that he exposed himself to some reproach for supposing that the 
distinctions of human society were, in a certain sense, continued 
beyond this world. ' Some, 5 said he, ' will reprove me here, and 
say — What, must none but ministers and authors and learned 
men have their distinguished rewards and glories in the world of 
spirits ? May not artificers and traders and pious women be 
fitted by their character and conduct on earth for peculiar sta- 
tions and employment in heaven? Yes, doubtless, 5 he answers. 
But he asks whether Deborah, who animated the armies of Israel, 
and sang their victories, is not engaged in some more illustrious 
employment among the heavenly tribes than Dorcas, whose 
highest character is that she was full of alms-deeds, and made 
coats and garments for the poor? and whether Dorcas is not 
' prepared for some greater enjoyments, some sweeter relish of 
mercy, or some special taste of the divine goodness above Bahab 
the harlot ? 5 Different, however, as may be the degrees of good 
in heaven, all may be perfect there, and free from every defect.' 5 
— Southefs Life of Watts. 



248 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 



The words onus probandi mean the burden of proving. 
It may be useful to notice the cases in which this burden 
may rightfully fall upon you. In all cases when you attack 
a generally received opinion, you are bound to prove the 
unsoundness of that opinion. Sentiments which are uni- 
versally acknowledged to be true, are seldom very minutely 
examined. There is no object in inquiring into the ground 
of a doctrine that no one ever denies. If you think any 
opinion of this kind is erroneous, you have a right to 
assail it ; but you have no right to single out at a moment's 
warning any professed believer in that doctrine, and demand 
from him a reason for his creed. If you wish for contro- 
versy, you are bound to lead the attack. If you cannot 
do this, you had better hold your tongue. 

If you advocate any kind of political or social reform, 
the onus probandi falls upon you. You are bound to show 
the advantages of the change. You have no right, in the 
first instance, to call upon your opponent to show that the 
proposed change would not be advantageous. Every new 
act of parliament is a change, and every member who 
brings forward a new bill is bound to show the advantages 
that would result from the adoption of the measures that 
he recommends. 

If you offer a bill to your banker for discount, the onus 
probandi falls upon you to prove that it is a good bill. 
If you cannot do this, he will be justified in refusing to dis- 
count it. You have no right to call upon him to prove that 
it is not a good one. So, if you give a bad character to any 
one, you are bound to prove the truth of your accusation. 
You have no right to call upon him to disprove the charge, 
and to assume it to be true if he cannot do so. The onus 
probandi in this as in the former case falls clearly on 
yourself 

Generally speaking, the onus probandi falls upon the 
advocate of the affirmative of any proposition. . No man 
should be called upon to prove a negative. In practical 
questions, however, it is not always easy to state which side 
is properly the affirmative, as much will depend upon the 
wording of the sentence. But in all cases the assailant or 
challenger is bound to prove his own case ; the onus pro- 
bandi most unquestionably falls upon him. But a party 



* 



CONVERSATIONAL REASONING. 249 

is not in all cases called upon to accept the challenge. 
And we will now notice the cases in which a challenge 
to controversy may be honourably declined. You are 
not bound to accept a challenge, to dispute upon a subject 
that you do not understand. If pressed for an opinion, 
you may fairly say, " I am not sufficiently acquainted 
with the matter to be able to offer any opinion on the sub- 
ject." Nor are you bound to accept a challenge to dispu- 
tation from a party who does not himself understand the 
question. We daily meet with people who think they 
know our business better than we do ourselves, and who 
are anxious to dispute with us upon the most knotty 
points of our profession. In this case we had better answer 
one question by asking another, and if we have nothing to 
contend against but simple ignorance, without conceit or 
obstinacy, we may, peradventure, by the adoption of Socra- 
tical interrogations, lead our pugnacious friend into a 
better knowledge of the subject. When Nathanael asked, 
"Can any good thing come out of Nazareth V Philip did 
not engage in controversy on the question, but merely 
replied, " Come and see." 



SECTION III. 

CONVERSATIONAL REASONING. 

By conversational reasoning, I mean that kind of reason- 
ing which is employed chiefly in conversation. I say 
chiefly, for there is no kind of reasoning that is employed 
exclusively in conversation, nor is conversational reasoning 
confined to only one kind. But all kinds of reasoning, 
when employed in conversation, are employed in a different 
manner as to the form or mode of expression, than when 
employed in books or in speeches. It is impossible to 
describe all these forms. Every man will express his 
reasons in conversation in a way of his own, according to 
his constitutional temperament, his education, his temper 
at the time, the occasion, or the manners of the society in 
which he is accustomed to move. You may therefore 

m 3 



250 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

improve your knowledge daily by merely observing the 
conversation of your friends. You will find examples of 
conversational reasoning in the fifteenth chapter of the 
first book of Samuel, and in the eighth chapter of the 
Gospel according to St. John. 

1. The language and form of conversational reasoning. 

This is chiefly by enthymemes. I wish I had a good 
English word to substitute for the Greek word enthymeme 
— it signifies, from the mind. Reasoning by enthymemes 
therefore means reasoning from the mind : — reasoning as 
you think, or talk, or write, in the ordinary affairs of life. 
You have heard of a character in a French play, who was 
surprised to learn that he had been talking prose for fifty 
years without knowing it. He might have made the same 
observation respecting enthymemes. Whenever you have 
given a reason, you have spoken an enthymeme. If you 
observe to a friend, " It is a fine day," that is a description. 
If you ask, " Is it going to be wet ?" that is an interroga- 
tion. If you say, " I shall take my umbrella, for I think 
it will rain," that is an enthymeme. 

Enthymemes are treated of largely in Aristotle's Rhe- 
toric. The following is the substance of his doctrine 
respecting them. An enthymeme bears the same relation 
to rhetoric as a syllogism to logic. It is composed of a 
sentence and a reason. A sentence is a general proposi- 
tion concerning those things which are to be desired, or 
avoided, and it bears the same relation to an enthymeme 
as any proposition to a syllogism. And therefore a sen- 
tence, if a reason he rendered, becomes a conclusion, and 
both together make an enthymeme. The following is an 
example given by Aristotle : " To be over-learned produces 
effeminacy and envy. Therefore, he that is wise, will not 
suffer his children to be over-learned." The form of this 
enthymeme may be reversed thus : — " A wise man will not 
suffer his children to be over-learned, because too much 
learning produces effeminacy and envy." 

The Rev. John Huyshe, M.A. of Brazenose College, 
Oxford, in a Treatise on Logic, intended to assist those 
who wish to study Aldrich's Logic, in order to pass their 






CONVERSATIONAL REASONING. 2-51 

examination in the Oxford schools, has thus treated of 
enthymemes : — 

" The entliymeme is a defective syllogism, which consists of 
one premiss and a conclusion ; e.g. 

' Diamonds are jewels ; they are therefore valuable.' 
' God is a spirit ; therefore he is eternal/ 
"An entliymeme may easily be reduced to a regular syllogistic 
form ; for since the conclusion and one premiss are given, the 
three terms may be known, and the omitted premiss may be sup- 
plied : thus, in the above example, the major, ' All jewels are 
valuable,' is omitted, and, if supplied, the syllogism will be 
regular, thus : 

' All jewels are valuable j s 
'Diamonds are jewels ;' 
therefore, ' Diamonds are valuable;' 

" Again : 

' Every spirit is eternal ; ' 
'God is a spirit ;' 
therefore, ' God is eternal.' 

"In both these examples, the major premiss is suppressed ; for, 
as was before observed, the major premiss is, generally speaking, 
some universal and incontrovertible principle, which is so evident 
that it is left to the hearer's judgment ; but the minor premiss is 
most commoidy expressed, because it has more particular refer- 
ence to the question which is to be proved. 

" In common, discourse the usual mode of expressing an argument 
is by means of the entliymeme ; it being unnecessary to adduce both 
the premises, when o?ie is so evident that it may very fairly be left 
to the hearer's judgment ; e.g. 

" 'When we find a book quoted, or referred to by an ancient 
author, we are entitled to conclude that it was read and received 
in the age and country in which that author lived.' This sen- 
tence is an enthymeme, in which the major premiss is suppressed, 
but which may easily be supplied as follows : ' Every book quoted, 
or referred to by an ancient author, must have been read and re- 
ceived in the age and country in which that author lived.' The 
sentence may thus be reduced to a regular syllogism in Barbara : 
this maybe effected in most enthymemes without much difficulty, 
whether their conclusions be negative or affirmative. 

" Although the major premiss is generally suppressed in most 
enthymemes, yet there are some enthymemes in which the minor 
premiss is found to be omitted : this may happen when the minor 
premiss is very evident, or when much stress is meant to be laid 
upon the major ; e. g. 'Every tyrannical king deserves to be de- 
posed by his subjects; therefore Nero deserved to be deposed by 



252 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

the Romans.' The minor premiss, which is suppressed, may be 
thus supplied : 

' Nero was a tyrannical king : ' 

and thus the argument is reduced to the regular syllogistic form. 
"An enthymeme is sometimes condensed into one sentence, 
which is called an enthymematic sentence ; viz. when the premiss 
is united in one ■ proposition with the conclusion ; e.g. ' All 
machines, being of human manufacture, are liable to imperfec- 
tions. 5 This argument may be thus expanded into a regular 
syllogism : 

' All things of human manufacture are liable to im- 
perfections ; ' 
e All machines are of human manufacture : ' 
therefore, ' They are liable to imperfections.' " 
— Huyshis Treatise on Logic. 

The following are examples of enthymemes given by 
Mr. Hill. 

" The human soul is immaterial, consequently it is immortal. 

" We enjoy a greater degree of political liberty than any civi- 
lized people on earth, and therefore have no excuse for a seditious 
disposition. 

" The power of ridicule is a dangerous faculty, since it tempts 
its possessor to find fault unjustly, and to distress some for the 
gratification of others. 

" The study of mathematics is essential to a complete course 
of education, because it induces a habit of close and regular 
reasoning. 

" Hard substances may be elastic, for ivory is both hard and 
elastic." 

The following are examples of enthymematic sen- 
tences : — 

" The example of Virgil shows that even a great poet may be 
seduced into some faults by the practice of imitation. 

" The apparent insufficiency of every individual to his own 
happiness or safety, compels us to seek from one another assist- 
ance and support. 

" Should such a man as I flee ? 

" Real learning is too valuable a thing to be within the grasp 
of the idle. 

" I ask your lordships, whether Parliament will be in a state 
to transact public business, or be attended by a sufficient number 
of members, while engaged in preparing for a public election." — 
Hill's Logic. 



CONVERSATIONAL REASONING. 253 

You will observe that although an enthymeme is called 
by scholastic logicians a defective syllogism, yet the syllo- 
gism is formed from the enthymeme, not the enthymeme 
from the syllogism. The enthymeme is the natural 
mode of reasoning ; the syllogism is the artificial mode. 
The argument first occurs to our mind in the form of an 
enthymeme, but when we wish to make it clearer, we 
extend it to a syllogism. 

You will remember that the occurrence of "/or," "be- 
cause,'" " therefore" or any similar word, either in conver- 
sation or in reading, usually denotes an enthymeme ; in 
other words, denotes a reason or argument expressed natu- 
rally, without the formality of scholastic logic. 

In the refutation of enthymemes we sometimes reply to 
the implied proposition. For example, if the enthymeme 
be — " You ought to do this, because the clergyman bids 
you ;" the reply may be — "And ought I do everything which 
the clergyman bids me 1 " Of this kind is the scriptural 
example : " Why do thy disciples transgress the tradition 
of the elders ? for they wash not their hands when they 
eat bread. But he answered and said unto them, Why do 
ye transgress the commandment of God by your tradi- 
tion 1 " — Matt. xv. 2. At other times, we admit the im- 
plied proposition of the enthymeme, and object only to 
the proposition which is expressed. Thus, in reply to — 
" You had better take your umbrella, for it is going to 
rain ;" you may say — " No ; I don't think it will rain." 
The implied proposition that " When it is going to rain, 
you should take your umbrella," is not disputed. 

2. The principles of reasoning most in use in conver- 
sation. 

We refer not here to that communication which takes 
place on occasion of buying and selling, or in any other 
of the business transactions of life. We speak of that 
kind of conversation which takes place in the hours of 
social intercourse. Into this circle, formal logical defi- 
nitions, and processes of syllogistic reasoning, are never 
introduced. Nor do we witness any pitched battles of 
controversy — nor systematic discussions of any one topic 
— nor captious objections — nor triumphant boastings. 



254 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 



Every principle of reasoning may be introduced into con 
versation, but I think those most frequently employed are 
the relation of cause and effect, of example and of ana- 
logy. You call on a friend, and find he has taken cold. 
You inquire the cause. It may be he rode in an omnibus 
with the windows open ; he was caught in a shower with- 
out an umbrella, or he got wet in the feet, and did not 
change his boots ; or perhaps his female relations will tell 
you that it was all his own fault, as he never takes proper 
care of himself. Here you will have an interesting dis- 
cussion upon the relation of cause and effect. But you 
observe, you had previously called on half a dozen of your 
friends, and they all had colds. You infer it is a very 
unhealthy season. Here you reason from example, and 
you arrive at your conclusion by induction. But you think 
the situation of your friend's house is a very exposed one, 
and you make a comparison between that and other situ- 
ations which are more sheltered. The language of conver- 
sational reasoning will be, as we have stated, enthymemical. 
Descriptions, when introduced, will be short, unless one of 
the party is describing an object which the others have not 
seen, as the hippopotamus, or the crystal palace. Inter- 
rogative reasoning is sometimes employed, but chiefly in 
the form of inquiry, — • How do you account for this ? " 
And in this mode it is sometimes prefixed to an argument 
from analogy. The form of dilemma— a form to be here- 
after described — is also often used in conversation. By a 
little observation on those conversations that come under 
your notice, you will soon, be able to discover the principles 
and forms of reasoning that enter into their composition. 

Though the following conversation is not very contro- 
versial, the subject may interest the reader. It is taken 
from an article on " The Literature of the Rail," reprinted 
by Murray from the Times of August 9th, 1851 : — 

"As we progressed north, a loholesome change, we rejoice to say, 
became visible in railway bookstalls. We had trudged in vain 
after the schoolmaster elsewhere, but we caught niin by the 
button at Euston-square ; and it is with the object of inducing 
kirn to be less partial in his walks that we now venture thus 
publicly to appeal to him. At the North-Western terminus we 
diligently searched for that which required but little looking after 






CONVERSATIONAL REASONING. 255 

in other places, but we poked in vain for the trash. If it had 
ever been there, the broom had been before us and swept it clean 
away. We asked for something ' highly coloured. 5 The book- 
seller politely presented us with Kiigler's ' Handbook of Paint- 
ing. 5 We shook our head and demanded a volume more intimately 
concerned with life and the world. We were offered ' Kosmos. 5 
'Something less universal, 5 said we 'befits the London travel- 
ler. 5 We were answered by ' Prescott 5 s Mexico, 5 ' Modern 
Travel, 5 and 'Murray's Handbook of France. 5 We could not 
get rubbish, whatever price we might offer to pay for it. There 
were no ' Eugene Sues 5 for love or money — no cheap transla- 
tions of any kind — no bribes to ignorance or unholy temptations 
to folly. ' You'll soon be in the " Gazette, 55 5 we said commise- 
ratingly to the bookseller. The bookseller smiled. ' You never 
sell those things, 5 we added mildly. ' Constantly ; we can sell 
nothing else. 5 'What have you nothing for the million? 5 
' Certainly ; here is " Logic for the Million, 55 price 6s. ; will you 
buy it V ' Thank you, but surely books of a more chatty charac- 
ter .' 'Chatty — oh, yes! "Coleridge's Table Talk 55 is a 

standard dish here, and never wants purchasers. 5 Deeming our 
friend facetious, we entered into further conversation and more 
minute inquiry." — The Literature of the Rail. 

3. The rules usually observed in conversational rea- 
soning. 

Dr. Watts, in his " Improvement of the Mind," has 
some excellent observations on this subject, as well as on 
conversation in general. Presuming that with these my 
readers are already familiar, I shall lay before them some 
extracts from a work published under the title of " The 
Art of Conversation, with Pvemarks on Fashion and Dress, 
by Captain Orlando Sabertash :" — 

"If you have been an observer in the world, you will have 
seen how much information is pleasantly conveyed to the mind 
by its means ; and how often new ideas are awakened, and new 
sources of thought, study, and reflection opened out by a little 
lively discourse. 

" But not to speak of instruction alone ; recollect how great 
and essential a part conversation acts in life and society ; how 
much of our happiness, how many of our joys result from plea- 
sant, lively, and agreeable discourse ; consider how often we have 
seen it alleviate pain, sorrow, and affliction, and soothe the bed of 
sickness : and then smile, if you can, at this attempt to give its 
better influence a wider range. Does not cheerful conversation 
exhilarate and expand the heart, make the blood circulate freely 



256 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

through the veins, brighten and give elasticity to the spirit, and 
cast over the whole frame that glow of healthy satisfaction phy- 
sicians deem it the greatest proof of skill to call forth ? It thus 
acts beneficially on the body even, and is one of the best medi- 
cines that can be administered. 5 ' 

" How often have we not seen pleasant conversation charm the 
family circle assembled round the evening fire ; link the members 
in happy union together, and prevent the idle from rambling 
abroad in search of thoughtless amusements, ending too fre- 
quently in ruinous dissipation ? " 

"As the object of conversation is pleasure and improvement, 
those subjects only which are of universal interest can be made 
legitimate topics of pleasantry or discussion. And it is the gift 
of expressing thoughts and fancies in a quick, brilliant, and grace- 
ful manner on such topics, — of striking out new ideas, eliciting 
the views and opinions of others, of attaching the interest of all 
to the subject discussed, — giving it, however trifling in itself, 
weight and importance in the estimation of the hearers, that con- 
stitutes the great talent for conversation." 

"As to subjects for conversation, what difficulty can there be 
about them? Will not books, balls, bonnets, and metaphysics 
furnish pleasant topics of discourse ? Can you not speak of the 

" 'Philosophy and science, and the springs 

Of wonder, and the wisdom of the world ? ' — 
Are flirtation, travelling, love, and speech making at an end ; is 
St. Stephen's shut up ; or is the great globe itself and the weather 
on its surface so perfectly stationary that you can find nothing 
to say about them ? No, no, let us not deceive ourselves : we 
never want subjects of conversation; but we often want the 
knowledge how to treat them; above all, how to bring them for- 
ward in a graceful and pleasing manner." 

" There is, I am sorry to say, a great deal of servility in the 
very best society : a needless meanness, seen through at once ; 
for you may be pleasant, courteous, and well-bred, without 
cringing to the wit or opinions of others. All that is expected, 
or can be expected from you, is, that you are not to shock the 
unsuccessful wit by exposing his stupidity, however glaring it 
may be, nor mark dissent from opinions in which you may not coin- 
cide, in such a manner as to bring on an argument or discussion. 
Any pleasant, passing, and good-humoured jest, will free you 
from noticing the wit, if particularly forced upon your attention ; 
even as an easy, playful dissent from objectionable opinions will 
relieve you from the necessity of disputing or submitting to them. 

"Franklin says, that you must never contradict in conversa- 
tion, nor correct facts if wrongly stated. This is going much too 
far: you must never contradict in a short, direct, or positive 



CONVERSATIONAL REASONING. 257 

tone : but with politeness, you may easily, when necessary, 
express a difference of opinion in a graceful and even complimen- 
tary manner. And I would almost say, that the art of conversa- 
tion consists in knowing; how to contradict, and when to be silent ; 
for, as to constantly acting a fawning and meanly deferential part 
in society, it is offensive to all persons of good sense and good 
feeling. In regard to facts wrongly stated, no well-bred man 
ever thinks of correcting them, merely to show his wisdom in 
trifles ; but with politeness, it is perfectly easy to rectify an error, 
when the nature of the conversation demands the explanation. 

" Whenever the lady or gentleman with whom you are discus- 
sing a point, whether of love, war, science, or politics, begins to 
sophisticate, drop the subject instantly. Your adversary either 
wants the ability to maintain his opinion, — and then it would be 
uncivil to press it ;— or he wants the still more useful ability to 
yield the point with unaffected grace and good humour ; or, what 
is also possible, his vanity is in some way engaged in defending 
views on which he may probably have acted, so that to demolish 
his opinions is perhaps to reprove his conduct, and no well-bred 
man goes into society for the purpose of sermonising." 

" In merely relating an ordinary tale or anecdote, you will 
most certainly, — if you are an observer of character, — relate it 
differently, — not in import perhaps, but in voice and manner, — 
to different persons. A man of the world will naturally, and 
without premeditated effort or thought, so regulate his words, 
tone, and the very voice in which he speaks, as to make the best 
impression on the individual addressed. And as no two persons 
are exactly alike in the world, a good judge will not address them 
as if they were." 

"Anecdotes are pretty gems in conversation, and furnish admir- 
able illustrations : they also serve to fill up a threatening pause, 
and give fresh life to expiring discourse ; and must, of course, be 
appropriate, short, well timed, and well told. But let no one 
hope to found a claim for conversational powers on a mere col- 
lection of anecdotes ; for however numerous, they will necessarily 
wear out, and they never admit of being repeated." 

" Anecdotes must be looked upon as particles of well-flavoured 
spice, to season and enliven discourse, rather than as a very 
essential portion of the dish itself. Still a good relater of anec- 
dotes is a great acquisition in company ; for he can not only link 
the scattered fragments of discourse round some well-applied 
illustration, but if skilful in his line, can give a pleasing turn to 
conversation when taking a faulty direction." 

Man's superiority over other animals has been attributed 
to his powers of association and conversation : — 

" His gregarious nature is another cause of man's superiority 



258 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

over all otlier animals. A lion lies under a hole in a rock; and ii 
any otlier lion happen to pass by, they fight. Now, whoever gets 
a habit of lying under a hole in a rock, and fighting with every 
gentleman who passes near him, cannot possibly make any pro- 
gress. Every man's understanding and acquirements, how great 
and extensive soever they may appear, are made up from the con- 
tributions of his friends and companions. You spend your morn- 
ing in learning from Hume what happened at particular periods 
of your own history : you dine where some man tells you what 
he has observed in the East Indies, and another discourses of 
brown sugar and Jamaica. It is from these perpetual rills of 
knowledge that you refresh yourself, and become strong and 
healthy as you are. If lions would consort together, and growl 
out the observations they have made, about killing sheep and 
shepherds, the most likely places for catching a calf grazing, and 
so forth, they could not fail to improve ; because they would be 
actuated by such a wide range of observation, and operating 
by the joint force of so many minds." — Sydney Smittis Moral 
Philosophy. 

" By the power of language we are enabled to be useful to 
others. We can instruct the ignorant, caution the unwary, or 
console the afflicted. Of what use is the intense application of 
the student, the conceptions of the poet, or the contemplations 
of the philosopher, if the result of their labours is known only to 
themselves ? Thoughts valuable as gold in the mine are of no 
use to others until coined into words. And by imparting infor- 
mation to others, our own faculties are improved. Our intellec- 
tual weapons are kept polished by us. Knowledge shut up in 
the mind of its possessor is like a stagnant pool, useful to none ; 
but when allowed to flow out freely in the channels of language, 
it becomes a living fountain, the streams of which carry health 
and beauty and fertility into every district through which they 
roll." — Lecture on the Philosophy of Language. 

4. The following are examples of conversational rea- 
soning : — 

" I praised the accuracy of an account-book of a lady whom I 
mentioned. Johnson : ' Keeping accounts, Sir, is of no use 
when a man is spending his own money, and has nobody to whom 
he is to account. You won't eat less beef to-day because you 
have written down what it cost yesterday.' I mentioned another 
lady who thought as he did, so that her husband could not get 
her to keep an account of the expense of the family, as she 
thought it enough that she never exceeded the sum allowed her. 
Johnson : ' Sir, it is fit she should keep an account, because her 
husband wishes it ; but 'I do not see its use.' I maintained that 



CONVERSATIONAL REASONING. 259 

keeping an account has this advantage, that it satisfies a man 
that his money has not been lost or stolen, which he might some- 
times be apt to imagine, were there no written state of his ex- 
pense : and, besides, a calculation of economy, so as not to exceed 
one's income, cannot be made without a view of the different 
articles in figures, that one may see how to retrench in some 
particulars less necessary than others. This he did not attempt 
to answer." 

" Mr. Walker, the celebrated master of elocution, came in, and 
then we went up stairs into the study. I asked him if he had 
taught many clergymen. Johnson: 'I hope not. 5 Walker: 
' I have taught only one, and he is the best reader I ever heard, 
not by my teaching, but by his own natural talents.' Johnson : 
' Were he the best reader in the world, I would not have it told 
that he was taught.' Here was one of his peculiar prejudices. 
Could it be any disadvantage to the clergyman to have it known 
that he was taught an easy and graceful delivery? Boswell: 
'Will you not allow, Sir, that a man may be taught to read 
well ? ' Johnson : ' Why, Sir, so far as to read better than he 
might do without being taught, yes. Formerly it was supposed 
that there was no difference in reading, but that one read as well 
as another.' Boswell : ' It is wonderful to see old Sheridan as 
enthusiastic about oratory as ever.' Walker : ' His enthusiasm 
as to what oratory will do, may be too great : but he reads well.' 
Johnson : ' He reads well, but he reads low ; and you know it is 
much easier to read low than to read high ; for when you read 
high you are much more limited, your loudest note can be but 
one, and so the variety is less in proportion to the loudness. Now 
some people have occasion to speak to an extensive audience, and 
must speak loud to be heard.' Walker : ' The art is to read 
strong, though low.' 

" Talking of the origin of language : — Johnson : ' It must 
have come by inspiration. A thousand, nay a million of children 
could not invent a language. While the organs are pliable, there 
is not understanding enough to form a language; by the time 
that there is understanding enough the organs are become stiff. 
We know that after a certain age we cannot learn to pronounce 
a new language. No foreigner who comes to England when 
advanced in life ever pronounces English tolerably well ; at least, 
such instances are very rare. When I maintain that language 
must have come by inspiration, I do not mean that inspiration is 
required for rhetoric, and all the beauties of language ; for when 
once man has language, we can conceive that he may gradually 
form modifications of it. I mean only that inspiration seems to 
me to be necessary to give man the faculty of speech ; to inform 
him that he may have speech ; which I think he could no more 
find out without inspiration than cows or hogs would think of 



260 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

such a faculty.' "Walker : ' Do you think, Sir, that there are 
auy perfect synonymes in any language ?' Johnson : ' Originally 
there were not ; but by using words negligently, or in poetry, 
one word conies to be confounded with another.' " — BoswelVs 
Life of Johnson. 

5. After the above examples of conversational reasoning, 
I will conclude this Section with an example of a conversa- 
tion without reasoning. It is taken from Miss Austen's 
description of " The Voluble Lady :" — 

" My dear sir, you are too obliging. Is there nobody you 
would not rather ? — I am not helpless. Sir, you are most kind. 
Upon my word, Jane on one arm, and me on the other ! Stop, 
stop, let us stand a little back, Mrs. Elton is going; dear Mrs. 
Elton, how elegant she looks — beautiful lace ! — Now we all follow 
in her train. Quite the queen of the evening ! — Well, here we 
are at the passage. Two steps, Jane, take care of the two steps. 
Oh ! no, there is but one. Well, I was persuaded there were 
two. How very odd! I was convinced there were two, and 
there is but one. I never saw anything equal to the comfort 
and style — candles everywhere. I was telling you of your grand- 
mamma, Jane, — there was a little disappointment. The baked 
apples and biscuits, excellent in their way, you know ; but there 
was a delicate fricassee of sweetbread and some asparagus brought 
in at first, and good Mr. Woodhouse, not thinking the asparagus 
quite boiled enough, sent it all out again. Now there is nothing 
grandmamma loves better than sweetbread and asparagus — so she 
was rather disappointed; but we agreed we would not speak of 
it to anybody, for fear of its getting round to dear Miss Wood- 
house, who would be so very much concerned. Well, this is 
brilliant ! I am all amazement I — could not have supposed any- 
thing ! — such elegance and profusion ! I have seen nothing like 
it since. — Well, where shall we sit ? Where shall we sit ? Any- 
where, so that Jane is not in a draught. Where / sit is of no 
consequence. Oh ! do you recommend this side ? Well, I am 
sure, Mr. Churchill — only it seems too good — but just as you 
please. What you direct in this house cannot be wrong. Dear 
Jane, how shall we ever recollect half the dishes for grand- 
mamma ? Soup too ! Bless me ! I should not he helped so 
soon, but it smells most excellent, and I cannot help beginning." 
— Half-hours with the best Authors. 



KEASONING BY SINGLE SYLLOGISM. 2G1 

SECTION IV. 

EEASONING BY SINGLE SYLLOGISM. 

The following description of the nature of the syllogism 
is taken from Dr. Watts : — 

" If the mere perception and comparison of two ideas 
would always show us whether they agree or disagree ; then 
all rational propositions would be matters of intelligence, 
or first principles, and there would be no use of reasoning, 
or drawing any consequences. It is the narrowness of the 
human mind which introduces the necessity of reasoning. 
When we are unable to judge of the truth or falsehood of 
a proposition in an immediate manner, by the mere con- 
templation of its subject and predicate, we are then con- 
strained to use a medium, and to compare each of them 
with some third idea, that by seeing how far they agree or 
disagree with it, we may be able to judge how far they 
agree or disagree among themselves : as if there are two 
lines, a and b, and I know not whether they are equal or 
no, I take a third line c, or an inch, and apply it to each 
of them ; if it agree with them both, then I infer that a 
and b are equal : but if it agree with one and not with the 
other, then I. conclude a and b are unequal : if it agree 
with neither of them, there can be no comparison. 

" So if the question be, whether God must be worshipped, 
we seek a third idea, suppose the idea of a Creator, and say, 

" Our Creator must be worshipped: 
God is our Creator ; 
Therefore, God must be worshipped. 

" The comparison of this third idea, with the two dis- 
tinct parts of the questions, usually requires two proposi- 
tions, which are called the premises : the third proposition 
which is drawn from them is the conclusion. 

" Thus it appears what is the strict and just notion of a 
syllogism : it is a sentence or argument made up of three 
propositions, so disposed as that the last is necessarily 
inferred from those which go before, as in the instances 
which have been just mentioned. 



262 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

" The three terms are named the major, the minor, and 
the middle. The predicate of the conclusion is called the 
major term, because it is generally of a larger extension 
than the minor term, or the subject. The major and minor 
terms are called the extremes. The middle term is the 
third idea, invented and disposed in two propositions, in 
such a manner as to show the connexion between the major 
and minor term in the conclusion ; for which reason the 
middle term itself is sometimes called the argument. 

" That proposition which contains the predicate of the 
conclusion, connected with the middle term, is usually called 
the major proposition, whereas the minor proposition con- 
nects the middle term with the subject of the conclusion, 
and is sometimes called the assumption. 

u This exact distinction of the several parts of a syllo- 
gism, and of the major and minor terms connected with the 
middle term in the major and minor propositions, does 
chiefly belong to simple or categorical syllogisms, though 
all syllogisms whatsoever have something analogical to it." 

" /Single syllogisms are made up of three propositions : 
compound syllogisms contain more than three propositions, 
and may be formed into two or more syllogisms. 

" Single syllogisms, for distinction's sake, may be divided 
into simple, complex, and conjunctive." 

I. — Simple Syllogism. 

( i Those are properly called simple or categorical syllo- 
gisms, which are made up of three plain, single, or cate- 
gorical propositions, wherein the middle term is evidently 
and regularly joined with one part of the question in the 
major proposition, and with the other in the minor, 
whence there flows a plain single conclusion ; as, ' Every 
human virtue is to be sought with diligence ; prudence 
is a human virtue ; therefore, prudence is to be sought 
with diligence.'" 

II. — Complex Syllogism. 

Those are properly called complex syllogisms, in which 
the middle term is not connected with the whole subject, 
or the whole predicate in two distinct propositions, but is 



REASONING BY SINGLE SYLLOGISMS. 2G3 

intermingled and compared with them by parts, or in a more 
confused manner, in different forms of speech ; as, — 

" The sun. is a senseless being ; 
The Persians worshipped the sun ; 
Therefore, the Persians worshipped a senseless being. 

Here the predicate of the conclusion is, ' worshipped a 
senseless being,' part of which is joined with the middle 
term, ' sun,' in the major proposition, and the other part 
in the minor. 

" Though this sort of argument is confessed to be en- 
tangled or confused, and irregular, if examined by the 
rules of simple syllogisms ; yet there is a great variety of 
arguments used in books of learning, and in common life, 
whose consequence is strong and evident, and which must 
be ranked under this head ; as, — ■ 

" Pious men are the only favourites of heaven ; true Christians 
are favourites of heaven; therefore, true Christians are pious 
men. Or thus, Hypocrites are not pious men ; therefore, hypo- 
crites are not favourites of heaven. 

" &Tone but physicians came to the consultation ; the nurse is 
no physician ; therefore, the nurse came not to the consultation. 

" The fogs vanish as the sun rises ; but the fogs have not yet 
begun to vanish; therefore, the sun is not yet risen. 

" It is necessary that a general understand the art of war ; but 
Caius does not understand the art of war ; therefore, it is neces- 
sary Caius should not be a general. A total eclipse of the sun 
would cause darkness at noon ; it is possible that the moon at 
that time may totally eclipse the sun ; therefore, it is possible 
that the moon may cause darkness at noon. 

" Now the force of all these arguments is so evident 
and conclusive, that though the form of the syllogism be 
never so irregular, yet we are sure the inferences are just 
and true ; for the premises, according to the reason oi 
things, do really contain the conclusion that is deduced 
from them, which is a never-failing test of a true syllo- 
gism." 

III. — Conjunctive Syllogism. 

" Those are called conjunctive syllogisms, wherein one of 
the premises, namely the major, has distinct parts, which 
are joined by a conjunction, or some such particle of 



2G4; LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

speech. Most times the major or minor, or both, are 
explicitly compound propositions; and generally the major 
proposition is made up of two distinct parts or proposi- 
tions, in such a manner, as that by the assertion of one in 
the minor, the other is either asserted or denied in the 
conclusion : or, by the denial of one in the minor, the 
other is either asserted or denied in the conclusion. It 
is hardly possible indeed to fit any short definition to 
include all the kinds of them ; but the chief amongst them 
are the conditional syllogism, the disjunctive, the relative, 
and the connexive. 

" 1. The conditional or hypothetical syllogism, is that 
whose major or minor, or both, are conditional proposi- 
tions ; as, If there be a God, the world is governed by 
Providence ; but there is a God ; therefore the world is 
governed by Providence. 

" These syllogisms admit two sorts of true argumentation, 
where the major is conditional. Pirst, When the antecedent is 
asserted in the minor, that the consequent may be asserted in the 
conclusion; such is the preceding example. This is called 
arguing from the position of the antecedent to the position of 
the consequent. Secondly, When the consequent is contradicted 
in the minor proposition, that the antecedent may be contra- 
dicted in the conclusion : as, If atheists are in the right, then 
the world exists without a cause ; but the world does not exist 
without a cause ; therefore, atheists are not in the right. This 
is called arguing from the removing of the consequent to the 
removing of the antecedent." 

"2. A disjunctive syllogism is when the major propo- 
sition is disjunctive ; as, The earth moves in a circle or an 
ellipsis ; but it does not move in a circle ; therefore, it 
moves in an ellipsis. 

" A disjunctive syllogism may have many members or parts ; 
thus, It is either spring, summer, autumn, or winter ; but it is 
not spring, autumn, or winter ; therefore, it is summer. 

" 3. A relative syllogism requires the major proposition 
to be relative ; as, Where Christ is, there shall his servants 
be ; but Christ is in heaven ; therefore, his servants shall 
be there also. Or, As is the captain, so are his soldiers ; 
but the captain is a coward ; therefore, his soldiers are 
so too. 



REASONING BY SINGLE SYLLOGISM. 265 

" Arguments that relate to the doctrine of proportion must be 
referred to this head ; as, As two are to four, so are three to six ; 
but two make the half of four; therefore, three make the halt' 
of six. 

" 4. A connexive syllogism requires that two or more 
ideas be so connected, either in the complex subject or 
predicate of the major, that if one of them be affirmed or 
denied in the minor, common sense will naturally show us 
w r hat will be the consequence. 

"Meekness and humility always go together; Moses was a 
man of meekness ; therefore, Moses was also humble. Or we 
may form this minor, Pharaoh was no humble man ; therefore, he 
was not meek. 

"No man can serve God and Mammon; the covetous man 
serves Mammon ; therefore, he cannot serve God. Or the minor 
may run thus, The true Christian serves God ; therefore, he does 
not serve Mammon." — Watts' 's Logic. 

Academic or scholastic disputation, which was carried on 
by syllogism, is thus described in Dr. Watts's " Improve- 
ment of the Mind :" — 

" The common methods in which disputes are managed in the 
schools of learning are these ; viz. 

" 1. The tutor appoints a question in some of the sciences to 
be debated amongst his students : one of them undertakes to 
affirm or to deny the question, and to defend his assertion or 
negation, and to answer all objections against it : he is called the 
respondent ; and the rest of the students in the same class, or 
who pursue the same science, are the opponents, who are ap- 
pointed to dispute or raise objections against the proposition 
thus affirmed or denied. 

" 2. Each of the students successively in their turn becomes 
the respondent or the defender of that proposition, while the rest 
oppose it also successively in their turns. 

"3. It is the business of the respondent to write a thesis in 
Latin, or short discourse on the question proposed ; and he either 
affirms or denies the question according to the opinion of the 
tutor, which is supposed to be the truth, and he reads it at the 
beginning of the dispute. 

"4. In his discourse (which is written with as great accuracy 
as the youth is capable of) s he explains the terms of the question, 
frees them from all ambiguity, fixes their sense, declares the true 
intent and meaning of the question itself, separates it from other 
questions with which it may have been complicated, and distin- 
guishes it from other questions which may happen to be akin to 

N 



2QQ LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

it, and then pronounces in the negative or affirmative concern- 
ing it. 

"5. When this is done, then in the second part of his dis- 
course he gives his own strongest arguments to confirm the pro- 
position he has laid down, i. e. to vindicate his own side of the 
question : but he does not usually proceed to represent the objec- 
tions against it, and to solve or answer them ; for it is the busi- 
ness of the other students to raise objections in disputing. 

"6. When the respondent has read over his thesis in the 
school, the junior student makes an objection, and draws it up in 
the regular form of a syllogism: the respondent repeats the 
objection, and either denies the major or minor proposition 
directly, or he distinguishes upon some word or phrase in the 
major or minor, and shows in what sense the proposition may be 
true, but that that sense does not affect the question ; and then 
declares, that in the sense in which it affects the present question, 
the proposition is not true, and, consequently, he denies it. 

" 7. Then the opponent proceeds by another syllogism to vindi- 
cate the proposition that is denied ; again the respondent answers 
by denying or distinguishing. 

"Thus the disputation goes on in a series or succession of 
syllogisms and answers, till the objector is silenced, and has no 
more to say. 

"8. When he can go no further, the next student begins to . 
propose his objection, and then the third and the fourth, even to 
the senior, who is the last opponent. 

"9. During this time, the tutor sits in the chair as president, 
or moderator, to see that the rules of disputation and decency be 
observed on both sides ; and to admonish each disputant of any 
irregularity in their conduct. His work is also to illustrate and 
explain the answer or distinction of the respondent where it is 
obscure, to strengthen it where it is weak, and to correct it where 
it is false ; and when the respondent is pinched with a strong 
objection and is at a loss for an answer, the moderator assists 
him, and suggests some answer to the objection of the opponent, 
in defence of the question, according to his own opinion or 
sentiment/' 

The advantages and disadvantages of this method of dis- 
putation are thus pointed out : — 

"It must be confessed there are some advantages to be 
attained by academical disputation. It gives vigour and briskness 
to the mind thus exercised, and relieves the langour of private 
study and meditation. It sharpens the wit, and all the inventive 
powers. It makes the thoughts active, and sends them on all 
sides to find arguments and answers both for opposition and de- 
fence. It gives opportunity of viewing the subject of discourse 



REASONING BY SINGLE SYLLOGISM. 267 

on all sides, and of learning what inconveniences, difficulties, and 
objections, attend particular opinions. It furnishes the soul with 
various occasions of starting such thoughts as otherwise would 
never have come into the mind. It makes a student more ex- 
pert in attacking and refuting an error, as well as in vindicating. a 
truth. It instructs the scholar in the various methods of warding 
off the form of objections, and of discovering and repelling the 
subtile tricks of sophisters. It procures also a' freedom and readi- 
ness of speech, and raises the modest and diffident genius to a 
due degree of courage. 

" But there are some very grievous inconveniences that may 
sometimes overbalance all these advantages. Tor many young 
students, by a constant habit of disputing, grow impudent and 
audacious, proud and disdainful, talkative and impertinent, and 
render themselves intolerable by an obstinate humour of main- 
taining whatever they have asserted, as well as by a spirit of 
contradiction, opposing almost everything that they hear. The 
disputation itself often awakens the passions of ambition, emula- 
tion, and anger ; it carries away the mind from that calm and 
sedate temper which is so necessary to contemplate truth. 

" It is evident, also, that by frequent exercises of this sort, 
wherein opinions true and false are argued, supported and refuted 
on both sides, the mind of man is led by insensible degrees to an 
uncertain and fluctuating temper, and falls into danger of a scep- 
tical humour, which never comes to an establishment in any 
doctrines. Many persons by this means become much more 
ready to oppose whatsoever is offered in searching out truth ; they 
hardly wait till they have read or heard the sentiment of any 
person, before their heads are busily employed to seek out argu- 
ments against it. They grow naturally sharp in finding out 
difficulties ; and by indulging this humour, they converse with 
the dark and doubtful parts of a subject so long, till they almost 
render themselves incapable of receiving the full evidence of 'a 
proposition, and acknowledging the light of truth. It has 'some 
tendency to make a youth a carping critic, rather than a judi- 
cious man." 

We presume that disputes of this kind were carried on 
at Oxford in the time of Mr. John Wesley. 

" Eight months after his election to a fellowship he was ap- 
pointed Greek lecturer, and moderator of the classes. At that 
time disputations were held six times a-week at Lincoln College, 
and however the students may have profited by them, they were 
of singular use to the moderator. ' I could not avoid/ he says, 
' acquiring hereby some degree of expertness in arguing, and 
especially in discerning and pointing out well-covered and plau- 
sible fallacies. I have since found abundant reason to praise 
n 2 



268 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

God for giving me this honest art. By this, when men have 
hedged me in by what they called demonstrations, I have been 
many times able to dash them in pieces, and in spite of all its 
covers, to tonch the very point where the fallacy lay, and it flew 
open in a moment. 5 " — Southefs Life of Wesley. 

Lord Bacon observed in his Novum Organum, published 
in the year 1605, " that the logic now in use is not con- 
ducible to the rinding out of true science, but tends to 
the establishment and confirmation of errours which are 
founded in vulgar notions, rather than to a serious inquiry 
after truth." 

" A syllogisme," he states, " is not used among the prin- 
ciples of sciences, and in medial axioms it is employed in 
vain, for it falls much short of Nature's subtilty. It con- 
sists of propositions, propositions of words, words interpret 
notions ; therefore, if notions, the basis of things, be con- 
fused and rashly abstracted from things, nothing will be 
firm that is built upon them ; therefore, our only assurance 
is in a right induction." 

The Port Royal Logic was published at Paris by the 
Jansenists, in the year 1662. The authors seem to have 
had no very high opinion of the Aristotelian forms of logic. 
They refer to " certain matters difficult enough, but of little 
use, such as the conversion of propositions, and the demon- 
stration of the rules of figure." And they express a doubt 
of the usefulness of the syllogism, saying, " that the greater 
part of the errors of men arise much more from their rea- 
soning on false principles, than from their reasoning wrongly 
on their principles." 

Mr. Hallam observes in his " Literature of Europe," 
that after the publication of the Port Royal Logic, " it 
became more and more acknowledged, that the rules of 
syllogism go a very little way in rendering the mind able 
to follow a course of inquiry without error, much less in 
assisting it to discover truth, and that even their vaunted 
prerogative of securing us from fallacy is nearly ineffectual 
in exercise." 

Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding was pub- 
lished in the year 1688. He condemns strongly the syllo- 
gistical form of reasoning. It is useless, inasmuch as you 
must understand your argument before you can form the 



REASONING BY SINGLE SYLLOGISM. 269 

syllogism ; and then it comes too late to settle the matter. 
It is of no assistance to reasoning, as it is more difficult to 
understand the rules of syllogism than it is to understand 
the argument. The mass of mankind know nothing of it, 
and yet they reason well, and did so long before syllo- 
gisms were invented. God did not make men two-legged 
creatures, and leave it to Aristotle to make them reason- 
able beings. 

Dr. Watts, throughout Ins work, has strongly enforced 
the doctrine, that an acquaintance with the things them- 
selves is the only way of reasoning correctly about them. 
And he exhorts his readers not to rely upon the mere forms 
of scholastic logic. 

He thus speaks of formal definitions : — 

"After all, it must be confessed that many logicians and philo- 
sophers, in former ages, have made too great a bustle about the 
exactness of their definition of things, and entered into long, 
fruitless controversies, and very ridiculous debates in the several 
sciences, about adjusting the logical formalities of every defini- 
tion ; whereas that sort of wrangling is now grown very justly 
contemptible, since it is agreed that true learning and the know- 
ledge of things depends much more upon a large acquaintance 
with their various properties, causes, effects, subject, object, ends, 
and designs, than it does upon the formal and scholastic niceties 
of genus and difference." — Watts' s Logic. 

In the section on the opposition and conversion of pro- 
positions, he observes : 

" The logicians of the schools have written manv large trifles 
concerning the opposition and conversion of propositions. It will 
be sufficient here to give a few brief hints of these things, that 
the learner may not be utterly ignorant of them " — Ibid. 

The following are his remarks on the moods and figures 
of simple syllogisms : — 

" Simple syllogisms are adorned and surrounded in the common 
books of logic with a variety of inventions about moods and 
figures, wherein by the artificial contexture of the letters A, E, I, 
and O, men have endeavoured to transform Logic, or the Art of 
Reasoning, into a sort of mechanism, and to teach boys to syllo- 
gise, or frame arguments and refute them, without any real in- 
ward knowledge of the question. 

" This is almost in the same manner as schoolboys have been 



270 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

taught perhaps in their trifling years to compose Latin verses, 
that is, by certain tables and squares, with a variety of letters in 
them, wherein by counting every sixth, seventh, or eighth letter, 
certain Latin words should be framed in the form of hexameters 
or pentameters, and this may be done by those who know nothing 
of Latin or of verses. 

" I confess some of these logical subtleties have much more 
use than those versifying tables, and there is much ingenuity 
discovered in determining the precise number of syllogisms that 
may be formed in every figure, and giving the reasons of them ; 
yet the light of nature, a good judgment, and due consideration 
of things, tend more to true reasoning than all the trappings of 
moods and figures/' — Ibid. 

Dr. Campbell published his Bhetoric in the year 1776. 
He strongly condemns the syllogistic mode of reasoning 
as unnatural and prolix. Its rules are cumbersome to the 
memory, and unnecessary in practice. This method of 
arguing has not the least affinity to moral reasoning. In 
matters that we know by experience, it can be of little or 
no utility. And it has produced two evils ; — a desire of 
disputing on every subject, however incontrovertible, and 
a philosophical pride, which will not permit us to believe 
anything, even a self-evident principle, without a previous 
reason or argument. 

From the time of the publication of Dr. Watts's Logic, 
the scholastic forms of reasoning appear to have fallen into 
disuse. Dr. Whately, the present Archbishop of Dublin, 
was the means of reviving attention to the subject in the 
University of Oxford. He was at that time the Principal 
of St. Alban's Hall. His publication on the subject first 
appeared in the " Encyclopaedia Metropolitana," and was 
afterwards published separately. Not only were the scho- 
lastic forms resumed, but new definitions of logic were 
brought forward ; and they who had stated in their works 
any theory inconsistent with these definitions were charged 
with being ignorant of the nature of the science. Dr. Watts 
is repeatedly censured for calling logic the art of using our 
reason well. And we are told that " Logic is the art of 
employing language properly for the purpose of reasoning ;" 
and " is entirely conversant about language." According 
to Dr. Whately, the principle of the syllogism is the prin- 
ciple of all reasoning. The art of reasoning is the art of 



REASONING BY SINGLE SYLLOGISM. 271 

syllogizing. It is not the province of logic to prove the 
truth of the proposition employed in the syllogism, but 
merely to see that the conclusion follows naturally from 
those propositions, supposing them to be true. And this 
point is to be ascertained, not by the exercise of the judgment, 
but by the application of certain rules which scholastic 
logicians have drawn up for this purpose. To perceive the 
force of a syllogistic argument, it is not necessary to be 
acquainted with the subject, nor even in some cases to 
understand the meaning of the words. 

Sir William Hamilton, a Professor of Logic and Meta- 
physics in the University of Edinburgh, has proposed what 
he deems an improvement in the syllogistic mode of reason- 
ing, by the adoption of what he calls " the quantification of 
the predicate." By this phrase he means nothing more than 
that the word " all " or " some " should be attached to the 
predicate of the propositions that enter into the syllogism. 
Thus, instead of saying " All men are mortal ;" he would 
say, " All men are some mortal ;" to denote that other 
beings are mortal besides men. A book has been published 
on this subject by Mr. Thomas Spencer Baynes, under the 
sanction and approval of Sir William Hamilton, entitled, 
" An Essay on the New Analytic of Logical Forms." It 
is difficult to perceive what great practical advantage 
would be gained by this suggestion, even were it uni- 
versally adopted. The arguments in favour of its adoption 
rest mainly on the defects of the present system. Mr. 
Baynes states, that logic has remained imperfect and de- 
formed in the hands of all previous logicians ; and that in 
regard to " the common doctrine of syllogistic figure, mood 
and reduction, the whole doctrine is cumbrous and unsatis- 
factory ; inconsistent, and destructive of the science itself." 
Mr. Baynes, from the extent of his logical reading, should 
be a very competent witness on this subject. He has shown, 
we think, that the rules of scholastic logic contain some 
great inconsistencies. It is remarkable how ready scholastic 
logicians are to censure their own system as explained by 
other writers. Archbishop Whately accuses I know not 
how many preceding authors of being totally ignorant 
of the nature of logic. And Mr. Baynes considers the 
whole science to have been imperfect from the days of 



Aristotle to Sir William Hamilton ; and he rejoices " to 
know that one has at length arisen able to recognise and 
complete the plan of the mighty builder, Aristotle ; to lay 
the, top-stone on that fabric, the foundations of which were 
laid more than two thousand years ago by the master hand 
of the Stagyrite." We will not deny that the censures on 
the scholastic logicians are some deserved ; but we think 
the eulogium on Sir W. Hamilton's discovery is in a high 
degree some excessive. 

Mr. Mill steers a middle course with regard to the syllo- 
gism. He says, — " Archbishop Whately has contended that 
syllogizing or reasoning from generals to particulars is not, 
agreeably to the vulgar idea, a peculiar mode of reasoning ; 
but the philosophical analysis of the mode in which all 
men reason, and must do so, if they reason at all. With 
the deference due to so high an authority, I cannot help 
thinking that the vulgar notion is in this case the more 
correct." In the syllogism, All men are mortal ; the 
Duke of Wellington is a man ; therefore, the Duke of Wel- 
lington is mortal : — Mr. Mill thinks that we do not infer 
the mortality of the Duke of Wellington from the general 
proposition, All men are mortal, but " from our experience 
of John, Thomas, &c, who once were in being, but are now 
dead." He contends that all inference is from particulars 
to particulars, and that general propositions are merely 
registers of such inferences. Dr. Whewell thinks that this 
doctrine of Mr. Mill, "that the force of the syllogism con- 
sists in an inductive assertion with an interpretation added 
to it, solves very happily the difficulties which baffle the 
other theories of this subject." This question is rather 
beyond the limits we have assigned to our own inquiries. 
But it appears to us that if the individual conclusion is not 
a deduction from the general principle, the argument is no 
longer a syllogism. It may, nevertheless, be a good mode 
of reasoning, but surely it is not a syllogism in the sense 
in which Archbishop Whately and other logical writers use 
the term. At the same time it appears to put the syllogism 
in the same place that we have assigned to it in the pre- 
sent work. It is received as one of the forms of reasoning ; 
in some cases a very useful form, but not necessarily con- 
nected more than any other form with the reasoning pro- 



REASONING BY SINGLE SYLLOGISM. 273 

cess. And whether Mr. Mill gets his conclusion from the 
general proposition, or from certain facts of which the gene- 
ral proposition is a correct register, does not appear to be 
of much practical importance. 

After a consideration of all the above writers, and of 
others whom we have consulted on the subject, we have 
arrived at the conclusion, that the syllogism is only one of 
the forms of reasoning ; a useful form, certainly, in some 
cases, but still only a form, and by no means necessarily 
connected with any of the principles of reasoning. 

It has been said that all other modes of reasoning may 
be turned into syllogisms. It would be difficult to prove 
this, but it is not worth while to ask for proof. Let it be 
admitted that all other forms of reasoning may be turned 
into syllogisms, and that all syllogisms may be turned into 
other forms of reasoning. This convertibility shows that 
syllogism is only one of the forms in which all reasons 
may be expressed. Another argument to prove that it is 
only a form, is, that the mass of mankind reason well, and 
yet know nothing about it. None of the writers of the Old 
Testament knew anything about syllogism, nor have we any 
proof that it was known to the writers of the New. We are 
not aware that it has ever been known to the Chinese, or 
to any other people unacquainted with Greek. We are 
sure that the mass of the population in our own country 
are wholly unacquainted with it. 

Seeing, then, that syllogism is one of the forms of reason- 
ing, it may be well to inquire for what kinds of reasoning- 
it is best adapted. 

It does not appear to be well adapted for arguments 
founded on induction, or on analogy, or on mere proba- 
bility. The conclusion of a syllogism should be a certainty, 
and a certain deduction from the premises. Let us take 
Mr. Mill's example : — 

" All men are mortal ; 
The Duke of Wellington is a man ; 
Therefore, the Duke of Wellington is mortal." 

Here you will observe, it is essential to the validity of 
this argument, that the first proposition should be univer- 
sally true. Had it been said, " All men (except one) are 
n 3 



274 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

mortal ; the Duke of "Wellington is a man ;" we could not 
have inferred that the Duke of Wellington is mortal, for 
that excepted one might, for ought we know, be the Duke 
of Wellington. 

It would appear from this example, that the syllogism 
is not adapted for probable arguments, however high the 
degree of probability may be. Hence, as in the moral 
sciences, and in the ordinary affairs of life, we cannot 
always have more than a high degree of probability, it 
seems to follow that in these sciences, and in these affairs, 
we cannot always employ the syllogism. 

The chief principle of reasoning for which the syllogism 
appears to be adapted, is that of genus and species, and here 
chiefly when the relation of genus and species is founded 
in nature. When we try to form this relation mentally, by 
simply changing the mode of expression, we may weaken 
our reasoning. We have shown this at page 70. In similar 
cases we can rarely form a major proposition, capable of 
being proved to be universally true. We place ourselves 
by syllogism under the necessity of proving a universal, 
when the argument requires us to prove only a particular. 
And we attempt to prove by reasoning, a proposition that 
cannot be proved but by observation and experience. 

Although an argument legitimately founded on any other 
relation than genus and species, such as the relation of 
subject and attribute, cause and effect, can seldom be so 
well expressed by syllogism, yet, when an argument is 
legitimately founded on the relation of genus and species, 
and that a natural, not an artificial relation, the syllogism 
will sometimes afford the means of expressing the argu- 
ment with superior clearness. Perhaps this is the case in 
the example we have noticed. Were we to say, " As the 
Duke of Wellington is a man, he must be mortal ;" or, 
" As all men are mortal, the Duke of Wellington must be 
mortal, for he is only a man;" or any similar mode of 
expression, we should not, perchance, express our meaning 
with as much clearness as in the above syllogism. 

While we are thus ready to admit that the syllogism is 
sometimes a useful form of reasoning, we do not admit that 
an argument derives greater strength from being put into 
this form. In fact, no argument obtains increased strength 



REASONING BY COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 275 

by being expressed in one form more than in another. The 
advantage gained is in point of clearness, or in adaptation 
to the party to whom the argument may be addressed. 
The same form is not suitable for all occasions. The form 
which gives clearness and adaptation in one case may in 
another case be attended with obscurity and unsuitableness. 
The case in which syllogism may be used with advantage 
is, as we have said, in natural relations of genus and species. 
In many other cases we think it unsuitable, and in some, 
probably injurious.* 



SECTION V. 

REASONING BY COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 

" We properly call those compound syllogisms, which are 
made of two or more single syllogisms, and may be resolved 
into them. The chief kinds are these : epichirema, dilemma, 
prosyllogismus, and sorites. 

" I. Epichirema is a syllogism which contains the proof 
of the major or minor, or both, before it draws the con- 
clusion. 

" This is often used in writing, in public speeches, and in com- 
mon conversation ; that so each, part of the discourse may be 
confirmed and put out of doubt, as it moves on toward the con- 
clusion which was chiefly designed. Take this instance : 

" Sickness may be good for us ; for it weans us from the 
pleasures of life, and makes us think of dying ; 

"But we are uneasy under sickness, which, appears by our 
impatience, complaints, groanings, &c. ; 

" Therefore, we are uneasy sometimes under that which is good 
for us. 

" Another instance you may see in Cicero's oration in defence 
of Milo, who had slain Clodius. His major proposition is, that 
4 it is lawful for one man to kill another who lies in wait to kill 

* With, reference to the system of scholastic logic, Mr. Bailey observes : — 
" Such an artificial system is needless, because the natural method is ready of 
application and sufficient of itself. It does not substitute compendious processes 
for long ones, nor such as are easy for such as are difficult ; nor those which are 
more certain for those which are less to be relied upon. And it has not the 
slightest pretensions to the power of conducting us to results which we could not 
reach without its assistance ; while, on the other hand, the study of it requires a 
great expenditure of time and labour, and is attended from its very nature with 
intellectual evils of no inconsiderable moment." — Page 146. 



276 FOE THE MILLION. 

him ;' which he proves from the custom of nations, from natural 
equity, examples, &c. His minor is, that Clodius ' laid wait for 
Milo ;' which he proves by his arms, guards, &c. ; and then in- 
fers the conclusion, that ' it was lawful for Milo to kill Clodius.' 

" II. A Dilemma is an argument which divides the whole 
into all its parts or members by a disjunctive proposition, 
and then infers something concerning each part which is 
finally inferred concerning the whole. 

" Instances of this are frequent; as, In this life we must either 
obey our vicious inclinations, or resist them : to obey them will 
bring sin and sorrow ; to resist them is laborious and painful : 
therefore, we cannot be perfectly free from sorrow or pain in 
this life. 

" A dilemma becomes faulty or ineffectual three ways : Eirst, 
When the members of the division are not well opposed, or not 
fully enumerated ; for then the major is false. Secondly, when 
what is asserted concerning each part is not j ust ; for then the 
minor is not true. Thirdly, when it may be retorted with equal 
force upon him who utters it. 

" There was a famous ancient instance of this case, wherein 
a dilemma was retorted. Euathlus promised Protagoras a reward 
when he had taught him the art of pleading ; and it was to be 
paid the first day that he gained any cause in the court. After 
a considerable time Protagoras goes to law with Euathlus for the 
reward, and uses this dilemma : ' Either the cause will go on my 
side, or on yours : if the cause goes on my side, you must pay 
me, according to the sentence of the judge ; if the cause goes on 
your side, you must pay me according to your bargain ; therefore, 
whether the cause goes for me or against me, you must pay me 
the reward.' But Euathlus retorted this dilemma, thus : ' Either 
I shall gain the cause, or lose it : if I gain the cause, then 
nothing will be due to you, according to the sentence of the 
judge ; but if I lose the cause, nothing will be due to you, ac- 
cording to my bargain ; therefore, whether I lose or gain the 
cause, I will not pay you, for nothing will be due to you.' 

" This sort of argument may be composed of three or more 
members, and may be called a trilemma. 

" III. A Prosyllogism is when two or more syllogisms 
are so connected together, that the conclusion of the former 
is the major or the minor of the following : 

Example — 

"Blood cannot think ; but the soul of man thinks; therefore, 
the soul of man is not blood : but the soul of a brute is his blood, 



REASONING BY COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 277 

according to the Scripture ; therefore, the soul of man is different 
from the soul of a brute. 

" IV. A Sorites is when several middle terms are chosen 
to connect one another successively in several propositions, 
till the last proposition connects its predicate with the first 
subject. 

" Thus : All men of revenge have their souls often uneasy ; un- 
easy souls are a plague to themselves ; now to be one's own plague 
is folly in the extreme ; therefore, all men of revenge are extreme 
fools. The Apostle (Rom. viii. 29) gives us an instance of this 
sort of argument, if it were reduced to exact form : ' Whom he 
foreknew those he predestinated; whom he predestinated he 
called ; whom he called he justified ; whom he justified he glori- 
fied ; therefore, whom he foreknew he glorified.' 

" To these syllogisms it may not be improper to add 
Induction, which is, when from several particular proposi- 
tions we infer one general ; as, The doctrine of the Soci- 
nians cannot be proved from the Gospels, it cannot be 
proved from the Acts of the Apostles, it cannot be proved 
from the Epistles, nor the Book of Revelation ; therefore, 
it cannot be proved from the New Testament." — Watts 
Logic. 

We shall here give an example of each of these compound 
syllogisms : — 

I. — The Epichirema. 

Happiness is the result of certain habits ; 
Man has the power of acquiring those habits ; 
Therefore, man has the power of making himself happy. 

The first and second of these propositions require to be 
separately proved. Here is the proof : — 

1. Happiness is the result of certain habits. 

"We find ourselves making a part of an existing universe, 
which neither ignorance nor wisdom, doubting nor confidence 
can alter. If we know the order of which we are the subjects, 
and conform to it, we are happy. 

"The natural laws of this system are universal, invariable, 
unbending : that physical and moral tendencies are the same all 
over our world; and we have every reason to believe over all 



278 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

other worlds. Wherever moral beings keep in harmony with these 
laws, there is no instance in which happiness is not the result. Men 
never enjoy health, vigour, and felicity in disobedience to them. 
The whole" infinite contrivance of everything above, around, and 
within us, appears directed to certain benevolent issues ; and all 
the laws of nature are in perfect harmony with the whole consti- 
tution of men." 

" In all positions man finds himself called upon, by the clear 
indications of the organic laws, to take that free and cheerful 
exercise, which is calculated to develope vigorous muscular, and 
nervous and mental action. The peasant digs, and the hunter 
chases for subsistence. ; and each finds at the same time health 
and cheerfulness. The penalty of the violation of this organic 
law by the indulgence of indolence is debility, enfeebled action 
both bodily and mental, dyspepsia with all its painful train, and 
finally death. On the other hand, the penalty of over exertion, 
debauchery, intemperance, and excess of every species, comes in 
other forms of disease and suffering. These laws, though not so 
obviously and palpably so, are as invariable and inevitable, as 
those of attraction or magnetism." 

" If then, by any process of instruction, discipline, and mental 
force, we can influence our circumstances, banish grief, create 
cheerfulness, we can, in the same degree, reduce rules for the 
pursuit of happiness to a system ; and make that system a matter 
of science. Can we not do this ?" — Art of being Happy. 

2. Man has the power of acquiring these habits. 

<c The elements upon which we should operate are circum- 
stances, habits, and modes of thinking and acting. The impulse 
of all our actions from birth to death, the spring of all our move- 
ments, is a conviction that, by the blessing and help of the Most 
High, we can alter and improve our condition. We have a con- 
sciousness stronger than our reason, that we can control our 
circumstances. We can change our regimen and habits ; and, by 
patience and perseverance, even our temperament. Every one can 
cite innumerable and most melancholy instances of those who 
have done it for evil. The habit of indulging in opium, tobacco, 
ardent spirits, or any of the pernicious narcotics, soon reduces 
the physical and mental constitution to that temperament in 
which those stimulants are felt to be necessary. A corresponding 
change is produced in the mind and disposition. The frequent 
and regular use of medicine, though it may have been wholly 
unnecessary at first, finally becomes an inveterate habit. No 
phenomenon of physiology is more striking than the facility with 
which the human constitution immediately commences a confor- 
mity to whatever change of circumstances, as of climate, habit, 



BEASONING BY COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 279 

or aliment, we impose upon it. It is a most impressive proof, 
that the Creator has formed man capable of becoming the creature 
of all climates and conditions. 

" If toe may change our temperament both of body and mind for 
evil, as innumerable examples prove that we may, why not also for 
good ? Our habits certainly are very much under our control : 
and our modes of thinking, however little the process may have 
been explained, are in some way shaped by our voluntary disci- 
pline. We have powers of self-command, as every one who has 
made the effort to exercise them must be conscious. We have 
inexhaustible moral force for self-direction, if we will only recog- 
nise and exert it. We owe most of our disgusts and disappoint- 
ments, our corroding passions and unreasonable desires, our 
fretfulness, gloom and self-torment, neither to nature nor fate ; 
but to ourselves, and our reckless indifference to those rules that 
ought to guide our pursuit of happiness. Let a higher education 
and a truer wisdom detach us from our passions, dispel the mists 
of opinion, aud silence the authority of example. Let us com- 
mence the pursuit of happiness on the right course, and seek it 
where alone it is to be found. Equanimity and moderation will 
shed their mild radiance upon our enjoyments; and in our 
reverses we shall summon resignation and force of character; 
and, according to the sublime ancient maxim, we shall, in some 
useful degree, become masters of events and of ourselves." — Ibid. 

The conclusion follows, that man has the power of 
making himself happy. 

II. — The Dilemma. 

The following are examples of the dilemma : — 

" And there were four leprous men at the entering in of the 
gate : and they said one to another, Why sit we here until we 
die ? If we say, We will enter into the city, then the famine is 
in the city, and we shall die there : and if we sit still here, we 
die also. Now therefore come, and let us fall unto the host of 
the Assyrians : if they save us alive, we shall live ; and if they 
kill us, we shall but die. 3 ' — 2 Kings vii. 3, 4. See also Luke xx. 
3_7 . John xviii. 23. 

" I will always place restrictive laws in this dilemma : Either 
you agree that you do produce scarcity, or you do not agree to 
it. If you agree to it, you confess, as a consequence, that you 
inflict upon the people all the harm you can. If you do not agree 
to it, then you deny having restricted supply and raised prices, 
and, consequently, you deny having favoured the producer. You 
are either hurtful or inefficient ; you cannot be useful." — Bastiafs 
Popular Fallacies regarding General Interests. 



280 



LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 



Mr. Burke uses the dilemma in arguing against public 
debts. — " If/' says he, " Governmeuts provide for these 
debts by public impositions, they perish by becoming 
odious to the people. If they do not provide for them, 
they will be undone by the efforts of the most dangerous 
of all parties, I mean an extensive discontented monied in- 
terest, injured and not destroyed." The objections to the 
law which prohibits the payment of wages in goods, have 
been made in the same form. " Either the law will be gene- 
rally observed, or it will not. If it be generally observed, 
it will frequently prevent the workmen from procuring 
employment, since manufacturers may be able to pay 
wages in goods when they are totally incapable of furnish- 
ing money. If it be not generally observed, which is the 
most probable case, it will be the means of giving an 
advantage to those who are dishonest and loose in principle, 
over the strictly upright and conscientious manufacturers, 
without any benefit to the workmen." Colonel Torrens 
employs the dilemma in arguing against the construction 
of canals (or other public works) by the Government. " If 
canals could be profitably opened, it would not only be super- 
fluous and absurd, but positively pernicious for Government 
to undertake them ; for in this case, private interests would 
accomplish the object far more economically. If they could 
not be opened with a profit, it would be pernicious to force 
capital into an unproductive channel. In either case, there- 
fore, nothing but mischief can result from the interference 
of Government." 

In the same form of reasoning Monsieur Say argues 
against Sumptuary Laws. " Sumptuary Laws are super- 
fluous and unjust. The indulgence proscribed is either 
within the means of the individual or not. In the former 
case it is an act of oppression to prohibit a gratification 
involving no injury to others ; in the latter case, it is, at 
all events, nugatory to do so, for there is no occasion for 
legal interference where pecuniary circumstances alone are 
an effectual bar." The Rev. Mr. Seymour, in his " Mornings 
with the Jesuits," attacks the doctrine of priestly absolution 
by way of dilemma : — " At the time of confession the 
penitent is sincere, or he is not. If he is sincere in his 
repentance, then God has already forgiven him, and abso- 



REASONING BY COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 281 

lution by the priest is useless. If he is not sincere, the 
absolution by the priest is of no value according to the 
doctrine of the Catholic Church. Therefore, whether 
the penitent is sincere or not, the priestly absolution is 
useless." 

The following is the language of Lord Beaumont, a 
Catholic nobleman, with respect to the recent appointment 
to English bishoprics by the Pope : — 

" The Pope by his ill-advised measures has placed the Roman 
Catholics in this country in a position where they must either 
break with Rome, or violate their allegiance to the constitution 
of these realms ; they must either consider the Papal bull as null 
and void, or assert the right of a foreign prince to create, by his 
sovereign authority, English titles, and to erect English bishop- 
rics. To send a bishop to Beverley for the spiritual direction of 
the Roman Catholic clergy in Yorkshire, and to create a see of 
Beverley, are two very different things — the one is allowed by 
the tolerant laws of the country ; the other requires territorial 
dominion and sovereign power within the country. If you deny 
that this country is a fief of Rome, and that the Pontiff has any 
dominion over it, you deny his power to create a territorial see, 
and you condemn the late bull as 'sound and fury, signifying 
nothing.' If, on the contrary, you admit his power to raise 
Westminster into an archbishopric, and Beverley into a bishopric, 
you make over to the Pope a power which, according to the con- 
stitution, rests solely with the Queen and her Parliament, and 
thereby infringe the prerogative of the one and interfere with the 
authority of the other. It is impossible to act up to the spirit of 
the British constitution, and at the same time to acknowledge the 
jurisdiction of the Pope in local matters. Such is the dilemma 
in which the lately published bull places the English Roman 
Catholic." 

" Synods. — Synods will either be mere party affairs — in which 
case they will produce a schism in each diocese ; or they will not 
be party affairs — in which case they will bring the presiding 
Bishop into collision with his clergy. If freedom of speech is 
really bona fide allowed, the clergy will soon be found to be 
at variance on many essential points with their bishops — if it is 
not allowed, the clergy are degraded by attending synods." — 
Morning Herald, 

"Knowledge. — Let us, then, while engaged in the honour- 
able pursuit of wealth, engage at the same time, with at least 
equal eagerness, in the pursuit of knowledge. If Providence 
should smile on our exertions to obtain wealth, our intellectual 



282 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

attainments will enable ns to enjoy that wealth with elegance 
and taste — to employ that wealth, so as to promote the happiness 
of others — to move with honour in that higher class of society to 
which our wealth will introduce us— and to discharge faithfully 
any public duties which our country's voice may call us to per- 
form. But if, on the other hand, the winds of heaven should 
scatter our ships, the fire devour our storehouses, or the sons of 
wickedness rob us of the fruits of our industry, — still, amid the 
wreck of our fortunes, our intellectual and moral worth will 
secure the respect of those around us, and we shall possess within 
ourselves a source of happiness more pure, more serene, more 
constant than all the wealth and all the luxuries of India can 
supply. c Happy is the man that findeth wisdom, and the man 
that getteth understanding. Eor the merchandise of it is better 
than the merchandise of silver, and the gain thereof than fine 
gold.'" — Lectures on Ancient Commerce. 

III. — The Trilemma. 

It has been remarked as a characteristic of the late Sir 
Robert Peel, that in introducing his measures to the House 
of Commons, he often used the trilemma. " Three courses 
are before us — to go backward, to stand still, to go forward. 
We cannot go backward ; we cannot stand still ; we must, 
then, go forward." 

".Go and say unto David, Thus saith the Lord, I offer thee 
three things ; choose thee one of them, that I may do it unto 
thee. So Gad came to David, and told him, and said unto him, 
Shall seven years of famine come unto thee in thy land ? or wilt 
thou flee three months before thine enemies, while they pursue 
thee ? or that there be three days' pestilence in thy land ? now 
advise, and see what answer I shall return to him that sent me. 
And David said unto Gad, I am in a great strait : let us fall now 
into the hand of the Lord ; for his mercies are great : and let me 
not fall into the hand of men. So the Lord sent a pestilence upon 
Israel from the morning even to the time appointed : and there 
died of the people from Dan even to Beer-sheba seventy thousand 
men." — 2 Sam. xxiv. 12 — 15. 

Sometimes a subject is divided into three parts, with the 
view of disproving two of these parts in order to affirm the 
third. Thus, workmen must have fair wages — not too high 
or too low. 

"And each of these employers is forced to pay each of his 
workmen as high wages as the work which the workman does,- 



REASONING BY COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 283 

and the price which goods sell for, will allow. For if he paid 
less, his workmen would leave him to get better wages else- 
where ; and if he paid more, he would lose instead of gaining, 
by employing them ; and if he were to pay every workman alike, 
whatever were the quantity or goodness of the work done by 
him, it is certain that in most cases he would be paying either 
too much or too little : too much to the bad workmen, and too 
little to the good ones. Besides this, when workmen are not 
paid according to their merit, there are scarcely any good ones : 
because when they see that they are no gamers by working well, 
and working hard, they all become idle or careless." — Easy Lessons 
on Money Matters. 

Mr. Gilfillan thus describes the Scripture idea of the 
Universe : — 

"There are three methods of contemplating the universe. 
These are the material, the shadowy, and the mediatorial. The 
materialist looks upon it as the only reality. It is a vast solid 
fact, for ever burning and rolling around, below and above him. 
The idealist, on the contrary, regards it as a shadow, a mode of 
mind, an infinite projection of his own thought. The man who 
stands between the two extremes, looks on nature as a great but 
not ultimate or everlasting scheme of mediation or compromise 
between pure and absolute spirit and the incarnate soul of man. 
To the materialist there is an altar, the lighted, heaven-high, but 
no God. To the idealist there is a God, but no altar. He who 
holds the theory of mediation has the Great Spirit as his God, 
and the universe as the altar on which he presents the gift of his 
worship or poetic praise." — Gilfillan 's Bards of the Bible. 

The following trilemma has been employed in defence of 
the writings of the Old Testament: — " If the books of the 
Old Testament be forgeries, they must have been invented 
by either the Gentiles, the Christians, or the Jews. They 
could not have been invented by the Gentiles, because they 
were all ignorant of the history and sacred rites of the 
Hebrews; they could not have been invented by the Chris- 
tians, as no Christians existed previous to the introduction 
of Christianity ; they could not have been invented by the 
Jews, because they contain difficult laws and rules, and 
relate all their idolatrous crimes and punishments, which 
would not have been inserted if the writings had been 
forged by Jews ; therefore, these writings could not have 
been forged at all." 



284 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

IV. — The Prosyllogism. 

Happiness is the result of certain habits ; 
Man has the power of acquiring those habits ; 
Therefore, man has the power of making himself happy. 

Man has the power of making himself happy • 
Every wise man uses this power ; 
Therefore, every wise man is a happy man. 

V. — The Sorites. 

" Now if Christ be preached that he rose from the dead, 
how say some among you that there is no resurrection of 
the dead 1 But if there be no resurrection of the dead, 
then is Christ not risen : and if Christ be not risen, then 
is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain. Yea, 
and we are found false witnesses of God ; because we have 
testified of God that he raised up Christ : whom he raised 
not up, if so be that the dead rise not. For if the dead 
rise not, then is not Christ raised." — 1 Cor. xv. 12 — 16. 

This argument may be placed in the form of a sorites, 
thus : — 

If Christ rose from the dead, it must have been through a 
divine power. 

If Christ was raised from the dead by divine power, it proved 
that he was a prophet sent of God. 

If he was a prophet sent of God, then all his predictions will 
be accomplished. 

If all his predictions will be accomplished, then his prediction 
that the dead shall be raised will be accomplished. 

Therefore, if Christ rose from the dead, the dead will be 
raised. 

Other Scriptural examples may be seen in Rom. viii. 
29, 30; andx. 13—15. 

The following is the train of reasoning followed by those 
who adopt the principle of the Act of 1844 with reference 
to the administration of the currency : — 

A favourable state of the Exchange will cause an importation 
of gold. 

This importation of gold will cause a corresponding issue of 
bank notes. 






REASONING BY COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 28-5 

This issue of bank notes will cause a general advance in the 
prices of commodities. 

This general advance of prices will check exportation and 
encourage importation. 

This decrease of exports and increase of imports will turn the 
exchanges against us. 

The exchange being turned against us, will cause a demand for 
the exportation of gold. 

This demand for the exportation of gold will cause the notes 
to be taken to the bank of England, and payment demanded in 
gold. 

The notes in circulation will thus be diminished, and the cur- 
rency will again be placed in a sound state. 

The sorites, it will be seen, embraces a number of argu- 
ments connected together. It is therefore called a chain 
of reasoning. It resembles a chain in this, that if one 
link be broken, the whole argument is destroyed. In the 
example we have just given, the third link is denied by 
Mr. Tooke, who contends that an increase in the amount 
of the circulation has no effect on the prices of commo- 
dities. Were this doctrine demonstrated, the chain would 
be broken, and the whole reasoning annihilated.* 

The sorites is the form of reasoning employed in mathe- 
matical deductions. If you pay attention, I will give you 
an illustration of this, and explain it so clearly, that you 
will be able to understand all the operations, even though 
you may not have learned algebra. I take the question 
from one of my old school-books : 

"When first the marriage knot was tied 

Betwixt my wife and me, 
My age did hers as far exceed 

As three times three does three ; 
But when ten years and half ten years 

We man and wife had been, 
Her age came up as near to mine 

As eight is to sixteen. 

Now tell me, I pray, 

What were our ages on the wedding-day ?" 

I will presume at starting that you know the sign -f- 
denotes plus or more, the sign — denotes minus or less, 

* "A chain may be composed of bo^h strong and wenk links, but its strength as 
a chain can never be greater than that of the weakest imk in it." — Bailey, p. 58. 



2SQ LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 



X denotes multiplication, and = denotes equality. Now 
then we will begin. The figures 1, 2, &c., at your left 
hand express the number of operations. 

1. Let the age of the wife on the wedding-day be represented 
by the letter x. 

2. Then, as the husband's age to the wife's is as "three times 
three to three," his age must be three times x, say 3 x. 

3. Ten years and half ten years are equal to fifteen years. 

4. At the end of fifteen years the wife's age will be x + 15, 
chat is, x added to 15. 

5. And the husband's age will be 3 x + 15, that is, three times 
x added to 15. 

6. By the question, the wife's and the husband's ages should 
at this period be in the proportion of 8 to 16. As 8 is to 16 so 
is x + 15 to 3 x + 15 ; expressed thus ; 

8 : 16 : : x + 15 : 3 x + 15. 

7. Now you know by the rule of three, that if the two ex- 
tremes (that is, the first and the fourth terms) be multiplied 
together, the product will be the same as the product of the 
multiplication of the two means (that is, the second and third 
terms). Now, 

3 x + 15 multiplied by 8 give 24 x + 120, and 
x + 15 multiplied by 16 give 16 x -f 240. 

8. As these two products are equal to each other, we thus 
form our equation ; 

24 # + 120 = 16.?+ 240. 
You will read the equation thus, — Twenty-four x plus 120 equal 
sixteen x plus 240. 

9. Our uext operation will be to transpose the 16 # to the other 
side of the equation. In doiug this we must of course change 
the sign. As it is now plus, we must make it minus. Our equa- 
tion will then stand thus ; 

24# — 16 x + 120 = 240; 
that is, 24 x minus 16 x plus 120 equals 240. 

10. We will now deduct the — 16 x from the 24 x. The equa- 
tion will stand thus ; 

8 x + 120 = 240. 

11. "We will now transpose the 120 to the other side of the 
equation, changing its sign of course, thus ; 

8 x = 240 — 120 ; 
that is, 8 x equals 240 minus 120. 

12. We will now deduct the —120 from the 240, and the 
equation will stand thus ; 

_ 8.? = 120. 

13. We will now divide both sides of the equation by 8, and 
we shall have, 1 x == 15. 



ft 



REASONING BY COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 28T 

14. Now then we have discovered the value of x ; that is, we 
have found that the age of the wife on the wedding-day was 15 
years. And as the husband's age was as three times three to 
three, his age must have been 45. Then after ten years and half 
ten years— that is, 15 years — the wife's age would be 30 and the 
husband's 60, which is as eight is to sixteen. 

You see what a beautiful process of reasoning we have 
gone through, and with what certainty we have arrived at 
the result. This is called mathematical reasoning. It 
is the kind of reasoning employed in Algebra, Geome- 
try, Astronomy, Navigation, and the other Mathematical 
Sciences. 

I will close this Section by another problem : — 

" "While I was coursing on the forest grounds, 
Up starts a hare before my two greyhounds : 
The dogs, being light of foot, did fairly run, 
Unto her fifteen rods just twenty-one. 
The distance that she started up before 
"Was fourscore fifteen rods just "and no more. 
I pray you, scholar, unto me declare, 
How far they ran before they caught the hare ?" 

1. For the distance they ran put x. 

2. Then the distance the hare ran will be x — 95 rods. 

3. Then as 21 is to 15 so is x to x — 95. 

21 : 15 : : x : x — 95 

4. Then multiply the two extremes together and the two 
means together, and we have an equation, thus : — 

21 x — 1995 = 15 x. 

5. 21 x = 15 x + 1995. 

6. 21 x — 15 x = 1995. 

7. &x = 1995. 

8. x = 332|rods. 

Distance run by the dogs, 332| rods. 
Do. (95 less) run by the hare, 237| do. 
As 21 is to 15 so is 3321 to 237i 



28S LOGIC FOR THE MILLION, 

SECTION VI. 

SERIES OF REASONINGS. 

We have shown that a chain of reasoning consists cf a 
number of reasons so connected with each other, that the 
failure of one reason would destroy the whole argument. 
A series of reasoning denotes a number of reasons all 
bearing to prove the same sentiment, but so far uncon- 
nected with each other, that the failure of one reason does 
not weaken the force of the others. 

It is impossible to lay down rules whereby a number of 
reasons may be so arranged as to produce the best effect 
in establishing the point for which they are adduced. 
Indeed, people who are sufficiently skilled in logic to be 
able to maintain their sentiments in a set discourse, must 
have acquired that systematic habit of mind which will sug- 
gest the best rules for the arrangement of their thoughts. 
For the sake of the young we will transcribe a few rules, 
which have chiefly a reference to the writing of themes, 
published by an author who has had great experience in 
tuition : — 

"In treating of method in reasoning, it is common to divide it 
into two kinds, analysis and synthesis. All, however, that seems 
necessary to be said in this treatise concerning these distinctions, 
is, that in the mode of reasoning called synthesis, the proposition 
is the conclusion sought ; but in the reasoning called analysis, 
the conclusion cannot be previously proposed ; for till the argu- 
ments on which it depends are unfolded, it is presumed to be 
unknown. In reasoning synthetically, the arguer knows before- 
hand what is to be established : and he may, at his option, pro- 
pose it first, and add his arguments afterwards, or he may neglect 
to state the intended proposition, till he has brought forward 
what he has to advance in support of it. In reasoning analyti- 
cally, the arguer lays down nothing to be proved, nor has he any 
foreknown conclusion in view, but he goes on, unfolding one 
argument after another, till he reaches a conclusion. Analysis, 
therefore, is the way by which we attain truth ; synthesis, that 
by which we communicate it. We pursue the method of analysis, 
when, not having formed our judgment on a subject, we tliink to 
ourselves in order to form one : we pursue the method of synthesis, 



SERIES OP REASONINGS. 289 

when our judgment is formed, and we undertake to convince 
others. It is scarcely necessary to add that in writing themes, 
the principle on which we proceed is synthesis. 

"Before anything more particular is advanced on the method 
of writing themes, it must be mentioned, that the manner in 
which a theme is given out, determines what latitude is allowed 
to the writer in treating it. When a theme is given out thus — 
' On education/ ' On a knowledge of the world ' — the theme may 
be called unlimited ; for the writer is left to lay down any propo- 
sitions to be proved which he may think fit, provided they bear a 
due relation to the subject. But a particular proposition being 
laid down to be proved, necessarily limits the theme; as for 
instance, when a theme is given out thus — ' Man is the creature 
of education ;' ' A proper knowledge of the world is favourable 
to virtue.' This kind of theme is called a thesis, — a Greek word 
signifying position or proposition; — in the plural, theses. An 
unlimited theme generally contains many theses ; for whenever 
the writer goes into a new branch of his subject, he must lay 
down, or have in view, some new proposition, — that is, a thesis. 
In a limited theme there is but one main proposition, to which 
every other ought to be subservient. This main proposition is 
called, by distinction, the thesis, and the theme which is written 
in support of it, takes the same name." 

" Suppose the theme given out to be c Eriendship ;' — teachers 
recommend the pupil to consider it under the following heads : — 
the Definition ; the Cause ; the state in ancient and in modern 
times ; the Advantages ; the Disadvantages. Proper answers to 
the following questions will form such a theme as is here 
required : — 

"1. What is friendship? 2. What is the cause of friendship? 
3. What was anciently thought of friendship, and what examples 
are on record ? 4. What is friendship often found to be in these 
days? 5. What are the benefits of true friendship? 6. What 
are the evils of false friendship ?" 

" When, instead of an unlimited title, a thesis is given out to 
be proved, teachers recommend the following heads as helps to 
find the arguments : — the Proposition ; the Reason ; the Confir- 
mation ; the Simile ; the Testimony ; the Example ; the Conclu- 
sion. Under the first head, the writer restates his thesis in such 
a shape, that the arguments he designs to use will easily connect 
with it. Under the second, he brings forth the strongest direct 
internal argument he can find in proof of it, — that is, from the 
nature of the thing, from enumeration, from the cause, the effect, 
the adjuncts, the antecedents, or the consequents. Under the 
third, he tries to strengthen his proof by showing the absurdity 
of the contrary proposition, or by advancing some fresh argument 
of whatever kind that is not taken from the same source as tha 



290 LOGIC EOS THE MILLION. 

preceding, and does not anticipate those that are to follow. 
Under the fourth, he uses an argument from similitude. These 
are internal arguments. Under the next two heads, he brings 
forward testimonies or authorities from authors of repute, and 
facts from history. And lastly, he forms his conclusion not 
merely in the words of the proposition with which he set out, 
(though in strictness the conclusion would be nothing more,) but 
with some practical inference or inferences appended to it." — 
Practical Logic, or Hints to Theme- Writers. By B. H. Smart. 

We shall now present the reader with some examples of 
propositions being proved by series of reasonings. 

I. — The Industrial Exhibition. 

From an Address delivered by the Earl of Carlisle at the Meeting 
at Westminster. 

"The object of the undertaking was too generally known to 
call for explanation, and too generally approved of throughout the 
country to stand in need of defence. He was not a member of 
the Royal Commission to which the office had been entrusted of 
superintending the management and execution of the project, 
and he was therefore not called upon to enlighten them with 
reference to the specific details. He could only make the most 
general remarks, and submit the most general grounds which, as 
he conceived, this undertaking put forward for their support. 
The first ground was one of a very general character, because it 
rested on the constitution of our common nature. He liked the 
occasional recurrence of celebrations, pomps, festivities, com- 
memorations — call them by whatever name you please. They 
seemed to him in accordance with the feelings and instincts im- 
planted in the human breast. He did not call to muid any 
country or era which had dispensed with them. In the primitive 
east, both in ancient and in our own times, they were, for the 
most part, associated with ceremonies of worship, with uncouth, 
and too often horrid rites. In more enlightened and civilized 
Greece, they consisted of public games, in displays of physical 
strength, ennobled, it was true, by the susceptibility of her people 
to all the forms of taste and beauty, and recorded in immortal 
song. Among the sterner Romans they generally accompanied 
the long train of martial triumphs up the steep ascent of the 
Capitol, or the more degrading spectacles which summoned the 
men, and, alas ! the women of Rome, to witness the dying throes 
of the gladiator, or the bloody struggles of captives and wild 
beasts. In our own age and country they naturally wore a softer 
aspect ; but still, in his judgment, had been too much confined 
to the easier and wealthier classes, or connected with the pursuits 



SERIES OF REASONINGS. 291 

of frivolity and dissipation. It seemed, therefore, but natural 
and becoming at the period of the world at which we were 
arrived, that industry, that skill, that enterprise should in their 
turn have their own ovation, their own triumph, their own high 
holiday, where the workmen and workwomen of the world might 
enjoy a day's pause from their engrossing toils for the purpose of 
seeing what their fellow-workmen and workwomen were doing 
and could do all the world over — that they might see, not barbaric 
rites, but useful inventions ; not exhibitions of physical prowess 
in the prize ring, or the foot-race, but results which interested 
the mind and elevated the soul; not suppliant provinces and 
chained captives, but the pursuits of peace and of civilization — not 
crowded saloons and heated theatres, but an arena where all ranks 
might mingle, where all might learn, and all might profit by what 
they saw. This was one of the grounds which the undertaking 
put forward for support. It might be reckoned one, perhaps, 
rather of a sentimental and fanciful character ; he would proceed 
to one somewhat more practical. The exhibition, carried into 
effect on the scale proposed, would give people in. all pursuits and 
professions, in all classes and callings, the opportunity of examin- 
ing and ascertaining methods by which the work which formed 
the daily business of their lives might be expedited, facilitated, 
assisted, and improved. There might be the textures which best 
suited the climate in which we lived. There might be the tools 
and implements calculated to lighten or shorten labour. There 
might be the discoveries in mechanics which should mould to the 
purpose of man the unvarying attributes of matter, space, and 
time ; discoveries of which we, perhaps, had long been in the un- 
conscious need, but which had long been beneficially adopted in 
other countries. He could not but look forward with pleasure 
and hope to the evidences which our countrymen would afford of 
the distinguished progress they had made in the pursuits of 
civilized life, and especially in those which interested most per- 
manently the well-being and comfort of the millions. And though, 
he could not forget, on this occasion, as he could not forget on 
any occasion, his long connexion with a district which had attained 
a marked eminence in all these departments of production — the 
West Riding of Yorkshire, the region of our cutlery, of our hard- 
ware, of our great woollen and worsted manufactures — yet he 
must say, that he not only anticipated advantage to the country 
from our victories on this occasion, but also from our defeats. It 
was only when we could compare and put side by side what we 
could not do and what we were not with what we could do and 
with what we were, that we could attain the true measure of our 
superiority and of our deficiencies. Nations, equally with indi- 
viduals, should say, after Brutus, — 

' I should be glad to learn of better men.' " 
2 



LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

II. — The Industrial Exhibition and the London 
Shopkeepers. 

" In what way can the Exhibition have injured trade ? Let us 
place the matter steadily before us for consideration, and ask 
ourselves by what conceivable means the vast addition that has 
been made to the floating population of London can possibly take 
money out of the pockets of our tradesmen ? Here are the rail- 
way termini and steamboat quays daily pouring upon the town 
their thousands of visitors to the Crystal Palace. How can the 
presence of these almost innumerable multitudes be said to injure 
trade? Granted that considerable bodies of the labouring popu- 
lation come and go in the same day, even these have given a 
considerable stimulus to the receipts of the railways, and of the 
ordinary conveyances which ply about our streets. Thousands 
no doubt come and go, but thousands remain for twenty-four, for 
forty- eight hours, for a week. About 50,000 persons daily visit 
the Crystal Palace. We presume that these sojourners are 
affected by the ordinary wants of humanity. They must eat 
something, they must drink something, they must sleep some- 
where. It is certain that the great bulk of the number will soon 
have returned to their homes, yet they will be replaced by others, 
who will be replaced by others in their turn. Now, is it natural 
to suppose that the ladies of the different parties, old or young, 
will be indisposed to carry back from ' town ' such articles of 
finery as may be best calculated for the enslavement of the 
country-side? We will not confine the observation to ladies 
alone, for we have yet to learn that men who come up from the 
provinces to make holiday, with a reasonable amount of ready 
money in their pockets, do not usually succumb to temptation 
before the brilliant shop-fronts of the metropolis. A watch must 
be purchased for one fair cousin, a dress for another, and so on. 
Each lays in a stock of presents for absent friends, according 
to his means and degree — the selfish fellows' buy for themselves. 
We are surely not exaggerating matters, for we find, on turning 
to the traffic returns of the railways for the past week, as com- 
pared with the corresponding week of last year, that the London 
and NorthWestern has taken 66,561/?. as against 51,492/. Now, 
all due abatement made for other causes which might have stimu- 
lated traffic, is there not here enough to show the nature of the 
addition that must have been made to the floating population of 
the metropolis during the past week ? The past week is merely 
a repetition of other weeks that have preceded it, and a sample 
of others that are to follow. 

"We have not dwelt upon the influx of foreigners that has 
actually taken place, although a considerable increase in the usual 
number of our continental visitors must, of necessity, exercise a 



SERIES OF REASONINGS. 293 

very important influence upon trade. Granting that the ex- 
penditure of each of them individually may be but slight, yet, 
taken collectively, that expenditure must represent a vast amount 
of consumption, and consequently of profit to the London trades- 
man. Common sense, then, would tell us a priori that a great 
concourse of people within the limits of a particular town must" 
exercise a very beneficial influence upon trade. When we come 
to try the case by other tests, how does it stand ? Were the 
streets of London ever more crowded than during the present 
Exhibition year? Are they not swarming with carriages and 
throngs of well-dressed people? Is there not more than the 
usual difficulty in getting served in any shop which has attained 
a celebrity in any particular department of trade ? Has the 
' season,' as it is called, been a bad one for those tradesmen who 
minister to the luxurious tastes of the fashionable world ? If you 
passed at night through any of the quarters of the town in which 
Eashion holds her seat, you might see mansion after mansion 
lighted up, and find to your sore discomfort that the usual strings 
of carriages 'stopped the way.' A bare reference to the columns 
of the public journals hi which such matters are usually recorded 
would be sufficient to show that never, as far as entertainments 
go, has a gayer season been known. Of all the ill-timed and 
illogical cries that ever were raised, this one of injury to the 
trade of London in consequence of the Great Exhibition is the 
most fatuous and the most untrue. We should be curious to 
have in a succinct form a detailed account of the miseries of some 
London shopkeeper who could establish any connexion between 
his losses and the Crystal Palace in Hyde Park. Still more 
should we feel obliged to any one who could favour us with any 
approximation to the per contra." — Times, Aug. 11, 1851. 

III. — The Permanency of Modern Civilization. 

"A youthful student, returning from a journey which he had 
undertaken for the purpose ot viewing some newly-discovered 
Roman coins, became fatigued, and reclining beneath the spread- 
ing branches of an oak, he sank into a profound meditation. His 
thoughts were directed by the subject of his recent investigations. 
' Yes,' he exclaimed, ' it must be so ; the civilization of the mo- 
derns, like that of the ancients, will decline : it is the law of 
nature. The flower at my feet will wither by to-morrow's noon. 
This forest will in a few revolving months be bereft of its foliage. 
The sun is now on its decline, and will shortly fall below the 
horizon. The surface of the earth, now clothed with beauty, 
will soon be stripped of all its charms, by the ruffian hand of 
winter. Science is no doubt subject to similar revolutions. Where 
are the glories of Egypt and Constantinople ? where now is the 



29 i LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

learning of Persia and Arabia ? and what are the modern charac- 
ters of Athens and of Rome ? Ah, Rome, how art thou fallen ! 
We seek thy honours beneath the clod : the monuments of thy 
greatness are buried in the earth. How many of thy arts are 
lost, never to be restored ! Neither eminent science, nor exten- 
sive dominion, nor military prowess, could prevent thy fall ! And 
what a long and dreary night succeeded thy meridian splendour ? 
The lapse of ages, impelling wave after wave, has hitherto over- 
whelmed all human greatness. Modern science will no doubt be 
subject to a similar doom, and sink into the abyss of oblivion. 
Yes, in a few years all the discoveries in art will be forgotten — 
all our labours in science will be unknown — our exertions in 
literature will be buried in darkness. The world will again be 
immersed in barbarism, and exhibit no more traces of its present 
civilization, than is to be found of the loveliness of summer after 
the devastations of a winter's storm.' 

" An aged philosopher who had overheard this soliloquy, now 
approached : ' My son, 5 he exclaimed, c despair not of the per- 
manency of modern science : the waves of time have indeed washed 
away the frail fabrics of ancient institutions ; the leaves of ancient 
lore have, it is true, withered away, and even the tree was 
plucked up by its roots by the hand of the Barbarian : but does 
that justify the supposition, that modern science will share a 
similar fate ? Listen now to me, and perceive how different are 
the cases from each other : — 

" ' Knowledge was never general among the ancients : a few 
favoured individuals were admitted to the temple of science, and 
were initiated into the knowledge of what were then her myste- 
ries ; but the mass of the people were excluded, and remained 
untaught : the necessary time and expense were an eternal bar 
to their attainment of knowledge. With us education will soon 
be universal : knowledge, like the light of heaven, is now poured 
over all the land. Had the mass of the people been educated, 
when the barbarians overthrew the Roman empire, the conquered 
would soon have civilized the conquerors, and science would have 
been preserved. The Tartars conquered the Chinese; the Romans 
conquered the Greeks : but these events did not destroy, but ex- 
tended the triumphs of civilization. 

" ' The ancients were unacquainted with the art of printing. 
The student, in ancient times, attended the lectures of his 
master, and from his oral instructions obtained a knowledge of 
the science he wished to learn. The arts of ancient times were 
enclosed in manuscripts, and placed in the libraries of the schools; 
hence, when these libraries were destroyed, all knowledge was 
destroyed. Then science was placed in large reservoirs, and 
those who had leisure and means, might resort thither and drink: 
but the art of printing has supplied aqueducts, and conveyances, 



SERIES OF REASONINGS. 205 

fcy which, the streams of knowledge are conducted to every 
private habitation. 

" ' The art of war, too, has undergone an alteration, which is 
friendly to civilization. In ancient times, poor nations conquered 
the wealthy, and the barbarous those which were civilized. The 
invention of gunpowder, by rendering wars less frequent and less 
destructive, has been productive of advantage to mankind. Our 
fortified places cannot now be taken by barbarians. War is now 
expensive and systematic ; and in the conflict all the advantages 
are on the side of the wealthy and the civilized. Civilization 
found the Genius of War in a savage state ; she taught him, and 
disciplined him ; and now, in return, the Genius of War protects 
and extends the empire of Civilization. 

" ' But, were we less able to repel the attacks of barbarians, 
from whence are those barbarians to arrive ? Where are now the 
forests, from which, as from a hive, they are to issue forth, and 
devastate civilized Europe ? Is it from the empire of the Czar ? 
Is it not the most thinly populated country of Europe ? And 
even had it been more populous, or more powerful, has it mani- 
fested any desire to exterminate the arts ? 

" ' But suppose, in defiance of all probability, that a horde of 
savages may again issue from the regions of the North : suppose 
them to be successful, and to effect what Napoleon, with all his 
gigantic powers and his immense resources, could never effect — 
the subjugation of Europe, — have we not another advantage 
over the ancients ? Have we not an immense navigation ? Have 
we not numerous ships ? Could we not take our arts and our 
sciences and carry them to distant nations, to which barbarians 
could not follow us ? No ; the lamp of science could not be 
extinguished — it would be rekindled in a distant hemisphere, and 
its piercing rays would illumine the seats of its former glory. 5 " 
— The Author. 

IV. — The Advantages op Music. 

" Music exists not only in the lower, but also in the higher, 
grades of creation. We laugh, and cry, and speak music. 
Everybody is more or less of a musician, though he knows it not. 
A laugh is produced by repeating in quick succession two sounds 
which differ from each other by a single whole tone. A cry aris- 
ing from pain, grief, or bereavement, is the utterance of two 
sounds differing from each other half a tone. A yawn runs down 
a whole octave before it ceases. A cough may be expressed by 
musical intervals. A question camiot be asked without that 
change of tone which musicians call a fifth, a sixth, or an eighth. 
This is the music of nature. There is not a man who speaks five 
minutes without gliding through the whole gamut, only in speak- 



296 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 



ing 3 the tones, from not being* protracted, slide imperceptibly into 
each other. In short, every sound of the human lip is loaded 
with music." 

"Music was part of the preparatory Pythagorean discipline. 
Aristides says, ' Music is calculated to compose the mind and fit 
it for instruction ;' Picus Mirandola, ' Music produces like effects 
on the mind as medicine on the body;' Plato, 'Music to the 
mind is as air to the body ;' Homer, ' Achilles was taught music 
in order to moderate his passions ;' Aulus Gellius, ' Sciatica is 
cured by music ;' Milton, ' If wise men are not such, music has 
a great power and disposition to make them gentle;' Chry- 
sostom, ' God has joined music with worship, that we might with 
cheerfulness and readiness of mind express his praise in sacred 
hymns ;' Bishop Home, ' The heart may be weaned from every- 
thing base and mean, and elevated to everything excellent and 
praiseworthy, by sacred music' Martin Luther was deeply 
affected by music. One day two of Luther's friends, on visiting 
him, found him in deep despondency, and prostrate on the floor. 
They struck up one of the solemn and beautiful tunes which the 
Reformer loved. His melancholy fled ; he rose and joined his 
friends, adding, ' The devil hates good music' " 

"Music has a wonderfully soothing influence : purer than 
painting, more ethereal than poetry, and the least sensuous of 
any, it exercises the greatest power over the human mind. Are 
you, young men, worn out with the toils of the day, and anxious 
to drown the lingering echoes of the roar of the wheels and ma- 
chinery of mammon ? Learn to sing, or play on the violin, 
sacred anthems, airs, and tunes. Amusement or relaxation you 
must have. Try this ; it will exert on you all the power and none 
of the poison of opium. Singing keeps off pulmonary disease. 
Disease of the lungs often arises from failing fully to inflate them. 
Now moderate exercise of the voice is just as necessary to the 
health of the whole chest as exercise of the whole body to its 
healthy development. Music has also an inspiring power. If 
you feel dull, sleepy, and exhausted, a lively tune on the violin 
will rouse your nerves, and restore them to harmony. Don't 
have recourse to wine or alcohol ; these will aggravate, not cure. 
Try music ; it is essentially teetotal, and yet inspiriting." 

" Adam and Eve, as sketched by Milton, delighted in song ; 
they sang many a beautiful duet, and knew not what discord was 
till sin entered and death by sin. The music of the spheres is 
intimated by David when he states, 'The heavens declare the 
glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handywork.' The 
children of Israel, on their escape from the reach of Pharaoh, 
sang, 'I will sing unto the Lord, for he hath triumphed gloriously;' 
' and Miriam the prophetess, and all the women went out after 
her with timbrels.' David was a great musical reformer ; at the 



to 

id 



SERIES OP REASONINGS. 297 

close of his reign four thousand Levites praised the Lord. When 
the ark was brought into Solomon's temple, 'It came to pass 
that the trumpeters and singers were as one in praising and 
thanking the Lord : and when they lifted up their voice with 
trumpets, and cymbals, and instruments of music, saying, For he 
is good, his mercy endureth for ever ; and when all the children 
of Israel saw it they bowed themselves, with their faces to the 
ground, upon the pavement, and worshipped and praised the 
Lord, saying, Eor he is good, for his mercy endureth for ever.' " 

" It has been urged that the study of music leads to dissipa- 
tion, that musical, men are not of the most temperate or domestic 
habits. If it be so, it is deeply to be deplored ; but surely there 
is no essential connexion between music and wine : Apollo and 
Bacchus are not Siamese twins : wine-glasses, and quavers, and 
semibreves, are not sisters, nor even second cousins. In the 
natural world, Music and Temperance are plainly sisters. The 
blackbird, thrush, canary, and nightingale, all exquisitely musical, 
drink nothing but water, and smoke nothing but fresh air. A 
grove or wood in spring echoes with feathered musicians, each a 
teetotaller, temperate without a pledge, and ever singing and 
never dry." — Lecture on Music, by the Rev. Dr. Gumming. 

V. — Congregational Chanting. 

" We go back to the ancient Jewish Church ; that Church, we 
know, was formed, presided over, and guided in all things by God. 
I don't myself see that the Jews could know anything at all about 
our kind of psalmody. Their psalmody must have been a species of 
chanting, because, from the very nature of Hebrew poetry, it could 
not have been anything else. The poetry and sacred psalms of the 
ancient Church were not in common metre, long metre, and short 
metre, such as you have : not verses with exact number of feet and 
syllables that can be sung to a tune. The poetry of the Bible is 
rather in thought, though it is also in expression. There is an idea, 
and then there is the echo of the idea ; and so the poetry goes on, 
idea contrasting, or repeating, or illustrating idea, and thus we have 
parallel lines. These lines, however, are not of the same length ; 
hence the very construction of the song prevented its being sung to 
a tune like our psalm-tune, and so the praise of the ancient Church 
must of necessity have been of the nature of our chanting. And 
not only so, but you will see, from the very structure of many of 
the Psalms, that they were responsive ; one class of the singers 
sang one sentence, and another class responded to it. We have 
a representation of what I mean in the vision of Isaiah, where 
the seraphim are represented as answering one another ; and you 
have another specimen of it in that very ancient song of Miriam's, 
which was sung when the Israelites had passed through the Red 
o 3 



298 



LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 



Sea — though that is rather choral than antiphonal. Many of 
the Psalms, however, are obviously constructed to be used anti- 
phonally. We can hardly conceive, in reference to the 136th 
Psalm, but that in worship the manner was to take up each clause 
alternately. The 118th Psalm is a very remarkable Psalm : if you 
look attentively into that, you will see that the different clauses 
are constructed to be sung by different persons. So of the 24th. 
A question is asked by one party of singers, and an answer is 
given by another party. That is, these Psalms were composed 
for chanting antiphonally." 

" To me there is something exceedingly solemn, something 
very touching in looking back to the last supper. Our Lord had 
performed the last act with his disciples as Jews in the Jewish 
Church ; and, along with that, had established the ordinance of 
the Christian dispensation. And it was after he had done this — 
after he had added the Christian to the Jewish, that he sang a 
hymn with his disciples, according to the mode in use in the Jewish 
Church. Chanting psalms was the course of the service of praise 
at that time; and after our Lord had united with his disciples in 
one of these songs, he went forth to that great agony which was 
to be the subject of the song of the new dispensation. Why, the 
very first, the greatest, and sublimest act of praise in the Chris- 
tian Church, in which the Master and Head of that Church 
joined, would be something in the nature of a chant — the sacred 
song which belonged to that peculiar service. Well, then, you 
know the same thing must have taken place in the first assem- 
blies of Christians. They did not change the Jewish language or 
the form of Jewish poetry — there was the introduction of no new 
metrical literature ; the old songs continued, but a new sense was 
attached to the words : the songs of the ancient Church were 
sung with the glorious associations of the new dispensation. I 
cannot see myself that there was room or opportunity for any- 
thing but this kind of praise in the Apostolic Church. I am very 
much disposed to think that when the disciples carried out the 
injunction which had been given them, f to teach one another in 
psalms, and hymns, and spiritual songs/ not only was chanting 
the kind of singing employed, but that they answered one an- 
other in their songs ; and when Paul and Silas sang praises to 
God while in the prison, it is not improbable that they did this 
antiphonally." 

" Here it may be remarked that there are no reasons for think- 
ing that Christian praise was originally official, — that the singers 
were kept separate from the congregation, and took the singing, 
as it were, out of their mouth. AJ1 the people had a right, and 
were required to take part in this service. It was from the 
circumstance that the people got into the habit of singing without 
proper feeling and decorum, that official singing was introduced. 



SERIES OP REASONINGS. 299 

It was not introduced with the design of preventing the people 
singing, but for the purpose of reformation, — to bring the Church, 
properly so called, back again to a more reverent and simple mode 
of performing this part of worship." — Lecture on Congregational 
Chanting, by the Rev. T. Binney. 

VI. — Social Responsibility. 

"It is not consistent with the teaching of our intellectual 
faculties, nor with the impulses of our moral feelings, that a 
Being of immaculate holiness and inflexible justice, and possessed, 
moreover, of omniscience and omnipotence, should permit, in 
even a single instance, that virtue should go unrewarded, and 
vice should remain unpunished. If the Creator of the world 
were not a righteous Being, he would not have implanted a love 
of righteousness in the minds of his creatures; and if he be 
a righteous Being, it is reasonable to expect that his righteous- 
ness should appear in all the operations of his moral govern- 
ment. And as we find this is not universally the case, we are 
driven to the conclusion, that the present state is not a state of 
final retribution; that the enjoyments and the afflictions of 
the present life are intended chiefly as instruments of moral 
discipline ; and that there is a future state of existence, in which 
the final distribution of rewards and punishments will take place. 
Thus reason concurs with Revelation in teaching us that c it is 
appointed unto men once to die, and after that the judgment.' 
The inequalities of the present world will thus be rectified in 
the next, and ' every man will be rewarded according to his 
works.' 

"But, however satisfactory this solution of the difficulty may be 
with regard to individuals, it does not apply to the case of public 
companies. Their existence commences and terminates in the 
present world, and they must be rewarded or punished in the 
present world, or they will not be punished or rewarded at all. 
In the latter case they are exempted from the moral government 
of God. With them virtue has no reward and vice no punish- 
ment. In reply to any exhortations to perform their moral and 
religious duties, they may exclaim, c What is the Almighty, that 
we should serve him, and what profit should we have if we pray 
unto him ?' ' We know not the Lord, neither will we obey his 
voice.' As, however, we cannot suppose that God has exempted 
public companies from his moral government, we must infer that 
they are punished or rewarded in the present state. • ■ 

" This conclusion rests upon the same evidence as the argu- 
ment we have just stated. In the former case the argument 
stands thus : — 

The Righteous Governor of the world must reward the good 
and punish, the wicked. 



300 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

But this is not done in the present world. 
Therefore, there must be a future world, in which this retribu- 
tion will take' place. 
Our present argument stands thus : — 

The Righteous Governor of the world must reward the good 
and punish the wicked, whether those actions are performed 
bj public bodies, or private individuals. 
But the public companies who now perform good or evil actions 

will not exist in a future world. 
Therefore, public companies must be rewarded or punished in 

the present world. 
" The only way of resisting this argument is either to maintain 
that public companies are not moral agents, and therefore not 
responsible for their good or evil actions, or that they will exist 
in a future world. The former part of the alternative we think 
we have sufficiently refuted — the latter is too wild to need refu- 
tation." — Gilbarts Practical Treatise on Banking. 

VII. Experience the Test of Truth. 

From a Sermon preached at St. Margaret's Church, 
Lothbury, by the Rev. Henry Melvill, B.D. 

" ' Philip findeth Nathanael, and saith unto him, We have found 
him, of whom Moses in the law, and the prophets, did write, 
Jesus of Nazareth, the son of Joseph. And Nathanael said unto 
him, Can there any good thing come out of Nazareth ? Philip 
saith unto him, Come and see.' — John i. 45, 46. 

" But now let us turn to the remaining topic presented by our 
text — the treatment which a prejudiced man should receive from 
a believer. It is very observable that Philip declined all contro- 
versy with Nathanael, though a fairer opening could hardly have 
been offered. Nathanael' s question might almost be said to have 
challenged controversy, or, if not controversy, some measure of 
expostulation. But Philip attempted no correction of the mis- 
take into which Nathanael had fallen ; he undertook no argument 
to prove to him the unreasonableness of his question. His only 
anxiety was to bring Nathanael into personal communication with 
Jesus : this was the method which had succeeded with himself, 
and he felt as though it could not possibly fail with another. And 
there was great wisdom in this : for it does not often happen 
that men are convinced by an argument. There is something in the 
intellectual warfare, whatever the subject which comes under dis- 
cussion, which seems generally to strengthen the combatants in 
their respective opinions. It may, therefore, be better in many 
cases, to try the ' Come and see' which Philip tried, and with 
which he succeeded. I will not endeavour by abstract arguments 



SERIES OF REASONINGS. 301 

to convince Nathanael that c good' can ' come out of Nazareth/ 
when I have that good to show him if he will only accompany 
me and look. If, for example, I can persuade a man to read the 
Bible, it may be immeasurably better than if I draw him into 
debate on the evidences of the Bible. He says to me, c Can 
there any good thing come out of Nazareth ? This Bible of 
yours is confessedly the work of illiterate men : would you per- 
suade me that I may be instructed from its pages?' And such 
a question tempts us to go straightway into controversy, to the 
varied and multiplied proofs of inspiration from the heaven above 
and from the earth beneath, from the past, the present, and the 
future. All crave to be urged — and occasions will arise in which 
it is indispensable to urge them; but, they are, perhaps, less 
numerous than those in which it were wiser to waive them, and 
bend all the effort to the persuading a man to c come and see ' for 
himself. "We like leaving the Bible to defend its own character, 
and make good its own pretensions. We have every confidence 
in the self-evidencing power of Scripture, in the power which 
there is in the contents of the Bible of acting as the credentials 
of the Bible. We have every faith in the fine saying, that there 
is no evidence of the truth of Christianity like that which a man 
knocks out for himself with the simple apparatus of a Bible and 
a conscience. The thorough suitableness of the gospel — its 
exact adaptation to our wants and our circumstances — in this 
lies a mighty argument that the gospel is from God. You admit 
the argument in regard to creation ; you admit that the precise 
adaptation of the world in which we dwell to the beings who 
inhabit it, is a vast proof that a supreme Intelligence prepared 
the dwelling-place for the creatures, and the creatures for the 
dwelling-place. You think that the existence of such a series of 
adjustments and contrivances seems to prove the one made on 
purpose for the other, and shows such evidence of design as 
should leave no doubt on the authorship of creation. Now we 
claim the very same admission in reference to redemption. If 
the exact adaptation of the world to our natural circumstances 
be received in evidence that God made the world, the just as 
exact adaptation of the gospel to our spiritual circumstances 
should be received in evidence that God planned the gospel. 
Ay, and as even a poor man, who has never been schooled in the 
lessons of natural theology, might feel the smile of a Deity in 
the sunshine which gladdened him, and hear the voice of a Deity 
in the melodies which soothed him, and trace the hand of a Deity 
in the supplies which sustained him, so might he convince him- 
self of the divinity of doctrines which dispersed all his anxieties, 
met all his wishes, and satisfied all his wants, though he never 
heard of the demonstrations of the schools, and was never 
trained to the defence of Christianity. And, therefore, ' Come 



302 LOGIC FOR TEE MILLION. 

and see' may be the best tiling to say to the modern Nathanael, 
who is inclined towards Deism; towards the rejection, that is, of 
the Scriptures as a revelation from Gocl. We ask him to read 
the Bible ; for, unfair as it is, the Bible may be rejected where 
it has never been read ; and many a sceptic, and many a young 
man who thinks it shows independence of mind to boast his infi- 
delity, if he be only close pressed, will be hardly able to tell you 
what those things are which he affects to disbelieve. Let there 
be only an endeavour to lay aside prejudice, and to read Scrip- 
ture with the same candour as is given to an ordinary book, and 
we can almost dare to answer that men will rise from the perusal 
disposed to confess that it is indeed the Word of God ; at least 
we can believe, that if no effect were wrought through Philip's 
method, ' Come and see,' neither would there have been through 
the more combative method, ' Come and debate.' " 



PART V. 



THE APPLICATIONS OP REASONING. 

We have now nearly completed our book. We have gone 
through the introduction to reasoning, the principles of 
reasoning, and the forms of reasoning. We have only 
to consider the applications of reasoning. Many of these 
applications you will have already noticed in the observa- 
tions and quotations I have brought before you. But as 
this matter is of great importance, we must consider it by 
itself. For the practical application of our reasonings is, 
after all, the great end of our acquiring a knowledge of the 
art of reasoning. 



SECTION I. 

THE APPLICATION OF THE ART OF REASONING TO THE 
ORDINARY AFFAIRS OF LIFE. 

In the application of logic to the ordinary affairs of life, 
we have first to discover general principles, and then to 
apply these general principles to particular circumstances. 
In the affairs of life you will have to rely mainly on your 
own judgment. And what are you reading logic for, but 
to enable you to form sound opinions for yourself 1 The 
following are some of the points that will require your con- 
sideration. Do not, however, confine your attention to the 
few illustrations I may quote, but consider each topic as 
the representative of a class of questions and opinions on 
which, in the ordinary course of events, you may be called 
upon to exercise your powers of reasoning. Take, for 
example, the subject of dress, and, view it in all its rela- 



304 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

tions — consider its attributes, parts, species, causes, and 
effects — call to mind the examples, comparisons, proverbs, 
and laws or other written documents with which it may 
be connected — and discuss the various opinions that may- 
be entertained respecting it. 

This topic is one of frequent occurrence. With regard 
to the statue about to be erected in the city to Sir Robert 
Peel, discussion took place as to the comparative merits of 
the Roman and the English dress. And whether the Euro- 
pean or the Oriental costume is the more suitable for ladies, 
is a question that now excites great interest throughout the 
United States of America. So, under the head " The Logic 
of Food," you may consider the principle of the Tempe- 
rance and Vegetarian Societies. And under " Logic to 
Children " you may class the various questions that have 
a reference to education. Endeavour so to discipline your 
mind as to be able readily to put together under one gene- 
ral head those topics and questions that have a reference 
to the same class. You will then easily add from your 
own experience, observation, or reading, other illustrations 
as suitable as those now before you. 

1. The Logic of Dress : — 

" The numerous advantages, with the importance resulting 
from an elegant personal appearance, are too generally known and 
appreciated throughout civilized Europe, to require much comment 
here. It is only to be lamented, that the enormous charges usually 
incident to a desirable apppearance, preclude many of limited in- 
comes from enjoying it, while it brings down distress upon others. 
Eor I think it will almost invariably be found, that the first 
embarrassment young men — more especially our city youth with 
small salaries — bring upon themselves, is through endeavouring 
to support a fashionable exterior in the usually expensive method ; 
hence in time results inability to pay, with the certain after con- 
sequences of arrest, and, with sorrow I pen it, too frequently 
entire ruin." — The Whole AH of Dress. 

The book from winch I have taken the above extract, 
has separate chapters upon coats, waistcoats, ' and panta- 
loons, stocks . and neckcloths, shirts, pocket-handkerchiefs, 
stockings, socks and gloves, hats and caps, boots and 
shoes, and the adaptation of dress to tall and short men, 



APPLICATION TO THE ORDINARY AFFAIRS OF LIFE. 305 

and to fair and dark complexions. He shows that on all 
these points much logic may be expended both in regard 
to taste and economy. 

"Fair, and Dark Complexions. — The appearance of the 
countenance is very greatly subjected to be relieved or depressed 
by the influence of colours. To be aware immediately of this 
fact, you have only to perceive how wretched white neckcloths 
make some people appear ; those, for instance, of a sallow skin ; 
while, on the opposite, a black velvet or satin stock throws, by 
its comparative depth of hue, the former into shade. All this is 
either more or less regulated by other colours. On dark people 
a dark coat looks best ; black for the neck most assuredly ; then, 
as too much black would look gloomy, they should be relieved by 
a white or buff waistcoat." — The Whole Art of Dress. 

In Mr. Hall's " Book of the Feet," we have an example 
of the truths of science being applied to the promotion of 
personal comfort. The anatomy of the foot proves the 
injury of tight shoes : — 

" ' There is nothing more beautiful than the structure of the 
human foot,' says Sir Charles Bell, ' nor perhaps any demonstra- 
tion which would lead a well-educated person to desire to know 
more of anatomy than that of the foot. The foot has in its 
structure all the fine appliances you see in a building. In the 
first place, there is an arch in whatever way you regard the foot ; 
looking down upon it we perceive several bones coming round 
the astrologos, and forming an entire circle of surfaces in the 
contact. If we look at the profile of the foot, an arch is still 
manifest, of which the posterior part is formed by the heel, and 
the anterior by the ball of the gieat toe, and in the front we 
find in that direction a transverse arch : so that instead of 
standing, as might be imagined, on a solid bone, we stand upon 
an arch composed of a series of bones, which are united by the 
most curious provision for the elasticity of the foot ; hence, if we 
jump from a height directly upon the heel, a severe shock is felt ; 
not so if we alight upon the ball of the great toe, for there an 
elasticity is formed in the whole foot, and the weight of the body 
is thrown upon this arch, and the shock avoided." 

" For upwards of twenty years as a bootmaker, I have made 
the feet my study, and during that period many thousand pairs 
of feet have received my attention. I have observed with minute 
care the cast from the antique as well as i the modern instances/ 
and I am obliged to admit, that much of the pain I have wit- 
nessed, much of the distortion of the toes, the corns on the top 



306 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

of the feet, the bunion on the side, the callosities beneath, and 
the growing in of the nails between, are attributable to the shoe- 
maker. The feet, with proper treatment, might be as free from 
disease and pain as the hands ; their structure and adaptation to 
the wants and comfort of man, as we have seen, is most perfect." 
— Hall's Book of the Feet. 

2. The Logic of Marriage. To wed, or not to wed % that 
is the question : — 

" Man is airthenware, coarse, rude, rough, and onseemly. 
Woman is porcelain, a crittur highly finished and delicate. Man 
was made for knockin' about, he is tough and strong; but wo- 
man, to be taken care of and handled gently. What a sweet 
thing is innocence, Sam; how beautiful to contemplate, how 
lovely to associate with ! As a philosopher, I admire purity in 
the abstract ; but, as a man and a Christian, I love it when par- 
sonified. Purity in a child, of such is heaven ; purity in woman, 
of such also is the realms of bliss ; but purity in man — oh, Sam, 
I am most afeerd, sometimes, there ain't much of it any where 
now a days, I snore : but matrimony, Sam, is a state ordained by 
God, not only to carry out his great purposes that is above our 
comprehension, but also for our happiness ; yes, it is a nateral 
state, and a considerable of a pleasant one too, when well consi- 
dered, and rightly entered upon. Don't put it off too long, Sam ; 
don't wait till the heart ossifies." 

" Yes, my son, said he, get married, and marry soon ; it 's time 
you were a-thinkin' on it now in airnest. — Well, I feel most 
plaguily skeered, minister, says I, to try, for if once you get into 
the wrong box, and the door is locked on you, there is no escape 
as I see; and besides, women are so everlastin' full of tricks, 
and so cunnin' in hiden 5 em aforehand, that it 's no easy matter 
to tell whether the bait has a hook in it or not ; and if you go 
a-playin' round it, and a-nibblin' at it, why a sudden jerk given by 
a skilful hand may whip it into your gills afore you know where 
you be, and your flint is fixed as shure as there are snakes in 
varginy." 

" I must go now ; but I '11 give you a word of advice at 
partin', my dear boy. Don't marry too poor a gall, for they are 
apt to think there is no eend to then: husband's puss ; nor too 
rich a gall, for they are apt to remind you of it onpleasant some- 
times ; nor too giddy a gall, for they neglect their families ; nor 
too demure a one, for they are most apt to give you the dodge, 
race off, and leave you ; nor one of a different sect, for it breeds 
discord; nor a weak-minded one, for children take all their talents 

from their mothers ; nor a Lord ! says I, minister, how you 

skeer a body ! Where onder the sun will you find a nonsuch like 



APPLICATION TO THE ORDINARY AFFAIRS OF LIFE. 307 

what you describe ? There ain't actilly no such critturs among 
women. — I'll tell you, my son, said he, for I'd like afore I die to 
see you well mated ; I would, indeed ! I'll tell you, tho' you 
talk to me sometimes as if I didn't know nothin' of women. 
You think nobody can't know 'em but them as romp all their 
days with them as you do ; but them, let me tell you, know the 
least, for they are only acquainted with the least deserving. 
I'll gin you a gage to know 'em by that is almost invariable, 
universal, infallible. The character and conduct of the mother is a 
sure and certain guarantee for that of the darter" — Sam Slick, 

3. The Logic of Age. Ought the husband to be older 
than the wife 1 : — 

" We say disproportion of age, for allowing their years to be 
equal, as they usually are, the lady is virtually many years in 
advance. A woman, all the world over, is as old at twenty as a 
man is at twenty-eight ; that is to say, she has as much world- 
knowledge, as much tact, as much finesse, as much judgment of 
character, as much self-possession, as much — cunning we were 
going to say, but that is rather a harsh term to apply to a lady. 

"Now this disproportion of ages gives rise to many serious 
evils ; so many, that we hardly know which to begin with. The 
young women must despise or at least undervalue the young men 
with whom they associate, as inferior to themselves in manner, 
tact, and conversational power. Hence they 'form a low opinion 
of men, as men, and are tempted to value them only for their 
external advantage, — personal beauty, skill in dancing — above 
all, wealth. Here is a fearful incentive to mercenary marriages. 
But we prefer to confine ourselves to its effects on married hfe. 
The bride and bridegroom are the same age, say twenty-three or 
four, unless indeed she happens to be a year older than he. In 
a mere external and physical point of view the first consequence 
is that she is an old woman while he is in the prime of life, for 
though both sexes among us are too apt to break themselves down, 
and grow old before their time, this premature decay is more 
general and more speedy with our females. The inconveniences, 
mistakes, mortifications, and jealousies that constantly arise from 
such discrepancy, are too evident to require more than being 
hinted at. But this is nothing to the moral phase of the ques- 
tion, — the effect which a virtual disparity of ages has had in 
establishing a gynocracy, That a gynocracy does exist, no one 
conversant with fashionable life will be hardy enough to deny. 
In nine cases out of ten the lady rules the roast. That cardinal 
duty of a wife, respect for her husband, is utterly ignored by her. 
He is regarded as little more than an upper servant. Now the 
main cause of this is undoubtedly the original equality (which is 



308 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

virtual disproportion) of ages. As the bride, we repeat it, is 
substantially ten years older in all world -knowledge than the 
bridegroom, she soon gets the upper hand of him. If he is a man 
of some character, the fight may last two or three years ; occa- 
sionally he is driven by his domestic troubles into evil courses, 
in which cases he usually goes to work with the national rapidity 
and earnestness, so as to kill himself off in twelve months, and 
leave his widow more triumphant than disconsolate." — New York 
Literary World. 

4. The Logic of Diet : — 

" You hate cold mutton ! The more shame for you, Mr. Caudle. 
I'm sure you 've the stomach of a lord, you have. No, sir ; I 
didn't choose to hash the mutton. It 's very easy for you to say, 
hash it ; but / know what a joint loses in hashing : it 's a day's 
dinner the less if it's a bit. Yes,, I dare say; other people may 
have puddings with cold mutton. No doubt of it ; and other 
people become bankrupts. But if ever you get into the Gazette, 
it shan't be my fault. 

" Where do you think pudding 's to come from every day ? You 
show a nice example to your children, you do ; complaining, and 
turning your nose up at a sweet piece of cold mutton, because 
there's no pudding ! You go a nice way to make 'em extrava- 
gant — teach 'em nice lessons to begin the world with. Do you 
know what puddings cost; or do you think they fly in at the 
window ? 

"Apples arrft so dear, am't they? I know what apples are, 
Mr. Caudle, without your telling me. But I suppose you want 
something more than apples for dumplings ? I suppose sugar 
costs something, doesn't it ? And that 's how it is. That 's how. 
one expense brings on another, and that 's how people go to ruin.' 3 ' 
— Mrs. Caudle's Curtain Lectures. 

" To be easy all night, 
Let your supper be light ; 
Or else you '11 complain 
Of a stomach in pain." 

5. Logic to Children : — 

" When the parent is sufficiently enlightened to rear his child 
himself, instead of plying him with rudimental books, dictionaries, 
and restraint, let him impart the first instructions by familiar 
conversation. Ideas advanced in this way are accommodated to 
the comprehension of the pupil, by mutual good feeling rendered 
attractive, and brought directly within the embrace of his mind. 
This instruction leads him to observe, and accustoms him to com- 
pare, reflect, and discriminate, offers the sciences under interest- 



APPLICATION TO THE ORDINARY AFFAIRS OF LIFE. 309 

ing associations, and inspires a natural thirst for instruction. Of 
all results which education can produce, this is the most useful. 
A youth of fifteen trained in this way, will come into possession 
of more truths, mixed with fewer errors, than much older per- 
sons reared in the common way. He will be distinguished by the 
early maturity of his reason, and by his eagerness to cultivate the 
sciences, which, instead of producing fatigue or disgust, will every 
day give birth to new ideas and new pleasures. I am neverthe- 
less little surprised, that the scrupulous advocates of the existing 
routine should insist that such a method tends to form superficial 
thinkers. I can only say to these profound panegyrists of the 
present order of instruction, that the method which I recommend 
was that of the Greeks. Their philosophers taught while walking 
in the shade of the portico, or of trees, and were ignorant of the 
art of rendering study tiresome, and not disposed to throw over it 
the benefits of constraint. Modern instructors ought, therefore, 
to find that they were shallow reasoners, and that their poets and 
artists could have produced only crude and unfinished efforts." — 
Art of Being Happy. 

" It is of great importance that you know what you cannot do, 
as well as what you can do. For this reason, with all the temp- 
tations and dangers attending a public education, I am satisfied 
it is much to be preferred to a private one. The wisest period in 
the whole of a man's existence, is when he has just entered col- 
lege. And why ? Simply because the youth has not yet had the 
opportunity of measuring his attainments and capacity with that 
of his fellows. It is not merely that you sharpen the intellect, 
and add a keenness to the mind, by contact with other minds, but 
you strengthen it by the contact, and you learn to be modest in 
regard to your own powers. You will see many with intellects 
of a high order, and with attainments far beyond anything which 
you have dared call your own. There must be some radical de- 
fect in that man's nature, who can be associated in study, for 
years, with those who are severe students, and at the end of the 
period feel that he is a very wise or a very great man." — Todd's 
Students Manual. 

6. Logic to Servants : — 

" I feel almost ashamed to urge upon the master and mistress 
the propriety of using kind language to their domestics, so much 
a matter of course it ought to be that in addressing those who 
are rendering a service to us, we should be kind. Yet to scold 
servants is the usual process by which an attempt is made to 
make them better. Nay, sometimes although the servant is not 
to blame for the mistake which excites the master's displeasure, 
he is nevertheless scolded, and is made the object upon whom the 



310 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

ill-temper of the master vents itself, as if to bear that were part 
of the consideration for which he receives wages. The effect is, 
to wound unnecessarily the feelings of a sensitive man, and to 
still further brutalize one who is indifferent." 

" It is so easy to add ■ if you please ' to a request ; to speak 
in a gentle tone of voice ; to be thankful when what you have 
asked for has been done : moreover, the service is then performed 
with, so much alacrity and cheerfulness. Unkind language ex- 
pressed in a harsh voice is listened to certainly, and obeyed ; but 
it is obeyed through fear, or some other equally low motive, and 
if a stronger motive comes there will be no obedience. A reason, 
also might generally accompany the request. When it does, the 
necessity for its performance is more strongly impressed upon the 
servant ; his employment is no longer so purely mechanical, and 
he increases therefore in intelligence." — On the Responsibilities of 
Employers. 

"The female servants of the middle and upper classes of 
society are generally daughters of working men. Many of the 
faults which we so often hear their superiors complain of may be 
traced to the deficiencies of their early education. The utter 
neglect in which their childhood is passed, and their consequent 
ignorance, unfit them for understanding very clearly the nature 
of moral obligation, or for appreciating the importance of relative 
duties, while the habits to which they are accustomed in child- 
hood are seldom of a kind to render them active in the discharge 
of their daily labour. Much of that dishonest grudging and 
awkward performance of duty, those rude maimers and slovenly 
habits which frequently occasion so much annoyance in respectable 
families, spring altogether from ignorance. Self-interest, even 
where they are not influenced by higher motives, ought to induce 
the upper classes of society to devise means for securing a more 
liberal education for the daughters of the poor. The more so 
when it is considered that they frequently entrust their own little 
ones to the care of domestics. A very little attention to the 
situation and duties of female servants must convince every one 
capable of reflection that moral principle and intellectual cultiva- 
tion of a very high order must be necessary to their usefulness, 
respectability, and happiness." — Female Education, by a Labourer's 
Daughter. 

7. The Logic of Domestic Consultation : — 

" But all I want to ask you is this : do you intend to go to 
the sea-side this summer? Yes? yoiillgo to Gravesend! Then 
you '11 go alone, that's all I know. Gravesend! You might as 
well empty a salt-cellar in the New River, and call that the sea- 
side. What ? It's handy for business ? There you are again ! 






APPLICATION TO THE ORDINARY AFFAIRS OF LIFE. 311 

I can never speak of taking a little enjoyment, but yon fling 
business in my teeth. I'm sure you never let business stand in 
the way of your own pleasure, Mr. Caudle — not you. It would 
be all the better for your family if you did." 

" What do you say ? How much will it cost ? There you are, 
Mr. Caudle, with your meanness again. When you want to go 
yourself to Blackwall or to Greenwich, you never ask, How much 
will it cost? What? You never go to Blackwall? Ha! I don't 
know that ; and if you don't, that's nothing at all to do with it. 
Yes, you can give a guinea a plate for whitebait for yourself. 
No, sir ; I'm not a foolish woman ; and I know very well what 
I'm talking about — nobody better. A guinea for whitebait for 
yourself, when you grudge a pint of shrimps for your poor family. 
Eh? You don't grudge 'em anything? Yes, it's very well for 
you to lie there and say so. What will it cost? It's no matter 
what it will cost, for we won't go at all now. No ; we '11 stay 
at home. We shall all be ill in the winter— every one of us, all 
but you ; and nothing ever makes you ill. I've no doubt we shall 
all be laid up, and there'll be a doctor's bill as long as a railroad ; 
but never mind that. It's better — much better — to pay for nasty 
physic than for fresh air and wholesome salt water." 

" What will I do at Margate ? Why, isn't there bathing, and 
picking up shells ; and arn't there the packets, with the donkeys ; 
and the last new novel — whatever it is, to read — for the only 
place where I really relish a book, is at the sea-side. No, it isn't 
that I like salt with my reading, Mr. Caudle ! I suppose you 
call that a joke ? You might keep your jokes for the day-time, I 
think. But as I was saying — only you always will interrupt me 
— the ocean always seems to me to open the mind. I see nothing 
to laugh at ; but you always laugh when I say anything. Some- 
times at the sea-side — especially when the tide's down— I feel so 
happy ; quite as if I could cry. 

"When shall I get the things ready? Eor next Sunday? 
What will it cost ? Oh, there — don't talk of it. No : we won't 
go. I shall send for the painters to-morrow. What ? I can go 
and take the children, and you'll stay? No, sir; you go with me, 
or I don't stir. I'm not going to be turned loose like a hen 
with her chickens, and nobody to protect me. So we '11 go on 
Monday ? Eh ?" — Mrs. Caudle's Curtain Lectures. 

8. The Logic of Social Intercourse : — 

" What is it, then, that constitutes a gentleman in your mind ? 
Not his station — for he may disgrace it. Not his power — for he 
may misuse it. Not his graces and endowments, — for you may 
despise them. It is, in the nakedness of truth, because he pos- 
sesses qualities which ennoble him, and shed a lustre over his 



312 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

actions, in their ntter separation from those of the common herd 
by whom he is surrounded. Because you see in that man a depth 
of feeling and right principle, which you look in vain for in the 
ordinary run of the men you meet. 

" When, then, you hear any one giving himself airs, and despis- 
ing his part in the world, you will say immediately, that he can- 
not have the true feeling of a gentleman; because, instead of 
looking into his own mind as the seat and source of honour, he 
descends to the external trappings and decorations of his office ; 
and only regards himself with complacency, as he glitters in the 
eyes of others." 

" Again, should you unfortunately find yourself embroiled in 
any dispute or quarrel — which may occur to the most peaceable 
— and perceive, on reflection, that you have been betrayed by the 
heat of the moment into any intemperance, or that there is any 
one point in which you are not completely satisfied with yourself, 
— do not fancy it derogatory to your manhood to acknowledge 
your error, and to make a just reparation. You may, at first, 
have an idea, that it is inconsistent with true courage to make 
this concession, and that you should bear the brunt of the oifence 
with a total disregard of personal consequences. But as you mix 
more with the world, you will find, that in very many cases a 
much higher degree of courage is necessary to the avowal of a 

fault, than to sustaining it "We should wish you to be firm 

as a rock in repelling an aggression or an insult ; — but still we 
would strongly impress upon you, that it is, in every case, far 
more consistent with high courage and gentlemanly feelings to 
own a wrong than to defend it ; and to allay, than to confirm an 
injury." 

" When therefore you enter into society, whatever may be the 
state of your mind, put such a restraint on the expression of it, 
that you shall appear pleased and cheerful. Consider, that people 
meet together for instruction and enjoyment, and to rub out the 
cares and cobwebs of the day. You wish to join them to promote 
these good objects; and if you are so dispirited and careworn, 
that you cannot promote them, a just and correct tone of feeling 
would induce you to remain at home." 

"There are two or three minor subjects that occur to me, 
which may be dismissed at once in a few words. On no account 
swear, or use cant terms. Never be inquisitive. Never interrupt 
a speaker. Always take off your hat to a woman. Scrupulously 
acknowledge the salute of a poor man. Eat slowly and quietly, 
and without any show of eagerness. This last is a serious sole- 
cism in good-breeding. Indeed, it is impossible for you to be too 
careful in your own person of the niceties of the table, and too 
vigilant of offending against its recognised proprieties. I will not 
attempt to give any description of them ; as it would lead me 



APPLICATION OP REASONING TO HISTORF. 313 

into a long detail of things -which might seem trifling, and occa- 
sionally, perhaps, ridiculous ; but you may receive it as an un- 
doubted truth, that they bear great weight with them in the 
world; and that a disgust against a man is seldom more readily 
taken, than in a dereliction of these little points, either through 
ignorance or wilful rudeness." — The English Gentleman. 

There are many other topics on which you will have to 
exercise your reasoning powers. Among others, let me 
request you not to forget to inquire into the reasons for 
insuring ones life, and the reasons for making a will. You 
should also exercise your reasoning powers in the choice of 
your amusements. As, however, on this subject you will 
also consult your inclination, I will conclude with merely a 
quotation in favour of the game of chess : — 

" There are two important lessons to be learned at chess. 

" The first is the value of acquired knowledge. A person who 
has studied the game of chess and knows it, will beat with ease 
and certainty one of much more talent for the game, who under- 
stands its general principles only. 

" The second is, encouragement never to give up a losing game, 
but still to struggle on for success, playing only with increased 
caution and thought, as the difficulties muster around you. In 
life, as at chess, no one can anticipate the remote consequences 
of every position, and the skilful management of disastrous cir- 
cumstances may be the road to prosperity." — Maya's Philosophy 
of Living. 



SECTION II. 

THE APPLICATION OP THE ART OP REASONING TO HISTORY. 

Some years ago I commenced a work on the Philosophy 
of History. It was proposed to be written in the form of 
Lectures. After writing two Lectures, I was compelled, 
from want of leisure, to lay the subject aside, and it will 
probably never be resumed. The commencement of the 
work may now for the first time be useful by standing at 
the head of this Section : — 

"Philosophy has been defined, 'the knowledge of the reasons 
of things;' in opposition to History, which is the bare knowledge 

P 



314 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

of facts ; or to Mathematics, which is the knowledge of the quan- 
tity of things, or their measures. It is the province of philosophy 
to collect together those facts which have occurred; to investi- 
gate their causes and operations ; and to classify them according 
to the principles they may have developed. It is thus that the 
chemist takes every object in nature, examines its constituent 
principles, notices their operation when brought into combination 
with other bodies, and from the effects he observes he forms 
those general rules, which are universally true, and which, when 
arranged and demonstrated, form what may be called the Philo- 
sophy of the Science. 

"Thus it is in every branch of experimental philosophy. At 
first the substances of water or air, or other natural objects, are 
merely observed. By and by a few experiments are made upon 
them. Other experiments follow, and either correct or confirm 
those which preceded. Experiments are multiplied, until it is 
found at last that in a variety of instances the same experiments 
are uniformly followed by the same results. These are then con- 
sidered as established truths ; the knowledge thus acquired is 
acted upon in the investigation of other bodies ; fresh truths are 
elicited ; and the whole body of truths or general principles thus 
established by repeated experiments, constitute what is termed 
Natural and Experimental Philosophy. 

" But this course of procedure is not confined to material sub- 
stances. The moralist observes minutely what actions conduce 
to happiness and what lead to misery. Those actions which lead 
to happiness, he calls good or virtuous ; those actions which lead 
to misery, he calls bad or vicious. He examines the causes or 
motives from whence those actions proceed, and he considers the 
motives to be good or evil according to the good or bad actions 
they produce. Hence he forms general rules by which he declares 
that certain classes of actions or motives are good, and ought to 
be inculcated, while other classes of actions or motives are evil, 
and ought to be condemned. He compares these rules with the 
relations which man sustains in reference to other beings in the 
universe. Hence, to examine the reasonableness and propriety 
of moral conduct, and to investigate and lay down rules for 
moral action, constitute what is termed the Science of Moral 
Philosophy. 

" Thus, too, the political economist views the increase and the 
diminution of those products which constitute national wealth. 
He traces the various circumstances by which either the one or 
the other may be promoted ; and from the observation of indi- 
vidual examples and instances, he lays down general principles 
for the regulation of future conduct in affairs of state economy. 
This constitutes the philosophy of the science. 

" Political economy bears the same relation to history as morals 






APPLICATION OF REASONING TO HISTORY. 315 

do to biography. History records those facts which have oc- 
curred in the affairs of nations. From these facts political eco- 
nomy derives her principles. She arranges these facts, not 
according to their chronological order, but accordingly as they 
concurred in exhibiting the good or evil of any line of political 
conduct. So biography records those events that have occurred 
in the lives of individuals ; and the moralist hence derives prin- 
ciples for the regulation of individual conduct. 

" All philosophy, whether it refer to material or immaterial sub- 
jects, is founded on fact. It is not philosophy to build castles in 
the air ; to fancy theories, and then maintain them in defiance of 
evidence. If we wish to lay any claim to the character of philo- 
sophers, we must not first assume principles, and then hunt for 
facts in order to establish them; but our principles must be 
deductions from the facts with which we were previously ac- 
quainted. 

"When, however, the facts by which our principles are sup- 
ported are so numerous or so decisive, that few persons are 
disposed to dispute the conclusion to which they lead, it is not 
always necessary, in teaching our general principles, to detail all 
the individual facts upon which they may be founded. A few 
pertinent examples are sufficient for the purpose. 

" From what I have said, none of my auditors will be at a loss 
to conjecture what ideas I attach, to the Philosophy of History. 
The Philosophy of History means those general principles which 
the facts of history clearly establish. It is not, therefore, my 
intention to detail all the events which are recorded in the page 
of history. I shall attempt to exhibit those principles which are 
deduced from those events, and shall consider those events them- 
selves, not in their chronological order, but as they tend to esta- 
blish the principles I had previously advanced. 

" The philosophy of history takes a much wider range than 
political economy. The economist views only those facts which 
have an influence on the accumulation of national wealth. The 
philosopher views also those facts which have a reference to the 
character of man ; to the development of his physical powers ; 
the exercise of his intellectual faculties : his progress in scientific 
inquiry; the formation of domestic and civil society; and his 
performance of moral and religious duties. 

" In pursuing these inquiries, I propose to deliver five lectures. 
The first will be on the Philosophy of Geographical History ; the 
second, the Philosophy of Domestic History ; the third, the 
Philosophy of Intellectual History ; the fourth, the Philosophy 
of Political History; fifthly, the Philosophy of Ecclesiastical 
History. 

"In the first lecture, upon the Philosophy of Geographical 
History, I propose to inquire what are the effects which history 
p 2 



316 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 



records to have been produced upon man and upon human socio 
by geographical circumstances — by the varieties of climate ; by 
the mountainous character of countries; by the fertility or bar- 
renness of the soil; or by the intervention of rivers or arms of 
the sea. 

" In the second lecture, I shall inquire what is the langu age 
of history as to the relation of husband and wife ; the institu- 
tions of polygamy and divorce ; the relation between parents and 
children, masters and servants ; and the rise and progress of 
domestic slavery. This lecture will be on the Philosophy of 
Domestic History. 

"In the third lecture, on the Philosophy of Intellectual or 
Scientific History, I shall inquire into the circumstances which 
have developed the intellectual faculties ; the rise and progress 
of the arts ; the circumstances by which they are promoted or 
retarded; the advantages which the moderns have over the 
ancients ; and the benefits to be expected from universal 
education. 

"In the fourth lecture, upon the Philosophy of Political His- 
tory, I shall inquire what is the evidence of history as to the 
origin of government ; the advantages and disadvantages of par- 
ticular forms of government ; and the union of the simple forms 
in the British Constitution. 

" In the fifth lecture, upon the Philosophy of Ecclesiastical 
History, I propose to examine whether it is obvious from history 
that man is endowed with a moral sense ; to inquire what are the 
different forms of polytheism ; and how far it is necessary that 
the church should be established by the civil power ; and to trace 
the influence of religion upon the political, intellectual, and social 
happiness of man." 

We shall now point out some of the different ways in 
which logic is applied to history. 

1. Logic is applied to history in examining the evidence 
either for or against the truth of disputed facts : — 

" Without this exercise of the reasoning faculties, books will 
as often mislead as instruct us. In making an estimate of the 
authenticity of historical relations, three principal rules are to be 
observed, — the probability or improbability of the facts recorded, 
the nature of the evidence attesting them, and in what degree 
they are corroborated or contradicted by the general circum- 
stances of the world in the period of time alluded to. On these 
principles the reader must exercise a discretionary power of 
yielding or suspending his belief; but he ought carefully to avoid 
the two extremes of scepticism and credulity, which are equally 






APPLICATION OF EEASONING TO HISTORY 317 

inimical to the improvement of the human mind." — Bigland's 
Letters on History. 

" There is a minuteness in the details of the Mosaic writings, 
which argues their truth ; for it often argues the eye-witness, as 
in the adventures of the wilderness ; and often seems intended 
to supply directions to the artificer, as in the construction of the 
tabernacle. 

" There are touches of nature in the narrative, which argue its 
truth ; for it is not easy to regard them otherwise than as strokes 
from the life — as where the ' mixed multitude,' whether half-casts 
or Egyptians, are the first to sigh for the cucumbers and melons 
of Egypt, and to spread discontent through the camp ; as, the 
miserable exculpation of himself, which Aaron attempts, with all 
the cowardice of conscious guilt — ' I cast into the fire, and there 
came out this calf : ' the fire, to be sure, being in the fault." 

"There is a candour in the treatment of his subject by Moses, 
which argues his truth ; as when he tells of his own want of 
eloquence, which unfitted him for a leader — Ms own want of faith, 
which prevented him from entering the promised land — the idola- 
try of Aaron his brother — the profaneness of Nadab and Abihu, 
his nephews — the disaffection and punishment of Miriam, his 
sister — the relationship which Amram his father bore to Jochebed 
his mother, which became afterwards one of the prohibited 
degrees in the marriage tables of the Levitical law." — Blunts 
Scriptural Coincidences. 

2. Logic is applied to history in discussing the charac- 
ters of distinguished men : — 

" If Alexander had not been at the head of such an army, and 
assisted by the counsels and exertions of such commanders as 
Parmenio, Lysimachus, Antigonus, Perdiccas, Craterus, Ptolemy, 
and others ; or if he had turned his arms westward against the 
warlike Romans, instead of the effeminate Persians, his affairs 
would, in all probability, have assumed a very different aspect, 
and he would scarcely have shone in the page of history as the 
invincible conqueror. But every observing and intelligent reader 
of history cannot but see, that in this war the circumstances of 
the two belligerent nations, and the state of their armies, were 
such that a general of ordinary abilities in Alexander's place 
could hardly have failed of success. Possessing all the advan- 
tages of an excellent literary and military education, and endowed 
by nature with courage, magnanimity, and genius, Alexander 
appears to have been capable of the greatest things ; but we can 
only estimate his political and military character by what he 
actually performed ; and in this estimation we must allow that, 



318 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

every circumstance duly considered, Alexander's achievements 
were a much less arduous task than those of many other warriors, 
whose successes have been far less brilliant, and whose names 
shine with a much less dazzling lustre. 

"It must, however, be confessed, that some of Alexander's 
projects are characteristic of a political and commercial, as well 
as a warlike genius, and redound more to his honour than his 
mad career of conquest. His foundation of the city of Alexandria 
in a situation so extremely favourable to commerce, seems to in- 
dicate an extensive view of the advantages accruing from trade ; 
and the nourishing state of that city, both while it continued the 
capital of an independent kingdom, and afterwards under the 
Roman and Byzantine empires, displays the justness of his under- 
standing in the choice of so excellent a situation for a great mer- 
cantile city. His sending out his admiral Nearchus, to explore 
the coasts of Persia and India, also shows that he was actuated 
by a spirit of discovery, as well as an avidity of conquest ; and 
if he had attained to an advanced age, it is not possible to con- 
ceive what he might have performed, when, the best parts of the 
world being subdued, conquest could no longer have presented to 
him the same allurements." — Bigland's Letters on History. 

3. Logic is applied to history in drawing parallels or 
contrasts between persons or epochs or events : — 

" England under Cromwell was in a high state of general pro- 
sperity. Its domestic commerce prospered. Cromwell was the 
chief founder of our maritime greatness. The seas were swept 
of all obstruction, to an unprecedented freedom of trade. The 
merchants who had ordered the most costly goods from abroad, 
could rest in quiet and contentment until the appointed time for 
their expected arrival; or, having shipped some of their most 
costly produce for distant lands, they could indulge in a well- 
grounded confidence that, at the appointed time, the needful 
equivalent would arrive. This wonderful confidence derived its 
chief strength from the fact, that the great name of Cromwell 
was a mighty safeguard to property both at home and abroad ; a 
very terror to all evil-doers as well on sea as on the land. Learn- 
ing prospered. In illustration of this it will be enough to con- 
template the state of Oxford under the vice-chancellorship of 
Dr. Owen. There was liberty at home and abroad. Of the prin- 
ciples of equity and toleration which the Protector had esta- 
blished in England, he became the great champion and defender 
in foreign lands. 

" I certainly could not divine what Oliver Cromwell would do, 
were he now at the head of the Government of these kingdoms ; 
but it were easy to know what he would not do. He would not 



APPLICATION OF REASONING TO HISTORY. 319 

have submitted your institutions to Rome, for the consideration, 
revision, and approval of an Italian priest. He would not compel 
the people of Great Britain, out of their hard earnings, to pay 
thirty thousand pounds a-year for the support of Maynooth. He 
would not have meddled with the foundation of those new em- 
pires now rising up in our colonial dominions, by supporting, at 
the cost of England, Romish priests and bishops, and by erect- 
ing from the same source Popish chapels and schools. He would 
not have allowed of any unconstitutional Papal aggression. He 
would not allow British subjects to suffer persecution, or lie 
unbefriended in remote Inquisitions on account of their religion. 
He would not be at a loss to know was the Papal system a reli- 
gious system or a secular system, half religious or half secular. 
He would not have been at a loss to know how to deal with 
Cardinal "Wiseman. Such is what Oliver Cromwell would not 
have done in England of the seventeenth century ; and such, in 
some respects, is what he would have done. Say, do we or do we 
not want a man of similar policy, and of a kindred fortitude for 
England of the nineteenth century ? Do we, or do we not ? is 
the question. Let the remarkable times, now passing over us, 
declare." — Rev. Joseph Denham Smith's Lecture on Olioer Cromwell; 
or England in the past, viewed in relation to England in the 



4. Logic is applied to history in considering the wisdom 
or justice of individual acts : — 

"Although historians may conjecture that the removal of 
the imperial residence contributed to hasten the downfal of the 
empire, it is a certain fact, that the fixing of it at Constantinople 
put a final period to the passage of the barbarians through the Bos- 
phorus, who could never after force that insurmountable barrier ; 
and Greece, as well as Asia Minor, was secure from their ravages, 
until Valens unadvisedly suffered the Goths to pass the Danube, 
and received their armed bands into the heart of the empire. In 
after ages Constantinople presented an insurmountable obstacle to 
the progress of the Persians under Chosroes, and resisted all the 
attacks of the Avans, the Goths, and other northern enemies. 
During the existence of the Caliphate, that city was the bulwark of 
Europe against the Saracens ; and fell a prey to the Turks so late 
as a.d. 1453, one thousand and forty -three years after Rome was 
taken and plundered by Alaric, and nine hundred and seventy- 
seven years after the entire subversion of the western empire. 
Indeed, no good reason can be given why the empire might not 
have been as well defended, when Constantinople was the capital, 
as if Rome had always retained that prerogative; and it is no 
improbable conjecture, that if the imperial residence had not 



320 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

been removed to Constantinople, all the eastern parts of the empire 
would have fallen a prey to the Persians, on the one hand, and to 
the Goths on the other, without prolonging for any considerable 
time the existence of the western empire." — Bigland's Letters on 
History. 

5. Logic is applied to history in tracing the adaptation 
or effects of particular laws or institutions : — 

"The Hebrew laws concerning debt were remarkably different, 
in many respects, from those which prevail in European countries. 
This difference probably arose in a great degree from the peculia- 
rities in the condition of the people ; but, however this be, their 
singularity, their high antiquity, and the sanction under which 
they come to us, recommend them to greater attention than they 
seem generally to have received. It will be recollected, that it 
was provided that, as soon as Palestine was conquered, there 
should not be one individual without property. Every one had 
his hereditary land, which he might alienate until the fiftieth 
year, but not for ever. Poverty, therefore, eould rarely prevent 
the ultimate safety of what was advanced in loan: and of an 
insolvent debtor, destitute of property on which execution could 
be made, the Hebrew could scarcely have an idea. The following 
useful summary of these laws is from T. H. Home, who seems to 
have condensed it from Michaelis. It will serve as an index to 
the various details which we shall consider separately, as they 
hereafter come under our notice. ' The debt which remained unpaid 
until the seventh or sabbatic year (during which the soil remained 
without cultivation, and, consequently, a person was supposed not 
to be in a condition to make payments) could not be exacted 
during that period (Deut. xv. 1 — 11). But, at other times, in 
case the debt was not paid, the creditor might seize, first, the 
hereditary land of the debtor, and enjoy its produce till the debt 
was paid, or at least until the year of jubilee ; or, secondly, his 
houses. These might be sold in perpetuity, except those belong- 
ing to the Levites (Lev. xxv. 14 — 32). Thirdly, in case the 
house or land was not sufficient to cancel the debt, or if it so 
happened that the debtor had none, the person of the debtor 
might be sold, together with his wife and children, if he had any. 
This is implied in Lev. xxv. 39 ; and this custom is alluded to in 
Job xxiv. 9. It existed in the time of Elisha (2 Kings iv. 1) ; 
and on the return of the Jews from their Babylonish captivity, 
some rich persons exercised this right over their poor debtors 
(Nehem. v. 1 — 13). Our Lord alludes to the same custom in 
Matt, xviii. 25. As the person of the debtor might thus be 
seized and sold, his cattle and furniture might consequently be 
liable for his debts. This is alluded to by Solomon, in Prov. xxii. 
27. It does not appear that imprisonment for debt existed in the 



APPLICATION OF REASONING TO HISTORY. 321 

age of Moses, but it seems to have prevailed in the time of Jesus 
Christ.' " — Pictorial Bible. Note on Deut. xv. 2. 

6. Logic is applied to history in observing the rise and 
progress of arts and sciences : — 

" At the close of the fifteenth century, an extraordinary activity 
was reigning in Europe. Bold investigations were remarkable 
everywhere. A general yearning for truer, more real science, 
was manifest. This movement continued during the greater part 
of the sixteenth century without results, owing to the absence of 
unity and method; a confusion also ensued, arising from the 
revival of the systems of antiquity, and the mystical philosophy 
so pregnant with fruitless efforts. In the meantime, however, 
new discoveries gave a fresh impulse to the human mind. 
Copernicus described the true system of the world. Kepler some- 
what foreshadowed the discoveries of Newton. Tycho Brahe was 
collecting the most invaluable observations. Then came Lord 
Bacon, whose great genius dissipated the mists of error, and 
broke down the obstacles which impeded advancement in useful 
science. His works present an 'estimate on the actual attain- 
ments in all the sciences, a catalogue of the desiderata in each 
department, and the detail of the methods best suited to pro- 
secute improvements and new discoveries. The world owes to 
Bacon the sure method of advanciug hi knowledge by experiment 
and the observation of nature, instead of system and conjecture. 

"Bacon, said Horace Walpole, has been the prophet of truths 
that Newton came to reveal to mankind. True; but between 
Bacon and Newton, a man arose who followed the track of 
Bacon, and inflicted a mortal blow on all systems— who created 
a new method and a general theory of the world : we allude to 
Descartes, who was the first to lay down the laws of motion, 
especially that all bodies persist in their present state of rest or 
uniform rectilineal motion, till affected by some force." 

"Galileo, in 1609, constructed telescopes, and discovered the 
satellites of the larger planets. Kepler investigated the laws 
which regulate the motions of the planets, and the analogy 
between their distances from the sun, and periodical revolutions. 
The discoveries in astronomy led to improvements in navigation, 
and a great advancement of geometry in all its branches. Napier, 
in 1614, abridged calculation by the invention of logarithms. 
The Torricellian experiments determined the weight of the atmo- 
sphere. In 1616, Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood. 
The Royal Society was incorporated in 1662. The Royal Aca- 
demy of Sciences was instituted by Louis XIV. in 1666 ; and 
similar institutions were founded in most of the countries of 
Europe. In the end of the seventeenth century arose the 
immortal Newton, and Leibnitz, the universal genius. Newton 
p3 



322 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

had discovered, before the age of twenty-four, the theory of 
universal gravitation, a priuciple which solves the chief pheno- 
mena of nature, and connects and regulates the whole machine 
of the universe. His theory of light and colours is the founda- 
tion of the science of optics, and his Principia the basis and 
elements of all philosophy. Locke, his contemporary, investi- 
gated the operations of the human mind, examined the soul by 
attending to its operations, and has been a priori the founder 
of the sensualist school of intellectual philosophy." — Historical 
Analysis of Christian Civilization ; by Pe,oeessor De Yeeicotjr, 
Queen's College, Cork. 

7. Logic is applied to history in observing the remark- 
able occurrences with regard to individuals or nations : — 

" It is, however, a remarkable fact, that some of the greatest 
men, both in ancient and modern times, have been extremely 
unhappy in their domestic concerns. The rebellion of Absalom 
against his father David, and its tragical issue ; the murder of 
Sennacherib, in the temple of the god Nisroch, by the hands of 
his own sons, Adrammelech and Sharezar ; the severities which 
Augustus Caesar was obliged to use against his only child, his 
daughter Julia, on account of her scandalous life ; and the 
havoc which Herod the Great made in his own family, by the 
execution of his beautiful and beloved wife Mariamne, his two 
most promising sons, and others of his near relatives, may be 
adduced as instances, among a great number of others which 
occur in ancient history, that the highest degrees of human 
power, exaltation, and splendour, do not always exempt their 
possessors from domestic infelicity, no more than from personal 
misfortunes and the ordinary sufferings of mortality. To these 
instances, and many others in ancient history, may be added a 
number of a similar nature, in more modern times ; among which 
the tragical catastrophe of Don Carlos, son of Philip the Second 
of Spain ; and that of the Czarowitz, son of the immortal Peter the 
Great, of Russia, stands as conspicuous and distinguished proofs 
of the uncertain and fluctuating nature of all human felicity." — 
Bigland's Letters on History. 

8. Logic is applied to history in deducing general prin- 
ciples in the science of politics : — 

" Much has been said by many writers against the pernicious 
effects of extensive empire, but many arguments may also be 
adduced in its favour. The union of a numerous mass of people 
in one political system is one of the surest preventives of war, as 
the division of countries into a greater number of independent 
states is a never-failing source of predatory hostilities, of blood- 






APPLICATION OF REASONING TO HISTORY. 323 

shed, rapine, and anarchy. Wherever a country is thus divided, 
such a multiplicity of jarring interests arise, and so many objects 
of ambition present themselves, as cannot fail of producing con- 
tinual scenes of contention, originating in the ambition, the 
avarice, and the jarring interests of the rulers or the subjects, 
which, involve the people in all sorts of calamities. Instances 
without number might be adduced, but a glance at the state of 
England during the time of the Heptarchy will suffice to exemplify 
the propriety of this observation. In an extensive monarchy there 
is only one great political interest, and the objects of ambition, 
however splendid and attractive, are fewer, and consequently 
within the reach of a smaller number of persons ; in such a state 
all tends to one central point, instead of deviating to different 
centres. The vast collective mass of the people is united in one 
political system, and in one general interest, and the different 
provinces which compose the empire enjoy the advantages of a 
free and uninterrupted commerce ; a circumstance of incalculable 
benefit, both to individuals and to the whole community. Sup- 
posing even an extensive monarchy to he despotic, and the monarch 
himself a sanguinary and unfeeling tyrant, yet, by reason of the 
extent of his dominions, only a few individuals, who most of them 
voluntarily bring themselves into contact with him, feel the effects of 
his cruelty and despotism. Those who, from motives of ambition 
or interest, approach his person, and serve him as the instruments 
of his tyranny, are the persons who principally feel the heavy 
hand of the tyrant. The great mass of the people feel its pres- 
sure in a much lighter degree. Distance of situation, and the 
great multitude of subjects, cause individuals to escape his 
notice. The reverse is the case in petty states, where the eye 
of the tyrant is always upon the individuals of his contracted 
dominions ; and a tyrant at the distance of a thousand miles, is 
infinitely preferable to a tyrant at home, at our very doors. The 
history of mankind affords a multiplicity of proofs, that extensive 
monarchies are more conducive to the tranquillity of the world, and 
the general interests of humanity, than petty states."— Ibid. 

9. Logic is applied to history in inculcating the truths 
and lessons of morality and religion : — 

" Besides, it is the history of the Bible which hath conveyed 
down to us the knowledge of those miracles and divine wonders 
which have been wrought by the prophets, the immediate messen- 
gers of heaven, to prove that they were sent of God. It is hi this 
history we read of those Prophecies of things to come, together 
with the accomplishment of them, which stand in a beautiful 
connexion from the beginning of the world to the days of the 
Messiah. All of them join to confirm our faith in the several 



324 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

revelations of religion which God has made to the sons of men ; 
and all concur to establish the last and noblest scheme of religion, 
that is, Christianity. Thns the very history of Scripture has a 
powerful and rational influence to establish our belief of the 
Gospel, and to make us Christians upon solid and reasonable 
grounds. 

" I add yet further, that in the historical part of Scripture we 
read the holy Laws of God, exemplified in the life and practice of 
good men in several ages of the world : and when we see the 
rules of religion copied out in the words and actions of our fellow- 
creatures, it renders the performance of them more practicable 
and more delightful to us. While the word of command stands 
in the law to require our obedience, the actual obedience of our 
fathers to those commands recorded in the history, invites our 
imitation, and makes the work more easy. 

" We find not only the precepts but the sanctions of the law 
of God exemplified in the narratives of Scripture. How often do 
we read the promises of God fulfilled in the rewards of the 
righteous, and his threatenings executed against wilful transgres- 
sors ! these things set the government of God before our eyes in 
a stronger light ; they show us that his words of promise and 
threatening are not empty sounds ; and make it appear, with sen- 
sible conviction, that he will certainly reward, and that he will as 
certainly punish. The many wonderful instances of a Divine Pro.- 
vidence which concerns itself in the affairs of men, and which are 
recorded in the word of God, have a natural tendency to awaken 
our fear of so great and glorious a Being, and to encourage our 
hope and trust in him. In a word, the perfections of God, 
whereby he made and governs the world, are set before our eyes 
by the Scripture History in such divine colours, as give us a more 
awful and more amiable idea of God himself, than any words of 
description could have done, without such an historical account 
of his works of nature, grace, and providence." — Br. Watts' 's 
Scripture History. 

There are many other ways in which logic is applied to 
history. Such, for example, as in the investigation of the 
causes of " great facts " — the cause of the spread of Chris- 
tianity — cause of the rise of Mahometanism — of the Refor- 
mation — of the French Revolution, &c. &c. Also, in tracing 
effects, — as the effects of the feudal system — of the crusades 
— of the discovery of America, &c. &c. I mentioned to 
you, at the commencement of my book, that although the 
mere acquiring of information is not reasoning, yet every 
fact in history may, in some way or other, become the 
subject of a reasoning process. 



APPLICATION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY. 325 



SECTION III. 

THE APPLICATION OF THE ART OP REASONING TO POLITICAL 
ECONOMY. 

" Political Economy " is the name which is given to the 
Science of Wealth. Adam Smith does not use this name, 
but simply calls his work " An Inquiry into the Nature 
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations." A political econo- 
mist is one who studies or explains the doctrines of political 
economy. He is not merely one who believes Malthus's 
theory of the population, Huskisson's system of free trade, 
Ricardo's theory of rent, and Sir Robert Peel's opinions on 
the currency. These doctrines do not constitute the 
science ; they are some of the disputed doctrines of the 
science. He who rejects them is, in our view, as much a 
political economist as he who maintains them. 

I am not going to teach you political economy, but 
merely to give you a few hints as to the use of the art 
of reasoning in acquiring a knowledge of some of its 
principles : — 

I. — The art of reasoning then will teach you that you 
should understand clearly the nature of the science you 
intend to learn. 

" The science of political economy is intimately connected with 
the daily occurrences of life, and in this respect differs materially 
from that of chemistry, astronomy, or any of the natural sciences ; 
the mistakes we may fall into in the latter sciences can have little 
sensible effect upon our conduct, whilst our ignorance of the for- 
mer may lead us into serious practical errors. There is scarcely 
any history or any account of voyages or travels that does not 
abound with facts and opinions, the bearings of which cannot be 
understood without some previous acquaintance with the prin- 
ciples of political economy : besides, should the author himself 
be deficient in this knowledge, you will be continually liable to 
adopt his errors from inability to detect them." 

" This science is essentially founded upon history, — not the his- 
tory of sovereigns, of wars, and of intrigues ; but the history of 
the arts, of trade, of discoveries, and of civilization. We see 
some countries, like America, increase rapidly in wealth and pro- 



326 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 



sperity, whilst others, like Egypt and Syria, are impoverished, 
depopulated, and fa l ling to decay : when the causes which produce 
these various effects are well understood, some judgment may be 
formed of the measures which governments have adopted to con- 
tribute to the welfare of their people ; whether such or such a 
branch of commerce should be encouraged in preference to others ; 
whether it be proper to prohibit this or that kind of merchandise ; 
whether any peculiar encouragement should be given to agricul- 
ture ; whether it be right to establish by law the price of pro- 
visions or the price of labour, or whether they should be left 
without control ; and so on. You see, therefore, that political 
economy consists of two parts, — theory and practice ; the science 
and the art. The science comprehends a knowledge of the facts 
which we have enumerated : the art relates more particularly to 
legislation, and consists in doing whatever is requisite to contri- 
bute to the increase of national wealth, and avoiding whatever 
would be prejudicial to it." — Mrs. Marcefs Conversations on 
Political Economy. 

II. — The art of reasoning will teach you to be systematic 
and methodical in your studies. 

Dr. Watts observes, in his " Improvement of the Mind," 
that " the best way to learn any science is to begin with 
a regular system, or a short and plain scheme of that 
science, well drawn up into a narrow compass, omitting 
the deeper and more abstruse parts of it /' and he remarks 
in another place, that if a man in his younger days has 
arranged all his sentiments in any particular order, it will 
be much more natural and easy for him to continue to dis- 
pose all his further acquirements in the same order. And 
he illustrates this by the arrangement of books in a library : 
when we have accustomed ourselves to any particular ar- 
rangement, we can find a book more readily than if they 
were again to be arranged in even a better order. 

Recent writers on political economy have usually divided 
the science into four parts, — Production, Distribution, In- 
terchange, and Consumption. Under the first division, 
they have considered labour and capital ; under the second, 
rent, profit, and wages ; under the third, commerce and 
money ; and under the fourth, the consumption of Govern- 
ment and that of individuals. It cannot be denied that 
there is a neatness in this division, aDd doubtless all the 
topics of the science may be discussed under one or other 



ce 



APPLICATION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY. 327 

of these heads. But perhaps we cannot have a better divi- 
sion of the science than into — the Nature, — the Causes, — 
and the Effects of National Wealth. Under the first head, 
you might enumerate the articles that constitute wealth ; 
under the second head, specify the causes ; and under the 
third head, trace the consequences of wealth on the happi- 
ness, intelligence, and morals of the population, &c. The 
main object of a plan is to assist the memory by a syste- 
matic arrangement of your knowledge ; and the next object 
is to be able to adjust under some head or division of your 
plan, any additional knowledge you may acquire. 

The nature of national wealth is thus described by one 
who was both a poet and a monarch : — 

" Rid me, and deliver me from the hand of strange children, 
whose mouth speaketh vanity, and their right hand is a right 
hand of falsehood : that our sons may be as plants grown up in 
their youth ; that our daughters may be as corner stones, polished 
after the similitude of a palace : that our garners may be full, 
affording all manner of store : that our sheep may bring forth 
thousands and ten thousands in our streets : that our oxen may 
be strong to labour ; that there be no breaking in nor going out ; 
that there be no complaining in our streets. Happy is that people, 
that is in such a case ; yea, happy is that people whose God is 
the Lord." — Psalm cxliv. 11 — 15. 

The causes of wealth may be thus enumerated : — 

1. The physical characteristics of a country are a source 
of its wealth. 

" Moses, in describing the Land of Promise, uses the follow- 
ing language ; and, like a skilful orator, fixes upon those points 
in which Canaan was superior to Egypt : ' For the land whither 
thou goest in to possess it is not as the land of Egypt, from 
whence ye came out. But the land is a land of hills and valleys, 
and drinketh water of the rain of heaven.' ' The Lord thy God 
bringeth thee into a good land, a land of brooks of water, of 
fountains and depths that spring out of valleys and hills. A land 
of wheat and barley, and vines, and fig-trees, and pomegranates. 
A land of oil olive, and honey. A land wherein thou shalt eat 
bread without scarceness, thou shalt not lack anything in it. A 
land whose stones are iron, and out of whose hills thou mayest 
dig brass. 5 This may be regarded as a negative description of 
Egypt. The land of Canaan was not, like the land of Egypt, a 



328 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

level country on which there was no rain, but whose fertility was 
caused by the overflowing of the river. It was a land of hills 
and valleys, which drank water of the rain of heaven; it was, 
also, more picturesque, and afforded everywhere a constant sup- 
ply of water for themselves and their cattle, for it had brooks of 
water, and fountains springing out of valleys and hills ; it not 
only produced, like Egypt, wheat and barley, but also vines, and 
fig-trees, and pomegranates, and oil olive, and honey, which Egypt 
did not produce : and, moreover, Egypt had no mines of copper 
or of iron, but this is ' a land, whose stones are iron, and out 
of whose hills thou mayest dig brass. 5 " — Lectures on Ancient 



2. The moral habits of its population are a source of its 
wealth. 

" The hand of the diligent maketh rich. — He that loveth plea- 
sure shall be a poor man ; he that loveth wine and oil shall not be 
rich. — The drunkard and the glutton shall come to poverty, and 
drowsiness shall clothe a man with rags. — He that tilleth his land 
shall be satisfied with bread, but he that followeth after vain per- 
sons shall have poverty enough. — He that is slothful in his work 
is brother to him that is a great waster. — A prudent man fore- 
seeth the evil, and hideth himself ; but the simple pass on and are 
punished. — The sluggard will not plough by reason of the cold ; 
therefore shall he beg in harvest, and have nothing. — Love not 
sleep, lest thou come to poverty. Open thine eyes, and thou 
shalt be satisfied with bread. — In all labour there is profit : but 
the talk of the lips tendeth only to penury." — Book of Proverbs, 

" Let us, in conclusion, take for our practical government our 
last observation — the commerce of a country depends upon the 
character of the people. Let us never forget, that the main cause 
of the prosperity of any country or of any city lies in the mental 
and moral character of its inhabitants. Every possible advantage 
of situation may be rendered nugatory by the misconduct of the 
people. If, instead of availing themselves of these natural ad- 
vantages, and persevering in the steady pursuits of trade, the 
merchants neglect their business, or have recourse to swindling, 
or gambling, or smuggling, they will assuredly bring upon them- 
selves that ruin and degradation which such practices never fail 
to produce. It is by honesty, by industry, by prudence, by per- 
severance, and by public spirit that nations and cities are made to 
prosper." — Lectures on Ancient Commerce. 

3. Political institutions are a source of wealth, — such 
as security of property, a good government, wise laws, 
and the impartial administration of public justice. 



APPLICATION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY. 329 

" The right of private property can be secured only by law ; 
and the laws affecting property are more numerous in commercial 
than in other countries ; because the modes of acquiring and 
conveying property are more numerous, and the rights of dif- 
ferent claimants cannot be so easily defined. Commerce is 
affected by all laws relating to the production of commercial 
commodities — the mode of transferring property — the facility 01 
transport — the laying on of taxes — or the punishment of crimes. 
Besides these general laws, which affect all branches of com- 
merce, there are in many countries laws affecting particular 
trades, or the export and import of particular commodities." — 
Ibid. 

4. Social institutions are a source of wealth, — as mints, 
banks, post-offices, roads, canals, railways, harbours, ex- 
changes, markets, &c. &c. 

" Banking institutions cannot flourish in any society in which 
property is insecure, whether that insecurity arises from the 
tyranny of the government, the turbulence of the people, or the 
incursions of foreign enemies. In oriental countries, where the 
possession of wealth invites the rapacity of the government, 
people conceal their wealth by burying it in the earth, and hence 
we read in Scripture of ' treasures hid in a field.' A similar prac- 
tice prevailed in Europe during the times of the feudal system ; 
and treasure-trove was a source of royal revenue, as all the con- 
cealed treasure, when found, belonged to the king. In the early 
ages of Greece property was very insecure ; partly from the tur- 
bulence of the people, partly from the incursions of the neighbour- 
ing states. In this state of society, the temples were employed 
as banks. People who had got money lodged it with the priests, 
and the sanctity of the place preserved it from violation. Even 
hostile tribes would not take this treasure, lest they should incur 
the vengeance of the deity to whom the temple was consecrated." 
—Ibid. 

5. Commerce is a source of wealth. 

" Tyre is thus described in the Holy Scriptures : c A joyous 
city, whose antiquity is of ancient days, whose merchants are 
princes, whose traffickers are the honourable of the earth/ — 
' Tyrus did build herself a stronghold, and heaped up silver as 
the dust, and fine gold as the mire of the street. When the 
waves went forth out of the seas, thou nlledst many people ; thou 
didst enrich the kings of the earth with the multitude of thy 
riches and of thy merchandise. 5 " — Ibid. 



330 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

6. Manufactures are a source of wealth. 

" Manufacturing nations rise to -wealth from the additional 
value which they give to the raw materials ; for there is an im- 
mense difference between the value of the raw materials and the 
value of the same materials in a manufactured state. Thus, for 
instance, it has been stated that a pound of cotton wool, when 
spun, has been worth five pounds sterling ; and when wove into 
muslin, and ornamented in the tambour, is worth fifteen pounds, 
yielding 5,900/. per cent, on the raw material. An ounce of fine 
Manders thread has been sold in London for four pounds. Such 
an ounce made into lace may be sold for forty pounds, which is 
ten times the price of standard gold, weight for weight. Steel 
may be made three hundred times dearer than standard gold, 
weight for weight. Six steel wire springs for watch pendulums 
weigh one grain, to the artist seven shillings and sixpence each, 
equal to two pounds five shillings. One grain of gold costs only 
two-pence. So a service of cut glass, or of fine porcelain, will 
cost many hundred times the value of the raw materials of which 
it is composed." — Ibid. 

7. Colonies are a souree of wealth. They are a certain 
market for your manufactures; they supply you with food 
and raw materials ; they are a place whither your surplus 
population may emigrate ; and in case of war, they are 
out-posts of defence. 

" The Greeks established colonies for the purpose of getting 
rid of a superabundant population, and their colonies soon became 
independent. The Roman colonies were established partly for the 
same purpose, and partly for the purpose of acting as garrisons, 
and thus keeping possession of the countries they had conquered. 
The Tyrians and Carthaginians established colonies for the pur- 
pose of extending their trade. The Tyrians are said to have planted 
forty colonies in different parts of the Mediterranean, and the 
Carthaginians periodically sent out a number of their citizens in 
new places where they thought an advantageous trade might be 
opened."— Ibid. 

After noticing the nature and the causes, you may 
notice the effects of wealth. 

" 'Tis not correct that the possession of wealth, honestly ac- 
quired, has any tendency either to enervate the intellect, to 
corrupt the morals, or to impair the happiness of man. The fact 
is the reverse. 'Tis poverty which is the source of crime — 'tis 
poverty which is the great barrier to the acquisition of knowledge 
— 'tis poverty which is the great source of human woe. If you 



APPLICATION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY. 331 

wish to increase your knowledge, increase yonr wealth : you will 
then have more leisure to study, and be better able to purchase 
the means of instruction. If you wish to increase your virtue, 
increase your wealth : you will then have a higher character to 
support, and fewer and less powerful temptations to act disho- 
nourably and disreputably. If you wish to increase your happi- 
ness, increase your wealth : you will then have more numerous 
sources of pleasure, and, above all, you will be able to indulge in 
the luxury of doing good. Away with the notion that wealth is 
an evil. If wealth be an evil, industry is a vice ; for the tendency 
of industry is to produce wealth. If wealth be an evil, commerce 
should be abandoned ; for the object of commerce is to acquire 
wealth. If wealth be an evil, those efforts which are made by 
benevolence or patriotism, to improve the condition of the poor, 
are deserving, not of support, but of execration. But wealth is 
not an evil. However much the doctrine may have been counte- 
nanced by mistaken moralists or dreaming poets, it has never been 
generally acted upon, for it is one opposed to the common sense 
of mankind. Both to individuals and to nations wealth is a 
blessing. It is only when nations become wealthy that the popu- 
lation are well fed and well clothed, and reside in roomy habita- 
tions well furnished. It is only when nations become wealthy that 
the cities and towns have wide streets, well formed for carriages 
and for foot-passengers, and apparatus for conveying the water 
to every private habitation, and for supplying light in the streets 
at night. It is only when nations become wealthy that famines 
are less frequent, epidemic and contagious disorders less fatal, 
and institutions are formed for relieving the distresses and pro- 
moting the education of the poor. It is only when nations have 
become wealthy that men have leisure for study— that literature 
flourishes — that science is explored — that mechanical inventions 
are discovered — and that the fine arts are patronised and encou- 
raged : — all these are the effects of wealth." — Ibid. 

III. — The art of reasoning will teach you how to apply 
general principles to practical cases. 

The general principles of political economy differ from 
those of geometry. In the first place, these principles are 
not self-evident, but are inferences derived by induction 
from a series of facts ; and, secondly, they possess only a 
moral, not a mathematical universality. 

" That a free commercial intercourse amongst different nations 
would be for their mutual advantage, is a proposition which is 
very generally true ; and being so, every proposal for restriction 
on commerce may be fairly presumed to be inexpedient till the 



332 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

reverse be established. There can, however, be no manner of 
donbt that there are cases, though but few in number, in which 
nations would grossly overlook their own interests if they per- 
mitted a free intercourse with their neighbours. Suppose, for 
example, we had a monopoly of the supply of coal, it would not 
be difficult to show that it would be good policy, with a view to 
the increase of national wealth and security, either wholly to pro- 
hibit, or to lay a high duty on its exportation ; and so in other 
instances. The recent history of the theory of population affords 
a striking instance of the abuse of general principles, or rather of 
the folly of building exclusively upon one set of principles, with- 
out attending to the influence of the antagonist principles by 
which they are partly or wholly countervailed. The principle of 
increase, as explained by Mr. Malthus, and more recently by Dr. 
Chalmers, appeared to form an insuperable obstacle to all per- 
manent improvement in the condition of society, and to condemn 
the great majority of the human race to a state approaching to 
destitution." 

" The real difficulty does not lie in discussing matters connected 
with this science, in the statement of general principles, or in 
reasoning fairly from them : but it lies in the discovery of the 
secondary or modifying principles, which are always in action, and 
hi making proper allowance for their influence. . . . Generally, 
indeed, we may predicate, with considerable confidence, the more 
immediate results that would follow the adoption of any novel 
system of measures ; but it is extremely difficult, or rather, per- 
haps, impossible, without an extensive analogous experience, to 
foretell its remoter consequences ; because we must, in the ab- 
sence of such experience, be necessarily in the dark respecting 
the nature and influence of the modifying principles which a 
change of measures would no doubt bring into action." — M'Cul- 
loctis Principles of Political Economy. 

IV. — The art of reasoning will teach you the best ways 
of increasing your knowledge of the subject. 

In the pursuit of information, you should read chiefly 
those works that are practically useful. Read such books 
as Dr. Kane on the Industrial Resources of Ireland ; the 
Letters of the " Commissioners" of the Times and Morning 
Chronicle; the various Trade Circulars ; and the Public 
Documents issued by the Government. Take every oppor- 
tunity of going over dockyards, warehouses, and manu- 
factories j and there trace the production of commodities, 
from the raw material to the finished article. And be 
sure you go to the Industrial Exhibition. Get a catalogue 






APPLICATION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY. 333 

beforehand, and mark those things you intend more mi- 
nutely to inspect. This will save your time when you 
arrive ; and you will be able to employ your opportunities 
more effectively and profitably. 

When you read history, you will observe that the 
sources of national wealth were as well understood in 
ancient as in modern times. That more corn could be 
produced from the soil than was necessary for the Wcints 
of the population, and the surplus could be sold to 
foreigners, was as well known in Egypt and Sicily as it is 
now known in Poland and Canada ; the effect of manu- 
factures to produce wealth was as well understood in Tyre 
and Corinth as it is now in Birmingham and Manchester ; 
''- ships, colonies, and commerce " were as highly appreciated 
at Athens and at Carthage as they have since been at 
Amsterdam and London ; and the Eomans knew the ad- 
vantages to be gained by facility of intercourse as well as 
it is now known by the advocates of our modern railways. 
And with regard to moral causes : that industry, frugality, 
and prudence, are the road to wealth, is as distinctly taught 
in the Proverbs of Solomon as in any of our modem sys- 
tems of political economy ; and the denunciations of the 
prophets against fraud, robbery, injustice, and oppression, 
are proofs that they taught the doctrine, that security of 
property is essential to national prosperity. 

I advise you thus to study political economy. Study it 
because it is interesting, and will form an agreeable recrea- 
tion to your reasoning faculties. Study it because it con- 
cerns the welfare of others ; and a new discovery of any 
important principle may cause you to become a public 
benefactor. Study it because it contains no principles 
adverse to morality and religion, and the investigation of 
its doctrines is not attended with that danger to which 
weak minds are exposed by the study of the abstract 
principles of morals and metaphysics. Study it because 
it will lead your mind into the contemplation of the divine 
wisdom and goodness, manifested no less in the organiza- 
tion of society than in the construction of the material 
universe. 



334 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 



SECTION IV. 

THE APPLICATION OP THE ART OP REASONING TO STATISTICS. 

1. The nature and extent of the Science of Statistics is 
thus described in the Sixth Annual Report of the Statis- 
tical Society of London : — 

"The first sentence of the prospectus of the Society, issued in 
1834, which states that the object of its establishment is 'to 
procure, arrange, and publish facts, calculated to illustrate the 
condition and prospects of society/ contains, perhaps, the best 
definition of statistics which has yet been attempted ; and, if it 
be imperfect, its imperfection assuredly consists in its being, not 
too narrow, but too comprehensive. Statistics, as thus defined, 
and as a branch of study worthy of our efforts, are assuredly not 
the mere ' method' of stating the observations and experiments 
of the physical or other sciences, as seems, in some instances, to 
have been supposed. Such was not the duty assigned to this 
Society by its founders ; — it was not to perfect the mere art of 
'tabulating' that it was embodied;— it was not to make us 
hewers and drawers to those engaged on any edifice of physical 
science : — but it was that we should ourselves be the architects 
of a science or of sciences; the perfecters of some definite branch 
or branches of knowledge, which should do honour to ourselves 
and our country, and at the same time to the distinguished men 
who summoned us to the labour ; the elaborators, in fine, of 
truths which we feel to be necessary to our happiness, but which 
are yet wholly hidden from us, or but partially revealed." 

" The whole field of our labours appears to be divisible into the 
following chief sections : — 

" I. The Statistics of Physical Geography, Division, and Ap- 
propriation ; or geographical and proprietary statistics. 

"II. The Statistics of Production; or agricultural, mining, 
fishing, manufacturing, and commercial statistics. 

"III. The Statistics of Instruction; or ecclesiastical, scien- 
tific, literary, and academical statistics. 

"IV. The Statistics of Protection; or constitutional, legal, 
judicial, and criminal statistics. 

"V. The Statistics of Consumption and Enjoyment; or of 
population, distribution, consumption, diversions, life, health, and 
public and private charity." 

2. The importance of the science is now universally 
acknowledged. It is manifested in the attention paid by 
the Government to the register of births, marriages, and 



APPLICATION OF REASONING TO STATISTICS. 335 

deaths, and by the anxiety shown at the present time with 
regard to the census. It was not always so. The following 
are extracts from a letter I addressed, on the 17th of 
October, 1823, to the then prime minister, the Earl of 
Liverpool : — 

" Under these circumstances, I beg leave to suggest to your 
Lordship the propriety of establishing a public register of all 
births (not baptisms), marriages, and deaths that may occur in 
the nation, including all the circumstances of sex, age, and occu- 
pation of the parties. 

" The utility of such a measure is obvious. Independently of 
its use in ascertaining the descent of every individual, and thus 
preventing disputed successions, it would possess numerous ad- 
vantages. The system of insurance on lives would be perfected. 
The influence of different occupations, or of different parts of 
the country, in extending or abridging the term of human life, 
would be clearly exhibited. The theories which are now advo- 
cated in regard to population, would be confuted or confirmed. 
A variety of useful truths, equally curious and important, would 
be elicited ; and the science of political economy, instead of rest- 
ing on probability and conjecture, would be founded on the rock 
of mathematical certainty. It would then be easy to ascertain 
the exact number of each respective class, or of any given age in 
society; and the information thus obtained might be usefully 
applied to subjects connected with taxation, to quotas required 
for military service, and to a variety of other subjects. 

"Had such a register been established three centuries ago, 
what a fund of knowledge would it supply ; what a number of 
tedious and expensive lawsuits would have been prevented ; how 
many visionary theories would have been suppressed ; how dis- 
tinctly should we be able to trace the progress of national pro- 
sperity ; and how highly should we esteem the author of so useful 
a regulation." 

POPULATION OP GREAT BRITAIN. 

Rate per cent. 
1841. 1851. of increase. 

Males 9,077,004 . 10,192,721 . 12 

Females 9,581,368 . 10,743,747 . 12 



1 2i£S2.^S£SWB8.3W . 20,936,468 . 12 

POPULATION OF IRELAND. „ L 

Rate per cent. 
1841. 1851. of decrease. 

Males 4,019,576 . 3,176,727 . 20 

Females 4,155,548 . 3,339,067 . 20 



Total . . . 8,175,124 . 6,515,794 



336 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 



POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMEEICA. 

Rate per cent. 
1841. 1851, of increase. 

United States, free po- 
pulation (31 states) . 17,064,688 . 23,347,884 . 36.8 
Slave ditto in 16 states 2,468,138 . 3,178,055 . 29.4 

3. The facts with which this science is conversant are 
those which are susceptible of being represented and regis- 
tered by figures. Its arithmetical operations are chiefly 
multiplication and division, the calculation of ratios, and 
the construction of tables. 

In treating of the relation of a whole and its parts, in 
the second section of the second part of this work, I have 
observed that we employ multiplication, when we wish to 
magnify the importance of any matter, and division when 
we wish to produce a contrary effect. Thus if a party 
wished to show that the Established Church is in posses- 
sion of enormous wealth, he would endeavour to obtain an 
account of all ecclesiastical property, and present it in one 
sum. But if another party wished to produce a different 
impression, he would divide this sum by the number of 
clergymen, and contend that upon, an average they do not 
receive, individually, a higher income than an educated 
man should receive for the kind of duty he performs. 
It was by simple multiplication that Mr. G. R. Porter 
ascertained the amount spent annually in the purchase of 
Spirits, Beer, and Tobacco — sums which he happily styled 
" self-imposed taxes." The following is the amount taken 
from the paper he read on the subject, at Edinburgh, be- 
fore the Statistical Section of the British Association : — 

British and Colonial Spirits . . . , £20,810,208 

Brandy 3,281,2 50 

Total of Spirits . . 24,091,458 
Beer of all kinds, exclusive of that 

brewed in private families .... 25,383,165 

Tobacco and snuff 7,588,607 

Total self-imposed taxes . . . £57,063,230 

When we wish to compare a number of things together 
in some one respect, we employ a ratio. The ratio usually 
employed is a per centage. For example, if we wish to show 



APPLICATION OF REASONING TO STATISTICS. 



337 



the number of crimes in each county or district, as com- 
pared with its population, we should place in one column 
the population of each county, and, in an adjoining column, 
the number of crimes in each county. We should then 
reduce these figures to a ratio, that is, we would, by the 
rule of three, ascertain what per cent in each county the 
crimes bore to the population. We might then, in making 
our comparisons, dispense with both the preceding columns ; 
and place against the name of each county its per centage 
of crime. 

A series of figures may be placed either longitudinally 
or horizontally. In the former case they are called a column 
of figures ; and in the latter case a row of figures. A 
table of figures combines both. Several columns of figures 
are placed side by side, but at the same time there is a 
connexion between all these columns horizontally.* Such 
a table admits of being added together in two ways. You 
may add longitudinally, and place at the bottom the 
amount of each column ; and you may add horizontally, 
and place in a column at your right hand, the separate 
amount of each row. You will understand what I mean 
by the following table, which I have taken from " The 
Statistical Companion," published by T. C. Banfield and 
C. R. Weld, of the Royal Society : — 

Classified Abstracts of the numbers of Electors in the Counties, Cities, and Boroughs 
of Great Britain, for the year 1846. The total number of registered Electors. 
in 1846 was as follows : — 





Counties. 


Cities and 
Boroughs. 


Total. 


475,036 
37,340 
48,953 


342,342 
11,205 


817,378 
48.545 


Wales 




29,597 | 78,550 


Totals 


561,329 


383,144 944 473 









All tables are not drawn up in this form. Some consist 
only of a series of columns placed side by side without 
any horizontal connexion, and sometimes the columns are 
not added up longitudinally. 

4. From the facts represented and registered by the 
figures, the statician endeavours to deduce new truths. 

* See the description of the horizontal system of bookkeeping in Gilbavt's 
Practical Treatise on Banking, p. 325. 

Q 



>38 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 



leful 

By 



There is scarcely a science from which so many useful 
truths may so readily be drawn as from statistics 
new truths I mean, of course, truths that are new to us. 
No truth is new in itself. The doctrine of gravitation was 
a truth in itself before it was discovered by Newton. But 
he made us acquainted with it. It is only in this sense 
that any truth can be new. By statistics many discoveries 
have been made — discoveries, too, of great importance — 
and made by very simple means. For instance, it was a 
new discovery in Edinburgh, last year, that the annual con- 
sumption of spirits in Scotland was in the proportion of 
lie gallons to every individual ; while in Ireland it was in 
the proportion of 2>\ gallons, and in England it was only 
in the proportion of 2 J gallons. It was also a new truth 
that the wealth of the lower classes is increasing— and in- 
creasing too in a higher proportion than that of the higher 
classes. For these truths we are indebted to Mr. Porter. 

" Proportions of Rich and Poor. — In a paper read by 
Mr. Porter before the British. Association, he shows that it is 
altogether a mistake to suppose that the rich are growing richer, 
and the poor are becoming poorer in this country, for there is 
abundant evidence of a much larger increase in the numbers 
of the middle classes than of either the rich or the poor. He 
states that between 1831 and 1848 there was a great propor- 
tionate increase in the number of small dividends paid at the 
Bank of England to the holders of money in the funds. Also 
that the incomes from trades and professions above 150/. a-year, 
which paid income tax, only amounted in 1812 to 21,247,621/., 
whilst in 1848 they amounted to 56,990,224/. ; and that the in- 
comes below 500/. a-year had increased several millions beyond 
any other class of incomes. Further, that the personal property 
on which probate duty was paid, increased from 14,757,420/. in 
1811, -to 44,348,721/. in 1848, — of which the increase was chiefly 
in the smaller properties. The conclusion of Mr. Porter is justi- 
fied by these figures, and it is one that should remove the 
popular prejudice on the subject — a prejudice that is equally 
painful and mischievous." 

These new truths are sometimes discovered by simple 
multiplication and division as already shown ; sometimes 
by ratios, and sometimes by placing interesting informa- 
tion in a tabular form. 

When our figures are chronological registers of facts, 



APPLICATION OP REASONING TO STATISTICS. 339 

new and highly important truths are sometimes ascer- 
tained by merely observing if any specific facts re-occur at 
tertain periods. When we have ascertained any unifor- 
mity in the occurrence of certain events, we call that uni- 
formity a law. Thus those uniformities that were found 
to occur in regard to the deaths at various ages, are now 
called the Laws of Mortality. A few years ago a Com- 
mittee of the House of Commons published the average 
monthly circulation for several years of the notes that 
had been issued respectively by the Bank of England, 
the Country Banks, the Banks of Scotland, and the Banks 
of Ireland. From these returns* Mr. Gilbart deduced 
what he terms " The Laws of the Currency : " — 

" "We will take the monthly returns of the circulation for the 
period that is past, that is, from the end of September 1833 to 
the end of 18 43, and endeavour, by observing their various revo- 
lutions, to discover if they are governed by any fixed causes or 
principles— to ascertain if those principles are uniform in their 
operation ; and if we should discover that the revolutions of the 
currency are regulated by any uniform principles, we shall call 
those principles the Laws of the Currency. 

"We shall begin with that portion of the currency which con- 
sists of notes issued by the Bank of England. On looking over 
the monthly circulation of the Bank of England, given in the 
Table, No. 34, in the Appendix to the Report of 1840, we 
observe, that the circulation of the months in which the public 
dividends are paid is higher than in the subsequent months. Thus, 
the average circulation of January is higher than that of Eebruary 
or March. The circulation of April is higher than that of May 
or June. The circulation of July is higher than that of August 
or September. And the circulation of October is higher than 
that of November or December. This, then, we may consider as 
one law of the circulation of the Bank of England — that it ebbs 
and flows four times in the year, in consequence of the payment 
of the quarterly dividends. This law does not apply to any 
other bank, as all the Government dividends are paid by the 
Bank of England." 

" On inspecting the monthly returns of the country circulation 
for the last ten years, we find that the highest amount is in the 
month of April : thence it descends, and arrives at the lowest 
point by the end of August, which is the lowest point in the 

* These returns were laid before a select committee of the House of Commons 
on Banks of Issue. A summary of the evidence has been published by Mr 
G. M. Bell, under the title of " The Country Banks and the Currency." 



340 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

year. It gradually increases to November; a slight reaction 
takes place in December ; but it then advances until it reaches the 
highest point in April. The general law is, that the country cir- 
culation always makes one circuit in the year — being at its lowest 
point in August, and advancing to December, and continuing to 
advance to its highest point in the month of April, and then 
again descending to its lowest point in August." 

" In Scotland the lowest point of the circulation is in March, 
and the highest in November. The advance, however, between 
these two points is not uniform — for the highest of the interven- 
ing months is May, after which there is a slight reaction ; but it 
increases again until November, and falls off in December. The 
reason of the great increase in May and November is, that these 
are the seasons of making payments. The interest due on mort- 
gages is then settled, annuities are then paid, the country people 
usually take the interest on their deposit receipts, and the 
servants receive their wages. There are frequently large sums 
transferred by way of mortgage. It is the custom of Scotland 
to settle all transactions, large as well as small, by bank notes — 
not by cheques on bankers, as in London. It is remarkable that 
these monthly variations occur uniformly every year, while the 
amount of the circulation in the corresponding months of different 
years undergoes comparatively very little change. 5 ' 

" From what we have already said of the laws of the currency, 
those of our readers who are acquainted with Ireland will be able 
to judge beforehand of the revolutions of her circulation. Being 
purely an agricultural country, the lowest points will of course 
be in August or September, immediately before the harvest, and 
the commencement of the cattle and bacon trade. Then it rises 
rapidly till it reaches its highest point in January, and then 
gradually declines. As an agricultural country, we should natu- 
rally expect that during the season of increase the circulation 
would expand most in the rural districts ; and so we find that 
the circulation of the Bank of Ireland in Dublin, expands very 
moderately — that of her branches, which are located chiefly in 
large towns, expands more — while the circulation of the joint- 
stock banks, which are located in the agricultural districts, 
receives the largest increase. Again, the purchases and sales of 
agricultural produce are known to be in small amounts ; and 
hence tne notes of the smallest denomination receive the largest 
relative increase. The annual changes of the Irish circulation 
are governed chiefly by the produce of the harvest, and the 
prices of agricultural products. These are the laws of the circu- 
lation of Ireland." — Gilbarfs Practical Treatise on Banking. 

The figures which represent tangible objects often indi- 
cate truths of an intellectual and moral character. Thus 



APPLICATION OF REASONING TO STATISTICS. 341 

if we found that the consumption of spirits had decreased 
in a district, while the consumption of tea and coffee had 
increased, we should infer that the population had become 
more temperate ; and if the number of schools had in- 
creased, we should infer that the people had become 
better instructed. The following statistics, from Dickens's 
" Household Words," are an indication of the intelligence 
of the inhabitants of London. 

" The area of a single morning paper — ' The Times/ say — is 
more than nineteen and a half square feet, or nearly five feet by 
four. Compared with an ordinary octavo volume, the quantity 
of matter daily issued is equal to three hundred pages. There 
are four morning papers whose superficies are nearly as great, with- 
out supplements, which they seldom publish. A fifth is only half 
the size. We may reckon, therefore, that the constant craving 
of the Londoners for news is supplied every morning with as 
much as would fill about twelve hundred pages of an ordinary 
novel, or not less than five volumes." 

5. The relation of cause and effect has a close con- 
nexion with statistics. Indeed, we may almost give the 
same definition of statistics which has been given of 
philosophy, the "science which teaches the causes of 
things." 

We discover the " causes of things " in various ways. 

Sometimes statistics will merely give us the facts, 
and we have to ascertain the causes from other sources. 
Thus we have fluctuation in the prices of corn — of the 
funds — and we have to judge of the causes. Here there 
is much room for difference of opinion. For instance, 
statistics will tell us that there was a great fall in the price 
of the funds in February 1848 — History will tell us that 
just before this, occurred the revolution in France. We 
may therefore infer with confidence that the French revo- 
lution was the cause of a decline in the English funds. 
But generally the relation of cause and effect is less 
obvious and less sudden, and consequently there is more 
occasion for sound reasoning. 

Sometimes the causes of things are discovered by taking 
two similar series of figures from two different localities. 
Thus at the time of the cholera the number of deaths 
was registered in a district where the people drank im- 



342 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

pure water, and in another district where the people 
drank pure water : and as the deaths were far more nume- 
rous in the former locality it was inferred that impure 
water produced the cholera. So in India the number of 
deaths from disease in the different regiments stationed 
in different parts of India was ascertained, and it was 
inferred that in the places where the deaths were most 
numerous, the climate was most unhealthy. 

Sometimes "the causes of things" are discovered by 
taking similar series of facts at different periods. Thus 
the number of letters passed through the Post Office before 
the adoption of "the penny postage," and subsequent to 
that event, will show the effect of that measure in in- 
creasing the number of letters. 

Sometimes causes are shown by two series of figures — 
one representing the effect, and the other the cause. Thus, 
if we have from various districts a series of figures show- 
ing the number of schools in each district, and another 
column of figures showing the number of crimes com- 
mitted in each district, and if we find that generally the 
number of crimes is in an inverse proportion to the num- 
ber of schools, we may then infer that want of education 
is the cause of crime. 

Causes are often discovered by various and minute 
classifications. We ascertain the number of people that 
die annually out of a given population. With this know- 
ledge only we should do as the Amicable Insurance did 
when first established, — charge the same premium on all 
lives indiscriminately. But we classify this total according 
to their ages, and hence we can charge a premium pro- 
portionate to the age. We go further, and classify the 
male and female lives ; and again we vaiy our premiums. 
We may again subdivide according to the districts, and 
ascertain how far the probabilities on life in the country 
vary from those in cities. Again, we may classify accord- 
ing to employments, and ascertain the influence of employ- 
ments on the duration of human life. So ; we may take 
a number of criminals, and classify them according to their 
antecedents, — that is, according to their previous circum- 
stances in regard to age, residence, employment, character 
of parents, education, &c. &c, and hence attempt to dis- 



APPLICATION OP REASONING TO STATISTICS. 



343 



cover those circumstances that lead to the formation of 
character, and therefore tend to produce crime. 

The principle of classification — that is, of genus and 
species — is of very extensive use in statistics ; and we can 
rarely apply it in any case without obtaining some impor- 
tant information. This remark is illustrated in the follow- 
ing table, from the Statistical Companion : — 



National Debt. — Numbers and Classification of Fundholders. 



Persons entitled to 
receive dividends 
October 10, 1846. 


Persons entitled to 
receive dividends 
October 10, 1847. 


Amount of Dividend each 
Person was entitled to receive. 


No. 

50,008 

24,978 

53,829 

13,119 

6,893 

1,903 

1,225 

529 

164 

92 


No. 

51,609 

25,274 

54,145 

13,087 

6,889 

1,917 

1,203 

520 

163 

97 


£ 


„ 10 


50 


„ 100 


200 


300 


500 


1,000 


2,000 


Exceeding 2,000 


152,740 


154,904 




Showing that the number of persons thus entitled to Dividends on the 10th 
October, 1847, was 2,164 more than at the same period of last year, by 
far the largest portion of the increase being in the smallest amounts. 



6. In reply to a statistical argument, Mr. Canning ex- 
claimed : — " Not figures, but facts." All figures should 
represent facts. But we cannot deny that even the facts 
represented by figures may, like other facts, become the 
basis of erroneous reasoning. 

Our reasoning may be erroneous from the inaccuracy 
of the data. In some cases no records may have been kept, 
and hence we have no authenticated facts. From this 
cause our reasoning may be defective respecting the po- 
pulousness of ancient nations — the average duration of 
life in the middle ages — the amount of the revenue the 
pope derived from England previous to the Reformation. 
Sometimes when records have been kept they are defective. 
Thus, the produce of the gold and silver mines in America 
and in Russia has been calculated from the amount of 
the duty paid to the State. But, of course, we have no 



344 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

record of the cases in which the duty has been evaded. 
We have records of the importation of tobacco, but we 
can have no records of the quantity introduced by smug- 
glers. We know the quantity of spirits that pay duty 
in Great Britain and Ireland every year, but we have no 
records of the illicit distillation. 

So in taking our series of figures from different coun- 
tries, we are liable to error in making comparisons between 
those things to which these series of figures may respec- 
tively refer. The prices of commodities, for instance, 
though referring to things called by the same name, may 
not refer to things of the same kind or the same quality. 
In comparing the wages of different countries, we may be 
led astray, for the quantity of labour rendered in return 
for these respective rates of wages may very much differ. 
When the union between England and Ireland was under 
consideration in the House of Commons, Mr. Wilberforce 
presented a petition from the Woollen Manufacturers of 
Yorkshire, praying to be protected against the low wages 
of Ireland. It was presumed that if woollen manufactures 
were established in Ireland, they would be able, from 
the low rate of wages, to undersell those of Yorkshire. 
Certain duties, called "Union duties," were accordingly 
continued for twenty years. But though those duties 
have ceased for thirty years, the woollen manufactures, 
notwithstanding the low wages, have shown no disposition 
to take flight from Leeds to Gal way. 

We are sometimes led astray in making comparisons 
beirween two series of figures, by confining our attention 
simply to the figures, without noticing the different cir- 
cumstances of the respective periods to which those figures 
refer. Thus, during the commercial pressure of 1847, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer stated to some deputations 
that waited upon him on the subject, that the restrictions 
on the issue of Bank notes, by the act of 1844, could not 
be the cause of the pressure, for the amount of notes then 
in circulation was higher than it had been in former years 
when no pressure existed. It was afterwards stated before 
the Parliamentary Committee, that of the notes in circula- 
tion, above 4,000,000Z. were locked up in the vaults of the 
London and Country Bankers, as a provision for any 



APPLICATION OF REASONING TO STATISTICS. 345 

demand that might be made upon them for payment of 
their notes or deposits. 

Sometimes, as we have stated, two series of figures 
will, by their correspondence, show that the facts denoted 
in one series, are the cause of the facts denoted in the 
other series. But this will not be uniformly the case. 
We cannot always conclude that, because two rows of 
figures increase simultaneously, therefore the facts regis- 
tered by one series of figures are the cause of the facts 
registered in the other series. The Morning Chronicle 
produced two series of figures — the one showing the in- 
crease in the number of boys who attended the Kagged 
Schools — the other showing the increase in the number of 
juvenile culprits brought before the police magistrate. 
It seems that within the same period of time, both the 
series of numbers had increased. It was, therefore, in- 
ferred that the establishment of the Ragged Schools had 
been the cause of an increase in the number of juvenile 
thieves. In reply to this inference, the Christian Times 
observes : — " As to the specific value of the statistical 
figures of the Morning Chronicle, we conceive the utmost 
merit that can be allowed them, is to consider them an- 
other ingenious illustration of the frequent fallacy cum hoc 
propter hoc : for more they can never pass, since they 
have not a whit better claim to be regarded as proofs than 
the declaration of a country cousin of ours the other day, 
who maintained that England had been falling ever since 
apple-dumplings on a Sunday went out of fashion. Our 
contemporary might, with equal truth, have shown that 
the increase of juvenile delinquency had kept pace with 
the increase of railway traffic, or with the sale of Banbury 
cakes, or the new discovery of apricot lozenges, or with the 
use of the magnetic telegraph : and there would have been 
this advantage in these comparisons — that they are facts. 
Many things have a co-existence, and preserve a marvellous 
ratio in their increments, and yet have not the remotest con- 
nexion as cause and, effect ; and this, we are convinced, is 
the predicament of the accidental co-increase of juvenile 
rogueries and Ragged Schools." 

Another case in which statistics have been found to be 
at fault, is in regard to the future. No one can doubt the 
Q 3 



346 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

beneficial effects of the penny postage. Yet it cannot be 
denied that those calculations which were made to show 
that this measure would increase the Kevenue to the State 
have not been realized. So those calculations which were 
made a few years ago, by distinguished staticians, as to the 
lowest price at which foreign corn could be imported into 
England, have not hitherto turned out to be correct. 
Perhaps, in these cases, our reasonings more than our 
calculations have been fallacious. We may, by statistics, 
establish the truth of general principles. And as a general 
rule, we may assume that the future will resemble the 
past. But as the influence of general principles is liable 
to be counteracted by special circumstances, we cannot 
predict the future without having also a previous know- 
ledge of those special circumstances. It is the business of 
statistics to calculate, not to prophesy. 

7. The following are extracts from the address of the 
Earl of Harrowby to the Statistical Society of London, at 
the annual meeting held March 15, 1851. 

" It is important in all sciences to know what is to be expected 
from them — what they can do, and what they cannot — and for 
this purpose it should be always kept in mind that a mere perusal 
of statistical truths gives no short, no royal road to knowledge, 
but is merely one of the aids to its acquisition. For instance, 
submit to a man totally ignorant of medicine a table containing a 
number of facts recorded on a medical subject, — and how many 
false conclusions will he draw from it ! He must know more 
than the number of deaths in the year, or even the enumeration 
of the diseases, before he dares to draw any conclusion as to the 
sanitary condition of the place. He must know whether epide- 
mics have prevailed in the year in question — whether war, pesti- 
lence, or famine have swelled the usual numbers. It must be 
remembered, that it is only a class of facts, it is not all the facts, 
that can be tabulated ; and these are only materials towards a 
conclusion, requiring themselves a running commentary from the 
knowledge, judgment, and impartiality of either the man who 
supplies, or the man who reads, the tables — without which quali- 
fication they not only do not give .the whole facts of the case, but 
absolutely mislead, by an appearance of completeness which they 
do not possess. 

" If, again, we were to take tables with regard to criminals, 
there is no man who, without considerable knowledge of the 
legal history, and more than the legal history, of the country, 
would not be misled bv the inspection. He would see, perhaps, 



APPLICATION OF REASONING TO STATISTICS. 347 

a considerable increase in the criminality of the country ; but it 
is desirable to know what was included in the criminality at the 
beginning of the time, and what is now included ; what changes 
have taken place in the laws, how much is now submitted to the 
public observation which once was not; whether crimes which 
once went under greater names and titles now wear lighter ones, 
and vice versa; whether the jurisdiction of one tribunal has been 
transferred to another; whether matters which formerly were 
submitted to the adjudication of a formal tribunal are now handed 
over to a summary jurisdiction. If you come further to details, 
they are of most essential importance in ascertaining the value of 
the tables. For the purpose of ascertaining the real fact at issue, 
which is the real increase or decrease of crime, it is essential to 
know still more — you must take county by county. In one case 
you have a rural police, in another you have not ; in one case you 
have a much stricter and more rigorous enforcement of the law 
than in others. I recollect, on a former occasion, I think *at 
Glasgow, there were comparisons between the different amounts 
of drunkenness of different towns. Then came the question — 
what did the magistrates of one town hold to be drunkenness of 
a kind to be submitted to the law, and what the magistrates of 
another town held to be such ? and rather an amusing test was 
submitted for drunkenness which would come within the law, 
namely, that as long as a man could walk on the curb-stone with- 
out going off, he was allowed to escape with impunity ; but if he 
could not keep on the curb-stone, he immediately was handed 
over to the proper tribunal. 

" Now, if we were to look at the statistics of circulation alone 
— the circulation of bank notes by itself — we surely should be 
very ill-informed as to the amount of means for promoting the 
exchange of commodities in actual operation, and yet, apparently, 
the Bank issues should be considered a sufficient test. But if we 
look back to the amount of circulation at the beginning of the 
present century, and see how little ifc varies from the amount at 
the present moment, and compare the amount of pecuniary trans- 
actions in the one case and in the other, which have to be 
carried on apparently by that same means of exchange, we should 
be extremely ill-informed if we did not take into our considera- 
tion the immense economy of exchange which has taken place by 
clearing houses and bills of exchange, and every kind of mercan- 
tile facility, which, in fact, makes the circulation, which, fifty 
years ago, represented one amount of transactions, to be a very 
imperfect test for purposes of comparison with the circulation of 
the present time." 

8. We shall conclude this section with some statistics 
respecting the Industrial Exhibition. 



348 



LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 



" The ' Crystal, or Glass Palace/ prepared for the 'World's 
Fair/ or great industrial exhibition of 1851, is 1,848 feet long, 
by 456 in width. The height of the three roofs is 64, 44, and 24 
feet ; and that of the transept, 108 feet. The ground floor occu- 
pies 752,832 superficial or square feet ; and the galleries, 102,528 
feet, making, in all, an exhibiting surface of some 21 acres, wit! 
a length of tables of about eight miles. There are 3,500 cast and 
wrought-iron columns, varying from 14^ to 20 feet in length ; 
2,224 cast-iron girders, and 1,128 supporters for the galleries. 
The glass necessary to cover this immense building, is 900,000 
square feet ; the length of sash-bars is 205 miles ; and there are 
34 miles of gutters to carry off rain-water to the hollow columns, 
through which it passes into drains or sewers under ground." 

The following Return has been compiled from the official lists published daily, and 
shows the estimated weekly number of visitors, and the money taken at the doors t 
• from the week ending May 3d, to Saturday the 30th of August. 







ID 




Estimated 


Total No. who 


Week 
ending 




fe 


Amount 


number of 


enter weekly, 


Number. 


5 


received at the 


persons 
entering 


including the 
staff, exhibitors' 






doors. 


with season 


attendants, and 










tickets. 


the press. 








£ s. d. 






May 3 


1,042 


£1 


1,042 


49,000 


56,042 


10 


41,194 


5s. 


10,298 10 


77,056 


118,250 


17 


53,386 


5s. 


13,346 10 


80,121 


145,507 


24 


89,458 


5s. 


22,189 


91,440 


192,869 


31 


160,857 


Is. 


11,123 5 


61,2.:7 


222,114 


June 7 


218,799 


— 


13,694 2 


27,129 


245,928 


14 


206,233 


— 


12,943 12 


32,352 


238,585 


21 


267,800 


— 


16,421 S 


35,215 


303,015 


28 


262,464 


— 


16,177 8 


30,245 


292,709 


July 5 


225,503 


— 


14,073 


21,436 


246,739 


12 


265,319 


— 


16,427 5 


23,108 


288,427 


19 


283,400 


— 


17,516 


22,453 


3(15,853 


26 


255,768 


— 


15,761 4 


18,371 


247,139 


Aug. 2 


270,900 


— 


16,315 17 6 


15,617 


288,519 


9 


266,770 


— 


15,440 14 6 


20.001 


186.771 


16 


236,096 


— 


14,050 18 ' 6 


15,961 


252,057 


23 


226,502 


— 


13,360 12 6 


10,037 


2 6,539 


30 


202,808 
Total numt 


erofV 


11,860 7 6 
isitors from May 


8,638 
1 to Aug. 30 


211,446 


4,205,509 



APPLICATION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 349 



SECTION V. 

THE APPLICATION OP THE ART OF REASONING TO MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY. 

Moral Philosophy has been denned by Paley as the 
science that teaches men their duty, and the reasons of it. 
It is thus described by Dr. Croly : — 

"Moral philosophy is tlie teaching of human happiness, in the 
hands of man; as religion is the teaching of human happiness, in 
the hands of the Creator. It is the history of the rules, impulses, 
and objects of hnman virtue. It was the earliest of all studies ; 
for the obvious reason, that it was the most essential. The first 
associations of men must have felt the value of truth, of a respect 
for property, and of the avoidance of mutual injury. Thus, we 
can expect no practical discoveries in morality, its* principles being 
fixed by the primal necessities of our nature. Still, though no 
tactical difficulties exist in its rules, their grounds, their action, 
and their objects abound in the most refined problems. The dis- 
tinction of vice and virtue, the supreme good, the foundation of 
obedience, the rights of man, the origin of evil, have exercised 
the subtlest intellects since the days of the illustrious author of 
the Proverbs ; a volume to which may be traced the greater por- 
tion of all the Eastern maxims ; the doctrines of the early sages, 
known as the 'wise men of Greece;' and, perhaps, the principles 
of the three great schools, the Platonic, the Stoic, and the Epicu- 
rean. With the restoration of learning in Europe, the subject 
was resumed, and has occupied powerful minds, from the logical 
acuteness of Hobbes and the profound learning of Cudworth, 
down to the dexterous simplicity, but dubious conclusions of 
Paley. To be ' able to give a reason of the hope that is in us,' 
is a divine command. Next in importance is, to be able to give 
to ourselves a reason for our duties. But, to give that reason 
requires the study of moral philosophy." — National Knowledge, 
National Power. 

In the application of logic to this science, we may 
observe : — 

1. Logic will teach ns that there are moral truths. 

" The first proposition which I assume, and which I wish you 
to bear in your minds as firmly established, is, that there are 
moral truths. So, however, it is. I am solicitous that you should, 
from the very first, constantly carry with you the firm conviction 



350 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

and clear apprehension of this proposition. And I venture to 
say, that if there be firmly established in your minds a conviction 
that there are moral truths, many of the difficulties which arise, 
respecting morality in general, will vanish of themselves, or will 
be easily removed. 

" Perhaps the best way of illustrating this doctrine, that there 
are moral truths, is by mentioning some of the most simple and 
familiar propositions of this kind, which are commonly delivered 
and assented to by men, both on practical occasions, and in the 
course of speculative discussions. Of this kind are the following : 
— That murder, theft, robbery, adultery, are wrong : that breach 
of promise is wrong ; that a man cannot liberate himself from the 
obligation of his own promise ; that it is wrong to treat a person 
as a mere thing; that we must, in general, recognise the autho- 
rity of the law of the land ; tkat the law ought to conform to 
justice ; that when a man acts against his conscience, his act is 
morally wrong. Of this kind, I say, are moral truths. I do not 
say that all these are certainly moral truths. I do not say this 
at present, at least. Still less do I say that all these propositions 
are evidently true, or that they do not admit of limitations and 
exceptions ; but I say that there are moral truths of this kind. 
If any of those which I have enumerated be not exactly true, or 
not true without exception, then there are corrections of them 
which are the truths at which I point; — then the proposition 
properly limited by exception is such a truth as I mean. Every 
body, upon every occasion in which man's moral nature comes 
into question, — and what occasion is unconnected with man's 
moral nature ? — every man, I say, upon every occasion, is ready 
to utter and to assent to propositions such as these; if not 
exactly these, still such as these. And I say, that this per- 
petual enunciation and acceptance of such propositions implies, 
and makes it indisputably certain, that they have in them a sub- 
stantial truth." — WhewelVs Lectures on Systematic Morality. 

"The view which I take of this subject is briefly as follows : — 
"It is manifest to every one, that we all stand in various and 
dissimilar relations to all the sentient beings, created and un- 
created, with which we are acquainted. Among our relations to 
created beings are those of man to man, or that of substantial 
equality, of parent and child, of benefactor and recipient, of 
husband and wife, of brother and brother, citizen and citizen, 
citizen and magistrate, and a thousand others. 

" Now, it seems to me, that, as soon as a human being com- 
prehends the relation in which two human beings stand to each 
other, there arises in his mind a consciousness of moral obliga- 
tion, connected, by our Creator, with the very conception of this 
relation. And the fact is the same, 'whether he be one of the 



APPLICATION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 351 

parties or not. The nature of this feeling is, that the one ought 
to exercise certain dispositions towards the others to v/hom he is 
thus related: and to act towards them in a manner corre- 
sponding with those dispositions." — WaylanoVs Elements of Moral 
Science. 

2. Logic will teach us to observe the foundation of the 
distinctions between moral good and evil. 

" All the systems we have examined may, I conceive, be re- 
ferred to six distinct heads. 1st, The eternal and immutable 
nature of all moral distinctions. 2d, That utility, public or 
private, is the foundation of moral obligation. 3d, That all 
morality is founded upon the will of God. 4th, That a moral 
sense, feeling, or emotion, is the ground of virtue. 5th, That it 
is by supposing ourselves in the situation of others, or by a 
species of sympathetic mechanism, that we derive our notions of 
good and evil. And 6th, The doctrine of vibrations, and the 
association of ideas. 

" Those whose doctrine is -mainly founded upon the first prin- 
ciple, — that of the eternal and immutable nature of all moral 
distinctions, — are Dr. Cudworth and Mr. John Locke ; Bishop 
Cumberland, who adopts, however, this principle with more quali- 
fication than several others ; Mr. Wollaston, by his fitness of 
things ; and Dr. Clarke, by his truth of things ; Dr. Price, Mr. 
Gisborne, and Dr. Dewar. 

" Those writers who ground their theories upon the doctrine 
of utility, or, as it is sometimes termed, the selfish system, are 
rather numerous. Mr. Hobbes is the first on the list. Mr. 
Stewart remarks, that there is in point of principle a far more 
close and intimate connexion between the opinions of this writer 
and Mr. Hume, and others of this school, than what has com- 
monly been imagined ; and this remark is perfectly correct. Mr. 
Hume himself is at the head of this philosophical party. Man- 
deville's Fable of the Bees, is, though in a caricaturist's dress, 
bottomed on the same views of human nature. Pope and Boling- 
broke take the universal weal as the standard of morals. Mr. 
B.utherford considers the advantages which the Scriptures hold 
out to those who practise virtue, as the ultimate end of it. 
Paley's system is well known as grounded on the general good. 
Godwin's Political Justice, and Mr. Bentham's system, are 
founded upon the same principle. 

" Archbishop King stands alone in maintaining that the will 
of God is the sole foundation of virtue ; if we except Dr. Paley, 
who has coupled this principle with the system of expediency. 

" Those who are advocates for a If oral Sense, are Shaftesbury, 
Bishop Butler, Dr. Hutcheson, Lord Karnes, Professor Stewart, 



352 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

and Dr. Thomas Brown. Dr. Cogan's views seem grounded on 
the same views. 

" Dr. Adam Smith's work on Moral Sentiments is the only one 
which is grounded solely on the principle of sympathy. 

" Dr. Priestley and Dr. Hartley are the only two writers who 
maintain that the Association of Ideas is the ground of good and 
evil. 

"There are none of these different systems that are not in 
some degree founded on truth ; but the great imperfection which 
runs through them all is, that they attempt to generalise too 
much. We cannot resolve all the moral feelings and habits of 
our nature into one general principle." — Blakey's History of 
Moral Science. 

3. Logic will teach us a proper mode of classification 
with regard to those actions or motives that are morally- 
good or evil. 

" The division of virtue, to which we are now-a-days most 
accustomed, is into duties : — 

" Towards God ; as piety, reverence, resignation, gratitude, &c. 

"Towards other men (or relative duties) ; as justice, charity, 
loyalty, &c. 

" Towards ourselves ; as chastity, sobriety, temperance, preser- 
vation of life, care of health, &c." — Palefs Moral Philosophy. 

The following is an enumeration of some of the duties 
of a public company : — 

The Duties op Public Companies. — "The first of these 
duties is to obey the lazes — a public company should abstain 
from smuggling and all other illicit proceedings — should make 
correct returns to Government, and pay its fair proportion of the 
property -tax, and of all other duties. ' Render unto Caesar the 
things which are Caesar's. Render to all their dues ; tribute to 
whom tribute is due ; custom, to whom custom ; fear, to whom 
fear; honour, to whom honour.'* Another duty is to enforce 
the laws upon others. Individuals sometimes abstain from pro- 
secuting frauds upon themselves, from a misapplied feeling of 
compassion, an unwillingness to incur odium, or the fear of 
expense; but none of these feelings are sufficient to justify a 
public company in abstaining from this duty. Such a course is 
injurious to the public, by holding out inducements to the com- 
mission of similar crimes. 'Because sentence against an evil 
work is not executed speedily, therefore the heart of the sons of 
men is fully set in them to do evil.'-j- It is also the duty of public 
companies to support the cause of order and of due submission to 

* Rom. xiii. 7. t Eccles. viii. 11. 



APPLICATION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 353 

constituted authorities — the rights of property — the supremacy 
of the law — the impartial administration of public justice — ana 
to honour the constitutional form of government of the country, 
by whatever party it may be administered. ' Put them in mind 
to be subject to principalities and powers, to obey magistrates, to 
be ready to every good work, to speak evil of no man, to be no 
brawlers, but gentle, showing all meekness unto all men.'* 
Another duty is to conduct the affairs of the company on such a 
liberal, yet prudent scale of expense, as shall afford encourage- 
ment to the industry, trade, and fine arts of the country. Solomon 
says, ' Prepare thy work without, and make it fit for thyself in 
the field, and afterwards build thy house. 5 f Which means, if we 
understand it rightly, ' Get your money before you spend it, but 
having got it, live in a scale of expense corresponding to your 
means — afterwards build thy house.' Individuals may be justified 
in living much within their means, in order to provide for old 
age, or for the proper settlement of their children ; but public 
companies cannot have such motives for conducting their esta- 
blishments with an unsuitable economy. But, above all, it is the 
duty of a public company to maintain, in all its transactions, a 
high-toned morality. 'Righteousness exalteth a nation.' % A 
departure from moral rectitude is altogether inexcusable in a 
public company. As all their actions are presumed to be the 
result of previous deliberations, they cannot plead in excuse, as 
individuals do, the power of passion, the impulse of the moment, 
or the force of habit. In proportion to the weakness, or the 
absence of temptation, in such proportion would their conduct 
be the more criminal ; § while their wealth and influence would 
render their example more extensively injurious to the public 
morality. If parties of high station in society depart from the 
strict rule of duty, those of inferior station will deviate still more 
widely. ' If a ruler hearken to lies, all his servants are wicked.' " || 
Gilbarfs Practical Treatise on 



4. Logic will teach us to notice the different species of 
any particular virtue or vice. 

" Question. What is forbidden in the Eighth Commandment ? 

"Answer. The Eighth Commandment forbiddeth whatsoever 
doth or may unjustly hinder our own or our neighbour's wealth 
or outward estate. 

" Q. How may we be said to steal from ourselves ? 

"A. By idleness, niggardliness, and prodigality. 

" Q. How many ways may persons be said to steal from 
others, or unjustly hinder their neighbour's wealth or outward 
estate ? 

* Tit. iii. 1, 2. t Prov. xxiv. 27. % Prov. xiv. 34. 

§ Prov. vi. 30. 1] Prov. xxix. 12. 



354 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

"A. Several ways; particularly by theft, robbery, resetting, 
defrauding, monopolizing, and taking unlawful usury." — Assem- 
bly's Shorter Catechism explained by James Fisher. 

" A merchant should be an honourable man. Although a man 
cannot be an honourable man without being an honest man, yet 
a man may be strictly honest without being honourable. Honesty 
refers to pecuniary affairs ; honour refers to the principles and 
feelings. You may pay your debts punctually, you may defraud 
no man, and yet you may act dishonourably. You act dishonour- 
ably when you give your correspondents a worse opinion of your 
rivals in trade than you know they deserve. You act dishonour- 
ably when you sell your commodities at less than their real value, 
in order to get away your neighbour's customers. You act dis- 
honourably when you purchase at higher than the market price, 
in order that you may raise the market upon another buyer. You 
act dishonourably when you draw accommodation bills, and pass 
them to your banker for discount, as if they rose out of real 
transactions. You act dishonourably in every case wherein your 
external conduct is at variance with your real opinions. You act 
dishonourably if, when carrying on a prosperous trade, you do 
not allow your servants and assistants, through whose exertions 
you obtain your success, to participate in your prosperity. You 
act dishonourably if, after you have become rich, you are un- 
mindful of the favours you received when you were poor. In all 
these cases there may be no intentional fraud. It may not be 
dishonest, but it is dishonourable conduct." — Lectures on Ancient 
Commerce. 

5. Logic will teach us to investigate the causes and 
consequences of virtues and vices, and the various circum- 
stances by which they may be attended. 

" The effect of intemperance in shortening life is strikingly 
exemplified in the contrast afforded by other classes of society to 
the Quakers, a set of people of whom I must again speak 
favourably. It appears from accurate calculation, that in London 
only one person in forty attains the age of fourscore, while among 
the Quakers, whose sobriety is proverbial, and who have long set 
themselves against the use of ardent spirits, not less than one in 
ten reaches that age — a most striking difference, and one which 
carries its own inference along with it. 

" It is remarked by an eminent practitioner, that of more than 
a hundred men in a glass manufactory, three drank nothing but 
water, and these three appeared to be of their proper age, while 
the rest who indulged in strong drinks seemed ten or twelve years 
older than they proved to be. This is conclusive." — Macnislis 
Anatomy of Drunkenness. 



APPLICATION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 355 

" But if a man is a fool to expect to attain wealth by dishonest 
means, he is a still greater fool if he expects that wealth so 
acquired will afford him any enjoyment. — Enjoyment, did I say? 
Is it possible, that in such a case any man can expect enjoyment ? 
What ! enjoyment for you — you who have obtained wealth by 
falsehood — by deception — by extortion — by oppression — you ex- 
pect enjoyment ? Listen — listen to the hearty denunciations of 
all honest men; to the awful imprecations of those you have 
injured ; to the reproaches of your family, whose name you have 
dishonoured ; to the accusations of that conscience whose voice 
you have stifled, and to the wrathful thunder of that heaven 
whose laws you have outraged ! Listen to these — these are the 
enjoyments that will attend your ill-gotten wealth : — ' He that 
getteth riches and not by right, shall leave them in the midst of 
his days : and at his end shall be a fool.' " — Lectures on Ancient 
Commerce. 

6. Logic will teach us how to apply general principles to 
particular acts, institutions, or opinions, and to judge of 
their propriety : — 

Wab,. — " When we contemplate the example of our Lord Jesus 
Christ, forming a perfect contrast to the war character, and 
remember that this was designed as a pattern for our conduct — 
when we consider his precepts, and reflect that these are of per- 
petual obligation ; and further bring to mind, that his followers 
took no part in wars for more than tioo hundred years after his 
personal appearance on earth, can we entertain a doubt of the 
incompatibility of war with the duties of a Christian ? Can we 
draw any other conclusion, than that, in adopting the spirit and 
practice of war, we must act with such inconsistency with the 
precepts and example of Jesus Christ, and the example of his fol- 
lowers, as amounts to a dereliction of Christianity itself ! " 

Oaths. — " The imposition of an oath carries with it the strong 
presumption, that the individual is not to be believed without it. 
This idea has an extensively demoralizing effect, on those who 
are placed within the sphere of its influence. It opens a wide 
door to the disgusting vice of lying. When men become recon- 
ciled to the idea, that an oath is necessary to the truth, it is a 
kindred feeling to reconcile them to falsehood, in their ordinary 
communications. Nor is this the only immoral tendency of 
requiring oaths, to ensure the truth. lit holds out a temptation 
to swearing in conversation. Reconciled, in the first place, to 
speak falsehood, unless under the coercion of an oath, and, in the 
next place, to attest the truth by swearing, a disposition is pro- 
duced, in some men, to give their conversation the appearance of 
truth, by interspersing it with profane oaths." 



356 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

Salutations. — " They believe there is no propriety in bowing 
the body, and uncovering the head, to any created beings ; for 
worship belongs to God only. But if we are told, that in fashion- 
able life these actions have no such intention, we reply, that if 
they have become unmeaning, men of correct feelings ought 
neither to offer nor receive them. If they are intended only to 
express civility and ordinary respect, we say, that these can be 
expressed in a more appropriate manner, than by degrading the 
outward acts of Divine worship down to a mere expression of 
common civility, or even nothing at all. Everything which relates 
to Divine worship, or that homage we pay to the Almighty, should 
be carefully guarded from being introduced into the familiar in- 
tercourse between man and man ; lest, by the association of ideas, 
our worship itself become adulterated and offensive. 

" We believe that, under the Gospel, we are bound to speak 
every man truth to his neighbour. The expressions, mister, or 
master, and your most obedient, &c. your humble servant, &c. 
being in the common application untrue, we decline to use. The 
love and charity which the Gospel inspires, are above all compli- 
mental expressions, and need neither flattery nor falsehood to set 
them off to advantage. 

" The plain language, as we term it, or the use of the singular 
pronouns to a single person, has much to recommend it. In the 
first place, it is consonant to truth ; for the plural pronoun does 
express a plurality of persons to whom it relates : hence, we 
consider it a departure from truth, to address a single individual 
with a word that conveys an idea of more than one. We consider 
the plain language, too, as the language of the greatest and best 
of men that have ever lived, to one another and to God. And we 
think this authority ought to possess great weight. The rules of 
the language contribute something to the same effect. It must 
be admitted, that the beauty and precision of the language are 
greatly injured by the promiscuous use of the plural pronouns." 

Amusements. — " Those vain amusements which have been de- 
nominated Recreations, we consider beneath the dignity of the 
Christian character; and they frequently prove the inlet to much 
vice and corruption. H. Tuke, in his ' Principles of Religion,' 
chap. 9, says : ' There are three rules relating to amusements, 
by which our conduct should be regulated. 1. — To avoid all 
those which tend needlessly to oppress and injure any part of the 
animal creation. Of this class are cock-fighting and horse-racing : also 
hunting, &c. when engaged in for diversion and pleasure. 2. — To 
abstain from such as are connected with a spirit of hazardous 
enterprise ; by which the property and temporal happiness of 
individuals and families are often made to depend on the most 
precarious circumstances ; and the gain of one frequently entails 



FORMATION OF HABITS OF REASONING. 357 

misery on many. Of this class are all games in which property is 
staked. 3. — To avoid such as expose us to unnecessary tempta- 
tions, with respect to our virtue ; or which dissipate the mind, so 
as to render a return to civil and religious duties ungrateful. Of 
this kind, stage entertainme?its are peculiarly to be avoided, with 
various other places of public amusement, which have a tendency 
to corrupt the heart, or to alienate it from the love and fear of 
God.' " — The Doctrines of Friends, by Elisha Bates. 

I shall conclude this section by a quotation on the 
moral effects of the Industrial Exhibition. 

" The many friendships that will be established during the 
existence of the Exhibition between the members of different 
nations, will be so many powerful motives for resisting war, so 
many guarantees for quiet and reasonable legislation ; the breaking 
down of unfounded prejudices, a more accurate and enlarged 
knowledge of the real character of our neighbours, the right 
appreciation of their talents and other excellences, the perception 
of those points in which we ourselves are inferior to them, — all 
these things have the same tendency, and they may rationally be 
expected to follow from that more close collision with foreigners 
which will be caused by the Great Exhibition of Industry. It is 
not enough, therefore, to say that it will, under this aspect, pro- 
mote the welfare of mankind ; we may boldly say, it will promote 
their moral and religious welfare." — Mr. Whish's Prize Essay. 



SECTION VI. 

THE APPLICATION OF THE ART OF REASONING TO THE 
FORMATION OF HABITS OF REASONING. 

The object of all rules is the formation of habits. Habits 
can be formed only by repeated acts. The rules direct 
how the act should be performed. The repetition of the 
act produces the habit. And when the habit is fixed 
there is no further occasion for rules. But practice is still 
necessary in order to confirm and strengthen the habit. 

1. To form a habit of reasoning, take care of your 
health. 

The possession of health seems essential to independence 
of mind. 'Tis those who have a weakly constitution whu 



358 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 

are led astray by the persuasion of others. The means 
that promote health— as temperance, early rising, and 
exercise in the open air, tend also to produce clearness and 
cheerfulness of mind. Do not let the love of reading lead 
you to sit up late, or deprive you of proper rest and exer- 
cise. Literary knowledge, valuable as it is, is but a poor 
compensation for the loss of health. If you are one of the 
million, one who has employment to attend to during the 
day, do not in the evening engage in those studies that 
require strong or continuous mental exertion, such as 
Greek, Latin, Mathematics, Chemistry, &c. ; but rather 
direct your attention to those sciences which combine 
amusement with instruction, and the knowledge of which 
can be obtained with a moderate degree of application. If 
you are of such a temperament that the state of your health 
is likely to affect your judgment, J advise you to read fre- 
quently those quotations I have made from Dr. Watts in 
the fourth section of the first part of this work. 

" Huffland has published a work, upon the art of prolonging 
life, full of interesting observations. ' Philosophers/ says he, 
' enjoy a delightful leisure. Their thoughts, generally estranged 
from vulgar interests, have nothing in common with those afflict- 
ing ideas with which other men are continually agitated and 
corroded. Their reflections are agreeable by their variety, their 
liberty, and sometimes even by their frivolity. Devoted to the 
pursuits of their choice, the occupations of their taste, they dis- 
pose freely of their time. Oftentimes they surround themselves 
with young people, that their natural vivacity may be communi- 
cated to them, and in some sort, produce a renewal of their 
youth.' We may make a distinction between the different kinds 
of philosophy, in relation to their influence upon the duration of 
life. Those which direct the mind towards sublime contempla- 
tions, even were they in some degree superstitious, such as those 
of Pythagoras and Plato, are the most salutary. Next to them, 
I place those, the study of which, embracing nature, gives 
enlarged and elevated ideas upon infinity, the stars, the wonders 
of the universe, the heroic virtues, and the pure and elevated 
doctrines of Divine revelation. ' Bat those systems,' says the 
writer just quoted, 'which turn only upon painful subtilties, 
which are dogmatic and positive, which bend all facts and opinions 
to form, and adjust them to certain preconceived principles ; in 
fine, such as are thorny, barren, narrow, and contentious, these 
are fatal in tendency, and cannot but abridge the lives of those 
who cultivate them. Of this class was the philosophy of the 



FORMATION OF HABITS OF REASONING. 359 

Peripatetics, and that also of the scholastics.' Tumultuous pas- 
sions, and corroding cares, are two sources of evil influences, 
which a true philosophy avoids. Another influence, adverse 
to life, is that mental feebleness, which renders persons perpe- 
tually solicitous about their health, effeminate and unhappy. 
Fixing their thoughts intensely on the functions of life, those 
functions that are subjects of this anxious inspection, become 
wearied. Imagining themselves diseased, they soon become so. 
The undoubting confidence that we shall enjoy health, is perhaps 
one of the best means of preserving it." — Art of Being Happy. 

2. To form a habit of reasoning, attend to the health of 
your mind. 

Do not exercise any one faculty unduly. Do not in- 
dulge the imagination. Read no novels, and but little 
poetry. Do not overload the memory. Think as well as 
read ; but do not think intensely on any one subject ; the 
reasoning powers then become distracted and enfeebled. 

"A quickness of mental perception, a lively and vigorous 
imagination, and a ready and retentive memory, are highly useful 
and ornamental qualities ; but they are individually limited in 
their beneficial influence. The reasoning power, however, is of 
vital use. It is the corner-stone of the intellectual building, 
giving grace and strength to the whole structure ; without it all 
the other faculties of the soul would be of little or no utility. 
All the differences in the mental qualifications of men may be 
traced to the various degrees of original strength in this quality 
of the mind, or to the successful manner in which it has been 
cultivated and improved." — Blaketfs Essay on Logic. 

In order to improve yourself in Logic, I would advise 
you to avoid, especially in your youth, discussions on those 
abstract principles of morals and metaphysics, which in 
every age of the world have puzzled, and which continue 
to puzzle, the most profound philosophers. Limit your 
inquiries and investigations to those things respecting 
which you may hope to arrive at some satisfactory con- 
clusion, and which are also capable of some useful practical 
application. The absorption of the mind in mysticism 
tends to impair both the faculty of perception, and the 
power of reasoning. I would also advise you to avoid 
reading books written in an obscure or affected style. Such 
writings tend to injure the perceptive faculty, and to 



360 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

familiarise the mind with obscure ideas, or with ideas 
obscurely expressed. Eead those works which are remark- 
able for profound reasoning and clear expression. Read 
with a pencil in your hand, and mark those paragraphs that 
contain any examples of clear and beautiful reasoning. 
If the newspapers you read are your own, cut out with a 
penknife all the good pieces of argumentation you may 
find, and after a while read them over again, and classify 
them according to the principles or forms of reasoning 
they can be employed to illustrate. 

3. To form a habit of reasoning, associate your reason- 
ings with your daily avocations. 

Don't imagine that the great end of the art of reasoning 
is to enable you to refute or to instruct other people. Its 
chief end is to enable you to teach yourself. " Logic," says 
Dr. Watts, "is the art of using our reason well in the 
search after truth and in the communication of it to others." 
But don't fancy that " to search after truth," means nothing 
more than reading books, or what is called study. You 
will find that your daily duties, your own reflections, and 
the conduct of mankind around you, will supply you with 
truths quite as interesting and as important as any that 
you will meet with in books. Think on these. Before per- 
forming any action, ask yourself what are the reasons for 
doing it, and ■ then ask what are the reasons for not doing 
it. Then consider the principles of your arguments and 
the various forms in which they may be expressed. When 
you have acquired the habit of thus reasoning on your 
own actions, you will soon learn to apply the same mode of 
reasoning to the actions of other people. 

We never hear any one praised for being a good logician. 
The fact is, that when a man reasons well, he is famed not 
for his knowledge of logic, but for his knowledge of the 
art to which his logic is applied. When a lawyer reasons 
well he is celebrated not as a good logician, but as a good 
lawyer. The late Sir William Follett owed much of his 
reputation to the beautiful clearness of his reasoning. It is 
the same in every other profession. If a tradesman reasons 
well when talking with his customers, he is never suspected 



FORMATION OF HABITS OF REASONING. 361 

of being skilled in logic, but, what is of more importance, 
he gets the character of being a good tradesman. And if 
a man reasons well upon " matters in general," he is 
reckoned a sensible man. Never boast of your logic. A 
reputation as a logician will damage the effect of your 
reasonings. Your opponent may fancy that his inability 
to answer your arguments arises, not from the weakness 
of his cause, but from your superior skill as a disputant. 

4. To form a habit of reasoning, rather divide your 
reading and studies among a variety of subjects, than con- 
fine yourself to one subject. 

Try to be distinguished in your profession, but do not 
be distinguished in anything else. If so, those engaged in 
the same profession will endeavour to detract from your 
professional reputation, by praising you for other attain- 
ments. You had better divide your unprofessional reading 
and studies among a good many subjects, rather than con- 
fine them to one. This will afford you more pleasure, 
impose less mental labour, and give a more lively exercise 
to your powers of reasoning. You will get the character 
of being a well-informed man, and awaken no envy by 
any special kind of superiority. Lord Bacon was a 
great lawyer, but he was also a great philosopher. And 
because he was a philosopher, he was supposed to be no 
lawyer. This opinion was entertained even by his distin- 
guished contemporaries, the Minister Cecil, and the Attorney 
General, Coke. Disraeli observes, that " both were mere 
practical men of business, whose narrow conceptions, and 
whose stubborn habits, assume that whenever a man ac- 
quires much knowledge foreign to his profession, he will 
have less of professional knowledge than he ought." 

Beyond your profession, then, it is better you should know 
a little about a good many things, than know a great deal 
about some one thing. This will give a more expansive 
character to your mind, and greater variety to the exercise 
of your reasoning powers. Get, therefore, a general 
acquaintance with every branch of knowledge. You will 
find that the sciences to which I have more especially 
directed your attention, History, Political Economy, 
Statistics, and Moral Philosophy, will supply you with an 

R 



362 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. f 

inexhaustible fund of topics, about which you will have 
occasion to reason. They can be studied without any 
expensive apparatus — without any knowledge of Latin or 
Greek — and they refer to matters of the highest import- 
ance, as well as to the affairs of every-day life. The lessons 
they teach will enable you both to judge of the conduct of 
nations and to regulate your own. These sciences ar 
strictly logical sciences. The physical and mathematical 
sciences will not, so far as you are concerned, call for the 
same exercise of your reasoning powers. The knowledge 
of the physical sciences is acquired by observation and 
experience, and imparted by writing or conversation. Here 
there is little ground for reasoning. All that is known is 
certain and cannot be disputed. What is unknown does 
not afford sufficient evidence for the formation of opinions. 
In Botany, Natural History, Geography, Geology, and the 
other Physical Sciences, all we have to do is to listen and 
learn. Mathematics is all severe reasoning, but the prac- 
tical application is mere routine. We learn cyphering at 
school mechanically. We add, subtract, multiply and 
divide. We learn fractions and decimals, and know how 
to extract the square and cube roots, all by rule. Nor can 
it be denied, that all these operations may be performed 
very well without any knowledge of the scientific princi- 
ples on which they are founded. The higher branches of 
mathematics and their application to Geometry, Astro- 
nomy, Navigation, &c. require great exertions of the 
reasoning powers, and eminence is rarely attained in this 
kind of knowledge but by the devotion of the whole time 
to its pursuit. Happily, however, this high degree of 
knowledge is not necessary to every member of the com- 
munity. If- you are acquainted with Arithmetic, understand 
simple equations in Algebra, and know how to use a table 
of Logariths, you have as much knowledge of Mathematics 
as you are likely to require in the ordinary business of life, 
and this will not tax very heavily your powers of reasoning. 
It has often been asserted that a familiarity with mathe- 
matical reasoning unfits the mind for proficiency in moral 
reasoning. I have never seen any evidence that has con- 
vinced me of the soundness of this opinion. No doubt a 
man will enter more readily upon that kind of reasoning 



FORMATION OF HABITS OF REASONING. 3G3 

with which he is most familiar. A professor of mathe- 
matics may reason well on mathematics, and badly on 
morals, simply because he is accustomed to one kind of 
reasoning and not accustomed to the other. This affords 
no evidence that his capacity for moral reasoning has been 
impaired by his study of mathematics. It appears to me 
more rational to suppose, that the discipline imparted to 
the mind by mathematical studies, tends to give increased 
precision and energy to all the other operations in which 
it may engage. At the same time, in passing through 
life, you will find that a dexterity in performing the 
operations of Arithmetic will be of more use to you than 
a knowledge of the abstract principles on which these 
operations are founded. Sam Slick says, " If you wish to 
go a-head, there's nothing like cyphering." 

5. To form a habit of reasoning, you must keep your- 
self in practice. 

One way of doing this is frequently to review all your 
opinions, and examine the arguments by which they are 
supported, and the objections to which they are exposed. 
Do not take your opinions in clusters upon the authority 
of the party or body to which you belong. Examine 
them one by one for yourself, and be at all times prepared 
to render a reason for any doctrine that forms an article 
in either your political or your religious creed. Read 
occasionally those books or newspapers that contain 
attacks upon the sentiments you hold, and think to your- 
self what you would say in case you were called upon to 
reply to those attacks. Take a parliamentary speech, for 
instance, and fancy how you would reply to it. In cases 
of actual contest attack the most able man of r his party. 
You pay yourself a poor compliment by selecting a weak 
opponent. It is by wrestling with superior minds that 
we increase our own strength. In logical disputation, as 
in social life, no honour can be gained by quarrels with 
inferiors. You should engage only in those contests in 
which victory is attended with renown. 

Many of our most distinguished men have in their 
youth been members of debating societies. We have in 
r2 



364 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

former days met at such societies men of high talent, who 
have rendered, and are still rendering good service to their 
country and to the world. These associations possess the 
same advantages, and are liable to -the same objections that 
are pointed out by Dr. Watts in regard to scholastic dispu- 
tations. (See page 268.) I believe that societies formed for 
the sole purpose of debate are not so numerous as formerly, 
but most of our literary and scientific institutions have a 
" discussion class," which answers the same purpose. I 
advise you to join this class. Institutions that. are adapted 
to make wise men wiser should not be laid aside merely 
because in some instances they may do injury to men who 
are not wise. If you have a talent for speaking, by all 
means cultivate it, but do not fancy that a fluent speaker 
is necessarily a good logician. Study your speeches be- 
forehand, and arrange your thoughts under one, two, or 
three heads, but do not write them out. Guard against 
dogmatism on the one hand, and scepticism on the other. 
Discuss only those questions on which there can be a 
reasonable difference of opinion. Never attempt to prove a 
doctrine that is transparently true, nor to refute a doctrine 
that is transparently absurd; and never, even to get up a 
debate, argue in favour of any doctrine that you do not 
honestly believe. At the close of every debate, sum up in 
your own mind the arguments that have been advanced on 
both sides of the question that has been discussed, and then 
form, correct, or confirm your own opinion. 

On this subject, I will quote from Mr. John Mottram's 
" Institutional Education." This essay obtained the prize 
offered to its members by the City of London Literary 
and Scientific Institution, for the best essay on " The 
Characteristics and Advantages of Literary and Scientific 
Institutions; their claims to the support of society; and 
the best means of extending their usefulness." 

" It is a good thing for a man that lie should bring his opinion 
into occasional conflict with those of other men : that he should 
regard those opinions from other points of view than what his 
own mind can furnish of itself; that he should look upon them 
as others look upon them ; and either be strengthened in his own 
im iressions, or suffer those impressions to pass away ; in either 
case becoming mentally and morally advantaged. And this has its 



FORMATION OF HABITS OF REASONING. 365 

practical advantages in our daily life. It is necessary for a man 
that he should be prepared to take part in the conflict of opinion 
that is constantly going on in the world ; and these occasional 
argumentative contests prepare him for this work." 

" The power of accustoming ourselves to discuss the opinions 
of others, becomes a habit of the greatest advantage to society ; 
it prevents the taking upon trust new opinions, or the pinning 
our faith to any, however prevalent they may be ; and it promotes 
that spirit of inquiry into the rationality of an opinion that must 
tend very considerably to augment the predominance of truth 
among men, and to aid on their progress. The man who feels 
the power within himself which frequent discussion upon all mat- 
ters moral and political will give him — who appreciates the much 
higher character of this power over other modes of influencing 
men's minds — will not be the man to apply to the legislature of 
his country for acts to coerce the opinions of his fellow-man, or 
to legalise and support his own views, by this course seeking to 
bring discredit and ruin upon the opinions of others ; nor will he 
be the man to raise the standard of rebellion, making violence the 
arbitrator between truth and error ; but ever struggling on, eager 
in the promulgation of his convictions, ever preparing and ever 
using the weapons mind places at his disposal, he will in this way, 
and in no other, seek to make his opinions prevail around him. 
These Institutions, in affording ssope for the necessary inquiries, 
and for the preparation necessary to the culture of this reliance 
upon the power of argument, and the continual progress of truth, 
put forward great claims to the support and attention of society. 
They are the schools, and they might be made more effectual 
schools, for the preparation required for taking part in the active 
duties and struggles of the world. Within their walls there is 
much of the information, order, and propriety of arrangements 
acquired, which fit a man for taking part in public business, to the 
advantage of the society of which he is a member." — Institutional 
Education. 

6. To form a habit of reasoning, attend to the disci- 
pline of your own mind with regard to its moral principles 
and dispositions. 

The cultivation of the moral feelings improves the 
intellectual faculties. A sound heart is less likely to go- 
astray than a clever head. " The entrance of thy words 
giveth light, it giveth understanding to the simple." On 
this subject w r e shall be content to quote from two authors 
—not theologians — who have written on very different 
subjects. 



366 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 

Mr. Taylor, of the Colonial Office, thus writes in his 
work entitled " The Statesman : " — 

" If there be in the character not only sense and soundness, 
hut virtue of a high order, then, however little appearance there 
may be of talent, a certain portion of wisdom may be relied upon 
almost implicitly. For the correspondencies of wisdom and good- 
ness are manifold ; and that they will accompany each other is to 
be inferred, not only because men's wisdom makes them good, 
but also because their goodness makes them wise. Questions of 
right and wrong are a perpetual exercise of the faculties of those 
who are solicitous as to the right and wrong of what they do and 
see ; and a deep interest of the heart in these questions carries 
with it a deeper cultivation of the understanding than can be 
easily effected by any other excitement to intellectual activity. 
Although, therefore, simple goodness does not imply every sort of 
wisdom, it unerringly implies some essential conditions of wisdom ; 
it implies a negative on folly, and an exercised judgment within 
such limits as nature shall have prescribed to the capacity. And 
where virtue and extent of capacity are combined, there is im- 
plied the highest wisdom, being that which includes the worldly 
wisdom with the spiritual." — The Statesman. 

Mr. Blakey, who is now the Professor of Logic and 
Metaphysics in the Queen's College, Belfast, writes as 
follows : — 

" 1 am fully convinced that there is a much closer connexion 
between mental superiority, and a belief in the Scriptures, than is 
commonly imagined. Sceptical modes of thinking have a direct 
and natural tendency to beget a captious, quibbling, sophistical, 
habit ; to create and foster literary arrogance and conceit ; to de- 
stroy whatever is candid and ingenuous in controversial warfare ; 
to make the mind diminutive, rickety, and distorted ; and to in- 
duce men to set a higher value on crotchety sophisms than on 
the inspirations of real wisdom and science, .... On the other 
hand, where the Scriptures are embraced with that sincerity, 
heartiness, and singleness of mind, to which their manifest import- 
ance so justly entitles them, we will perceive a comprehensive- 
ness, a vigour, and elasticity given to our minds, which cannot fail 
to vlace us on the vantage ground, whatever branch of knowledge 
we may choose to cultivate, or to excel in. The mind, no longer 
groping its way through the hazy and murky atmosphere of doubt 
and uncertainty, advances with a firm and confident step, under 
the bright and irradiating influence of the sun of truth. By the 
contemplation of whatever is grand and sublime in doctrine, and 



FORMATION OF HABITS OF REASONING. 307 

pure and simple in precept, our minds are naturally led, by our 
established constitution, to spread themselves into a wider com- 
pass ; to improve their various powers or faculties, by giving them 
an enlarged sphere of action ; to dwell upon what is great, noble, 
and excellent; to pursue our course with freedom and boldness, 
unencumbered with babbling sophistries, and cheered with the 
consolatory reflection, that we are engaged in promoting whatever 
is esteemed among mankind fair, honourable, and praiseworthy." 
■ — Blakeys History of Moral Science. 

And now, gentle reader, I have finished my book upon 
the Art of Reasoning. But as there is an intimate con- 
nexion between reasoning and speaking, I shall add an 
Appendix on the Philosophy of Language. This appendix 
is the substance of a lecture I delivered in November, 
1832, before the Waterford Literary and Scientific Insti- 
tution. After you have read it, I advise you to read the 
index, as this will recal to your mind the principal topics 
discussed in the body of the w 7 ork. Yon may then place 
the book in the hands of your children, or of your 
younger brothers and sisters. But before you do this, 
you had better read it a second time, and mark with a 
pencil those parts best adapted for their first reading. 
You will, perhaps, think that they may commit to 
memory the leading paragraphs in the second and third 
parts, in ttie same way that they have learned at school 
the first principles of grammar and geography; and that 
the other parts of the work may be divided into Lessons in 
Reading. Young men may form themselves into classes, 
and read a section at each of their meetings, and every 
member might, from his own reading, occupation, or pro- 
fession, give an additional illustration of the rules pro- 
pounded in the section. In this way they might train 
their minds into an accurate mode of thinking and of 
reasoning without encumbering themselves with the tech- 
nicalities and subtilities of scholastic logic. They who 
desire nothing more than useful amusement, may skip the 
rules, and read the illustrations. These, in the language 
of a Reviewer, form " a collection of Elegant Extracts." 



APPENDIX. 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 

Philosophers have given various definitions of Man. These 
definitions have been founded on the circumstances by which he 
is chiefly distinguished from other animals. 

By some he is styled a rational animal — being endowed with 
reason. Though several of the inferior animals, such as dogs, 
horses, and elephants, discover great sagacity in particular circum- 
stances, yet none seem to be endowed with that faculty which we 
style reason — the power of reflecting— of comparing ideas — of 
drawing inferences, and of tracing consequences. The instinct 
which they possess is sufficient for the station which Providence 
has assigned to them in this lower world. It rises at once to 
maturity, and is not, like the reason of men, developed by slow 
and imperceptible degrees. While instinct thus rises rapidly to 
maturity, it never surpasses a certain point. Reason seems 
capable of an indefinite degree of improvement. The arts and 
sciences are progressive through succeeding generations — where 
one ends another begins. But instinct makes no improvement. 
A bird of the nineteenth century will build his nest in the same 
way as a bird that lived two thousand years ago, and build it, too, 
without any previous instruction, and without having seen a single 
nest constructed. 

Man has been defined a religious animal. No other animal 
that we are aware of has any sense of religion. They have no 
consciousness that they are indebted for their existence to the 
power of a superior being — no sense of obligation to him — no 
anticipation of their own death ; of course they have no assemblies 
for religious worship— they perform no act of devotion — their 
conduct cannot be influenced by a fear of punishment or a hope 
of reward in a future state of existence. It is true, they have 
some dispositions which, among mankind, are deemed moral 
qualities. They are more temperate than men; they possess 
attachment for their offspring, and are free from that ambition and 
avarice which are the great sources of human vices : but these 
dispositions being conferred by nature, and not regulated by con- 
siderations of duty or propriety, ought more properly to be termed 
instincts than moral qualities. 

Man has been defined a political animal, as men only are found 
to associate in a political society. The inferior animals seem to 



THE PHILOSOPHY OP LANGUAGE. 369 

have no notion of the advantages to be derived from a division of 
labour ; each animal provides its own food, makes its own nest, 
and performs everything for itself. Nor do we find among them 
any class who devote themselves to the service of the community, 
and who, consequently, are supported by the labour of others. 
They have no lawyers, no judges, no magistrates, to adjust their 
disputes; no professors to impart knowledge; no physicians to 
heal the sick. There are a few cases in which animals live in 
society : such are the bees, who live under a monarchy, even in 
North America ; and' even in France and Germany, where the salic 
law is in force, their monarch is always a female. 

Man has been defined a cooking animal, because he alone cooks 
his food before he eats it. The bird eats the worm without either 
roasting or boiling it ; and all animals eat their food, whether it 
be animal or vegetable, in the state in which it is produced. But 
nearly all the food of man first undergoes an artificial preparation; 
fruits and salads are the chief things he eats raw. Nor does man, 
like the other animals, confine his beverage to the pure water of 
the spring, but has recourse to infusions and distillations, in order 
to render his drink more palatable or more potent. 

Man has been defined a tool-making animal. Whatever other 
animals perform^ whether they collect their food, or construct 
their habitation, they use only those instruments with which 
nature has endowed them ; but man looks about for tools, and 
constructs machines. By these means he increases his power, and 
effects his objects better and more rapidly than he could other- 
wise do. 

Man has been defined a pugnacious animal ; that is, — he alone 
in contending against his enemies employs artificial weapons. 
When the other animals fight, they use only the weapons which 
nature has given them ; it is by their horns, their teeth, their 
claws, or their poison, that they assail their foes. But man has 
put every part of nature under contribution to supply him with 
weapons of destruction. He has depopulated forests, and 
drawn iron from the mine, and compelled chemistry to furnish 
materials by which he might more effectually destroy his fellow- 
creatures : — 

" Oh shame to man ! 
Devil with devil damn'd firm concord holds ; 
Men only disagree of creatures rational." 

This definition, however, is said to be not strictly correct, as 
several tribes of monkeys are known to use sticks and branches 
of trees in contending against each other; If, however, this dis- 
tinction is not peculiar to man, we have the consolation to reflect 
that it is not shared with us by any but monkeys. 

Man has been defined a laughing animal. Though all animals 
jb3 



370 THE PHILOSOPHY OP LANGUAGE. 

are susceptible of pleasure, yet none of tbem express it in that 
peculiar way which is styled laughing. 

But the definition of man which has the nearest relation to our 
present subject is, that he is a talking animal. No other animal 
is endowed with the faculty of speech. 

A language is a collection of sounds employed by the people of 
any country to convey their ideas to each other. The word 
Philosophy is derived from two Greek words, which mean " the 
love of learning," and in modern use is employed to denote the 
investigation of abstract principles. The various branches or de- 
partments of Philosophy are usually called Sciences. A Science 
is different from an Art. Science consists in the investigation of 
causes and principles, with a view to the discovery of general 
rules. Art consists in the application of those rules to practical 
purposes. All art is founded on some science, and most sciences 
lead to the practice of some useful art. Though the words Science 
and Philosophy may, in point of meaning, be considered as nearly 
synonymous, both denoting the investigation of principles, yet 
from custom the word Science is limited to those branches of 
human knowledge which have a reference to the properties of 
matter, such as Astronomy, Navigation, and the different branches 
of the Mathematics ; while the term Philosophy is applied to those 
branches of knowledge which have a reference to the faculties of 
the mind, and to the various relations of human life. Thus we 
speak of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, of Moral Philosophy, 
the Philosophy of History, the Philosophy of Taste, the Philosophy 
of Rhetoric, and the Philosophy of Language. 

Philosophy as applied to language bears the same relation to 
grammar as science does to art, or as the business of an architect 
does to that of a mason. The grammarian, like the mason, is 
governed by the established rules. He requires that sentences 
should be constructed according to the acknowledged laws of the 
language. The philosophy or the science of language investigates 
the propriety of these laws, considers the circumstances in which 
they originated, and endeavours to ascertain whether, in some 
cases, more elegance and convenience may not be obtained by a 
departure from them than by their rigid observance. 

In the prosecution of this subject, 1 shall in the present lecture 
consider the Nature, the Origin, and the Porrnation of Language. 

I. The Nature of Language. 

Language is a collection of sounds expressive of ideas, and em- 
ployed as a means of intercourse among mankind. The inferior 
animals have certain sounds by which they express their feelings. 
Many fishes, indeed, cannot utter any kind of sounds, and many 
worms are in the same state. But most birds and beasts have the 
power of uttering sounds. If they feel pain, they express the sen- 
sation by a certain sound ; if they feel pleasure, they express it 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 371 

by another sound ; if exposed to danger, too, they employ another 
sound. But this is not language ; for men, too, express their 
sensations by certain sounds distinct from words ; and even men 
who are born dumb will express the sensations of pain and plea- 
sure, fear and desire, by certain natural sounds wholly distinct 
from articulate language. But animals have a further power than 
this. Not only do they express sensations by peculiar sounds, 
but they also employ certain sounds as a means of intercourse 
with each other. A hen, by a certain sound, will inform her 
chickens that she has found some food for them to eat, and they 
will all run to devour it. By another sound she can inform them 
of the near approach of a hawk, and they will all rush beneath her 
wings. So, also, most animals appear to be acquainted with the 
voices of their enemies. When the lion roars, the beasts of the 
forest will run to a place of shelter, and a hare will hasten away 
when she hears the voice of a pack of hounds. 

These sounds, however, which animals have the power of utter- 
ing, seem totally distinct from language, and are analogous to 
those sounds which men can utter who are unable to speak. An 
infant can express pain and pleasure by certain sounds, even in its 
tenderest age ; and long before it has learned the use of language, 
it has acquired certain sounds of its own, which it employs as a 
means of intercourse with those around. 

These animal sounds differ from language, in the first place, in 
being natural and instinctive, whereas language is always acquired. 
If a dog were bred up apart from all other dogs, it would never- 
theless acquire the practice of barking ; and were there only one 
bird in the world, that bird would sing. These exercises would 
be as natural to them as it is natural for a child to cry. But if a 
child were brought up by itself, it would never learn to speak. 
We know very well that when children are born deaf they always 
remain dumb. Nay more, even speech when once acquired is 
liable to be lost. Some of us, I dare say, have forgotten in a 
great degree languages which we understood pretty well when we 
were at school. And Selkirk, whose solitary residence in a desert 
island for four years gave rise to the popular novel of Robinson 
Crusoe, had, when taken away, nearly lost the use of speech, and 
pronounced his words very imperfectly. If we wish to retain the 
knowledge of any language, it is indispensably necessary that we 
write and talk it frequently; but animals retain the sounds by 
which they communicate with each other without any danger of 
losing them, or of becoming unable to utter them distinctly. The 
reason is, that with them the sounds are natural, while with us, 
language is always acquired. 

Another difference between these animal sounds and human 
language is, that these sounds are expressive of sensations, but 
language is* expressive of ideas. If I feel cold, 1 have a sensation 



372 THE PHILOSOPHY OP LANGUAGE. 

of cold ; but if I think of cold without feeling it, I have then an 
idea of cold. Animals feel external impressions like men, and 
they have sounds to denote those feelings. As sounds are expres- 
sive of sensations, it follows that they are all similar, for a similar 
sensation will produce a similar sound. All dogs of the same 
species will bark alike; all birds of" the same species will sing 
alike; but twenty men will express the same idea in as many 
different ways. Thus, if a man has a very painful tooth-ache, he 
may sigh, he may groan, he may weep. This is the expression of 
the sensation, and all men expressing the same sensations might 
express it in the same way and by similar sounds. But if he 
wished to communicate to some other person the idea that he had 
a very painful tooth-ache, this idea might be conveyed in as many 
different ways as there are languages ; and even twenty people 
who spoke the same language might use different words to con- 
vey this idea. Sensations are expressed by nearly similar sounds, 
but the same ideas may be expressed by various sounds. 

Another difference between animal sounds and human language 
is, that the latter is capable of being subdivided into syllables. 
Animals are without articulation. A word is not a continuous 
sound; it is a succession of sounds gradually sliding into each 
other. Let any one keep his organs of speech in a fixed position, 
and try how many sounds he can utter by the mere emission of 
his breath, and he will find that these sounds are exceedingly few. 
In speaking, the organs of speech are perpetually varying their 
position, and thus they form articulate language. It is a remark- 
able fact, that while we can construct mechanical instruments that 
shall emit sounds resembling the music of the birds, we can form 
none that are capable of uttering words. To this point our dis- 
coveries in mechanical science have not yet been carried. And 
we have to look forward to future inventions, when our harps and 
pianos shall accompany their music with their voices, and the 
organs in our churches shall not only sound the tunes but also 
sing the psalms. 

II. I now proceed to consider the Origin of Language. 

It is very certain that infants do not speak as soon as they are 
born, and if born deaf they do not learn to speak at all. Lan- 
guage, then, is not essential to existence : man may exist without 
language. It has been a matter of much inquiry, whether there 
was any period in the history of mankind wherein they were 
destitute of speech, and, if so, in what way they became ac- 
quainted with the use of language. 

Some philosophers, both ancient and modern, have believed 
that mankind were originally savages, destitute of any knowledge 
of the arts and sciences, and even of the. use of language ; and 
then, by their own unassisted exertions, they reached their sub- 
sequent state of improvement — that language is entirely of human 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 373 

invention; and that previous to its discovery the communication 
of ideas among mankind was carried on by signs and gestures. 
Hence we may account for the variety of languages that exists in 
the world, on the supposition that different branches of mankind 
fixed upon different sounds, as the representatives of their ideas. 

But the opinion that all mankind were originally savages, is 
unsupported by either reason or history. Had they been created 
savages, they would probably have remained savages for ever. 
They could have formed no idea of a civilization which had never 
existed, nor have desired comforts, the want of which they did 
not feel. History does not record a single instance of a savage 
nation having become civilized by its own unassisted exertions. 
Civilization has never sprung up spontaneously from the soil ; it 
has always been imported from abroad. The Greeks derived 
their civilization from the Egyptians ; the Romans theirs from 
the Greeks ; the nations conquered by Rome became civilized 
from their intercourse with the Romans. But if we attempt to 
trace the origin of civilization in Egypt and Babylon, we are at a 
loss ; for neither history, nor even tradition, mentions any period 
at which these nations were not civilized. Founded soon after 
the flood, they possessed the knowledge of all the arts and 
sciences known to the antediluvian world. The fertility of 
their soils, and the extent of their plains, furnished ample pro- 
vision for their population : hence, as population increased, their 
civilization increased. While, on the other hand, those tribes or 
families who wandered in quest of new settlements became sepa- 
rated from the rest of mankind by mountains, and forests, and 
rivers ; and their time being wholly occupied in seeking supplies 
of food, they lost, in the course of a few generations, the know- 
ledge they originally possessed, and fell into the savage state. It 
would thus appear, from history and from reason, that the savage 
state was not the original state of man, but a departure from that 
state, arising from a want of communication through several ages 
with the other branches of the family of mankind. 

But although, in various places, man has been found in a savage 
state, he has never yet been found so far brutalized as to be desti- 
tute of speech. All tribes of savages, however widely separated 
from each other, in various parts of the world, possess the know- 
ledge of some articulate language. Among these savages, then, 
the invention of speech must have preceded their advance from 
the savage state. But is it not very unlikely that men who were in 
so rude a state as to be unable to invent the simplest implement 
of agriculture, should invent a language ? Even in our present 
state of civilization, were we suddenly bereft of our language and 
of all recollection of it, we should find sume difficulty in framing 
a new language for ourselves. How then could a nation of 
savages be competent to effect such an object ? Besides, in what 



374 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 

way, previous to the invention of language, could a tribe of 
savages carry on the discussions upon the propriety of inventing 
it? Would it not be a curious sight were we to see a hundred, or 
a thousand, or ten thousand savages, discussing, without language, 
the propriety of inventing speech, and of fixing upon the various 
sounds that might be suitable to their respective ideas ? Can we 
imagine for a moment that either House of Parliament could 
fully discuss, without language, the plainest matter connected 
with our national interests ? And if not, how could a nation of 
savages discuss, without speaking, so abstruse a subject as that of 
language ? 

If, then, language be not a human invention, it must have been 
communicated to man by some superior being. When man was 
first created, he must have been informed of the variety of sounds 
he was capable of uttering, and instructed in the way in which 
these sounds might be employed, to denote sensations and ideas. 
The following account of the invention of the first language is 
given by Moses : — " And out of the ground the Lord God formed 
every beast of the field and every fowl of the air, and brought 
them unto Adam to see what he would call them ; and whatever 
Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof. 
And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, 
and to every beast of the field." 

Here it is presupposed that man was originally endowed with 
the faculty of speech, and was at the same time rendered capable 
of applying certain sounds to denote certain objects, and of 
remembering the association which he had thus formed. Agree- 
ably with this sentiment is the representation of Milton, in his 
Paradise Lost : — 

" To speak I tried, and forthwith spake ; 
My tongue obey'd, and readily could name 
Whate'er I saw. Thou Sun, said I, fair light, 
And thou enlighten'd Earth, so fresh and gay, 
Ye hills and dales, ye rivers, woods and plains, 
And ye that live and move, fair creatures, tell, 
Tell, if ye saw, how came I thus, how here? 
Not of myself; by some great Maker, then, 
In goodness and in power pre-eminent ; 
Tell me, how may I know him, how adore, 
From whom I have that thus I move and live, 
And feel that I am happier than I know." 

III. We shall now consider the Formation of Language. 

We contend, then, that man was originally taught the nature of 
speech, and supernaturally endowed with the power of forming a 
language. And we shall now inquire what are those faculties of 
the mind which are brought into exercise by the attempt to em- 
ploy this power, and what are the steps by which language would 
be gradually formed. These faculties we consider would be Inven- 
tion, Association, and Abstraction. 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 375 

As man at the first moment of his existence could have had no 
language, it is evident that the first words he uttered must have 
been words of pure invention. They could not have been 
borrowed from other languages, or derived from other words, 
because no other words or language had any existence. To exer- 
cise this power of invention to an extent sufficient to form a 
language, it would be necessary that man should be capable of 
uttering a variety of sounds — that he should be able to assign 
distinct sounds to denote distinct ideas — and that he should be 
able to remember each sound which had thus been appropriated. 
He would, in the first place, form words to denote those objects 
which were visible to his senses, and by which he was immedi- 
ately surrounded. These words must originally have been very 
few. His stock of words could not be greater than his stock of 
ideas : as his ideas increased, his words would increase. The 
three great classes of words in all languages are, — the names of 
things, the names of qualities, and the names of actions. Man 
would begin his efforts at language by giving names to things. 
The heavenly bodies; the natural scenery around him, the moun- 
tains, the hills, the rivers, the trees, and the fields; the birds, 
beasts, and other animals ; and the several objects with which he 
came in more immediate contact, would be designated by appro- 
priate sounds. The qualities which are obvious to the senses 
would next be noticed; and the different colours, figures, tastes, 
and sounds would be named as soon as occasion presenied them to 
his view. And then he would name those actions which he himself 
performed, or which he saw performed by the animals around him. 

Some philologists have considered that man did not invent any 
part of his language, but merely imitated the sounds issued by 
other animals, or by parts of the material universe. In support 
of this theory, they have adduced some words which resemble the 
sounds they are employed to denote — such as roar, crash, whisper. 
But these instances are too few to support a general theory. The 
greater part of the objects of our ideas are those which do not 
emit sounds, and to these the theory will not apply : besides, this 
theory would import that man had heard all these various sounds 
before he had commenced to form words. 

The faculty of invention, however, would very soon be assisted 
by the faculty of association. It is not necessary to the present 
subject that I should enter into any metaphysical discussion of 
the principle of association. It is sufficient for us to know, that 
when two ideas have a resemblance to each other, the occurrence 
of one to the mind often brings in the other. Hence, when the 
mind had, by the power of invention, appropriated a certain 
sound to denote a certain idea, if another idea occurred resem- 
bling the former, the association would lead to the formation of a 
sound that resembled the former sound. So, if we entertained 



376 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 

an idea formed of two ideas, each of which had its respective 
name, we should, by the power of association, call the compounded 
idea by a word formed of the names of the two single ideas. 
Thus, if we had formed an idea of a horse, and an idea of the sea, 
and had afterwards seen in the sea an animal resembling a horse, 
we should naturally call it a sea-horse. Hence, in all languages 
have arisen compounded words, in some of which the parts have 
been so blended, that the primitives of which they are composed 
cannot be ascertained but by the labour of philologists. 

There are numerous other ways in which the names of things 
would, by association, give rise to the names of other things. The 
names of trades and professions, for instance, are generally derived 
from the names of the commodities employed in carrying them on. 

Nouns, too, are often derived from verbs. These nouns denote 
the agent and the subject of the action. The agent in our 
language is denoted very often by adding r or er to the verb, as 
love, lover. Our language is deficient in not having words to 
denote the subject upon which the verb operates. Thus, we have 
no word to denote the person who is loved. We have only a few 
legal correlative terms of this sort, as payer, payee — drawer, 
drawee — mortgager, mortgagee. 

By association, too, words denoting things would give rise to 
words denoting qualities. Thus, if a house were made of wood, 
it would be very natural to call it a wooden house. And in this 
way there are in all languages numerous classes of adjective? 
formed by changing the termination of the substantives. Al- 
though in our own language we often use the substantive as an 
adjective without changing its termination, as a gold chain, a 
silver watch ; yet, in many others, we change the termination, or 
make an addition to it ; as, a sandy soil, a mountainous country, 
a ^fruitful tree. Some writers have contended that in this way 
were formed all our adjectives denoting colours and other simple 
sensations. Thus, when we say a chestnut horse, the word 
chestnut is employed as the name of a colour ; so also are the 
words orange, violet, indigo. 

Names of qualities are not only derived from the names of 
things, but also from names of actions. Thus, we have a class of 
adjectives ending in able, which were formed by associating the 
idea of capability with the ideas of the verbs, such are eatable, 
marketable, teachable. 

Mankind would soon perceive that actions have qualities similar 
to those which are ascribed to things ; and hence the names of 
the qualities of things would be employed with some little change 
to express the qualities of actions : hence from adjectives, which 
are the names of the qualities of things, would be formed adverbs, 
which are the names of the qualities of actions. The ideas being 
associated in the mind, the words would, by that association, be 



THE PHILOSOPHY OP LANGUAGE. 377 

brought to resemble each other. In our language adverbs of 
quality are often formed from adjectives, by the addition of ly, 
as wise, wisely ; beautiful, beautifully ; cruel, cruelly. 

The faculty of association is not employed merely in the forma- 
tion of new words, but it leads also to the application of old 
words to new ideas. Sometimes the material of whicli anything 
was formed, was employed to denote the thing itself, as a stick, a 
horn, a stone. The name of one object was also applied to some 
other, to which it seemed to bear a resemblance. Thus, the word 
branch, which denotes a part of a tree, is applied to a part of 
almost every object that is capable of division : hence we speak 
of the branch of a road, the branch of a river, the branch of a 
family, the branch of a discourse. 

Words which were originally employed to denote sensible 
objects were afterwards applied to intellectual ideas. The last 
object to which man directs his attention, and that which he finds 
the most difficult to comprehend, are the powers of his own mind. 
Hence mankind have usually a large stock of words denoting 
sensible ideas before they think of naming those ideas which are 
intellectual. And the operations of the mind can scarcely be 
understood but by comparison with external objects. Mankind, 
therefore, having found or fancied some resemblance between 
sensible and intellectual ideas, applied the same words to both. 
In all languages we find that words denoting intellectual ideas, 
when traced to their origin, are taken from sensible objects, and 
were at first metaphors. The words understanding \ evidence, 
reflection, as well as the words I have employed to denote the 
faculties of invention, association, and abstraction, are all taken 
from objects of sense. These words have now lost their meta- 
phorical meaning, and have become literal, through being so fre- 
quently used. So we still speak of a man being burning with 
zeal, inflamed with anger, swollen with rage, and inflated with 
pride ; and by the same figure of speech we talk of a man having 
a hard heart, or a soft heart ; a thick head, or a long head ; a 
fertile imagination, a sound judgment, a strong memory, polished 
manners. And when we recommend circumspection to an in- 
dividual, we tell him to " look sharp." 

By the same principle of association, we apply to inanimate 
objects words denoting ideas peculiar to animals. Thus we speak 
of the head of a river, the face of a country, a neck of land, and 
an arm of the sea, of a running stream, and a standing pool; we 
say the ground thirsts for rain, the earth smiles with plenty ; and 
so we speak of a learned age, a happy period, and a melancholy 
disaster. 

It may be observed, that in order to form an association between 
any two ideas in the mind, it is by no means necessary that there 
should be any resemblance between the ideas themselves. The 



378 THE PHILOSOPHY OP LANGUAGE. 

mind is exceedingly capricious in its associations, and this caprice 
is abundantly evident in the formation of language. In former 
times young women employed a good deal of their time in spin- 
ning; the idea of spinning became associated with the idea of a 
young woman ; and, to this day, an unmarried lady is called a 
spinster. It was also usual to keep footboys, who were generally 
styled Jack, as a sailor is styled Jack in the present day. One 
part of the duty of a footboy was to pull off his master's boots. 
But in the progress of society an instrument was invented, by 
which the master could take off his own boots ; and this instru- 
ment was called a Jack. Another part of the business of a foot- 
boy was to turn the spit ; but here, too, manual labour was 
superseded by machinery. An instrument was invented, by which 
a piece of meat could be roasted without the assistance of Jack ; 
but his name was retained, and the new instrument was called a 
Jack. Mr. Arkwright called some parts of his cotton machinery 
Spinning Jennies. The words Jack and Jenny, therefore, awaken 
very different ideas from those to which they were first applied. 

The power of association may from one word form a variety of 
others ; and although all the derivations may bear some resem- 
blance to the primitive word, yet they may have meanings widely 
different from each other. Thus, the word get means to acquire ; 
but it is used in a variety of senses : a man may get hungry, or 
he may get wet ; he may get a wager, or he may get a cold ; he 
may get money, or he may get drank. By associating the word 
get with particles, the number of meanings is still farther in- 
creased : we may get in or get out, we may get off or get on, we 
may get up or get down, we may get through or get along. Each 
of these phrases has again a variety of meanings. When we say 
a man has got off, we may mean that he has alighted from his 
horse, or that he has escaped being hanged. But in all these 
various meanings the primitive idea Is^retained, though the deri- 
vatives differ so widely. I might illustrate this observation by 
numerous other words of the same kkid. 

Having considered the faculties of Invention and Association, I 
will now make a few observations upon the faculty of Abstraction. 
To abstract means to draw from, to withdraw. I may see a white 
hat, a white horse, a white wall. Now, if I think of a white 
colour without thinking of the hat, or the horse, or the wall, I 
have then an abstract idea of white, which I may call whiteness. 
Now, this is called an abstract idea, because it is drawn from some 
other idea with which it is naturally associated. It is impossible 
for the colour white to exist by itself; there must be some object 
that is white. But, in the mind, we draw it from this object, 
and hence it is an abstract idea. In our language, the names of 
many of these ideas end in ness, as whiteness, blackness, sweet- 
ness, thickness. These are abstract sensible ideas derived from 






THE PHILOSOPHY OP LANGUAGE. 379 

sensible ideas. But there are also abstract moral and intellectual 
ideas. Many of these are denoted by words ending in ity and ce> 
and are chiefly of Latin derivation, — as frugality, hospitality, dili- 
gence, prudence. 

The faculty of abstraction not only gives rise to words denoting 
abstract qualities, but also to words denoting abstract actions. 
These are chiefly nouns and participles. There is a large class of 
nouns ending in ion which are derived from Latin verbs, and 
which denote the abstract action of those verbs ; such are pro- 
duction, destruction, persuasion, vision, motion, &c. Some of 
these nouns are used not only in the sense of abstract actions, but 
also to denote the effect of the action. Thus, when we say, That 
country is remarkable for the production of corn, we use the word 
production in the sense of abstract action, and might supply its 
place by the present participle producing. But when we say, Corn 
is the chief production of that country, it is used as the name for 
the thing produced, and we could not supply its place by the pre- 
sent participle. These two different senses of the word are in some 
instances expressed by two different words. Thus, the abstract 
action of the word create is denoted by the word creation, and the 
thing created is called a creature. So the word edify means to 
build up ; edification denotes the abstract action of building, and 
the thing built is called an edifice. So, imagine, imagination, image. 

The words formed by abstraction become more numerous as 
society becomes more intellectual. Association belongs to poetry, 
abstraction to philosophy. A poetic imagination grasps at resem- 
blances, and hence brings together ideas that seemed at first to 
have no connexion. It gives life and animation to every thing 
beneath its touch. Its vivid conceptions cannot be expressed in 
ordinary language. New words are formed by combination, or 
words previously formed are applied in new and bold significa- 
tions. But when mankind begin to study mental philosophy, when 
they begin to investigate causes, to trace consequences, and to 
discuss theories, then arise words of abstraction. It .becomes 
necessary to form words that shall express ideas and relations 
remote from common observation. Precision of conception becomes 
necessary ; and to assist precision of conception it is necessary to 
have precision of language. An idea that is to be the subject of 
investigation must be detached from all other ideas with which it 
may be found in combination, and viewed entirely alone. Hence 
arises the necessity of words of abstraction. Thus it is to inven- 
tion, association, and abstraction that we are indebted for the for- 
mation of language. 

While there is nothing more important, there is nothing more 
mysterious than language. How is it that by a single act of 
volition I can form sounds denoting the ideas that may exist in 
my mind ? — that these sounds are carried by the atmosphere to 



380 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 

the ears of my auditors, and awaken in their minds the same 
ideas which exist in my own ? To explain in what mysterious 
manner this is effected is beyond the power of our philosophy. It 
is one of the secrets of nature known only to Him who formed the 
ear and created the mind of man. 

One great advantage which, man has over the other animals 
consists in the power of co-operation. It is by this means that 
the whole community is benefited by the exertions of each indi- 
vidual. This power of co-operation could not exist unless man- 
kind possessed a prompt and perfect mode of communicating their 
ideas to each other. And this ready communication exists only 
by means of language. Language, too, is not merely a channel of 
thought, it is a vehicle of feelings, and by it we are able to impart 
our sentiments in such a way as to impress our emotions on the 
minds of our auditors. By language men are aroused into indig- 
nation or softened into sympathy. Without language we could 
not be enlightened with the instructions of science, or enraptured 
with the beauties of poetry. To this we owe all the pleasures of 
our public assemblies and all the luxuries of social intercourse ; it 
is from this we derive all the happiness we receive from the specu- 
lations of philosophy, the brilliancy of wit, the thunders of elo- 
quence, and the melody of song. 

By the power of language we are enabled to be useful to others. 
"We can instruct the ignorant, caution the unwary, or console the 
afflicted. Of what use is the intense application of the student, 
the conceptions of the poet, or the contemplations of the philo- 
sopher, if the result of their labours is known only to themselves ? 
Thoughts valuable as gold in the mine are of no use to others 
until coined into words. And by imparting information to others, 
our own faculties are improved. Our intellectual weapons are 
kept polished by use. Knowledge shut up in the mind of its 
possessor is like a stagnant pool, useful to none; but when 
allowed to flow out freely in the channels of language, it becomes 
a living fountain, the streams of which carry health and beauty 
and fertility into every district through which they roll. 



INDEX. 



A. 



Absolution, priestly : Mr. Seymour's 

diJemma against, 280. 
Account-book: the advantages of keep- 
ing one, 25S. 

Act of 1844 for Regulating the Cur- 
rency, S3, 87, 344; a sorites respect- 
ing its principles, 284. 

Actions are judged by their motives, 
115, 119. 

Acts of Parliament : their meaning 
fixed by their intention, 117. 

Advantages of the Industrial Exhibi- 
tion, GO, 290, 357. 

Advantages of a measure referred to 
effects, 90. 

Advice to Servants, by Dean Swift, 53. 

Advisers, logical, useful, 16. 

Advocates, logical, useful, 16. 

-<Esop's Fables quoted, 176. 

Age, the logic of, 307. 

Aiken, on "War, quoted, 128, 165. 

Alexander, Dr. : his censure of the 
voluntarians, 89. 

Alexanderthe Great: his character,317. 

Ambiguity of words a source of false 
reasoning, 27, 205. 

America : Law of Partnership in, 88 ; 
universal suffrage in, 159 ; Earl of 
Carlyle's Lecture on, 158; population 
of, 336. 

Amusements : we should be guided by 
reasoning in the choice of, 313 ; les- 
sons taught by chess, 313 ; those con- 
demned by the Society of Friends, 
356. 

Analogy ; reasoning by, 42, 143 ; appli- 
cation of, 144; fallacious analogies, 
161, 213; applied to public conapanies, 
186 ; in an interrogative form, 245. 

Analysis : wherein i t differs from syn- 
thesis, 288. 

Ancients : their festivals, 290 ; com- 
pared with the moderns, 294 ; under- 
stood political economy, 333. 

Anecdotes are arguments, 140 ; collec- 
tions of, 141 ; examples of, 142. 

Animals : knowledge of, derived from 
observation, 78 ; analogy between 
them and human beings, 114, 143, 
257; have we a right to eat them? 
162. 
Anonymous quotations, 125, 215, 244. 
Antecedent and Consequent, the rela- 
tion of, 73, 108. 



Apocrypha : reasons for its rejection, 

197. 
Argumentation : what is it 1 2. 
Arguments addressed to feelings or 

prejudices, 123; do not advance too 

many, 142. 
Argumentum a fortiori: what is it? 

155 ; examples of, 156. 
Argumentum ad hominem: what is it? 

123. 
Aristotle : what Sydney Smith says of 

him, 80. 
Arithmetic: its rules, 47; importance 

of, 363. 
Art of Being Happy, by the Rev. B. H. 

Draper, quoted, 113, 277, 308, 35S. 
Art of Equivocation, 21. 
Art of False Reasoning Exemplified, 

quoted, 201. 
Art of Prolonging Life, 358. 
Art of Reasoning : introduction to, 1 ; 

its name, 2. 
Assembly's Catechism quoted, 353. 
Association of ideas aids the memory, 

13. 
Astronomy: reasoning by analogy ap- 
plied to, 42, 144. 
Atlas newspaper quoted, 92. 
Attributes: reasoning from, 34. 
Author, the, quoted, 293, 313. 



B. 



Bacon, Lord, 76; Sydney Smith, re- 
specting, 80; quoted, 268. 

Bai!ev's Theory of Reasoning quoted, .3, 
7, 31, 40, 41, 56, 67, 130, 207, 275. 

his Questions in Political Econ- 
omy quoted, 80, 115, 120. 

Bank of England, 339. 

Bankers : judge from circumstantial 
evidence, 107 ; Onus probandi re- 
specting, 248 ; dishonourable conduct 
towards, 354. 

Banking : Prize Essay, 54. 

Baptismal Regeneration, 242. 

Barrow's Sermons quoted, 134. 

Bastiat's Popular Fallacies on General 
Interests quoted, 164, 279. 

Baynes : his Essay on Logical Forais 
quoted, 271. 

Beaumont, Lord, quotation from his 
letter, 281. 

Bell, Sir Charles : his remarks on the 
feet, 305. 



382 



INDEX. 



Bell, G. M. : his " Country- Banks and 
the Currency, 339." 

Berkeley's system, 75. 

Bible : Lectures on, by the Rev. T. 
Gilbart, quoted, 60; its evidences, 
193; landmarks, 197; a belief in, 
strengthens the powers of reasoning, 
366. 

Bickersteth,Rev.R.: his speech quoted, 
141 ; his Bible Landmarks quoted, 
197 ; his National Obligations to the 
Bible quoted, 244. 

Bigland's Letters on History 'quoted, 
316, 317, 3i9, 322. 

Blakey's Essay on Logic quoted, 144, 
163, 359. 

his Historv of Moral Science 

quoted, 351, 366. 

Bloomer dress, 304. 

Blum's Undesigned Coincidences, 105, 
317. 

Board of Health, their Report quoted, 
48, 54, 86, 87. 

Books : immoral, none sold at the 
stations of the North- Western Rail- 
way, 254. 

Boswell's Life of Johnson quoted, 258. 

Branches of knowledge should have 
distinct names, 2. 

Brewer's Guide to Science quoted, 49. 

Briggs, Mr., a working millwright, 
his prize essay on the Industrial 
Exhibition quoted, 90. 

Britannia newspaper quoted, 241. 

British Association for the Advance- 
ment of Science, 336, 338. 

British Banner quoted, 92. 

Broumam, Lord, quoted, 59. 

Bull, an example of, 142. 

Bullion's Internal Management of a 
Country Bank, 107. 

Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress quoted, 
218. 

Buxton, Sir Thomas Fowell, his attri- 
butes, i 9 ; his argument from enu- 
meration quoted in his Life by his 
son, 61. 



Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric 
quoted, 5, 270. 

, Lord, Lives of the Chan- 
cellors quoted, 154. 

Canaan, the Land of: its attributes, 33, 
327. 

Capital: its divisions, 54. 

Carlisle, the Earl of, his Lecture on 
America quoted, 158. 

his Speech on the Industrial 

Exhibition quoted,290. 

Case in point: what is it? 136. 

Catechetical way of reasoning, 239. 

Caudle's, Mrs., Lectures ; by Douglas 

. Jerrold, quoted, 52, 153, 308, 310. 



Cause and effect: arguments from, 
may be brought under genus and 
species, 69 ; the relation of, 71 ; 
physical, 71; moral, 80; conditional, 
95; final, 109; fallacies connected 
with, 210 ; connected with history, 
324 ; the relation of, connected with 
statistics, 341 ; of virtues and vices, 
354. 

Chain of reasoning : wherein it differs 
from a series of reasonings, 285. 

Chalmers, Dr., on Political Economy, 
quoted, 81, 86 ; his opinion of Church 
establishments, 81 ; of Ricardo's 
theory of rent, 86 ; adopted the 
Malthusian theory of population, 89, 
332. 

Chances, the doctrine of, 138. 

Charles II. granted a Charter to the 
Royal Society, 77; anecdote of, 78. 

Chartists : their principles, 51. 

Chess, lessons taught by, 313. 

Children, logic to, 308. 

Christian Times quoted, 159, 345. 

Christianity, evidences of, 193. 

Church establishment: its advantages, 
81. 

Circumstantial evidence, 99 ; the prin- 
ciples of. 100 ; employed by theolo- 
gians, 103; Paley's Horas Paulinae, 
ib. ; Blunt's Undesigned Coinci- 
dences, 105 ; application to the ordi- 
nary affairs of life, 106; Scriptural 
instances of, 107 ; final cause an 
item in, 119; illustration of! 120. 

City of London Literary and Scientific 
Institution: its prize essay, 364. 

Civilization, origin of, 122. 

Clarendon, Lord : his attributes, 40. 

Clarke's, Dr. Adam, Commentary on 
the Bible quoted, 214. 

Classification, examples of, 54 ; mental, 
66. 

Classifications of moral duties. 352. 

Clergymen, laws respecting, 187. 

Cobden, Mr. : his opinions on the 
Russian loan, 90 ; his argument 
against war from analogy, 162. 

Colonies, advantages of, 128 ; defended 
by comparison, 154; a source of 
national wealth, 330. 

Commerce : conditions of its prosperity, 
98 ; a source of national wealth, 329. 

Common-sense necessary to reasoning, 
24. 

Company, bad: its effects on the mind, 
125. 

Comparisons, logical, 152 : metaphori- 
cal, reasoning from, 167; by ques- 
tions, 244. 

Conder's Poet of the Sanctuary quoted, 
228. 

Conditional causes, the relation of, 94; 
mode of reasoning from, 95, 264 ; fal- 
lacies connected with, 234. 

Congregational chanting, 297. 



INDEX. 



383 



Consciousness, truths that we know 
by, 6. 

Constantine the Great removed the 
seat of empire, 319. 

Contrast: a principle of reasoning, 158; 
examples of, 1G0 ; used in theology, 
161. 

Controversy not inconsistent with re- 
ligion, 13 ; may sometimes be better 
declined, 249, 300. 

Conversation, compared with reading, 
153; rules of, 255; cause of man's 
superiority over animals, 257 ; with- 
out reasoning, 260. 

Conversational reasoning, 249, 254 ; 
examples of, 258. 

Convocation, the Archbishop of Canter- 
bury's Speech on, 94. 

Country bank notes, 339. 

Court of Chancery, abuses in, 235. 

Courtesy in controversy, 300. 

Courts of Law, evidence in, 99. 

Crime : causes of its increase, 92. 

Criticisms on Logic for the Million, 33, 
81, 160, 255. 

Croly's, Dr., Sermons quoted, 112; on 
Marriage with the Sister of a deceased 
"Wife quoted, 116; National Know- 
ledge, National Power, quoted, 349. 

Cromwell, Oliver: his government, 31S. 

Croxall's yEsop's Fables quoted, 176. 

Cruelty to animals, Lord Erskine's 
speech upon, 124. 

Crystal Palace : its size, 348. 

Cumming's, Dr., Sermon on God in 
Science quoted, 110 ; Lecture on 
Music quoted, 295. 

Curran ; his address to a jury, 241. 



Daily avocations, our reasonings should 
be associated with, 360. 

David : what he did when hungry, 
127, 134. 

Debating societies, 363 ; advantages 
of, 364. 

Debtors, the laws of Moses resDecting, 
320. 

Debts, public : Mr. Burke's dilemma 
against, 280. 

Deduction: what is it? 129. 

Definition: what is it? 25; reasoning 
from, 62 ; errors in reasoning from, 
209. 

Degrees of assent, 198. 

Degrees of rank in heaven, Dr. "Watts 
on, 247. 

Deity, proofs of his existence, 110,224; 
proofs of his goodness, 112, 113. 

Descriptive reasoning, 224, 227 ; the 
principles of reasoning connected 
with, 230 ; how rendered more vivid, 
231 ; in the form of personification, 
232; descriptions of Geo. Robins's, 
232 ; practical application of, 234 : 
erroneous reasoning from, 236. 



De Vericour's Historical Analysis of 
Christian Civilization quoted, 321. 

Dickens'sHousohol d Words quoted,341. 

Diet, the logic of, 308. 

Dilemma: what is it? 276 ; examples 
of, 279 ; Bastiat's in favour of free- 
trade, 279; Burke's against public 
debts, 280; Torrens's against works 
conducted by the Government, 280; 
Say's against Sumptuary Laws, 280; 
Seymour's against Priestly Abso- 
lution, 280 ; Lord Beaumont's against 
Bishops appointed by Borne, 281 ; 
dilemma against Synods, 281 ; in 
favour of the Pursuit of Knowledge, 
281. 

Discontent, reasons against, 244. 

Discoveries that may arise from the 
Industrial Exhibition, 291; in science, 
321. 

Disputation, scholastic, 266, 268. 

Disputes not incompatible with re- 
ligion, 13; are sometimes better 
avoided, 300. 

D'Israeli's Curiosities of Literature 
quoted, 40, 143, 178, 361, 140. 

Dissenters, Dr. Alexander on, 89. 

Distinctions between moral good and 
evil, 351. 

Division, rules of, 45 ; the application 
of, 48. 

Doctnne3 of the Catholic Church : 
tranoubstantiation, 38 ; confession 
and absolurion, 2S0 ; celibacy of the 
clergy, 245 ; baptismal regeneration, 
242; papal hierarchy, 246. 

Doctrines of the Society of Friends, 
on war and oaths, 355 ; on salutations 
and amusements, 356. 

Domestic concerns, great men un- 
happy in, 322. 

Domestic consultation, the logic of, 310. 

Doubting : the ait of, taught by meta- 
physical logic, preface vii. 75. 

Dress, the logic of, 304. 

Drunkenness : its effects, . c 0, 354. 

Duke of Wellington : how proved to be 
mortal according to Mr. Mill, 272. 



Ear] of Liverpool : letter from .the 
author to, 335. 

Early Marriages : evils of, 92. 

Ecclesiastical law : its origin, 1S8. 

Edinburgh Review quoted, 93. 

Education: public and private com- 
pared, 309. 

Effects : modes of reasoning respect- 
ing, 85. 

Effects of national wealth, 330. 

Egypt, Ancient : its characteristics, 
327. 

Electors : numbers and classification 
of, 337. 



384 



INDEX. 



Elijah : his residence at Zarephath,105; 
another reference to, 13S. 

Employments : their effects on the 
mind, 125 

Encyclopaedia Britannica quoted, 144. 

England: superiority of, 244. 

English Gentleman, The, quoted, 311. 

Enthymeme: what is it? 250; examples 
of, 252. 

Enumeration : arguments from, 59 ; of 
the duties of public companies, 352. 

Epichirema : a compound syllogism, 
275, 277. 

Erroneous reasonings of political eco- 
nomists, 68, 121. 

Errors in reasoning, 201 ; from not un- 
derstanding the question, 204; from 
the relation of subject and attribute, 
205 ; from a whole and its parts, 207 ; 
from genus and species, 208 ; from 
cause and effect, 210 ; from examples, 
211 ; from analogy, comparison and 
contrast, 213 ; from parables, fables, 
and proverbs, 214 ; from written do- 
cuments, 214; miscellaneous errors, 
216. 

Erskine,- Lord: his speech quoted on 
cruelty to animals, 124. 

Evidence of our sense : can we believe 
it ? 75. 

Examples, good, to be imitated, 133. 

Examples : mode of reasoning from, 
127 ; exemplified from Scripture, 132 ; 
differ from fables, 172 ; fallacies con- 
nected with, 211. 

Exeter, Bishop of: his trial with the 
Rev. Mr. Gorham, 189. 

Exhibition, the Great : Banking Prize 
Essays in connexion with, 54 ; Lord 
Overstone's speech on, 61; PrizeEssay, 
by the Rev. Mr. Whish, 81, 154, 357 ; 
Prize Essay, by a working millwright, 
on, 90 ; speech of the Earl of Carlisle 
on, 290 ; article from the Times on, 
292; statistics of, 348; Moral effects 
of, 357,. 

Experience the test of truth, 300. 

Extensive empires, advantages of, 322. 

Eye : a description of, 224. 



Fables: reasoning from, 170; Lessing's, 

173; jEsop's, 176. 
Facility of intercourse ; beneficial 

effects of, 88. 
Fallacies : with regard to moral causes 

and effects, 90 ; of various kinds, 204; 

of reasoning from description, 236 ; 

in statistics, 343. 
False induction: example of, 212. 
Female servants : education of, 310. , 
Festivals, ancient, 290. 
Fielding's Select Proverbs quoted, 178. 
Figurative language : effect of analogy, 

150. 



Final cause and effect : the relation of, 
109 ; application of, to natural theo- 
logy;, 110; to the divine attributes, 
112 ;' to the human mind, 113 ; to the 
animal creation, 114; to moral ac- 
tions; 115; the design of legislators, 
116; the interpretation of the law, 
117; in judicial cases, 118; in cir- 
cumstantial evidence, 119; in politi- 
cal economy, 121 ; to the feelings of 
the mind, 122 ; effects of training 
on the mind, 124 ; the ordinary af- 
fairs of life, 125 ; fallacies connected 
with, 211. 

Fletcher's Lectures on the Roman 
Catholic Religion quoted, 242, 246. 

Follett, Sir William : his clear reason- 
ings, 360. 

Forced interpretation, 214. 

Forgery of the Old Testament : dis- 
proved by a trilemma, 283. 

Forms of reasoning, 221, 274. 

France : law of partnership in, 88. 

Francis, St. : his Equivocation, 220. 

Franklyn, Dr. : his mode of reasoning, 
44; anecdote of, 215 ; his Poor 
Richard's Almanack quoted, 182. 

Free-Trade and its so-called Sophisms 
quoted, 84. 

Friendship : outlines of a theme on, 
289. 

Fugitive slave-bill in America: an a 
fortiori argument respecting, 157; 
description of a capture, 231. 

Fundholders: numbers and classifica- 
tion of, 343. 



Garden supplies examples for classifi- 
cation, 66. 

General principles : their application 
to particular cases, 57, 137 ; misap- 
plication of, 208; application of in 
political economy, 331 ; in moral 
philosophy, 355. 

General theories should not be raised 
on a small number of particulars, 
130, 211. 

Gentleman: what forms one, 311. 

Genus and species: the relation of, 
53; rules for dividing, 55 ; mode of 
reasoning from, 56, 130; errors in 
reasoning from, 63, 208; in statis- 
tics, 343; in morals, S53. 

Giddings, J. R. of America : his speech 
on slavery quoted, 157. 

Gilbart J. W. : his prize for a Banking 
Essay in connexion with the Great 
Exhibition, 54. 

his Practical Treatise on 

Banking quoted, 57, 107, 145, 299, 
339, 352. 

his Lectures on Ancient Com- 



merce quoted, 72, 98, 125, 135, 243, 
281, 327, 354, 355. 



INDEX. 



385 



Gilbart J. W.: his Lecture on the Philo- 
sophy of Language quoted, 150, 258. 

Gilbart, Rev. Thomas : his Lectures 
on the Bible quoted, 60. 

Gilfillan's Bards of the Bible quoted, 
283. 

Goodwill of other people : how to ob- 
tain, 126. 

Gorham, Rev. Mr. : his trial with the 
Bishop of Exeter, 189. 

Grammar compared with Logic, 4 ; sub- 
stantives and adjectives compared 
with subject and attribute, 31. 

Guilt; indications of, 100. 

GuyFawkes's Indictment quoted, 156. 

H. 

Habit, the effect of, 135. 

Habits, good: the source of happiness, 
277 ; man has the power of forming 
them, 278 ; of reasoning, how formed, 
357. 

Hall's Book of the Feet quoted, 305. 

Hallam's Literature of Europe quoted, 
270. 

Hamilton, Dr. : his sermon on Early 
Closing quoted, 97, 231. 

Sir William : his new ana- 
lytic, 271. 

Health necessary to reasoning well, 
357 ; effects of certain studies upon, 
358. 

Health of mind; how promoted, 359. 

Henry, Rev. Matthew: quoted, 139. 

Hill, Rev. Rowland: Sherman's Anec- 
dotes of, 38, 82 ; Southey's description 
of, 226. 

Hill's Logic quoted, 131, 252. 

Historians, philosophical, 139. 

Historical evidence, 229. 

History: mode of writing, 216, 316; 
logic applied to, 313; political eco- 
nomy founded on, 325 ; the philosophy 
of, 315. 

Holt, Judge : Lord Campbell's charac- 
ter of, in his Lives of the Lord Chan- 
cellors, 154. 

Homoeopathy : must be proved by ex- 
periment, not by reasoning, 79. 

Honourable man ; a merchant should 
be one, 354. 

Horae faulinae of Paley, quotations 
from, 103. 

Human body : is an animal, 79. 

Husband: logical, is useful, 15. 

Huyshe, Rev. John : his Logic quoted, 
250. 

I. 

Ignorantia elenc'hi: what is it? 204. 
Illicit process: what is it? 207. 
Imagination is restrained by reasoning, 

14, 359. 
Independence of mind : what it implies, 

19. 



Induction: what is it? 129; explained 
by Mr. Hill, 131. 

Industrial Exhihition : Lord Overstone 
on. 61 ; Rev. Mr. Whish on, 81, 154, 
357 ; a working man's essay on, 90; 
the Earl of Carlisle on, 290, 

Industry: the cause of distinction. 128; 
the cause of wealth, 328 ; of a gentle- 
man, 134. 

Intellect: truths of, 6. 

Internal evidences of the Divine in- 
spiration of the Scriptures, 194. 

Interpretation : rules of, in regard to 
legal instruments, 191; of the Holy 
Scriptures, 200. 

Interrogative reasoning, 237. 

Ireland, Lord-Lieutenancy of: effects 
of its abolition, 93; population of, 
335 ; circulation of. 340. 



Johnson's Lectures to Yonng Men, 126. 

Joint responsibility of a Board of Man- 
agers implies the personal responsi- 
bility of its individual members, 52. 

Joint Stock Banks, 88 ; their attributes, 
41; laws respecting them, 185; how 
affected by the Law of Evidence Bill, 
188. 

Joyce's Catechism of Nature quoted, 72. 

Judicial Committee of Privy Council : 
their decision in the case of Gorham 
v. the Bishop of Exeter, 189. 

Judicial proceedings : evidence in, 49. 



K. 



Knight's Half-hours with the Best 

Authors quoted, 134, 260. 
Knowledge: necessary to reasoning, 

24 ; a dilemma respecting, 281. 



Labour ; evil of its abolition, 88. 

Land of Canaan : its physical attri- 
butes, 33, 327. 

Landlords : their rights and duties, 92. 

Language, clear: necessary to reason- 
ing, 27 ; formed by analogy, 150 ; 
rules for acquiring good, 222 ; means 
of co-operation, 257 ; origin of, 259. 

Laughing Philosopher quoted, 142. 

Law of Evidence Bill : how it affects 
Joint Stock Banks, 188. 

Law Reform, 235. 

Laws of the currency, 339. 

Learning any new thing : how to do it, 
228. 

Lectures quoted : on the Holy Bible; 
60; on Ancient Commerce, 72, &c. , 
on God in Science, 110; on the Phi- 
losophy of Languge, 150, 258 ; on the 
Internal Evidences of the Sacred 
Scripture, 194; on the National Obli- 



386 



INDEX, 



gations to the Bible, 244; on Music, 
295 ; on Congregational Chanting, 
297; on the Philosophy of History, 
313 ; on Oliver Cromwell, 318 ; on 
systematic morality, 349. 

Legal argumentation : the principle of 
analogy applied to, 146. 

Lessing's Fables quoted, 1 73. 

Literary Characteristics of the Bible 
quoted, 179, 199. 

Literary Institutions : their effects, 245, 
364. 

Literary World of New York quoted, 
118, 307. 

Locke on the Human Understanding 
quoted, 26S. 

Logic : definition of, 3 ; compared with 
grammar, 4. 

Loose definitions : reasoning from, 209. 

Love of truth necessary to sound reason- 
ing, 18. 

Lysson's iEsop's Fables quoted, 177. 



M. 



Macaulay's History of England quoted, 

139, 159. 
McCulloch, Mr. : his dispute with 

Malthus, 66 ; his Analogies, 147. 
his Political Economy 

quoted, 109, 331. 
his Statistical Account 



of the British Empire quoted, 188. 
Macculloch'S; Dr., Literary Character- 
istics of the Holy Scriptures quoted, 

179, 199. 
Macnish's Anatomy of Drunkenness 

quoted, 354. 
Malthus, his dispute with Macculloch, 

66; his theory of population, 89, 332. 
Man's power over himself to prevent 

or control Insanity quoted, 14. 
Manner: influence of, 21. 
Manufactures a source of national 

wealth, 230. 
Marcet,Mrs.: Conversations on Political 

Economy quoted, 50, 88, 135, 325; 

her Willy's Grammar quoted, 240. 
Marriage: the logic of, 306. 
Marriage with the sister of a deceased 

wife, 165. 
Martin, Rev. S. Lecture on Money 

quoted, 42. 
Master, logical : useful, 15. 
Mathematical reasoning, 47, 285, 362. 
Mayo's Philosophy of Living quoted, 

313. 
Medicine, its character as a science, 

78, 79. 
Melvill, Rev. H. : his sermon quoted, 

300. 
Memory strengthened by the art of 

reasoning, 13. 
Mental independence should be culti- 
vated, 19. 
Mental reservation, 219. 



Metaphors are not arguments, 164. 
Mill's Logic quoted, 31, 75, 180, 208, 

212, 213, 272. 
Mind : its powers, 5. 
Modern civilization : the permanency 

of, 293. 
Money, metallic : its attributes, 42 ; 
effects of its increase, 30; evils of its 
abolition, 89. 
Moral cause and effect: the relation 
of, 78, 80 ; examples of, 81 ; modes of 
reasoning from this relation, 82 ; dif- 
ficulty in proving that a specific 
cause does produce a specific effect, 
83 ; public measures are usually 
judged by their effects, 85; sometimes 
effects are put for causes, 85; the 
same cause does not always produce 
the same effect, 87 ; the reductio ad 
absurdam, or pointing out the absurd 
effects, 88 ; proving too much, 90 ; ad- 
vantages and disadvantages of pro- 
posed measures are referred to cause 
and effect, 90; effects of early mar- 
riages, 92; causes of the increase of 
crime, 92; effects of the Lord Lieu- 
tenancy of Ireland, 93 ; probable 
effects of a convocation, 94; fallacies 
connected with cause and effect, 210. 

Moral habits a source of wealth, 328. 

Moral philosophy : application of logic 
to, 349. 

Moral principle connected with sound 
reasoning, 365. 

Moral reasonings: the principle of ana- 
logy applied to, 145. 

Moral truths proved to exist, 349. 

Morality of actions consists in their 
motives, 115. 

Morning Chronicle quoted, 234, 345. 

Morning Herald quoted, 281. 

Mosaic code of law: its spirit, 116; 
writings, authenticity of, 317. 

Moses : allowed interest for money, 39; 
the spirit of his laws, 116; respecting 
debt, 320. 

Motives to actions,'' 109 ; form the 
morality of actions, 115; inferred 
from the actions, 119, 125 ; fallacy of 
assigning wrong motives, 211. 

Mottram's prize essay on Institutional 
Education quoted, 364. 

Multiplication : application of, 48, 336. 

Munro's Manual of Logic quoted, 39. 

Music : advantages of, 295. 



N. 



Names have no necessary connexion 

with things, 2. 
Napoleon Buonaparte, 8, 13, 173, 216. 
Narratives, 227. 
National debt Mr. Burke's dilemma 

on, 280. 
National wealth: its nature, 327; its 

causes, 327; its effects, 330. 



INDEX. 



387 



Natural philosophy, 73 ; errors in, 74. 

Natural theology, 110, 112. 

Nature : how we reason respecting, 73 ; 

, uniformity of its laws the founda- 
tion of induction, 129. 

Narigation Laws, 87. 

New York Independent quoted, 231. 

Newspapers, London : the number of 
square feet they measure, 341. 

Newton, Sir Isaac: his attributes, 39, 

321. 
. Newton, Rev. John : his defence of 
forms of prayer, 150. 

Nicholls on the Book of Proverbs 
quoted, 181. 

Nile : its overflowing, 72. 

Nonconformist quoted, 235. 



Oaths : Curran upon, 241 ; the opinions 
of the Quakers respecting, 355. 

Observation and experiment : their 
province, 76, 78. 

Oliver Cromwell : established the Navi- 
gation Act, 88. 

Onusprobandi: what is it? 248. 

Oral traditions : why rejected, 197. 

Overstone, Lord : his speech in favour 
of the Industrial Exhibition, 61. 



P. 



Paley's Horae Paulinae quoted, 103. 
■ Moral Philosophy quoted, 143, 

146, 162, 352. 

Natural Theology quoted, 224. 

Parables, reasoning from, 166, 168; 

fallacies connected with, 214. 
Partnerships era commandite, 88. 
Paul, St. : his attributes, 33 ; his letters 

to Timothy, 103; his cloak, 104. 
Peel, Sir Robert: his attributes, 39; 

his trilemma, 282. 
Personal descriptions, 225. 
Petitio principii: what is it? 204. 
Philosophy of History, 313. 
Physical causes and effects : the rela- 
tion of, 71 ; modes of reasoning from, 

72 ; errors in reasoning from, 74 ; 

physical attributes of a country a 

source of its wealth, 327. 
Pictorial Bible quoted, 320. 
Places : description of, 235. 
Political economy, 50; its character as 

a science, 78; analogy employed in, 

147; application of logic to, 325. 
Political economists : their mode of 

reasoning, 68, 121. 
Politicalinstitutions a source of national 

wealth, 328. 
Politics: its character as a science, 78. 
Poetry, immoral, Dr. Watts on, 246. 
Polygamy : an a fortiori argument 

against, 156. 



Population of Great Britain and Ire- 
land, 335 ; of the United States of 
America, 336. 

Port Royal Logic quoted, 41, 269. 

Porter, G. R., author of the Progress of 
the Nation: his statistics ouoted, 
336, 338. 

translator of Bastiat, 164, 

279. 

Porteua's Summary of Christian Evi- 
dence quoted, 193. 

Power of man to prevent or control 
insanity, 14; his power over his own 
habits, 278. 

Prayer: forms of, defended by analogy, 
150. 

Prayer Book quoted, 109. 

Principles of reasoning : what are they? 
30. 

Prize essays on the Industrial Exhi- 
bition, 54, 81,90, 154, 357; on Literary 
Institutions, 364. 

Property: the evils that would result 
from its abolition, 88. 

Proposition : what is it? 26. 

Prosyllogism, a compound syllogism, 
276, 284. 

Protective system: historical defence 
of, 84. 

Protestant and Catholic states con- 
trasted, 159. 

Proverbs: their application, 58; Solo- 
mon's, 152 ; reasoning from, 166, 
178; Fielding's collection of, 178; 
Dr. Macculloch on do., 179 ; Nicholls 
on Solomon's, 181 ; Dr. Franklin's 
application of, 182; fallacies con- 
nected with, 214. 

Proving too much, 90. 

Public bodies : logical advisers useful 
to, 16 ; Responsibility of their man 
agers, 52. 

Public companies : laws respecting, 186; 
their moral duties, 145, 299, 352. 

Public measures: how they are»judged, 
85. 

Public works: Colonel Torrens' dilemma 
against their construction by the 
government, 280. 

Pun : an example of, 142. 

Punch: its representations founded on 
analogy, 152. 

Punishment: the end of, 120. 

Puseyism: the observances of, 51. 



Quakers: their opinions on war and 
oaths, 355 ; on salutations and amuse- 
ments, 356. 

Questions, reasoning by, 237. 

Questions on Political Economy, &c, 
for Discussion in Literary Societies, 
by Samuel Bailey, quoted, 80, 115, 
120. 



388 



INDEX. 



Raffles's Lecture to Young Men quoted, 
195 

Rail, Literature of the, quoted, 254. 

Railways : special trains, 36 ; advan- 
tages of free intercourse between 
different parts of a country, 81 ; books 
sold at the stations, 254 ; how affected 
by the Great Exhibition, 292. 

Reading compared with conversation, 
153. 

Reasoning : what is it ? 2 ; subjects of, 
7 ; utility of, 10 ; principles of, 30 ; 
forms of, 221 ; applications of, 303. 

Reductio ad absurdam : what is it ? 88; 
examples of, 76, 88. 

Relations are the foundation of reason- 
ing, 30. 

Religion, logical advocates useful to, 
16. 

Religion, revealed, the evidence of 
appeals to our senses, 76. 

Rent : are high rents the cause of high 
price of corn ? 86 ; Dr. Chalmers's 
opinion of the Ricardo theory, 86. 

Responsibility of employers quoted, 
110, 309. 

Restrictive laws, Monsieur Bastiat's 
dilemma respecting, 279. 

Resurrection of the dead proved by a 
Sorites, 284. 

Retiring from trade, objections to, 243. 

Rights between different species of 
animals are not the same as rights 
between the individuals of the same 
species; men may have a right to 
eat fish, though theyhave no right to 
eat one another, 162. 

Robins, George: his descriptions; 232. 

Robinson's Notes to Claude's Essay 
on the Composition of a Sermon, 
quoted, 13, 138, 161, 200. 

Rogue: the way to become one, 125. 

Rothschild, Baron, took part of an 
oath, 51. 

Royal Society : the formation of, 76 ; 
its charter, 77. 

Rules : their application, 58; of inter- 
pretation of the Holy Scriptures, 200. 

Russell, Lord John : his letter to the 
Bishop of Durham quoted, 51. 



S. 



Sabbath-day was made for man, 128 ; 

the conduct of Nehemiah respecting, 

132. 
Sabertash's Art of Conversation quoted, 

255. 
Salutations, of the Society of Friends, 

356. 
Sam Slick quoted, 128, 154, 306. 
Satire often the language of analogy, 

151 ; used in Scripture, 152. 



Saul, King of Israel, obeyed part of a 
command, 52 ; convicted by circum- 
stantial evidence, 108. 

Savage state, not the original state of 
mankind, 122. 

Scholastic disputation, 275. 

Scholastic logic : refers only to words, 
71 ; its defects, 275. 

Scotland, statistics respecting, 340. 

Scripture, sacred, instance of satire in, 
152; reasonings respecting, 193. 

Self-imposed taxes, 336. 

Senses, truths that we know by the, 6. 

Senses, the evidence of our : can we 
believe it? 75. 

Sermons quoted : Mr. Gilbart's, 60 ; 
Dr. Croly's, 112; Mr. Bickersteth's, 
197 ; Mr. Melvill's, 300. 

Servants, female : the education of, 
310. 

Servants, logical, are useful, 15 ; Dean 
Swift's advice to, 53 ; logic to, 309. 

Seymour : Mornings with the Jesuits 
quoted, 245, 280. » 

Shaftesbury, Earl of: his speech on 
lodging-houses quoted, 96. 

Shakspeare quoted, 2. 

Sherman's Anecdotes of Rowland Hill 
quoted, 38, 82, 226. 

Shopkeepers in London : how affected 
by the Great Exhibition, 292. 

Smart's Logic quoted, 288. 

Smith Rev. J. D. : his lecture on Crom- 
well quoted, 318. 

Rev. Sydney: his Sketches of 

Moral Philosophy, 13, 80, 114, 128, 
142, 143, 153, 245, 257 ; anecdotes 
from, 142. 

Soap, reasons against the tax on, 234. 

Social institutions a source of national 
wealth, 329. 

Social intercourse, the logic of, 311. 

Social responsibility, 299. 

Socratical way of reasoning, 238. 

Sophisms of Free-trade, by a Barrister, 
quoted, 84. 

Sorites : a compound syllogism, 277, 
284; applied to prove the resurrec- 
tion of the dead, 284 ; to the laws of 
the currency, 284; to mathematics, 
285. 

Southey's Life of Wesley quoted, 226, 
269 ; his description ofRowland Hill, 
226 ; his Life of Dr. Watts quoted, 
247. 

Sporting, argument for, 115. 

Statistical Companion quoted, 337, 343. 

Society of London : their 

Report quoted, 334. 

Statements: population of 

Great Britain and Ireland, 335 ; of 
the United States of America, 336; 
the consumption of brandy, beer, 
and tobacco, 336 ; number of electors 
for Members of Parliament, 337 ; 
the increase of wealth among the 



INDEX 



389 



middle classes, 338 ; the monthly 
circulation of "Bank 'Notes, 339 ; the 
London newspapers, 341 ; the number 
and classification of fundholders, 343; 
the size of the Crystal Palace, 348; 
the number, of persons who attended 
the Great Exhibition, 348. 

.Statistics application of logic to, 334; 
nature of the Science, 334; its im- 
portance, 334; its operations, 336; its 
principles, 337 ; its fallacies, 346. 

Statute Law, reasoning from, 185. 

Subject and attribute : the relation of, 
31 ; arguments from may be brought 
under genus and species, 68; falla- 
cies connected with, 205. 

Suburbs of London, comparison of, 
153. 

Summary of the Evidences of the 
Christian Religion, 193. 

Sumner, Dr. Archbishop of Canterbury, 
quoted, 38 ; his opinion of a convo- 
cation, 94. 

Sumptuary Laws, Monsieur Say's di- 
lemma against, 280. 

Swift, Dean : his Advice to Servants 
quoted, 53; his satire, 151 ; his Tale 
of a Tub quoted, 214. 

Syllogism single, 261; simple, 262; 
complex, 262; conjunctive, 263. 

compound, 275 ; epichirema, 

275,277; dilemma, 276, 279; tri- 
lemma, 282 ; prosyllogism, 276, 284 : 
sorites, 277, 284. 

Syllogistic reasoning : Lord Bacon on, 
268 ; Mr. Hallam, 268 ; Locke, 268 ; 
Dr. Watts on, 269 ; Dr. Campbell, 
270; Dr. Whately, 270 ; Sir W. Ha- 
milton, 271; Mr. Mill, 272; the 
Author, 56, 71, 273. 

Synthesis : wherein it differs from ana- 
lysis, 288. 

System to be observed in study, 326. 



Tales, reasoning from, 166. 

Taxes on soap, 234. 

Taylor's Statesman quoted, 366. 

Tenterden steeple and Goodwin sands, 
83. 

Testimony, truths of, 7. 

Texts, preached from analogically, 149. 

Themes, rules for writing, 288. 

Theology, the principle of analogy 
employed in, 1 47. 

Times newspaper quoted, 189, 209, 
233, 254, 292. 

Timeserving in religion, 218. 

Timothy, his parentage and infirmi- 
ties, 103. 

Tradesman's parable against undersel- 
ling, 170. 

Traditions of the elders, an argument 
respecting, 137. 

Training, its effects, 79. 



Tribute : a metaphor used as an argu- 
ment, 164. 

Trilemma, what is it? 282 ; Sir Robert 
Peel's, 282; one respecting wages, 
282; in defence of the Old Testament, 
283. 

Trueman on Food quoted, 49. 

Truths, classes of, that we know with- 
out reasoning, 5 ; new, how disco- 
vered, 337. 



Underselling, argument against, from 
a parable, 170. 

Understanding the question: false rea- 
sonings from not doing so, 204. 

Undistributed Middle : what is it, 207. 

Universal Suffrage, 159. 

Universality : difference between a ma- 
thematical, physical, and moral, 67. 

Universe, the: a trilemma respecting, 
288. 

Utility of the art of reasoning, 10. 



V. 

Variety of studies recommended, 361. 

Verbal quibbling, 215. 

Verbal analogies, reasoning from, 164. 

Virgil: his character as a poet, 40. 

Voluble lady, 260. 

Voluntaryism, Dr. Alexander on, 89. 



W. 



Wages, payment in goods : a dilemma 
against, 280 ; how regulated, 282. 

War, arguments in defence of, 165 ; 
opinion of Quakers respecting, 355. 

War-horse : a description of, 227. 

Wars diminished by the invention of 
fire-arms, 128. 

Water, lime in different kinds of, 54; 
how essential to health, 86, 87. 

Watts, Dr. : his Life by Conder quoted, 
228 ; his life by Southey quoted, 247. 

■ his Logic quoted, 2, 6, 18, 25, 

45, 55, 56, 66, 67, 73, 74, 123, 203, 204, 
205, 206, 207, 210, 211, 261, 269, 275. 

his Improvement of the Mind 

quoted, 119, 123, 130, 138, 19S, 212, 
222,228,238, 266, 326. 

his preface to his Lyric Poems 

quoted, 246. 

his preface to his Scripture His- 
tory quoted, 323. 

Wayland's Elements of Moral Science 
quoted, 115, 350. 

Wealth, the science that treats of, is 
called political economy, 325 ; its 
nature, 327 ; its causes, 327; its effects, 
330; ill-gotten, its effects, 355. 

Webster, Dr., hanged at Boston for the 
murder of Dr. Parkman, 118. 



390 



INDEX. 



Weld's History of the Royal Society- 
quoted, 76, 77 ; his Statistical Com- 
panion quoted, 337, 343. 

Wesley, John, at Oxford : his skill in 
logic, 226, 267. 

Whately, Dr., Archbishop of Dublin, 
usually reasons by analogy, 164. 

his Logic quoted, 270. 

his Easy Lessons on Money 

Matters quoted, 89, 135, 147, 283. 

his Historic Doubts about 



Napoleon Buonaparte quoted, 216. 
Whewell, Dr. : his opinion of Mr. 

Mill's theory of the syllogism, 272 ; 

his Lectures on Systematic Morality 

quoted, 349. 
Whish, Rev. J. C. : his Prize Essay on 

the Great Exhibition quoted, 81, 154, 

357. 
Whole Art of Dress quoted, 304. 



Whole and its parts : the relation of, a 
principle of reasoning, 45, 336; fal- 
lacies connected with, 207. 

Wife: logical, is useful, 15. 

Wilks, Rev. Matthew: his texts, 149. 

Wills's Principles of Circumstantial 
Evidence quoted, 99, 119. 

Winds : benefits arising from, 72. 

Wisdom is associated with goodness, 
366. 

Wit, example of, 142; usually asso- 
ciated with logic, 151. 

Words, caution in the choice of, 27, 67. 

Written documents, reasoning from, 
184; fallacies connected with, 214. 

Y. 

Young's Paraphrase on the Book of 
Job quoted, 236, 237. 



THE END. 






E. CLAT, PRINTER, BREAD STREET HlUt 



Merits pMisIj^ h % smw ^u%r. 



i. 

A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON BANKING. 

Fifth Edition. 2 vols. 8vo. Price 24s. 

" A very clear explanation of the principles on which the business of Banking 
must be conducted." — Banker's Magazine. 

" Mr. Gilbart's works on Banking have attained a just celebrity. Suitable to 
the wants of the Banking and Mercantile community. For statesmen and 
political economists, they are sources of much useful and even indispensable 
information." — Economist. 

"These two volumes will prove highly interesting to all classes of readers, and 
inculcate a useful knowledge of the monetary system of the British empire. It 
is an excellent and informing work, in a clear and straightforward style." — United 
Service Gazette. 

II. 

THE HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF BANKING. 

Third Edition. Price 9?. 

"Combining a clear appreciation of the science of Banking with the best 
practical knowledge of his business, we have seen no work on the subject which 
better deserves to be consulted and studied than Mr. Gilbart's volume." — Literary 
Gazette. 

"Mr. Gilbart claims for his book that it is a scientific work, written by a 
practical man. His claims appear to be fully borne out by the perspicuity of his 
views, and the analytical spirit in which he treats the subject. He is fully master 
of the details, and ascends with equal ease to the examination of the elementary 
principles." — Atlas. 

" A more complete and accurate work, with less irrelevant matter, we never 
read." — Gentleman's Magazine. 

III. 

LECTURES ON THE HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF 
ANCIENT COMMERCE. 

New Edition. Price 2*. 6d. 

" Thousands of young men who have not had the opportunity of consulting the 
writers of Greece and Rome, will find a variety of carious facts recorded in these 
pages, which cannot fail to afford amusement to those who seek no higher 
gratification ; while those who desire to be instructed will find the philosophy of 
the comments on past transactions well adapted to discipline and enlarge their 
reflective faculties. The style of Mr. Gilbart is pure and simple ; but there are 
many indications of his capacity to rise to the elevation of the loftiest elo- 
quence." — Douglas Jerr old's Weekly Newspaper, now the Weekly News. 

" Mr. Gilbart has evidently studied his subject. He writes forcibly and well, 
and has collected together a mass of useful information, well digested and lucidly 
arranged. The preface contains this suggestion, namely, that public lectureships 
should be established by the Government in any general system of nationa 1 
education. We do not believe that such a system would be found to operate 
beneficially ; but if we could be assured that all the lectures would be as meri- 
torious as those now before us, then our objection, to a great extent, would be 
removed." — Morning Post. 

" We must testify our very high admiration of this work. As a piece of author- 
ship it is very superior; clearly, strongly, convincingly written, abounding in 
valuable facts and just principles, and pervaded by a fine spirit of generous 
philanthropy. It were well to have such lectures as these delivered in every 
part of the iand." — British Banner. 



391 



IV. 

THE ELEMENTS OF BANKING ; WITH TEN MINUTES* 
ADVICE ABOUT KEEPING A BANKER 

Price 2s. 6d. 
"Chiefly composed of selections from the Author's larger work, entitled, 'A 
Practical Treatise on Banking,' and designed as a handbook of general principles 
for the information of those who desire a knowledge of them in a small compass. 
It explains the general administration of Private and Joint-Stock Banks, as 'well 
as of the national institutions for England, Ireland, and Scotland. The concluding 
advice will be found of much practical value/'— Smith, Elder # Co.'s Literary 
Circular. 

V. 

LOGIC FOR THE YOUNG ; 

Consisting of Twenty^five Lessons in the Art of Reasoning, selected from the 
Logic of Dr. Watts. Price Is. 
" This is as good a shilling's worth of instructive reading as one can easily 
meet with. The work is not an abridgment, but consists of selections from Dr. 
Watts's Logic, given for the most part in his own words, and so as to present a 
complete system, though in a brief and condensed form. Dr. "Watts's faculty 
for communicating instruction to the you:,g has rarely been equalled. Of his 
original work, Mr. Gilbart remarks : ' The Logic of Dr. Watts was not only 
received into both our Universities, but, for above a century, was a great favourite 
with the public. No other work on the subject ever obtained so extensive a cir- 
culation.' Mr. Gilbart has shown himself, in his own works, well qualified for 
the office of a public instructor ; but we think he has done wisely and well in 
drawing on these old and neglected treasures. It is pleasant to see the venerabl. 
Doctor thus enabled to resume his labours among the youth of a new generation. 
We wish him a hearty welcome in his new dress, and cordially commend this 
clear and brief compendium to instructors of youth."— Patriot, April 12, 1855. 



Preparing for Publication, by the same Author, 

THE LOGIC OF BANKING; 

OK, 

THE PRINCIPLES OF REASONING APPLIED TO THE ART AND 
THE SCIENCE OF BANKING. 



Preparing for Publication, dedicated to James William Gilbart, Esq. F.R.S. 
General Manager of the London and Westminster Bank, 

A DICTIONARY OF BANKING, 

By G. M. Bell, Author of the " Philosophy of Joint-Stock Banking," &c. 

This work has been for some time in preparation, and is now nearly completed. 
It is proposed to be published by subscription, and will be put to press as soon as 
a sufficient number of subscribers is obtained. T+ "'ill comprise a full and com- 
prehensive account of the Laws, Principles . i.<*uuce of Banking ; Biogra- 
phical Notices of persons who have dis . med themselves as Writers, 
Legislators, or Witnesses on Banking Affans ; the State of Banking in various 
parts of the World ; with a description of the different Banks in the United 
Kingdom, aud of the towns in which they are situated. It will also contain 
Notices of all matters relating to Banking as a Science, as well as an Art; in- 
formation as to the Investment of money ; the discoveries of the precious metals 
in Australia, California, and other parts of the world; the Rules and Regulations 
of the Stock Exchange and the Money Market, and explanations of Legal, Com- 
mercial, and Technical Terms connected with the general business of Banking. 

*** A List of Subscribers' Names will be published at the end of the Work. 
Price to Subscribers, 30s. ; to Non-subscribers, 21. 2s. 














><*V 




<;', aV 



> ^ 



V ■% ? 






Oo. 







,^% 






\u 



o X 



>> "V. 













-/• * m * ^ 

^V - - 

^' <V Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process 









c, s> Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
"- Treatment Date: Sept. 2004 



c° 



"oo^ 



PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 

1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 16066 
(724)779-2111 










o o 



/ V* V V / ' 



^ % 



^ 



,-fc° 



k 0o 







.^ :V ^% 




.^ ^. ^^ > x , ' 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




■Bill 

IIS 11151 i! 



W wfflfflm Eta 



